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Abstract 
 
The study of corporate risk disclosure is an emerging area and the work that has been 
done to date focuses on largely developed markets. This study aims to address the gap in 
the current disclosure literature by examining risk disclosure in an emerging market (the 
UAE). The study aims to extend our understanding of risk disclosure practice and 
determinants. The study interprets the subject matter of risk disclosure in the light of 
certain disclosure theories. The research methodology design uses a mixed method 
approach. The first methodology was qualitative method through semi-structured 
interviews with 22 people. The grounded theory approach was applied in order to analyse 
the interviews. The second method was a quantitative approach based on content analysis 
and regression analysis for 48 non-financial companies over three years (2007, 2008 and 
2009).  
 
The study found that there was considerable variation in risk disclosure level by UAE 
listed companies. The findings suggested that the companies‟ managers do not provide a 
full picture of companies‟ risks suggesting enhancement of regulation with more detailed 
rules and requirements on risk disclosure.  The research found that IFRS risk disclosure 
requirements have an important influence on the risk disclosure level especially financial 
risks. The results show that there is a positive association between risk disclosure and 
firm size and auditor type. The findings suggest mixed results on the association between 
risk disclosure and company performance, liquidity, risk level and industry type.  
 
The results confirm that risk disclosure is positively correlated with the presence of audit 
committee, reporting the internal control system and risk management system, whereas 
there was a negative association with duality. The results show that ownership structure 
has significant influence on the risk disclosure level. There were mixed results on the 
association between risk disclosure level and board size, non-executive and independent 
directors. The analysis of the research would be in the interests of shareholders, 
regulators, accounting setters, managers and stakeholders who focus on disclosure and 
corporate governance.  
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1.0 Introduction 
 
In recent years there have been several high profit corporate failures (e.g. Enron), 
financial crises (e.g. Global financial crisis) and economic scandals which have 
emphasised the importance of transparency and the need for strong corporate governance. 
Accounting irregularities involving companies such as Enron turned the spotlight on 
companies‟ risks and questioned the reliability of companies‟ accounting and financial 
reporting systems, especially annual reports (Linsley and Shrives, 2005), and the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms and disclosure.  
 
This study focuses on corporate disclosure of information on risks in a developing capital 
market (the UAE). The mainstream literature on risk disclosure suggests that 
shareholders and stakeholders receive little information about companies‟ risks and how 
the directors measure and manage those risks. Various users are demanding more risk 
disclosure in terms of quantity and quality. This has led to calls by academics, 
accountancy bodies and regulatory agencies for enhanced disclosure of risks, risk 
management and corporate governance.  
 
This thesis examines corporate risk disclosure theoretically and empirically in the context 
of UAE public companies. This research investigates risk disclosure volume, types, 
nature, time-frame and news-type. Then the study examines whether mandatory risk 
disclosure requirements or voluntary risk disclosure is suited to the UAE case. In 
addition, the thesis examines the factors dominating risk disclosure practice in the UAE, 
for example International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). A further determinant of 
risk disclosure examined in this study is corporate governance. The study investigates 
whether a relationship exists between some firm specific characteristics, for example firm 
size, performance, liquidity, risk level, industry type and auditor type. The thesis also 
investigates risk disclosure and corporate governance characteristics, for example 
ownership structure, board compensation, independence of the board, internal auditor, 
audit committee, internal control system and risk management system.  
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1.1 Motivation and rationale of the study 
 
There have been growing uncertainties and risks in stock market investment especially 
after the recent global financial crisis, therefore, regulators and shareholders have put 
pressure on companies to provide more disclosure, especially information on risks and 
risk management. The benefits and costs of risk disclosure play a vital role in determining 
risk disclosure practice of management. The author was motivated to address these issues 
in order to help users interpret risk information and to encourage management to provide 
more information on risks. This thesis attempts to provide insight about the types of risks, 
about the attitude towards risks and risk disclosure of management and of users of annual 
reports and finally about the determinants of risk disclosure level and practice.  
 
In addition, in recent years, the UAE has witnessed the establishment of two stock 
markets – Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) and Dubai Financial Market (DFM). 
The stock market authorities promote disclosure and transparency practice among listed 
companies. The findings of this study provide regulators with empirical analysis of the 
factors influencing risk disclosure practice. Moreover, recently there has been growing 
interest in evidence on corporate governance in the UAE which motivated the researcher 
to help in promoting corporate governance practice in UAE, especially disclosure aspects. 
The global financial crisis since 2007 has adversely impacted the UAE and resulted in the 
Dubai financial crisis in 2008/2009. This crisis motivated the author to investigate 
transparency, disclosure and corporate governance aspects in the UAE, especially risk-
related elements and information. This study contributes to knowledge and provides 
recommendations to improve disclosure practice and corporate governance practice.  
 
1.2 Objectives of the research 
 
There are five main objectives for this thesis. Firstly, the study explores corporate risk 
disclosure level and practice within the annual report of UAE listed companies over three 
years (2007, 2008 and 2009). The research provides evidence on risk information 
categories, volume, nature, time-frame and types of news. Secondly, the study attempts to 
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examine mandatory and voluntary risk reporting requirements and to investigate what is 
the best practice in case of risk disclosure with emphasis on the UAE environment. The 
study also investigates whether companies have responded to the recent regulatory 
pressure to enhance disclosure, transparency and governance.  
 
The third objective is to examine the influence of accounting standards and requirements 
(e.g. IFRSs) and corporate governance on risk disclosure level and practice. The fourth 
objective is investigation of the determinants of risk disclosure levels and of the 
association between risk disclosure levels and firm specific characteristics and corporate 
governance characteristics. The fifth objective is to compare the evidence of risk 
reporting practice using quantitative and quantitative research approaches. The use of an 
interview approach allows complementing the results from statistical analysis. Interviews 
with the relevant participants in the capital market capture the matter of risk disclosure in 
depth and enhance the evidence from content analysis.  
 
1.3 Why investigate an emerging market with emphasis on the UAE stock markets? 
 
Most risk disclosure studies have focused on the developed capital market; however, it 
would be interesting to study practice in an emerging capital market which would add to 
knowledge of disclosure literature. Emerging stock markets have a different environment 
to those of a developed capital market and greater variation in behaviour. Developed 
capital markets are efficient, have a strong regulatory framework, high compliance, 
developed financial reporting and corporate governance frameworks. In contrast, 
emerging stock markets may be less efficient and suffer from lack of regulation, 
compliance, enforcement and transparency. Capital markets require comprehensive and 
transparent disclosures in order to function efficiently (Richardson and Welker, 2001).  
 
Although emerging stock markets may be inefficient and risky, the expected returns are 
sometimes much higher than developed markets (Fama and French, 1997). According to 
Hooke (1999; p.447), “many foreign economies, particularly in those developing 
countries known as emerging markets, are expanding faster than the US economy”. 
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Therefore, it would be worthwhile to investigate risk disclosure practice in such an 
environment in order to add to the knowledge of disclosure practice. The UAE stock 
markets comprise of Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) and Dubai Financial Market 
(DFM). These stock markets would be suitable cases for examining corporate risk 
disclosure as a case of an emerging capital market because both markets are recently 
established and the regulatory framework is still developing.  
 
1.4 Research questions 
 
The literature review in chapters 2 and 3 leads to the following research questions. These 
questions attempt to address the gap in disclosure and corporate governance literature. 
The focus of the research questions is on risk disclosure aspects and practice.  
 
R.Q.1: What is the current risk reporting practice of UAE listed companies? 
R.Q.2: To what extent should risk disclosure be mandatory or voluntary for companies in 
UAE? 
R.Q.3: What is the influence of IFRSs on risk disclosure practice of UAE companies? 
R.Q.4: What are the firm-specific characteristic determinants of risk disclosure by UAE 
listed companies? 
R.Q.5: What is the influence of corporate governance code on risk disclosure practice of 
UAE companies? 
R.Q.6: What are the influences of corporate governance characteristics on risk reporting 
in UAE? 
 
1.5 Summary of research methodology  
 
The study employed a mixed method approach using both qualitative and quantitative 
methods. The primary data collection method for the qualitative part was through semi-
structured interviews. Twenty-two interviewees represented different groups and 
participants in the capital market, for instance company managers, financial analysts, 
investors, external auditors, regulators and stock market authority members. The 
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interview transcripts were analysed using a grounded theory approach (chapter 7). 
Grounded theory allowed the provision of relevant inferences on the matter of risk 
reporting where the analysis came to draw a “theory of risk disclosure” at the end of the 
analysis.  
 
The second method was a quantitative approach based on content analysis and regression 
analysis (chapter 8). Data was obtained from annual reports of the sample companies 
over three years (2007, 2008 and 2009). The sample size was 48 non-financial listed 
companies on ADX and DFM. The English language version of the annual reports was 
analysed. Content analysis was applied to the companies‟ annual reports (text) where risk 
information sentence was the unit of the analysis which allowed identifying the quantity 
and types of risk disclosure. The study created a structured disclosure index to identify 
and classify relevant risk disclosures. The index consisted of nine risk categories: 
financial, operational, environmental and social, information processing & technology, 
strategic, regulatory, integrity, empowerment and political and economic risks.  
 
Univariate analysis was based on Pearson correlation. Multivariate analysis employed 
OLS regression analysis and normal scores stepwise regression.  In addition, the study 
employs various statistical methods in order to analyse the quantitative data, for instance 
descriptive statistics, ANOVA and Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test and uses SPSS 
application. 
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis  
 
This study is organised into ten chapters. Chapter one sets out introductory information 
on risk disclosure, the motivation and rationale, the objectives, the main research 
questions, the research plan and process, a summary of the methodology employed to 
answer the questions and the contributions of the study. Chapter two is the first part of the 
literature review, which focuses on the theoretical framework of disclosure theories. The 
chapter discusses, firstly, theoretical frameworks and concepts of risks and risk disclosure 
before the discussion of the relevant theories of disclosure and the benefits and costs of 
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risk disclosure. The third chapter is divided into two parts: the first part reviews the 
empirical work and some arguments and firm characteristics; the second part reviews 
corporate governance characteristics. Chapter four provides an overview of the UAE 
political system, economy and regulatory framework, especially those related to the stock 
market and listed companies. Then this chapter provides a brief review of the main stock, 
and finance and commodities markets before discussion of the financial reporting and 
corporate governance framework in UAE. Chapter five develops a set of hypotheses 
based on disclosure theories, prior empirical studies and the context of UAE. The 
hypotheses are derived from the research questions.  
 
The sixth chapter is about the research methodology and explains the processes followed 
in order to carry out the analysis using qualitative and quantitative methods. The first sub-
section of the methodology explains the research design related to the interview and 
grounded theory approach. The second sub-section describes the procedures followed in 
order to apply the content analysis approach. The third sub-section explains the 
procedures followed to ensure the validity of regression analysis, 
 
Chapter seven presents the results from qualitative method based on the interview 
analysis by using grounded theory as an analysis tool. A theory of risk disclosure is the 
main outcome of grounded theory analysis. Chapter eight presents the empirical results 
from the quantitative method which is divided into two main sections: content analysis 
results and regression analysis results. Chapter nine is the discussion and analysis of the 
main findings. This chapter brings together the main results from the qualitative method 
and quantitative method in order to draw down the final findings and discussion. Chapter 
ten is the last chapter where general conclusions are drawn in order to sum up the study.  
 
1.7 Research plan and process 
 
The following diagram explains the process and steps of this research. The diagram 
explains the steps followed throughout the study based on the thesis chapters. It shows 
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the starting point (research motivation in chapter 1) until the final step (conclusion in 
chapter 10).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: research plan and process 
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2.0 Introduction  
 
This chapter provides theoretical discussions related to risk disclosure. The first section 
presents the definition of risk and risk disclosure. The second section explains main 
disclosure theories and the link between these theories and risk disclosure. Then there is a 
theoretical discussion on the benefits and costs of risk disclosure.  
 
2.1 Definitions of risk and risk disclosure 
 
2.1.1 Risk concept   
 
According to Linsley and Shrives (2006), a difficulty in performing any risk disclosure 
study is that to identify risk information, „risk‟ needs to be defined. Defining risk is 
complicated because the degree of management control over risk varies by the type of 
risk, for example financial risks could be managed by financial instruments and other 
risks are operational (Schrand and Elliott, 1998). Some academics distinguish between 
the concept of risk and uncertainty (e.g. Dobler, 2008). Watson and Head (1998) define 
risk as referring to a set of outcomes arising from a decision that can be assigned 
probabilities whereas uncertainty arises when probabilities cannot be assigned to the set 
of outcomes.  
 
The ICAEW (2002) states that there is a distinction between downside risk and upside 
risk. Downside risk is the risk that something will go wrong and volatility risk is the risk 
associated with uncertainty which gives rise to the opportunity for gain as well as loss. 
ASB (1998) defines risk within FRS 5 as “uncertainty as the amount of benefits. The 
term includes both potential for gain and exposure to loss”. Abraham and Cox (2007) 
classify risk as variation (e.g. volatility), as uncertainty (e.g. contingency) and as 
opportunity (e.g. upside). 
 
Risk is not just downside and there is an upside for risk (ICAEW, 1999, p.7). For 
example, in the capital asset-pricing model the expected returns (benefits) increase with 
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risk so the higher the risk, the greater expected return. “This upside is sometimes called 
opportunity and it affects the positive aspect of risk” (Shrives and Linsley, 2003). The 
ICAEW (2002) states that risk reporting should indicate that there may be a range of 
different outcomes with upside as well downside potential.  
 
2.1.2 Risk disclosure definition 
 
As it is observed, there are various definitions of risk concept. As a result, academics 
define risk disclosure in different ways. It is important to be clear about the definition 
adopted because different definitions may lead to different results and analysis. The risk-
reporting practices of listed companies depend on many factors, for instance legal, 
economic, political, cultural and historical backgrounds of financial markets and 
regulation. ICAEW (1999, p.3) explains that risk reporting in annual reports should 
contain “information about risks in the broadest sense, about actions to manage them and 
relevant measures”. Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) formalise risk disclosure as 
disclosure of the firm specific variance of future cash flows. Dobler (2005a, p.3) 
conceives risk reporting as probabilistic forecast disclosure.  
 
Linsley and Shrives (2006, p.3) define risk disclosure: 
“If the reader is informed of any opportunity or prospect or of any hazard, danger, 
harm, threat, or exposure, which has already impacted upon the company or may 
impact upon the company in the future or of the management of any such 
opportunity prospect, hazard, harm, threat or exposure”.  
 
Hassan (2009, p.669) defines risk disclosure as: 
“The financial statements‟ inclusion of information about managers‟ estimates, 
judgments, reliance on market-based accounting policies such as impairment, 
derivative hedging, financial instruments and fair value as well as the disclosure 
of concentrated operations, non-financial information about corporations‟ plans, 
recruiting strategy and other operational, economic, political and financial risks”.  
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2.2 Theories of disclosure 
 
According to Christensen and Demski (2003, p.6), “Theory refers to a set of knowledge 
that explains or purports to explain a set of phenomena. It is a coherent description or set 
of principles that illuminates or explains some particular set of phenomena”. Spira and 
Page (2008, p.12) emphasise that “research into disclosure requires a theoretical position 
on a number of questions before it can proceed”. There are many theories which explain 
the motivation of companies‟ directors to disclose information, for example signalling, 
agency costs, information asymmetry, political costs, proprietary costs, capital need, 
cultural, stakeholder and legitimacy theories.  
 
Disclosure theories are used to form research hypothesis and conceptual development and 
expectation. Cooke (1998, p.209) argues that “another complication when undertaking 
empirical work in accounting and finance is that the theoretically correct form of the 
relation between the dependent and independent variables is not known”. Also some 
association could be explained by more than one theory which could result in 
complicated relationships or more than one explanation or suggestion for the tendency of 
the relationship. This study applies disclosure theories to explain risk disclosure practice 
of listed companies used in prior risk disclosure literature. Prior risk disclosure literature 
has focused on signalling theory, agency cost theory and information asymmetry theory 
and political cost theory. The following section will review these factors in the light of 
existing theories. 
 
2.2.1 Information asymmetry theory 
 
Akerlof (1970) explains in his paper the information asymmetry problem and refers to it 
as a “Lemon Problem”. The paper explains the interaction of quality differences and 
uncertainty in the labour market. He relates it to buyers who are imperfectly informed 
about the quality of products in the market. In case of market uncertainty, sellers of high-
quality products may withdraw their products from the market because the quality of their 
products is not recognised by others (poor quality products). The author applies the 
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lemon theory in the case of automobile markets where there are good cars and bad cars 
(lemons) - either new or used cars. The individuals in this market do not know the quality 
of this car until they own it for a specific period. An asymmetry in available information 
exists between sellers and buyers. The bad cars sell at the same price as good cars since it 
is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference between good and bad cars because only 
the seller knows. The good cars may be driven out of the market by the lemons. The 
author concluded that the difficulty of distinguishing between good and bad quality is 
inherent in the business world and this may indeed explain many economic institutions 
and may be an important aspect of uncertainty.  
 
Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest that information asymmetry problems arise from 
information differences and conflicting incentives between firm managers and investors. 
They argue that such conflicts may lead to a breakdown in the functioning of the capital 
market in the sense that if the investor cannot distinguish between good and bad ideas of 
a business, entrepreneurs with bad ideas will try to claim that their ideas are as valuable 
as the good ideas and investors will value both good and bad ideas at an average level. As 
a result, the capital market will rationally undervalue some good ideas and overvalue 
some bad ideas relative to information available to entrepreneurs.  
 
The link between lemon theory and disclosure is widely tackled in the literature. Lemon 
theory is used to understand disclosure practice within the capital market. Disclosure is 
seen as a main solution for information asymmetry problem. Scott (2003) identifies that 
financial accounting and reporting can be viewed as a mechanism to control information 
asymmetry problems by converting inside information into outside information. 
According to Kothari (2000, p.92), “the theoretical literature shows that both mandated 
and voluntary disclosures reduce information asymmetries among informed and 
uninformed market participants”. He suggests that reduced information asymmetry has 
desirable effects on the cost of capital and the volatility of security prices which motivate 
regulators to strive for high-quality accounting standards.  
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2.2.1.1 Information asymmetry theory and risk disclosure  
 
“As the disclosure system has grown in size with the importance of evaluation of 
disclosure by other information intermediaries, analysts, business press, and the investors 
themselves, information asymmetries and agency conflicts between participants create 
greater demand for reporting and assurance of disclosure” (Kothari, Li and Short, 2009, 
p.1664). Managers are assumed to hold more information concerning the risks a company 
faces and their potential impact on the performance than outsiders who have no access to 
internal information sources (Dobler, 2008). Driven by increased complexities in the 
business world, and objectives to promote transparency and improve disclosure quality 
by reducing information asymmetry, risk and risk management disclosure are potentially 
useful to analysts, investors and other firm stakeholders (Lajili and Zeghal, 2005).  
 
2.2.2 Agency costs theory 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that an agency relationship can be seen as a contract 
between investors (the principal) and managers (the agent) in order to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the 
agent. However, conflict arises because both parties try to maximise their own interests 
and the agent will not always act in the interests of the principal. The principal can limit 
divergence from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by 
incurring monitoring costs (monitoring expenditures) and, in some situations, will pay the 
agent to expend resources (bonding costs). However, it is impossible for the principal or 
the agent, at zero cost, to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from the 
principal‟s viewpoint.  
 
They suggest a solution based on an optimal contract between investors and managers 
which aims to align the interests of managers with those of external equity and debt 
claimants. Separation of ownership and control in the modern diffuse ownership 
corporation is associated with agency problem which leads to a theory of the ownership 
(or capital) structure of the firm. Their work focuses on only a small part of agency 
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problems which is the analysis of agency costs generated by the contractual arrangements 
between the owners and top management of the corporation.  
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) discuss organisations characterised by separation of ownership 
and control. They argue for the separation between management decisions (initiation and 
implementation) and decision control (ratification and monitoring). They argue that risk-
bearing functions survive in large organisations in part because of the benefits of 
specialisation of management and risk bearing and also because of an effective common 
approach to controlling the agency problems caused by separation of decision and risk-
bearing functions (between residual claimants and decision-makers) by restricting 
residual claims to the decision-makers.  
 
In the agency literature, the problem is not only between owner-managers and outside 
shareholders but is also extended to include the demand for contracts between owner-
managers and debtholders and outside capital suppliers. Watts and Zimmerman (1986, 
p.199) point out that accounting numbers are used in the firm‟s contracts that are 
designed to reduce agency costs. For instance, debt/equity ratios are applied in debt 
contracts to restrict managers‟ action that transfers wealth from debtholders. Also, 
accounting earnings are used in bonus plans to reduce manager shirking.  
 
Figure 2.1: The dynamic explanation of agency cost theory 
 
Source: Wikipedia (n.d.)  
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2.2.2.1 Agency theory and risk disclosure  
 
Disclosure is seen as a monitoring mechanism of agency theory. Healy and Palepu (2001) 
discuss the agency-cost problem in the light of disclosure. They suggest some solutions to 
agency costs, including 1) disclosure of relevant information that enables investors to 
monitor compliance with contractual agreements and to evaluate whether entrepreneurs 
have managed the firm‟s resources in the interests of external owners, 2) corporate 
governance with emphasis on the board of directors‟ role which should monitor and 
discipline management on behalf of external owners, 3) information intermediaries who 
engage in private information production to uncover any manager misuse of firm 
resources and finally 4) corporate control contents, which include the threat of hostile 
takeovers and proxy contests, and mitigating agency problems between corporate insiders 
and outside shareholders. 
 
Disclosure literature theoretically hypothesises and empirically examines agency cost. 
Some authors apply firm size as a proxy for agency costs and assume a positive 
association between disclosure and firm size. The ownership structure variable is also 
examined widely in the literature as a proxy for agency cost. The literature hypotheses 
there is a positive association between the ownership diffusion pattern and agency cost. 
They assume that shareholders will put more pressure on the managers in order to 
disclose more information. Another proxy for agency cost is audit type. Some authors 
argue that the monitoring role is fulfilled by the auditing role. They assume that the better 
the quality of auditor, the more adequate and increased the information will be. A 
company‟s financial leverage is also applied as a proxy for agency cost in the disclosure 
literature. Some authors argue that leverage represents the agency cost between 
debtholders and managers or shareholders and therefore such association will be reflected 
in disclosure practice.   
 
Linsley and Shrives (2000, p.125) explain the link between agency theory and risk 
disclosure. They suggest that conflicts are arising over the level of information required 
to be disclosed by people inside the company to those outside. Shareholders and other 
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users of information currently receive little information about company risks and how the 
managers are managing those risks. This may encourage shareholders to monitor the 
managers‟ actions to ensure they will act in their best interests, which in turn may 
motivate the managers to disclose additional information including risk disclosure as a 
method of keeping shareholders satisfied. Shrives and Linsley (2003) state that agency 
theory could explain why managers may decide to disclose risk information voluntarily 
as they could reassure shareholders that they have risk management systems; however it 
also could represent a negative reason for companies to disclose risk information 
voluntarily.  
 
2.2.3 Signalling theory  
 
Signalling theory was developed by Spence (1973) in order to explain behaviour in the 
labour markets. He explains the signalling process in terms of education. The author 
argues that the level of education of a job applicant was a credible signal of their 
underlying competence. He argues that managers might not observe their employee 
productivity and that employees with greater abilities would signal their abilities to the 
employer in order to receive benefits. It is argued that all workers may do the same thing 
therefore workers may use more reliable characteristics as a signal of productivity, for 
instance the education level of employees. Ross (1977) points out that managers with 
good news or with high-quality products may offer a warranty in order to strengthen their 
signal and distinguish themselves from poor-quality and misleading information.   
 
2.2.3.1 Signalling theory and risk disclosure  
 
The disclosure literature identifies several variables as a proxy for signalling theory 
including profitability, liquidity and leverage. The theory argues that directors who 
believe their company can perform better than other companies will want to signal this to 
shareholders in order to attract more investments. Directors may do this in a sort of 
disclosure in excess of any information that is required by regulations. Signalling theory 
suggests that when a corporation‟s performance is good, managers will signal companies‟ 
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performance to their investors, stakeholders and the market by making disclosures that 
poorer companies cannot make. By enhancing disclosures, directors wish to receive more 
benefits: a better reputation and the firm‟s value will increase. In contrast, firms with 
poor performance may choose to keep silent rather than reveal unfavoured performance. 
However, investors may misinterpret this silence as withholding the worst possible 
information (Verrecchia, 1983).  
 
Linsley and Shrives (2005, p.293) suggest that signalling theory and agency theories are 
most appropriate in explaining voluntary risk management disclosures. Shrives and 
Linsley (2003) claim that managers may wish to signal to the market that their companies 
are more advanced in their management of risk than other companies and their managers 
are superior risk managers which would therefore provide an incentive for some 
companies to choose to disclose risk information. Tufano (1996) argues that “outsiders 
cannot observe managerial quality, nor can they disentangle profits due to managerial 
quality as compared to exogenous market stocks”. As a result, managers may prefer to 
engage in risk management (e.g. hedging and operating measures) so as to better 
communicate their skills to the labour market. 
 
2.2.4 Positive accounting theory (PAT): political costs 
 
PAT is concerned with predicting actions such as the choices of accounting policies by 
firm managers and how managers will respond to proposed new accounting standards. 
The term „positive‟ refers to a theory that attempts to make good predictions of real world 
events (Scott, 2003, pp. 273). Watts and Zimmerman (1978) develop a positive theory of 
the determination of accounting standards. They investigate the factors influencing 
management‟s attitude (lobbying behaviour) on accounting standards including 
regulation, political costs, management compensation plans, taxes and information 
production (e.g. bookkeeping). They argue that individuals act to maximise their own 
utility and management lobbies on accounting standards based on their own self-interests, 
for example managers have incentives to choose accounting standards which report lower 
earnings due to tax, and political and regulatory systems. The findings show that firm size 
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is the most important factor, explaining managerial behaviour towards financial 
accounting standards. This is explained in the sense that the larger firms are more likely 
to be subjected to governmental interference costs (political costs) than smaller firms.    
 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) highlight three main hypotheses for PAT, including 1) the 
bonus plan: managers with bonus plans are more likely to choose accounting procedures 
that shift reporting earnings from future periods to the current period, 2) size (the political 
cost): the larger the firm, the more likely the managers are to choose accounting 
procedures that defer reported earnings from current to future periods and 3) debt/equity: 
the larger the proportion of debt/equity ratio, the more likely the firm‟s managers are to 
select accounting procedures that shift reported earnings from future periods to the 
current period.  
 
Scott (2003) argues that firms‟ accounting policies will be chosen as part of the broader 
problem of attaining efficient corporate governance which requires trading of cost of 
capital (debt and equity) and contracting costs (contracts with managers, suppliers, capital 
providers which results in costs such as negotiation, monitoring, bankruptcy). PAT does 
not suggest that firms or standard setters should completely specify the accounting 
policies they use because this would be otherwise too costly. Hassan (2008) argues that 
PAT helps to explain how a conflict of interest between managers, shareholders and 
debtholders influences the corporation‟s accounting practices. 
 
Many disclosure studies examined disclosure practice in the light of PAT. Among PAT 
hypotheses, the political-cost hypothesis is the most widely used in disclosure literature. 
Political-costs theory is linked to disclosure practice in the sense that certain companies 
(e.g. large firms) attract the attention of the media, public and politicians. These firms 
have incentives to disclose more information voluntarily in order to manipulate their 
image and deflect unwanted attention (Linsley and Shrives, 2000).  
 
Size has been used as a proxy for political costs. The size-political-cost-disclosure 
hypothesis is based on the assumption that large firms are more politically sensitive and 
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have relatively larger wealth transfers imposed on them than smaller firm (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986, p.235). For such firms, increased disclosure is seen as an important 
element in reducing political cost. Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p.239) critique size-
political hypothesis in the sense that 1) economic theory of the political process is not 
fully formulated, 2) even though large firms are more politically targeted, they are also 
powerful adversaries in the political process and are observed receiving large wealth 
transfer, 3) Zimmerman‟s (1983) results suggest that firm size as a proxy for political 
costs varies over time, suggesting that size is a noisy proxy for political cost. They 
suggest that industry type could be considered as an alternative proxy for political cost.  
 
2.2.4.1 Political costs theory and risk disclosure 
 
Certain companies may have high public profiles which make them subject to greater 
attention by politics, public and media (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Healy and Palepu 
(2001) suggest that prior research supports the view that managers‟ financial reporting 
disclosure choices are associated with contracting, political costs and capital market 
considerations. Companies can overcome such pressure or attention, by disclosing 
additional information. Firm size and firm performance have been applied as a proxy in 
order to test empirically the political cost theory. Shrives and Linsley (2003) suggest that 
the political costs argument could be applied to interpret risk disclosure practice. They 
give an example that a rail company which suffers from poor safety might go under 
pressure from the public or media. Such companies may wish to disclose additional 
information on travelling risks and actions taken in reducing such risks in order to 
counter this additional unwanted attention.  
 
2.2.5 Capital need theory and risk disclosure  
 
„Capital need theory‟ suggests that companies disclose more information in order to raise 
capital at the lowest cost. Chio (1973) states that firms which are expected to release 
more valuable information than that required by law are those often going to the financial 
markets to raise capital and for these firms, increased disclosure would mean two things: 
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a lower cost of capital and a reduction in the level of uncertainty (risk) associated with a 
certain security. According to the ICAEW (1999 p.46), “directors who do object to 
keeping investors fully informed (including risk disclosures), need to consider quite 
seriously whether their companies should be listed”. The main aim of floating on the 
stock exchange is to raise capital. The providers of capital (shareholders) risk their money 
therefore they have the full right to be completely informed about the company‟s 
activities and position.  
 
Foster (1986) suggests that in capital markets when companies try to raise capital at the 
lowest possible cost, especially in the presence of competition from others on the type of 
security offered and on the issue terms and future returns, there are risks and uncertainties 
involved in the company and its securities which make investors demand more 
information to help in evaluating the risks of existing and future cash flows, securities 
value and investment decisions. As a consequence, companies are encouraged to disclose 
information that will reduce the information risk which in turn allows them to raise 
capital at the lowest cost possible.   
 
Table 2.1: Summary of risk disclosure theories  
Theory Basis Association 
with disclosure 
Explanation Proxy for 
theory 
Information 
asymmetry  
Managers withhold 
more risk 
information 
Positive  Larger firms face more 
risks. Investors demand 
more risk information 
Firm size 
Agency 
cost  
Agency conflicts 
between manager 
and investors 
Positive Larger companies have 
more investors and 
stakeholders 
Firm size 
Ownership 
Signalling Signal about risk 
management  
Positive Performance Profitability  
Liquidity 
Political 
costs 
Companies under 
political pressure 
may choose to 
disclose more 
information 
Positive Large companies face 
bigger political pressure.  
High-risk industry 
disclose more than low-
risk industry 
Firm size 
 
Industry 
type 
Capital 
need  
Managers disclose 
more information 
on risks to reduce 
uncertainties, hence 
attract more capital 
Positive Large firms disclose 
more risk information 
because they need to 
raise more capital than 
small companies 
Firm size 
 
Listing 
status 
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2.3 The benefits and costs of risk disclosure  
 
Disclosure literature provides discussion on the benefit and cost of disclosure and 
financial reporting. The focus of this section will be on the benefits and costs of risk 
disclosure. The benefits and costs of producing financial information are difficult to 
measure objectively or quantifiably (FASB, 2001). Thus, different person will disagree 
about whether the benefits of disclosure justify its costs. Therefore, cost-benefits analysis 
must be made as carefully as possible and some factors should be considered when 
making such analysis, for instance 1) factors that determine competitive advantage, such 
as type of information, level of detail and timing of disclosure, 2) the difficulty of 
generalisations, 3) the need for judgement, 4) competitors‟ access to commercially 
sensitive information and 5) repackaging information to prevent competitive harm.  
 
2.3.1 Benefit and importance of risk disclosure  
 
There are strong, apparently growing, pressures from global capital markets, financial 
regulators and policymakers and other interested groups for firms to include risk 
information in financial reports to facilitate cross-border comparisons of risk and value 
(Kelly, 1998). A considerable body of opinion has allocated risk disclosure for a wide 
variety of theoretical reasons. The ICAEW (2002) suggests that a number of benefits 
would arise from risk reporting, for example 1) it encourages better risk management, 2) 
it provides practical forward-looking information, 3) it improves accountability for 
stewardship, 4) it provides investors‟ protection and the usefulness of financial reporting 
and 5) it increases shareholder value. Risk disclosure is likely to provide valuable 
information to the major users, for instance, shareholders, managers, creditors, 
investment analyst, investors, government and customers. 
 
2.3.1.1 Management accountability and stewardship 
 
Spira and Page (2009) state that the literature on disclosure is extensive and is trying to 
achieve firstly a users‟ needs view, in that the purpose of disclosure is to provide 
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information to help investors make better investment decisions. Secondly it is trying to 
achieve an accountability or corporate governance view in order to reduce opportunistic 
behaviour by management. Abraham, Solomon and Stevenson (2007) state that the 
purpose of financial reporting is to satisfy the information needs of users, so that capital 
can be allocated efficiently and the accountability of company management to 
stakeholders can be improved.  
 
2.3.1.2 Good functioning of capital market 
  
According to Deumes (2008), studying risk disclosure is important because corporate 
transparency concerning risk is vital for the good functioning of capital markets. Well-
informed investors are a necessary element in order to achieve and maintain an accurate 
valuation of a company‟s stock and confidence in the stock market. Being clear about the 
risks and uncertainties involved can prevent severe damage to the reputation and long-
term health of a company that may otherwise result from overvalued corporate equity 
(Fuller & Jensen 2002). Managers may understand that markets will punish companies 
that provide inadequate information relative to their business and risks involved, for 
example fear of litigation and reputation costs.  
 
2.3.1.3 Facilitate investors and analysts‟ decision-making  
 
Modern portfolio theory suggests that investors are concerned with the level of risk and 
the rate of return when making investment decisions and these should be measured for 
the portfolio as a whole (Markowitz, 1991, p.470). Therefore risk disclosure is helpful in 
making such investment decisions, especially forward-looking risk information in that if 
the company provides forecasts of the company‟s financial results and cash flows, 
investors could then assess whether the current value of their shares is justified by the 
forecast future returns (Linsley and Shrives, 2000 p.124). Risk reporting is essential to 
help investors in making more informed judgments about the nature and scale of 
corporate financial risk exposures (Aldridge and Colbert, 1997).  
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Furthermore, the ICAEW reports that benefits of risk disclosure would follow for 
investment analysts, such as financial analysts, stockbrokers and fund managers, in terms 
that they offer financial advice to individuals and institutions and they consider financial 
reporting as the main source for the analysis of companies in order to assess share price 
and company market value. Spira and Page (2008, p.12) state that “financial disclosure 
permits investors to allocate investment to the best opportunities is frequently asserted 
but evidence of its effectiveness in this regard is somewhat lacking”.  
 
2.3.1.4 Benefits to listed companies  
 
Companies are becoming aware that enhanced narrative disclosure concerning their risk 
profile would generate beneficial capital market consequences in the sense of reduced 
cost of equity capital (Botosan, 1997), reduced cost of debt capital (Sengupal, 1998) and 
increased share  price performance (Healy et al., 1999) and maximised shareholder value 
(ICAEW, 1999). It is difficult for an organisation to develop an effective strategy because 
the competitive environment is moving and changing quickly. Therefore, companies need 
to see disclosure to investors as a way of securing competitive advantage in capital 
markets and use technology to make disclosure more efficient and effective (ICAEW 
1999; Deumes, 2008). Useful risk disclosure also enables companies to convey the 
message to investors that they better understand their own risks and that risk management 
practices are taking place (Abraham et al. 2007). 
 
2.3.1.5 Reduced cost of capital  
 
Companies‟ management can see risk disclosure and the communication of risk 
management policies as significant factors for reducing the cost of capital by raising 
confidence in the market (Solomon, Solomon and Norton, 2000). Theoretical research 
supports a negative association between disclosure and the cost of equity capital 
(Botosan, 1997). Public disclosure reduces information asymmetry by displacing private 
information. By reducing information asymmetry and estimation risk, risk disclosure may 
decrease the firm‟s risk premium demanded by investors and decrease the company‟s 
  
24 
 
cost of capital (Dobler, 2005a, p.2). Better risk reporting will reduce uncertainty and 
improve the level of return and eventually the cost of capital will decrease.  
 
A company‟s cost of capital is related to its perceived risks and therefore clear 
communication of risk information should reduce investor uncertainty and have a positive 
effect on the firm‟s cost of capital (Botosan, 1997; Linsley and Shrives, 2000, 2006; 
Abraham, Solomon and Stevenson, 2007). By enhancing risk disclosure levels “the 
providers of capital would now be better able to judge the risks of the business, 
consequently eliminating the need for them to incorporate a risk premium within any 
financing charge” (Linsley and Shrives; 2005, p.293). However, there is a lack of 
understanding about how risk and risk disclosures are related to a firm‟s cost of capital 
(Schrand and Elliot, 1998). The ICAEW (2011, p.29) concluded that “the research 
evidence to date does not show conclusively that risk reporting in general either reduces 
or raise the cost of capital”.  
 
2.3.2 Risk disclosure costs 
 
2.3.2.1 Proprietary information costs  
 
Proprietary costs arise when information disclosed conveys sensitive information with 
potential value to competitors (Verrechia, 2001), thereby threatening the company‟s 
future profitability. As a consequence, companies limit disclosure when proprietary costs 
are likely to increase and be exploited by competitors. Lajili and Zeghal (2005) state that 
given the voluntary nature of most risk disclosures, this is probably intentional since the 
competitive pressures and proprietary information costs associated with such disclosures 
could be substantial. Managers may perceive that there is a cost imposed on the firm by 
competitors who exploit the information to the detriment of the disclosing firm (Deumes, 
2008; Dobler 2005a; Emm et al., 2007). 
 
To overcome this problem some researchers suggest that risk information should not be 
reported where it is not material or it falls down in terms of relevance to the future, 
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reliability, comparability, understandability or commercial sensitivity (ICAEW, 1997). 
However, this may mislead the users and investors and some directors may choose to 
omit risk information on the grounds that it is all considered commercially sensitive 
(Linsley and Shrives, 2005). The ICAEW (1999, p.29) found in its study that commercial 
sensitivity is an overstated because any omissions must be authorised by the stock market 
authorities. Therefore, commercial sensitivity is unlikely to be a major problem that stops 
managers from enhancing risk information in annual reports. 
 
2.3.2.2 Non-Proprietary information costs 
 
Non-proprietary costs refer to the processing and disclosing of risk information. 
Disclosure is not a costless undertaking (Botosan, 1997) and creating and distributing 
timely and accurate risk information consumes valuable management time. Thus it 
involves internal control and risk management systems which are costly to be built. On 
the other hand, keeping silent is costly. Knowing how business directors manage risks 
helps investors to assess the volatility of the firm‟s returns and as a consequence, they 
will be able to determine a company‟s cost of capital and its value more accurately 
(ICAEW, 1999). Companies list on stock market in order to raise capital and investors 
risk their money based on returns and risks involved in business, therefore directors who 
object to keep investors fully informed need to consider quite seriously whether their 
companies should be listed (ICAEW, 1999).  
 
2.3.2.3 Shareholders activism  
 
There is a possibility of potential legal liability in connection with inadequate or 
misleading disclosure (Deumes, 2008; Kothari, 2000). In addition, where listed 
companies do not disclose risk information, they could be leaving themselves open to 
future problems. Shareholders may, on discovering that information was withheld from 
them, see this as a just reason to replace executive directors. Also, companies might find 
themselves languishing and having financial or capital problems, so then they will be 
under threat of a hostile takeover. Ree (1995; p.5) claims that the shareholders will 
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therefore try to arrange contracts which reward the management for results which are in 
the shareholders‟ interests and constrain the management from inappropriate activities. 
The shareholders will also monitor the firm‟s performance in order to dispose of 
ineffectual managers or those who take decisions which are not in the shareholders‟ 
interests. 
 
2.3.2.4 Litigation costs 
 
Litigation cost or threat is applied in the case of the USA stock market where 1) the SEC 
punishes listed companies that fail to provide detailed information on some types of risk 
that the companies face and 2) US investors could sue listed companies for giving 
misleading information which results in false investment decisions. Collins, Davie and 
Weetman (1993) state that researchers provide discussion on companies‟ failure to 
discuss many risks and uncertainty-related aspects, for instance discussion on the loss of 
a major customer, the obsolescence of large inventories of computers, accounting 
procedures aimed at income smoothing and failure to disclose greenmail premiums 
within stock repurchase arrangements.  
 
The SEC introduced the „Safe Harbor Rule‟ under the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Private Securities Litigation Amendment Act 1995, in order to give protection and 
encourage US companies to communicate forward-looking expectations and risk-related 
information (Marshall and Weetman, 2000). Similarly, in the UK, the Companies Act 
2006 introduced „safe harbour‟ provisions which may encourage managers to provide 
greater information on risk, uncertainties and forward-looking information (ASB, 2007). 
However, in practice, the Safe Harbor Rule in the US did not prevent litigation risks and 
created some risks for listed companies and their auditors (Collins et al., 1993).  
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2.4 Summary 
 
The chapter provides theoretical discussions of risk disclosure and disclosure theories. 
There are many theories employed to explain accounting choices and disclosure practice 
for corporations. Disclosure theories are widely applied to understand the practice. 
However, this area becomes complicated because researchers in the field applied 
different variables or measures as proxy for disclosure theories. It can be concluded that 
there is no unique theory that could be applied to explain disclosure or risk disclosure 
practice of companies. There is disagreement among researchers on the definition of risk 
and risk disclosure. This study adopts a comprehensive definition of risk and risk 
disclosure. Given the benefits and incentives to risk disclosure, companies would be 
willing to disclose more information. Researchers suggest theoretically that disclosure 
may lead to lower cost of capital; however, the empirical evidence is still limited. 
Moreover, disclosure is not without cost. Companies would be less motivated to provide 
more information on their risks if the costs exceeded the benefits. The next chapter 
provides a literature review on empirical work related to risk disclosure.  
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3.0 Introduction  
 
There have been considerable studies on corporate general disclosure, for example 
voluntary disclosure, mandatory disclosure, and aggregate, financial and corporate social 
responsibilities. This study focuses on corporate disclosure and concerns information on 
risks in the developing capital market (UAE). The corporate risk disclosure literature has 
followed a similar stream of that in the general disclosure literature. Some studies 
examine risk disclosure in term of quantity (e.g. Linsley and Shrives, 2006) and other 
studies attempt to examine the quality of risk disclosure (e.g. Beretta and Bozzolan, 
2004).  
 
Some studies examine the influence of firm characteristics at the risk disclosure level 
(Rajab and Schachler, 2009). Other studies examine the influence of corporate 
governance characteristics on risk disclosure (e.g. Abraham and Cox, 2007; Taylor 2011). 
In addition, some studies examine risk management disclosures (e.g. Lajili and Zeghal, 
2005; Amran, Bin and Hassan, 2009). Besides, another stream of studies examines risk 
reporting related to accounting standards, for example IFRSs and derivatives (e.g. Lopes 
and Rodrigues, 2007; Hassan, Saleh and Abd-Rahman, 2008). A detailed summary of 
previous related studies on risk disclosure studies is presented in tables located in 
Appendix A.  
 
This chapter provides a literature review on corporate risk disclosure which is divided 
into five main sections. The first section is voluntary and mandatory risk disclosure. The 
second section is the influence of accounting standards risk disclosure requirements (e.g. 
IFRSs). The third part is the influence of corporate governance on risk disclosure practice 
including internal control and risk management. The fourth section of the literature 
concerns the determinants of risk disclosure level and practice, namely firm-specific 
characteristics. The fifth section presents a summary on some prior empirical studies on 
risk disclosure. 
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3.1 Risk disclosure practice, type, nature and time frame  
 
3.1.1 Voluntary risk disclosure  
 
When there is an absence of specific risk regulations and mandatory requirements or 
guidance on risk disclosure as it is the case in most developing countries, managers could 
consider broad disclosure of risk information that is recommended by professional 
accounting bodies as guidance on effective voluntary disclosure. If managers believe that 
they would benefit from risk disclosure, it would be expected that managers would 
voluntarily disclose risk information. However, it would appear that there is a 
disincentive to disclose any information voluntarily because of the costs associated with 
the disclosure of risk information (Shrives and Linsley, 2003) especially if costs of risk 
disclosure exceed the benefits. In addition, in order to reduce information asymmetry and 
agency costs, managers may provide more information voluntarily.   
 
Some people argue that companies have always reported some risk-related information 
that complies with accounting standards and regulation, therefore there is no need for 
companies to explain additional risks they face and how specific risks are managed and it 
is for the market to punish what it does not like. However, given agency conflicts, some 
managers may not report on risks to maximise their wealth at the expense of shareholder 
wealth. The ICAEW (1999) argues that fully informed investors are necessary to run 
markets well. Also, in order for the market‟s participants to take good investment 
decisions, full and useful information should be disclosed.  
 
3.1.2 How much risk information should be disclosed? 
 
The above question remains open in the current disclosure literature. Gould (2002) argues 
that one major debate on the disclosure issue is always on how to strike a balance 
between too much disclosure and too little. Eccles, Herz, Keegan and Phillips (2001) 
argue that companies still struggle with how much risk information should be disclosed 
for four reasons: 1) there is no accepted method in the industry on how risk should be 
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disclosed, 2) disclosure is complicated and based on a number of assumptions and 
sophisticated methodologies, 3) there are risks and costs inherent in greater risk 
disclosure and 4) disclosure is subjective and abstract and difficult to be measured.  
 
Gould (2002) suggests that the best way forward is to allow those shareholders and 
stakeholders taking the lead to create market pressure on the companies to improve 
disclosure level and practice and then the case will be that poor-quality disclosure could 
damage companies‟ reputations. The result may be that companies will be increasingly 
prepared to be more open and transparent. In general, management needs to weigh up 
costs and benefits which involve disclosure in order to decide on the optimal level of 
disclosure.  
 
3.1.3 Risk events and disclosures 
 
There have been many crises and risk events over time, for instance Enron and the recent 
global financial crisis. Ernst & Young (2009a, p.2) illustrated that 2008 was a traumatic 
year for the global economy and the world is no more predictable now than it was in 
2007, volatility has increased and business risk has consequently increased. The global 
financial crisis of 2008 has reinforced the importance for investors and regulators to 
subject the quality of risk-related disclosures (Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig, 2010, p.3). 
Ho and Wong (2001, p.139) argued that financial crisis (e.g. in Asia) was not only the 
result of a loss in investor confidence but more importantly of a lack of effective 
corporate governance and transparency in financial markets and individual firms. 
 
Abraham and Darby (2008) investigate whether stated risks come to pass as significant 
events and whether the significant events are recognised in subsequent annual reports of 
sample UK companies. They found that sample companies in the UK disclose significant 
identified events that affected their share prices over the year preceding the annual report. 
They found that in the case of negative events, companies provide general discussion 
without details. They found that narrative risk disclosure is contained throughout the 
annual report, for instance the risk factor statement, chairman review and CEO review. 
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They concluded that companies need to focus on the quality, rather than the quantity, of 
information. This is a conclusion which many researchers have come to (e.g. Beattie, 
McInnes & Fearnley, 2004) 
 
3.1.4 Financial and non-financial risk disclosures  
 
Souabni (2011) found that disclosure of risk information within annual reports followed 
two main categories: financial risk and non-financial risk. He argued that financial risk 
can be easily quantified, can complement financial statements and help in financial 
analysis while non-financial risk cannot be easily quantified and is about a company as a 
whole. Cabedo and Tirado (2004) stated that financial risks have particular relevance in 
financial statements and have an immediate effect on monetary assets and liabilities and 
cash flows and company profits, whereas non-financial risks are not so directly related to 
assets and liabilities but have an effect on future cash flow losses in the long term.  
 
Lajili and Zeghal (2005) found that the highest volume of risk disclosure related to 
financial risks by Canadian companies. In contrast, Konishi and Ali (2007) found that 
companies in Japan were disclosing more non-financial risks than financial risks. 
Similarly Linsley & Shrives (2006) in the UK found that financial risk disclosure was 
26.7%, whereas non-financial risk was 73.3%. The following table provides a summary 
of some empirical evidence.  
 
Table 3.1: Variation in financial and non-financial risk disclosure   
Study Country Results 
Mohabbot (2005) Japan Large variation in risk reporting 
Lajili and Zeghal 
(2005) 
Canada Large variation in risk disclosure 
Konishi and Ali (2007) Japan Non-financial risk disclosure was 
more than financial risk disclosure 
Souabni (2011) US, UK, Germany, 
Canada, Malaysia, 
Singapore 
Financial risk information is 
disclosed in line with the 
requirement of IFRS 
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3.1.5 Quantitative and qualitative risk disclosure 
 
Linsley and Shrives (2006, p.391) argue that companies should quantify the size of a risk 
in order to improve the quality of risk reporting and enable readers to better and more 
easily assess the potential consequences of risks to the company. SEC 1997 regulation in 
the US motivates companies to disclose quantitative disclosures on market risk and is 
regulated under 10-Ks information. Companies have the discretion to choose among three 
alternative methods: sensitivity analysis, value-at-risk (VaR), and the „tabular‟ method 
(Emm et al., 2007). Cabedo and Tirado (2004, p.186) argue that financial and non-
financial risks must be quantified so that financial statements can present information on 
their financial and economic situations, thereby providing potential users with the most 
appropriate information necessary for the decision-making process. Furthermore, 
quantification of risk disclosure improves the credibility of the disclosures and makes 
them ex post verifiable (Schrand and Elliott, 1998 p.280). 
 
On the other hand, Mohobbot (2005, p.120) argues that there are some problems with 
quantifying risks, for instance the difficulty in measuring some risks and some 
measurement techniques only apply to certain risks. For example, VaR can only be 
applied to market risks, which may make managers reluctant to provide quantified risk 
information. Linsley and Shrives (2006), who found that only 5.3% of risk disclosures 
were quantified, concluded that it may be connected to the problems and difficulty of 
measurement of risks and the results signify inability on the part of directors to provide 
monetary risk disclosure rather than an unwillingness to do so. A similar argument was 
made by Rajgopal (1999) that SEC quantitative market risk disclosures are likely to be 
unreliable, plagued with measurement problems and the three options for quantitative 
market risk reporting (e.g. tabular, sensitivity, VaR) are likely to limit investors‟ ability to 
compare one firm to another. Such disclosures could be misleading and consequently 
affect the usefulness of the risk disclosures.     
 
Previous empirical studies in developed and developing capital markets found that most 
risk disclosures were qualitative in nature. Konishi and Ali (2007) found that companies‟ 
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risk disclosures are descriptive in nature and companies are reluctant to quantify risk in 
Japan. They found that companies were disclosing more non-monetary risks than 
monetary risks. Amran et al. (2009) found that most of the disclosures were qualitative in 
nature by Malaysian companies. Lajili and Zeghal (2005) found risk management 
disclosure was largely qualitative in the Canadian context. Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) 
found that 15.5% of total risk disclosures were quantified. Similar findings were obtained 
in the context of UK companies by Rajab and Schachler (2009) who found that 
qualitative disclosures dominate over quantitative disclosures. 
 
Table 3.2: Quantitative and qualitative risk disclosure  
Study  Country Results  
Konishi and Ali (2007) Japan More non-monetary risk than monetary risk 
Little quantity risk information 
Beretta, Bozzolan, (2004) Italy  Risk disclosures are mainly qualitative 
Linsley and Shrives, (2005) UK Lack of monetary risk disclosure (5.3%) 
Mohobbot (2005) Japan Risk disclosures are descriptive and a little 
quantitative 
Lajili and Zeghal (2005) Canada Risk information qualitative 
 
3.1.6 Forward-looking and past risk disclosures 
 
Historical information is useful for stewardship purposes (Linsley and Shrives, 2000, 
p.124).  Beattie, McInnes and Fearnley (2004) argue for more forward-looking and 
focusing on the quality disclosures, going beyond the traditional financial reporting 
model that focuses on historical and financial information. Revealing forward-looking 
information helps investors in their decision-making and to accurately forecast 
companies‟ positions and that economic environment is too dynamic to rely on historical 
information only (Aljifiri & Hussainey, 2007) and helps to place the financial statements 
in context (Souabni, 2011, p.13). Linsley and Shrives (2005) illustrate that forward-
looking information is more useful for decision-making and therefore has greater 
relevance than historical risk information.  
 
On the other hand, some researchers argue that forward-looking information is unreliable 
because of the uncertainties and subjective nature of forward-looking risk information 
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making it difficult to accurately predict and forecast future company behaviour (Cabedo  
and Tirado, 2004), which, in turn makes managers reluctant to disclose future risk 
information (Konishi and Ali, 2007). In addition, forward-looking information is 
considered as commercially sensitive information, which might affect companies‟ 
competitive position adversely (ICAEW, 1999; Emm et al., 2007). Another problem is 
that some companies may do their best to estimate and quantify their future risks but if 
the eventual outcome is different, this leaves them open to severe criticism and potential 
legal action from investors therefore managers may be reluctant to disclose such 
information (Mohobbot, 2005, p.120). 
 
Konishi and Ali (2007) found that past risk information was significantly higher than 
future risk information by Japanese companies and that some companies did not disclose 
any future risk information. Beattie et al. (2004) found that forward-looking information 
results in only 813 (6.6%) of the 12293 text units analysed and risk/opportunity forward-
looking disclosures comprise only 7% of the 813 forward-looking disclosures. Beretta 
and Bozzolan (2004) found that Italian companies provided limited forward-looking risk 
information. However, Linsley and Shrives (2006, p.400) found that forward-looking risk 
information was significantly higher than past disclosures in the context of UK 
companies and concluded that the adoption of a broad definition of risk may be a factor 
causing this result.  
 
Table 3.3: Forward-looking and past risk disclosure  
Study  Country Results  
Beattie, McInnes and 
Fearnley (2004) 
UK Forward-looking information results in only 813 
(6.6%) of the 12293 text units analysed 
Risk/opportunity forward-looking disclosures 
comprise only 7% of the 813 forward-looking 
disclosures. 
Linsley and Shrives (2005) UK Forward-looking risk information is 
significantly higher than past disclosures  
Mohobbot (2005) Japan Few forward-looking risks  
Lajili and Zegthal (2005) Canada Few disclosures on risk assessment and forecast  
Less forward-looking risk disclosure 
Beretta and Bozzolan 
(2004) 
Italy  Little forward-looking risk information  
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3.1.7 Good-bad-neutral risk disclosures  
 
Schrand and Elliot (1998) suggest that the mandated requirements for risk information 
may only need to mandate downside risk disclosure because firms have no incentives to 
provide bad news, whereas they have encouragement for voluntary disclosure of upside 
opportunities in order to signal their good performance and news. Ghazali (2008) found 
that management attitudes towards good news and bad news influenced corporate 
decisions on voluntary disclosure in annual reports. Linsley and Shrives (2006, p.392) 
argue that directors may choose not to disclose negative or bad news because they want 
to signal a good image of their management through annual reports and do not want to 
incur excessive reputation costs. In contrast, Mohobbot (2005, p.121) argue that 
managers have incentives to disclose bad-news risk information because 1) withholding 
such information would raise suspicions and potentially damage their reputations to a 
greater extent than if the information had been disclosed, 2) they would disclose bad 
news and attribute the causes to external factors, and 3) they want to warn of difficulties 
in the future.   
 
Some studies investigated empirically the nature of risk disclosure in terms of good, bad 
and neutral. Lajili and Zeghal (2005) found that the risk disclosures of Canadian 
companies focused on downside risks. However, Konishi and Ali (2007) found that the 
number of good-news risk disclosures was significantly higher than bad-news or neutral-
news risk disclosures by Japanese companies. They argue that this result implies that 
management may want to signal that it is capable and efficient at managing the 
company‟s risks. The following table summarises some empirical results. 
  
Table 3.4: Good-bad-neutral risk disclosures  
Study  Country Results  
Linsley and Shrives (2005) UK Numbers of neutral risk disclosures is the 
greatest followed by good-news risk disclosure 
and then bad-news risk disclosure.  
Konishi and Ali (2007) Japan Number of good news is significantly higher 
than bad news and neutral news 
No significant difference between bad news and 
neutral news 
Ghazali (2008) Malaysia Signalling theory explains good news/bad news 
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3.2 Mandatory risk disclosure  
 
3.2.1 Discussion on mandatory risk disclosure and regulation 
 
Financial scandals resulting from apparent misreporting raised concerns about the 
credibility of corporate reports and led to a series of legislative and regulatory responses 
which focused on disclosure through the establishment of financial reporting standards 
(Spira and Page, 2008). Disclosure has now become a significant tool of regulation and 
the key to achieving the desired step change in the quality of corporate reporting (Beattie, 
McInnes and Fearnley, 2004). There are many reasons that make regulators engage in 
disclosure practice, for instance market failure and behaviour modification. On the other 
hand, Foster (1979, cited by Apostolou & Nanopoulos, 2009) suggests that regulation and 
market forces may lead to inefficiencies in resource allocation and may lead to economic 
solutions which are undesirable. He recommends that regulators, therefore, be cautious in 
imposing additional costs on firms as this would potentially put the firms at a relative 
economic disadvantage. The following section will discuss these reasons in details.   
 
Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest that another explanation for disclosure regulation would 
be the absence market imperfections or externalities. “An accounting market failure is 
alleged to exist because the output of information in accounting report in the absence of 
regulation or the resource allocation resulting from the market for financial information is 
inequitable” (Watts and Zimmerman 1986, p.163). Market failure could be formed in 
cases when there is too little information which does not help in judging companies‟ 
performance and managers‟ stewardship. Another kind of failure can result in too much 
information that is too broad and vague.  
 
Another reason for regulating disclosure is behaviour modification, for example 
accountability and stewardship. One example of behaviour modification regulation would 
be corporate governance regulation where companies should comply with certain 
regulation or explain reasons for not complying. Behaviour modification is an „economic 
consequence‟ of disclosure which leads to certain regulation, for instance the Sarbanes-
  
38 
 
Oxley Act 2002 following big market scandals such as Enron and WorldCom. Behaviour 
modification can result in redistributive effects, the desirability of which cannot be 
determined by economic considerations but by legitimate political means.  
 
3.2.2 Legal requirements on risk disclosure and enforcement classification 
 
Companies are bound by an increasing number of regulations and norms which force 
them to communicate risk. Sources of regulation would be companies‟ acts, securities 
regulators‟ requirements, stock exchange listing requirements, corporate governance 
codes and accounting standards. Table 3.5 provides a summary of some mandatory 
requirements of risk disclosure in some developed countries.  
 
Table 3.5: Summary of mandatory requirements in developed countries  
Country  Mandatory risk disclosure requirement  Reference 
US SEC 1997 Financial Reporting Release No. 48 
(FRR48), Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 
SEC, (1997) 
UK Companies‟ Act 2006 ASB (2007) 
Germany The German Commercial Code (HGB) § 
289(1), 315(1) in 1998, GAS 5 
Dobler (2003);  
Kajuter et al. (2008)  
Europe 
Union 
Directive 2001/65/EC, Directive   
2003/51/EC, Directive 2004/109/EC 
Thuelin, Henneron and 
Touron (2006) 
Canada Canadian Securities Administrators 
requirements 
CA (2004), CICA (2006) 
Australia Corporate Governance Code, AASB7 Taylor (2011) 
 
Mandatory risk disclosure could be classified in terms of enforcement. The enforcement 
rate for the requirements on disclosure moves from voluntary disclosure which is scored 
as 0 in terms of enforcement towards legal requirements which gets the highest score. An 
accounting standards enforcement level depends on the regulatory regime of the country, 
whether it is compulsory to comply with a certain accounting standards (e.g. GAAP, 
IFRSs). The following Figure 3.1 shows a self-constructed diagram for enforcement 
classification for disclosure requirements. 
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Figure 3.1: Enforcement classification  
 
The above international review of the regulatory requirements on risk disclosure within 
developed countries indicates that regulations on risk disclosure have different legal 
sources and forms. In general, it can be seen that the current regulation approaches for 
risk disclosure follow three types. The first approach would be in the form of legislation 
where regulators introduce compulsory rules on risk disclosure and enforce companies by 
law to comply with these rules. Examples of this form of risk disclosure regulation would 
be in the US, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 and FFR48 release of SEC, 1997, and in 
Germany § 91 par.2 AktG and HGB) § 289(1), 315(1). 
 
The second approach of risk-related regulation is seen as soft law. It is based around 
voluntary codes and the principle of „comply or explain‟ (Spira and Page, 2008). These 
rules are part of corporate governance codes, for example risk disclosure related to risk 
management and internal control. Page and Spira (2008) state that argument in support of 
this approach relies on 1) the need for flexibility to recognise the range of diversity 
among companies and their business activities and 2) the assumption that the information 
provided about compliance will allow enforcement through market discipline. Examples 
of this type of regulation are the UK Combined Code and Turnbull Report.  
 
The third approach is referred to as non-statutory rules (Kajuter et al., 2008). These rules 
relate to accounting standards by standard setters such as IFRSs and GAAPs. Another 
form would be the recommendations for risk disclosure by professional institutes such as 
COSO (2004), Enterprise Risk Management Framework in the US and ICAEW (1997, 
1999) on risk reporting in the UK. These publications are usually more detailed and 
specific; however there is no sanction against non-adoption.  
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3.2.3 Debate about regulating risk disclosure 
 
A significant aspect of the risk-reporting debate has entered on the extent to which risk 
and risk management disclosure should be mandated. Cabedo and Tirado (2004) state that 
it seems clear that companies must report risks, but different opinions exist between 
academics and institutions on the need for compulsory reporting on risks and which type 
of risks firms must report on. Proponents of mandating risk disclosure promote some 
arguments to support their views. One argument would be that introducing mandatory 
risk reporting may force the manager to implement a risk early recognition and 
assessment which is adequate to provide the information necessary to fulfil the disclosure 
requirements (Dobler, 2003). Moreover, mandatory risk disclosure will promote equality 
among different companies; this is because as Linsley and Shrives (2005) conclude, some 
companies provide details and a variety of risk information whereas other companies 
provide little information.   
 
Some people may argue that there is no need for regulation on risk management and 
reporting since managers have the incentive to have a risk management system including 
reporting on the risks. Also, it may increase flexibility of the firms and reduce costs of 
compliance with laws. However, given interest conflicts and information asymmetry 
between managers and aspects outside the companies, managers may act against the 
interests of shareholders and stakeholders and risks might not be handled in the proper 
way which might result in reduced shareholder value or costs to stakeholders or society 
(Kajuter, 2006). Therefore, this would give theoretical support for the need for regulation 
on risk management and risk reporting in order to control managers‟ behaviour.  
 
On the other hand, some people argue that regulating such information may result in a 
boilerplate approach. Gould (2002) observes that although the Turnbull Report (1999) in 
the UK has led to many companies improving internal control and risk management 
systems, its failure to require companies to disclose the actual risks has resulted in 1) 
providing mundane statements or boilerplates describing internal control procedures 
which are not meaningful or relevant over time or 2) providing general and dynamic 
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narrative statements on the ongoing process of risk management and internal control. He 
also upholds that the boilerplate approach is observed within many American companies 
in their annual reports and is pursued by the dominance and advice of legal advisors and 
auditors. The strict litigation environment in the US stock market has led to a trend of 
seeking verification by lawyers for any disclosure statements. As a result US listed 
companies have become restricted in providing narrative discussions on business 
performance and assessing the future of the business and forward-looking information.  
 
Furthermore, increasing disclosure requirements arising from accounting standards and 
company law have made compliance with regulations increasingly difficult and complex 
(Dobler, 2003). Thuelin, Henneron and Touron (2006) state that the increase of 
mandatory risk reporting applying to companies leads to the question of whether or how 
companies are complying with these regulations. Deumes (2008) points out that a 
potential problem when regulating risk-factor disclosure is that much of the risk 
information is industry-specific and company-specific and that the most relevant 
information changes constantly as a result of rapid economic and technological changes. 
Regulating risk information might result in broad requirements which lead to reduce the 
usefulness and quality of information provided. The companies will then focus on 
achieving compliance instead of providing useful information which helps investors in 
their decision-making process. 
  
In the US, the risk disclosure requirements do little to enhance the quality of risk 
reporting and disclosure provided has wide variation in detail and clarity (Elmy, 
LeGuyarder and Linsmeier, 1998; Roulstone, 1999). Solomon, Solomon and Norton 
(2000) found that institutional investors in the UK do not generally favour a regulated 
environment for corporate risk disclosure. In Germany, where risk disclosure has been 
mandatory since 1998, empirical studies evidenced that there are significant deficiencies 
regarding the mandatory risk disclosure (Kajuter, 2003). Dobler (2005a) states that 
empirical evidence from Germany indicates that risk information just slightly improved 
after explicitly obliging firms to report on their risk. However, he argues that this may be 
due to lack of experience and practice, vague disclosure rules and poor enforcement.  
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3.3 Accounting standards and risk disclosure 
 
3.3.1 Risk-related accounting standards 
 
Dobler (2005b) argues that an international standard for risk reporting may enhance 
comparability among entities internationally and there is potential for convergence in 
risk-reporting requirements. According to Cooke (1992) the disclosure of information in 
annual reports involves a company in costs related to information gathering, management 
supervision, audit and legal fees and the dissemination of the information. Therefore, it 
would appear that there is a disincentive to disclose any information voluntarily and one 
solution would be through an accounting standard or a flexible framework on risk 
reporting (Shrives and Linsley, 2003). 
 
Risk-related accounting standards focus mainly on financial risks and pay less attention 
to non-financial risks. Cabedo and Tirado (2004) state that there is a lack of risk 
information because accounting standards and regulatory bodies (e.g. IASB, FASB, SEC) 
focus on financial aspects, for instance the compulsory disclosure of market risks arising 
from the use of financial assets; however these rules do not refer to any other risks 
affecting firms such as non-financial risks and financial risks other than market risks. 
Examples of risk-related issues within accounting standards would be going concern 
uncertainties, financial instruments (credit risk, liquidity risk, currency risk, interest rate 
risk, and price risk), derivatives and hedging accounting. The table below shows some 
references to risk disclosure requirements within accounting standards.  
 
Table 3.6: References to risk disclosure in national requirements  
Country Standard Reference  
US US-GAAP, SFAS 5, SFAS 133, SOP 94-
6.11-16, SOP 94-6.21-24, SFAS 131.39 
Dobler (2005b) 
UK FRS 4, FRS 5, FRS 8, FRS 13 Linsley and Shrives (2000) 
Germany GAS5 Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) 
Australia AASB7 Taylor (2011) 
UAE IFRS Hassan (2009) 
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3.3.2 International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) 
 
The main objective of financial reporting is to provide information about the financial 
position, performance and financial adaptability of an enterprise that is useful to a wide 
range of users for assessing the stewardship of management and for making economic 
decisions (ASB, 1996, p.845; Linsley and Shrives 2000, p.123). Risk-related information 
has been recognised by IASB in the form of various standards. According to Dobler 
(2005b) while IFRSs comprise no comprehensive standard on risk reporting, there are 
several rules on specific risk disclosures, for instance information on uncertainties and on 
key sources of estimation uncertainty and material going concern (IAS 1), information on 
contingent assets and liabilities (IAS 37), information on risks, risk concentrations and 
risk management associated with financial instruments (IAS 32, IAS 39) and IFRS 7 
which require the inclusion of market risk information in annual reports (Alfredson, Leo, 
Picker, Pacter, Radford, Wise, 2007). Risk-related IFRSs are provided in Appendix C. 
 
Taylor, Tower and Neilson (2010) argue that implementation of IFRS requirements 
places additional pressure on listed companies to disclose information relating to their 
financial risk management strategies. They state that such pressures are generated 
internally via the reporting requirement by senior management and board directors and 
are generated externally through stakeholders (e.g. investors) and external auditors 
demanding explanations for major accounting adjustments following implementation of 
IFRS. They found a positive association between the adoption of IFRS and the extent of 
financial risk disclosure levels by Australian listed firms.  
 
3.3.3 Management commentary standard of IASB 
 
IASB (2005) recognises that management commentary is an important section within 
annual reports. IASB recommends that financial reports should include discussion of 
risks and uncertainties which is seen as an essential in assisting investors to interpret the 
financial statements and understand the critical issues facing the company (Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006; Kajuter, Linsley and Woods, 2008). The standard will make it mandatory 
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for companies to discuss related risks within management commentary
1
. The guidance 
emphasises that commentary may help users of the annual reports to understand included 
information on the entity's risk exposures, its strategies for managing risks and the 
effectiveness of those strategies, information on the company future (forward-looking 
information), a clear description of the most important risks and uncertainties facing the 
entity.    
 
3.3.4 Debate on a comprehensive standard on risk disclosure 
 
An example of a comprehensive standard on risk reporting is GAS 5 in Germany. GAS 5 
is assigned a forerunner role in standardising risk reporting and it is still the only standard 
on comprehensive risk reporting worldwide (Dobler, 2005b). Despite some advantages of 
having a comprehensive standard on risk reporting such as GAS 5, there are many 
disadvantages. According to Shrives and Linsley (2003), GAS 5 is somewhat imprecise 
and does not give much in the way of advice with regard to compliance and some 
guidance still remains broad. The danger with the creation of a standard that is so broad is 
that the quality of disclosures deteriorates into rather bland statements of risk and then the 
ability of stakeholders to make well-informed decision is severely impaired (Shrives and 
Linsley, 2003).  
 
Moreover, Deumes (2008) states that relevant information does not lend itself to 
standardisation and most standard setters and regulators allow firms a large degree of 
discretion in drafting risk sections, for example in some regimes it is allowed for 
companies to omit commercially sensitive information. In addition, Lajili and Zeghal 
(2005) promote that the question of whether it would be more beneficial to make 
mandatory risk disclosure for non-financial risk is remaining open. This is because of the 
difficulty in measuring and objectively assessing some risks, such as operational risks 
that differ from firm to firm and industry to industry, and auditing such mandatory risk 
disclosure may pose challenges. 
  
                                               
1  It is similar to MD&A in the US and OFR in the UK 
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3.4 Firm specific characteristics and risk disclosure 
 
3.4.1 Company’s size and risk disclosure 
 
Firm size is the most widely used and linked variable to disclosure and it is a strong 
driver for disclosure. Size proxies various disclosure theories which make it complex to 
interpret the size effect and its meaning is unclear (Raffournier, 1997). There are many 
theoretical explanations for the association between firm size and disclosure. Information 
asymmetry is seen between investors and firms‟ managers. There is an increased demand 
by investors for information; however the costs associated with producing such 
information may hold managers back from increasing disclosure. The factor suggested is 
firm size in the sense that the bigger the company is, the larger the investors who demand 
more information and the larger the absolute benefit from availability of the information 
such as lower relative cost.   
 
Many studies use firm size as a proxy for political costs. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) 
argue that political costs are higher in large companies than small firms. This is because 
the larger the company, the wider the shareholders and stakeholders. Also, they attract 
bigger attention of the media, public and politicians (Linsley and Shrives, 2000). Cooke 
(1989a) suggests that reducing political costs may provide incentives for managers to 
disclose more information. It is also argued that large companies have efficient 
information systems which may make disclosing additional information less costly than 
in small companies.  
 
Lopes and Rodrigues (2007, p.32) argue that proprietary costs related to competitive 
disadvantages of disclosure are smaller as company size increases. Disclosure is costly 
and needs highly skilled employees. Large-sized companies tend to have large financial 
means and employ professional skills in the management and reporting process. 
Stakeholder theory is also applied to interpret risk disclosure behaviour. Amran, Bin and 
Hassan (2009, p.45) argue that as a company becomes bigger, the number of stakeholders 
is increased and it is expected that the burden of disclosure becomes heavier to fulfil their 
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needs. Linsley and Shrives (2006, p.274) state that stakeholders may have an expectation 
that larger firms should be providing more disclosures or the stakeholders may have 
varied needs for information and large firms may be responding to their expectations or 
needs.  
 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004, p.281) argue that in large companies the proportion of 
outside capital tends to be high (e.g. they borrow a higher proportion of their assets from 
banks) and the complexity is high (in the sense that bigger companies face more risks). 
Large companies have a number of diverse operations and face more complexity than 
small firms and hence it would be expected that they have more risks and information to 
report on to the users (Abraham, et al., 2007). Such large companies tend to disclose 
more to meet the information needs of their lenders. However, Deumes and Knechel 
(2008, p.46) argue that high inherent risk also makes it more likely that weaknesses in 
reporting on risks occur. 
 
In risk disclosure and empirical disclosure studies, most also show positive association. 
However, some studies find no association (e.g. Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). Botosan 
(2004) critiques Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) work. She said that their resulting index is 
inadequate and does not capture the quality of risk disclosure and that is why they found 
risk disclosure is not related to firm size and industry type. She said that these two 
variables are widely found in prior research as explanations to disclosure behaviour and 
practice. The main results on the relationship between firm size and risk disclosure are 
summarised in Table 3.7. Most empirical research on general disclosure (non-risk 
disclosure) shows positive and significant association between size and disclosure (e.g. 
McNally et al., 1982; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989a; Wallace et al., 1994, 
Hossain et al., 1994).  
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Table 3.7: Risk disclosure and company size 
Study Country Results  Measurements  
Risk disclosure studies    
Linsley and Shrives (2005) UK Positive Turnover, Market 
capitalisation 
Mohobbot (2005) Japan Positive  Total assets, turnover 
Amran, Bin, Hassan (2009) Malaysia Positive  Revenue  
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) Italy Not significant Turnover 
Hassan (2009) UAE Not significant Total assets 
Rajab and Schachler (2009) UK Not significant Sales 
Taylor (2011) Australia Not significant Market capitalisation  
 
3.4.2 Company’s performance and risk disclosure  
 
Profitability is a proxy for firm performance which may be of interest to the users of 
annual reports. Signalling theory leads to a hypothesis suggesting a relationship between 
disclosure companies‟ performance variables, such as profitability. Managers will want 
also to signal their superior risk management abilities to the marketplace via risk 
disclosures in the annual report (Konishi and Ali, 2007). It is argued that managers of the 
companies with better performance would be willing to disclose more information in 
order to signal good news to the market and attract more capital.  
 
Also, companies that are better at risk management will have higher levels of relative 
profitability because efficient risk management systems will help in identifying and 
managing such risks in their early stage which in turn will help in avoiding such losses 
and increasing companies‟ performance and profitability. In addition, it could be assumed 
that profitable companies have more resources available to invest in internal control and 
risk management systems (Deumes and Knechel, 2008) and therefore shareholders and 
investors of such profitable companies would have less demand for the information 
related to the risks and their management.  
 
Empirical studies have considered the association between risk disclosure and 
profitability. The results show that there is no significant correlation. These findings 
consist of the findings of meta-analysis study by Ahmed and Courits (1999). They 
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evidence that there is no association between disclosure and profitability. Table 3.8 
summarises the results of previous empirical studies. 
 
Table 3.8: Risk disclosure and company performance 
Study  Country Results  Measurement 
Risk disclosure studies    
Mohobbot (2005) Japan Not significant ROA, ROE 
Konishi and Ali (2007) Japan Not significant ROA, ROE 
Deumes and Knechel (2008) Netherlands Positive  Profitability 
Neri (2010)  Italy Negative Profit 
Non-risk disclosure studies     
Ahmed and Courtis (1999) Multiple 
countries 
Not significant Multiple measures 
Al-Shayeb (2003) UAE Not significant Net profit, book value 
of equity 
Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) UAE  Positive Net income/Net sales 
Aljifri (2008) UAE Not significant Net income/Net sales 
 
3.4.3 Liquidity and risk disclosure 
 
Information on a company's liquidity is an important issue in many aspects, for instance 
regulatory bodies, shareholders and debtholders. The inability of a company to meet its 
short-term and long-term financial commitments may result in delay in paying debts and 
in extreme cases go to bankruptcy and loss of confidence among those interested parties, 
for instance lenders and creditors (Naser, Al-Khatib & Karbhari, 2002). Accounting 
standards require a retrospective cash flow statement to be produced to inform users of 
the liquidity flows and to aid in the evaluation of the company‟s capacity to generate 
liquidity and of its needs (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004 p.193).  
 
Capital need theory could be applied in this term in order to understand the association 
between disclosure and liquidity. Companies seek financial capital from external sources 
such as banks through borrowing agreements which in general restrict their ability to 
meet such commitments. Liquidity ratios concern the ability of a company to meet their 
short-term commitments. Major debtholders demand information, including risk 
information, in order to assess companies‟ financial positions.  
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Agency costs theory describes the conflict between shareholders and debtholders or 
between managers and debtholders. In practice actions that may maximise shareholders‟ 
wealth may worsen debtholders‟ interest. For example, increasing dividends significantly 
will make the firm become riskier (insufficient cash) which in turn hurts lenders. One 
example of the conflict between managers and debtholders would arise when managers 
decide to borrow more on the same assets which make existing lenders worse off. The 
potential for such conflicts would encourage debtholders to demand more information on 
companies, especially risk information.  
 
Empirical evidence on the association between disclosure and liquidity reported mixed 
results in the sense that some studies reported a negative association (e.g. Wallace et al., 
1994; Naser, Al-Khatib & Karbhari 2002) whereas some studies found an insignificant 
association (Owusu-Ansah & Yeoh, 2005; Al Shammari et al., 2008). Table 3.8 provides 
a summary of some empirical studies on the association between disclosure and liquidity. 
 
Table 3.9: Risk disclosure and liquidity  
Study  Country Results  Measurement  
Non risk disclosure studies    
Wallace, Naser & Mora (1994) Spain Negative  Liquidity ratio 
Naser, Al-Khatib & Karbhari 
(2002) 
Jordan Negative  Current ratio 
Wallace and Nasser (1995) Hong Kong Not significant Liquidity ratio 
Owusu-Ansah (1998) Zimbabwe Not significant Acid-test ratio 
Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh 
(2005) 
New Zealand Not significant Quick ratio 
 
3.4.4 Company's risk level and risk disclosure 
 
Leverage is used as proxy for agency costs in many studies, suggesting that a higher 
leverage level leads to higher agency costs (Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007). Monitoring cost 
of lending agreements as an element of agency cost is represented by leverage variables. 
Abraham, Solomon and Stevenson (2007, p.15) argue that “companies that are perceived 
to have higher levels of risk of the market have incentives to disclose more information in 
order to reduce monitoring costs that shareholders will incur when investing in the 
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company”. The argument here lies on the conflict between shareholders and creditors in 
the sense that higher levels of risk could transfer potential wealth from debtholders to 
shareholders or managers. Therefore, it could be assumed that companies with higher 
levels of risk will disclose greater amounts of risk information as the directors have an 
incentive to explain the causes of these risks in order to reduce agency costs (Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006).  
 
With regard to signalling theory, a leverage variable is used as proxy for signalling 
arguments to explain disclosure practice within public companies. In terms of companies 
with high risk levels, it is expected that they would be willing to disclose additional 
information on how they manage risks in order to signal to the market's participants and 
stakeholders that there is an efficient risk management system in place and management 
abilities and skills in handling such risks (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). However, some 
authors argue that such companies may be reluctant to disclose risk information 
voluntarily because they may not want to pay attention to their risk level where investors 
then may consider them a risky business and decide not to invest in such risky companies 
(Mohobbot, 2005). By contrast, companies with lower risk levels would send good 
signals by disclosing more risk information in order to attract more capital.    
 
Despite the theoretical arguments above which assume a positive association between 
leverage levels and risk disclosure, empirical studies on such association show either 
positive or no significant association. It is observed that none of the prior studies 
reviewed in this thesis show negative association. Linsley and Shrives (2005) observe 
that the principal driver affecting levels of risk disclosure in the UK is company size and 
not company risk level. They argue that few studies consider companies‟ level of risk 
because there are difficulties associated with measuring such variables (Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006). Their results confirmed that stakeholders in the UK are not being 
provided with sufficient risk information particularly by those with higher levels of risk.  
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Table 3.10: Risk disclosure and company risk level  
Study  Country Results  Measurements  
Linsley and Shrives (2005) UK Not significant 
 
Positive 
Gearing, beta, asset cover, 
book-to-market value of equity 
Environmental risk 
Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) Portugal  Not significant Debt-to-equity ratio 
Konishi and Ali (2007) Japan Not significant Gearing, market-to-book ratios 
Abraham and Cox (2007) UK Positive 
Not significant 
Stock price volatility,  
Total debts/total assets 
Hassan et al. (2008) Malaysia Positive Debt to total assets 
Deumes and Knechel (2008) Netherlands Positive  Ratio of the book value of debt 
to the sum of the market value 
of equity and the book value of 
debt  
Hassan (2009) UAE Positive Debt to equity 
Debt to assets  
Amran et al. (2009) Malaysia Not significant Total liabilities/total assets 
Rajab and Schachler (2009) UK Not significant Leverage  
 
3.4.5 Industry type and risk disclosure  
 
Companies in different types of industry may face different degrees of costs and 
competition pressure which may lead to different degrees of disclosure demand by users 
of information. Also, companies which operate in different industries are expected to 
experience different kinds of risks and exposures and subject to special regulations 
(Hassan, 2009, p.45). Beretta and Bozzolan (2004, p.281) state that industry effects can 
be further included in the term of risk disclosure because the technological and market 
constraints exerted by the competitive industrial environment on business models 
influence significantly the risk profile of companies.  
 
The association between risk disclosure and industry type can be explained by political 
costs. Linsley and Shrives (2000, p.125) state that “companies‟ directors may be 
disclosing information in order to reduce the chance of more detailed and more costly 
requirements being introduced by law, accounting standards or stock exchange 
requirements”. Therefore, it is indicated that there is a positive association between 
political costs and risk disclosure which could be captured by industry type.  
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In the grounds of signalling theory, Lopes and Rodrigues (2007, p.32) argue that 
signalling theory provides a line for risk disclosure and industry type association, in the 
sense that companies in the same industry are interested in having the same level of 
disclosure in order to avoid negative appreciation by the market. Hassan (2009) states 
that corporations may adopt certain or unnecessary disclosure practices in order to signal 
to stakeholders that they are adopting state-of-the-art disclosure practices similar to other 
corporations in the same industry which may lead to variation in disclosure in accordance 
with the industry type.  
 
Proprietary costs vary according to industry membership (Verrecchia, 2001). Industry 
type may be proxy for differences in the proprietary costs of disclosure. Competitive 
pressure within the same industry may lead companies to hold sensitive commercial 
information. This argument implies that a negative association is expected between 
proprietary costs and risk disclosure. Empirical evidence on the association between risk 
disclosure and industry type reveals mixed results as shown in Table 3.11 below. The 
empirical results reflect the theoretical discussions above which do not indicate a certain 
direction of the relationship between disclosure and industry type because industry type is 
considered a proxy for different theories which makes it complex to interpret the 
industry-disclosure association.  
 
Table 3.11: Risk disclosure and industry type  
Study  Country Results  Measurement 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) Italy Not significant Transport, electronics, 
clothing, food, utilities, 
media 
Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) Portugal Negative Finance  
Konishi and Ali (2007) Japan Not significant Non-financial firms 
Abraham and Cox (2007) UK Positive Industries, consumer, 
services, technology, 
utilities 
Amran, Bin, Hassan (2009) Malaysia Positive Consumer, trading, 
technology, infrastructure 
Rajab and Schachler (2009) UK Positive Resources, industries, 
consumer, utilities 
technology 
Hassan (2009) UAE Significant Financial/non-financial 
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3.4.6 Auditor type and risk disclosure 
 
Managers are responsible for the production of information and preparation of annual 
reports; however auditors may exercise some influence or provide some advice regarding 
the level of disclosure to give (Firth, 1979, p.274). Capital providers require firms to hire 
an independent auditor as a condition of financing, even when it is not required by 
regulation (Healy and Palepu, 2001, p.415). Auditors provide investors with independent 
assurance that the firm‟s financial statements conform to regulation and accounting 
standards requirements. Some researchers question the credibility of auditors for several 
reasons including 1) auditors may act in the interest of the companies‟ directors who hire 
them, rather than in the interest of the firms‟ investors, 2) they do not provide timely 
signals because they provide assurance only on annual reports, and 3) auditors are 
concerned about minimising their legal liability rather than enhancing the credibility of 
financial reports (Healy and Palepu, 2001, p.415).  
 
Nonetheless, researchers believe that external auditors still play an important role in 
improving firms‟ overall reporting strategies and they suggest that large audit firms may 
promote disclosure practice within the company (Hail, 2002). There are many 
explanations for this influence. The first is related to agency cost theory. Audit is one 
type of monitoring activity that increases the value of the firm and reduces the agency 
problems that arise between the firm managers and principles (Watts and Zimmerman 
1983, p.613). Inchausti (1997) argues that companies engaging large audit firms are those 
that have substantial agency costs and try to reduce the conflicts by contracting with large 
audit firms.  
 
Secondly, big audit companies may have more concern for their reputation as providers 
of better audit quality than small auditors and hence they have the power to influence the 
disclosure practice of their clients and report on a breach in accounting rules (Watt and 
Zimmerman, 1986). Many recent companies‟ financial scandals (e.g. Enron) led to 
removal of a big audit firms from the audit process (e.g. Arthur Andersen). Such events 
make audit firms more risk avoiding and conservative.  
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Furthermore, signalling theory assumption is also applied to understand disclosure audit-
size relationship. Firm size is suggested to be a proxy for such assumptions. The theory 
indicates that large companies‟ managers may be in favour of hiring big audit companies 
in order to signal that financial statements and annual reports which are audited by large 
audit firms may increase the confidence of the investors. As a consequence, investors will 
be less demanding for more information on risks. In addition, big audit firms have strong 
incentives to signal to the market their higher audit quality which implies that they will 
influence their client companies‟ disclosure practice, for example they might encourage 
their client to be fully compliant with regulatory and accounting standards requirements.    
 
Flegm (2004) reviewed the major frauds of recent years, including for example Enron, 
WorldCom, Global Crossing, Qwest etc. He found that Arthur Andersen was the auditor 
of these companies. The author claimed that in the Parmalat case it was the auditor 
(Deloitte & Touche) who uncovered the fraud of $12 billion over 14 years. Ahmed and 
Courtis (1999, p.53) find no significant association between voluntary and aggregate 
disclosures and audit size. However, there is a positive association between audit size and 
mandatory disclosure. They argue that the degree of compliance with mandatory 
disclosure regulations is higher for firms employing big audit firms than for those 
employing small audit firms. Within the context of UAE empirical studies, Aljifri and 
Hussainey (2007) find no significant association between forward-looking disclosure and 
audit size. The following table shows that there are mixed results in this regard but none 
of the studies found negative association. 
 
Table 3.12: Risk disclosure and auditor type 
Study  Country Results  Measurement  
Risk disclosure studies    
Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) Portugal Positive Big 4/non-Big 4 
Deumes and Knechel (2008) Netherlands Not significant Big 6/non-Big 6 
Neri (2010) Italy Not significant Big 4/non-Big 4 
Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) UAE  Not significant Big 4/non-Big 4 
Non-risk disclosure studies    
Singhvi and Desai (1971) USA Positive  Big 8/non-Big 8 
Firth (1979) UK Not significant Big 8/non-Big 8 
Hossain, Perera & Rhaman (1995) New Zealand Positive Big 6/non-Big 6 
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3.5 Corporate governance and risk disclosure 
 
3.5.0 Introduction  
 
Corporate governance literature examines widely the association between corporate 
governance mechanism and corporate performance. This study focuses on the influence 
of corporate governance mechanism on disclosure practice with emphasis on risk 
disclosure. There have been growing studies on the influence of corporate governance on 
general disclosure, especially within developed capital markets; however the influence of 
corporate governance on risk disclosure particularly has been limited, especially within 
emerging capital markets. Therefore, this study attempts to address this gap and 
contribute to the literature of disclosure and corporate governance, on the influence of 
corporate governance and its characteristics and on risk disclosure level and practice.  
 
3.5.1 Corporate governance and risk disclosure  
 
3.5.1.1 Corporate governance definition   
 
Corporate governance has grown significantly in the last decade and has become an 
important part in corporate and organisation structure. “Corporate governance is the 
system and process by which entities are directed and controlled to enhance performance 
and sustainable shareholder value and it is concerned with the effectiveness of 
management structures, the sufficiency and reliability of corporate reporting and the 
effectiveness of risk management systems” (Sharman and Copnell, 2002). Solomon and 
Solomon (2004, p. 14) state that “Corporate governance is the system of checks and 
balances, both internal and external to companies, which ensure that companies discharge 
their accountability to all stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of 
their business activities”. The main elements of the corporate governance mechanism are 
the board of directors‟ structure, roles, responsibilities and remuneration, internal control, 
audit committee, internal audit, risk management and shareholders‟ rights.  
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3.5.1.2 Corporate governance and disclosure theories   
 
Although there is growing literature on corporate governance issues, discussions on the 
function of directors in the disclosure process have not been extensively explored 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). The theoretical link between corporate governance and 
disclosure has been through agency theory and information asymmetry and 
accountability. Corporate governance mechanisms are introduced to control agency 
problems and ensure that managers act in the interest of shareholders (Ho and Wong, 
2001). The theoretical lines for corporate governance and risk disclosure rely on agency 
costs, information asymmetry and accountability.  
 
Agency cost theory describes the conflicts between managers and investors where 
managers‟ interest diverges from investors‟ interest. Monitoring is one important element 
in controlling the behaviour of managers and reducing agency conflicts (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Several studies suggest different monitoring mechanisms, for instance 
independent external auditing, internal auditing, timely financial reviews and audit 
committees. Internal control can also serve as a monitoring mechanism that reduces the 
efficiency loss of agency conflicts because it provides management with more reliable 
information for financial reporting purposes (Deumes and Knechel, 2008, p.40).   
 
Information asymmetry conflicts between people inside the company (e.g. managers) and 
people outside the company (e.g. shareholders) could also be applied in the case of 
internal control. Internal control systems and their activities can not directly be observed 
by those outside the companies. In some cases where there is an absence of existence 
guidance or regulation on internal control, investors are unlikely to be fully informed 
about nature, extent and quality of internal controls. This will in turn make it difficult for 
investors or stakeholders to observe managers‟ efforts to manage risks. Managers could 
mitigate information asymmetry problems by voluntarily disclosing information on risk 
management and internal control. Reducing information asymmetry conflicts will lower 
the uncertainty of investors in forecasting future pay-offs from their investment and 
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reduce estimation risks which could reduce the cost of capital (Deumes and Knechel, 
2008, p.40).   
 
Spira and Page (2003, p.656) state that “the corporate governance framework was 
designed to manage risk through, inter alia, the accountability mechanisms of financial 
reporting, audit and internal control”. Corporate governance promotes the need to 
separate ownership and control of firms and the need for disclosure in the sense that 
companies should be more transparent and accountable to stakeholders. Ghazali (2008) 
argues that accountability is one of the factors influencing voluntary disclosure. 
Information to shareholders is one of the most important aspects of corporate governance 
as it reflects the degree of transparency and accountability of the corporation towards its 
shareholders (Mallin, 2002, p.254).  
 
3.5.1.3 The influence of corporate governance on risk disclosure 
 
There has been a strong link between corporate governance and disclosure, for instance 
FRC (2008) states that the Combined Code on Corporate Governance supports company 
performance, management effectiveness, and shareholder value and promotes confidence 
in corporate reporting and governance. "Corporate governance codes and their 
recommendations undoubtedly contribute towards increased transparency and 
disclosures" (Mallin, 2002, p.253). In addition, a range of corporate governance literature 
contributes to the link between corporate governance and risks and risk management and 
risk disclosure (e.g. Solomon and Solomon, 2004).  
 
The important insights into proper risk reporting, internal control and risk management 
arise from corporate governance (Solomon et al., 2000). Good corporate governance 
requires that companies adopt a system that involves a methodical approach to risk 
management, internal control and disclosure. The system should 1) protect the interests of 
their shareholders and stakeholders 2) ensure that the board of directors discharges its 
duties to direct strategy, 3) build value and monitor performance of the organisation and 
4) ensure that management controls are in place and are performing adequately.  
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Ghazali (2008) found that corporate governance structure and management accountability 
were influencing voluntary disclosure. Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) found that corporate 
governance has a weak influence on companies‟ disclosure and compliance with IAS. 
The following table shows a summary of some empirical results. 
 
Table 3.13: Corporate governance and risk disclosure   
Study  Country Results  Measurement 
Solomon and 
Solomon (2000) 
UK Positive  Corporate governance has increasing 
emphasis on corporate risk disclosure 
Ghazali (2008) Malaysia  Positive Corporate governance structure  
Lopes and 
Rodrigues (2007) 
Portugal  Not significant Compliance with corporate governance 
 
3.5.2 Internal control and risk disclosure  
 
COSO (1992, p.13) defines internal control as a process, affected by an entity‟s board of 
directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of financial reporting 
and compliance with laws and regulation. Risk disclosure is one of the main stages of 
internal control. Different levels within an organisation need different risk information 
and communication. In general, companies communicate risk disclosure at three levels: 
internal, intermediate and external. AIRMIC, ALARM, IRM (2002) uphold that the 
formal reporting of risk management should address the control methods, the process 
used to identify and address risks, the primary control and the monitoring system in place 
to manage significant risks.    
 
The ICAEW issues „The Turnbull Report on Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on 
the Combined Code 1999‟ which is considered as guidance on internal control, risk 
management and related disclosure. The guidance publications encourage companies to 
report on their key risks but without making it mandatory (ICAEW, 2002). Following a 
thorough implementation of the Turnbull Report in the UK, companies should be in a 
position to demonstrate that their internal risk management and internal control systems 
are working effectively which is fundamental to increase risk disclosure (Gould, 2002). 
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However, the Turnbull Report provides little guidance on what information companies 
should disclose, where it should be disclosed and what form the disclosure should take 
(Solomon et al., 2000, p.453).  
 
3.5.2.1 The correlation between risk disclosure and the internal control system  
 
The influence of internal control on disclosure practice of companies is discussed 
theoretically in terms of information asymmetry and agency cost theories. Internal control 
activities are not known to external parties, but managers have superior information. 
Therefore, in order to reduce information problems and agency costs, managers will have 
an incentive to report voluntarily on internal control systems and risks to external parties 
such as shareholders and stakeholders, who have an incentive to know about internal 
control systems and risks in order to monitor managers and the company.  
 
Deumes and Knechel‟s (2008) findings supported that managers voluntarily report more 
on internal control if information asymmetry and agency conflicts are higher. Forker 
argues that disclosure in financial statements enhances monitoring. He said that 
disclosure is the obvious means of communicating the existence of corporate governance 
devices rather than only existence which may increase the likelihood of identifying 
positive associations with disclosure (Forker, 1992). Table 3.14 provides a summary of 
the association between risk disclosure and internal control.  
 
Table 3.14: Risk disclosure and internal control   
Study  Country Results  Measurement 
Forker (1992) UK Positive Communicate internal control system 
Deumes and 
Knechel‟s (2008) 
Netherlands Positive  Report on internal control system 
Solomon and 
Solomon (2000)  
UK Positive Internal control  
 
 
 
 
  
60 
 
3.5.3 Risk management and risk disclosure 
 
Risk management has been considered an important element of corporate governance. 
There is a growing influence of risk management on financial reporting and accounting. 
Corporate failures and bankruptcies such as Enron have led to an increasing interest in 
risk management and have been fuelled by regulatory initiatives to specify the 
requirements for corporate governance, internal control and risk management (Kajuter et 
al., 2008). Risk management is a rapidly developing discipline and there are many varied 
views and descriptions of what risk management involves, how it should be conducted 
and what it is for (AIRMIC, ALARM, IRM, 2002).  
 
Risk disclosure must be illuminated in the context of risk management which involves 
identifying risk factors, analysing risks, deciding upon measures of risk handing and 
controlling effects (Dobler, 2005a). The ICAEW (2002) states that companies should 
report on the actions the company takes in order to manage the risks to which it is 
exposed. Different management has different risk strategies, objectives and tolerances, 
therefore investors should be aware of the key business risks and how each risk is 
managed. The benefits of risk management include maximisation of shareholder as it 
aims to maximise profitability while at the same time reducing probability of financial 
failure (Solomon et al., 2000).  
 
3.5.3.1 Theoretical discussion on risk management  
 
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) provides theoretical justifications for risk 
management. Market imperfections are discussed by agency theory which highlights 
conflicts of interest between agents (directors) and principals (shareholders). Risk 
management can be seen as a monitoring mechanism in order to mitigate agency 
problems (Kajuter, Linsley and Wood 2008). In addition, there is information asymmetry 
between people inside companies (managers) and those outside (shareholders and 
stakeholders) concerning risk information in terms of risks that companies faced or will 
face in the future and how these risks are measured and managed. The risk management 
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system enables shareholders to monitor the compliance with contractual agreement 
(between managers and shareholders) and reduce the monitoring costs caused by 
information asymmetries (Kajuter, 2006).  
 
3.5.3.2 Risk management framework 
 
The well-known framework on risk management has been introduced by the Committee 
of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission (COSO). COSO (2004, p.2) 
defines enterprise risk management as “a process, affected by an entity‟s board of 
directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the 
enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage 
risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of entity objectives”. The ERM framework describes principles of risk 
management and its components including internal environment, objective setting, event 
identification, risk assessment, risk response, control activities, information and 
communication and finally monitoring. Figure 3.2 below shows the ERM framework 
stages.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Enterprise risk management Source: COSO (2004) 
 
Risk disclosure relies on the information and communication stage within this model. 
However, the framework does not fulfil the need of boards of directors, audit committees, 
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senior financial managers and external stakeholders who need more detailed guidance in 
terms of the measurement and management of firm risks (Epstein and Rejc, 2005).   
 
3.5.3.3 Internal and external risk factors 
 
Risks facing companies can result from internal and external factors. Internal risk factors 
arise from internal environments, for example liquidity and cash flow, research and 
development, intellectual capital, information systems and products and services. This 
component includes organisation structure, board of directors, human resource policies 
and assignment of responsibility and ethical values. External factors arise from external 
environments, for instance technological progress, customer demands, global forces, 
continuously changing business models and increased competitive pressures, and 
government regulations creating additional uncertainty.  
 
3.5.3.4 Measurement of risks   
 
The ICAEW (2002) upholds that companies should report on measurement of risks they 
face. Measurement of risk is important because it will result in better allocating capital 
internally, deciding on the most cost-effective way to manage a risk and gaining a 
competitive advantage. There is no standard way in measuring risks. Examples of risk 
measurement include firstly, accounting measures such as contingencies, provisions, 
expected values and discounted cash flow valuations; secondly, non-accounting 
performance measures based on external data; thirdly, sensitivity analysis of the effects of 
changes in key variables on both accounting and non-accounting measures; and finally, 
value at risk related to accounting measures. 
 
3.5.3.5 External risk reporting framework 
 
Risk disclosure concerning the risk management process involves publishing a clear risk 
management covering risk management policies and responsibilities, and reporting 
systematically risks or failures that the company faces. For the purpose of this thesis, the 
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focus will be on risk reporting to satisfy the demand for risk disclosure by external users 
and within annual reports. Public expectations are growing in respect of reliability in the 
disclosure of risks because such disclosure is useful in making investment decisions. 
Therefore, communication of relevant risk information to external parties leads to a better 
understanding of the circumstances and risks the organisation faces (Epstein and Rejc, 
2005). 
 
Epstein and Buhovac (2006) recognise that there is a need to develop a way to effectively 
communicate companies‟ risks and risk management processes both internally and 
externally. They provide a risk-reporting model for external users. The first step is 
identifying the audiences and risk categories that they would be interested in for example 
external users would be shareholders, financial analysts, regulators, creditors, auditors, 
customers, suppliers and society. The second step is choosing the frequency of a risk 
report on the basis of real time and periodic. This stage involves compliance to 
mandatory requirements and cost-benefit analysis of voluntary disclosure to an external 
audience. The third stage is to decide on the content of a risk report. The authors state that 
managers must assure investors and stakeholders that firms‟ risks are well managed, 
including risks and actions taken to measure and manage them.  
 
The fourth step involves designing the format of a risk report, for example narrative 
descriptions, graphical disclosures, and risk response initiatives, put in a business context. 
The authors claim that this may help external users to better understand the importance of 
this information for decision-making. The final stage is to decide on the placement, 
distribution and communication of risk reports. The authors suggest examples including 
MD&A, another part of an annual report, quarterly reports and website.   
 
3.5.3.6 The correlation between risk disclosure and risk management 
 
An essential stage of risk management systems is risk reporting, where possible, 
internally and externally. It is expected that the existence of a proper risk management 
system would encourage more disclosure on risks. In addition, in theory assigning a risk 
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committee body is likely to attach greater importance to risk management and risk 
disclosure (Neri, 2010). Hassan, Saleh and Abd Rahman (2008, p.10) argue that a risk 
management committee has an obligation to identify, prioritise, manage risks and provide 
proper disclosure about risks to the shareholders for whom they are accountable therefore 
it is expected that the quality of disclosure in firms with a risk management committee is 
more than the firms without such a committee.  
 
Hassan (2009) examines the influence of risk management on risk disclosure. He uses 
reserves as measurement for risk management. He argues that managers (board of 
directors) attempt to increase reserves if their corporation faces a high level of risks 
which are considered an element for risk management. He hypothesises that the higher 
the percentage of net income transferred to the corporate reserves, the more risk 
information. He found insignificant association between risk disclosure and reserves. The 
table below summarises some empirical findings on the association between risk 
management and risk disclosure.  
 
Table 3.15: Risk disclosure and risk management system 
Study  Country Results  Measurement 
Hassan (2009) UAE Not significant  Reserves  
Neri (2010) Italy  Not significant  Presence of risk committee 
Hassan, Saleh and Abd 
Rahman (2008) 
Malaysia  Positive  Existence of risk management 
committee  
Beasly, Clune and 
Hermanson (2005) 
US  Positive  Role of CEO and CFO 
 
3.5.4 Ownership structure and risk disclosure 
 
Ownership structure and corporate culture have a major influence on attitudes to 
corporate governance and financial reporting (Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt, 2001, p.280). 
Abraham and Cox (2007, p.229) state that ownership and governance (the board of 
directors) may play a vital role in firms‟ risk reporting because the annual report is 
prepared by the directors for shareholders. Disclosure literature applies different proxies 
for the ownership structure variable, for example the number of shareholders, proportion 
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of the shares owned by outsiders, ownership concentration, institutional ownership, 
government ownership, family ownership, foreign ownership and managerial ownership. 
The existing empirical studies found different results in this regard which could be 
justified by the difference of the measurement applied to the ownership variable.   
 
Modern corporations are characterised by the separation of ownership (management 
decision) from control (monitoring decision) (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Owusu-Ansah 
(1998, p.613) states that the ownership structure and disclosure relationship is explained 
in terms of agency theory because modern companies are characterised by a separation of 
ownership and control. “Where there is a divorce of ownership from control, the potential 
for agency costs exists because of conflict between firstly shareholders and managers and 
secondly between bondholders and shareholder-managers” (Cooke, 1989b, p. 177).  
 
Agency cost tends to be higher for companies with a widespread public ownership of 
securities therefore shareholders of such companies apply more pressure for more 
information as part of monitoring activity. On the other hand, where there is concentrated 
ownership there is generally little or no physical separation between those who own and 
those who manage the capital. In such cases, capital owners have greater access to 
internal information and may not have to rely on public disclosure to monitor their 
investments and as a result, the demand for increased disclosure will be low.  
 
Information asymmetry between managers (insiders) and shareholders or stakeholders 
(outside) is also applied to the discussion on the influence of ownership structure on 
disclosure practice. Concentrated ownership firms probably do not experience a high 
degree of information asymmetry through increased disclosure and these firms do not 
face high demand for public disclosure. Owusu-Ansah (1998) argues that when there is 
more widely dispersed ownership, individual shareholders do not have a strong influence 
on corporate disclosure policies and practices because they do not have the bargaining 
power to access internal information from the company.  
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Signalling theory is also suggested in understanding the disclosure-ownership structure 
association. Hossain, Tan and Adams (1994) suggest that voluntary disclosure is likely to 
be greater in widely held firms so that principals can effectively monitor managers so that 
their economic interests are optimised and agents can signal that they are acting in the 
best of interests of the owners (principals).  
 
The ownership diffusion pattern and separate ownership for management promote the 
demand for disclosure to be high (Kothari, 2000, p.100). On the other hand, in 
concentration ownership cases most of the risk information may be communicated at the 
boardroom meeting or any other informal way and as a result there will be less risk 
disclosure available to the public (Mohobot, 2005). So it could be assumed that a 
negative association exists between risk disclosure and the level of shareholdings of the 
concentration ownership. Wallace and Nasser (1995) argue that the greater the number of 
people who need to know about the affairs of a firm, the greater the details of an item of 
information required and the more comprehensive the disclosure of the firm. One would 
expect to find that as the number of shareholders or the proportion of the shares owned by 
outsiders increases, the financial information disclosed in the annual report will become 
more comprehensive. They suggest this increasing disclosure could solve monitoring 
problems associated with increases in the proportion of the firm owned by outsiders. 
 
Konishi and Ali (2007) found no significant association between the ownership 
distribution pattern and the number of risk disclosures. However, they still feel there is a 
connection between the two factors. They justify that managers may hold a high 
proportion of shares and they might decide to withhold some risk information. They 
argue that risk disclosure policy is influenced by the board of directors or the top 
management in the sense that any release of risk information cannot be done without the 
involvement of them. Deumes and Knechel (2008) find negative associations between 
internal control disclosures and both ownership concentration and managerial ownership. 
They state that these findings suggest 1) there are economic reasons why managers 
voluntarily report more (or less) on internal control and 2) managers weigh the 
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disclosure‟s costs and benefits and report only if the benefits (in terms of reduced 
efficiency, loss of information and agency costs) outweigh the costs.  
 
Regarding government ownership, OFT (2009, p.1) states that government can affect 
markets either through direct participation (as a market maker or as a buyer or supplier of 
goods and services), or through indirect participation in private markets (for example, 
through regulation, taxation, subsidy)”. Owusu-Ansah (1998) argues that government 
ownership may have exceptional access to company information in order to oversee and 
control its investment activities therefore this might make it less incentivised to increase 
public information. The firms‟ disclosure strategies respond to differences in the demand 
for public disclosure facing these firms. If the majority of shares are owned by 
government, risk disclosure patterns would be lower than firms having distributed 
ownership, for example when the number of individual investors and foreign 
shareholders is high (Konishi and Ali, 2007). This is because the pressure increases to the 
directors to disclose more risk information in distributed ownership. Cooke (1998) found 
that there was insignificant association between disclosure and government holdings. 
 
In regards foreign ownership, Mohobbot (2005, p.119) argues that if the number of 
foreign shareholders is high, the pressure mounts to the directors to disclose more risk 
information. Mangena and Tauringana (2007) found that disclosure is positively 
associated with foreign ownership. However, Koshini and Ali, (2007) found insignificant 
association between risk disclosure and foreign ownership.  
 
In terms of institutional ownership, Hassan (2008, p.3) argues that corporation managers 
respond to pressures from their institutional environments through adopting some 
practices (e.g. risk disclosures) in order to obtain social legitimacy. Taylor (2011) argues 
that institutional investors are expected to mitigate information asymmetry by performing 
a monitoring role through close relations with the management of corporations (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Healy & Palepu, 2001) and as one of the key corporate mechanisms; 
institutional investors are expected to curb management from withdrawing risk 
information.  
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Solomon, Solomon and Norton (2000) found that institutional investors in the UK agree 
that increased corporate risk disclosure would help their portfolio investment decision-
making; however they do not favour a regulated environment for corporate risk 
disclosure or a general statement of business risk. Abraham and Cox (2007) found a 
negative association with long-term institutional investors in the UK and a positive 
association with short-term institutional investors. Taylor (2011) found no significant 
relationships between long-term institutional investors and risk disclosure in Australia and he 
argues it is consistent with a proprietary information perspective. However, he found a 
positive relationship with short-term institutional investors and he argues that this result is 
consistent with a principal that wields limited monitoring resources while achieving high 
resource dependency over management. A summary of the main empirical results is 
presented in the following table.  
 
Table 3.16: Risk disclosure and ownership structure   
Study  Country Results  Measurement  
Mohobbot (2005) Japan Not significant 
Not significant 
Not significant 
Top 10 shareholders 
Individual investors 
Foreign shareholders 
Abraham and Cox (2007) UK Positive 
Negative 
Short-term institutions  
Long-term institutions 
Konishi and Ali (2007) Japan Not significant  
Not significant 
Not significant 
The top few shareholders 
Shareholding by individuals 
Foreign shareholders  
Deumes and Knechel 
(2008) 
Netherlands Negative 
Negative 
Ownership concentration  
Managerial ownership 
Taylor (2011) Australia  Not significant 
Positive  
Long-term investors  
Short-term investors 
 
3.5.5 Board size and risk disclosure  
 
There is no prior study that examines specifically the association between risk disclosure 
and board size. However, some authors examine it in the context of voluntary disclosure. 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006, p.266) argue that there is no preponderance of theory to 
suggest a relation between board size and level of voluntary disclosure and it remains an 
empirical issue. The same situation is applied to the association between risk disclosure 
and board size. One theoretical argument would be that an increased number of directors 
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on the board may reduce the information asymmetry problem (Chen and Jaggi, 2000) and 
they would encourage more disclosure.  
 
In addition, it could be argued that the number of directors on a board may influence its 
control and monitoring activities and since disclosure is considered a monitor element 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001), it could be argued that the increased number of board members 
would enhance its ability to monitor and control companies in which risk disclosure could 
be considered one of these elements. However, it could be argued to the contrary that the 
larger the board size, the less effective it will be at monitoring management (Cheng and 
Courtenay, 2006) because of free rider problems among directors and increased decision-
making time (Jensen, 1993) and increased costs, for instance costs of poor 
communication which may have an adverse impact on disclosure levels and good 
practice. The empirical work in this regard report mixed results. A summary on the 
empirical results is shown in the table below. 
 
Table 3.17: Board size and disclosure  
Study  Country Results  Measurement  
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) Singapore Not significant  Number of directors 
on the board 
Akhtaruddin, Hossain, Hossain & 
Yao (2009) 
Malaysia Positive  Number of directors 
on the board 
Abeysekera (2010) Kenya Positive Board size 
 
3.5.6 Non-executive directors (NED) and risk disclosure  
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the presence of non-executive directors on the board 
may lead to reduced agency conflicts between managers and owners. They are considered 
by shareholders and investors as an important control and monitoring aspect of corporate 
governance providing the necessary checks and balances needed to enhance board 
effectiveness (Barako et al., 2006). However, Ho and Wong (2001) argue that agency 
theory does not expect all classes of board directors to improve accountability and 
disclosure level.  
 
  
70 
 
Abraham and Cox (2007, p.231) argue that boards with greater numbers of non-executive 
directors are in a stronger position to fulfil shareholders‟ preferences for accountability 
and transparency. Also, they state that the results indicate that board combination has 
great importance in the transmission of risk information to investors and different types 
of directors fulfil different functions. They suggest that the balance of executive to 
independent directors may be a key to risk disclosures. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) argue 
that non-executive directors are seen as the control, check and balance mechanism in 
enhancing board effectiveness. Therefore more disclosure is expected if they are actually 
carrying out their monitoring role rather than their „perceived‟ monitoring role and their 
dominance would provide more power to force management to disclose (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003).  
 
Berry (2008) served as a non-executive director of some UK companies and confirmed 
that in his roles he attempted to contribute to the development of effective risk 
management and he made the key risks to be well understood to the board. However, it 
could be argued that not all non-executive directors are independent therefore dependent 
non-executives may have relationships with management that could question their role in 
monitoring, controlling and enhancing disclosure levels through independent judgment. 
Empirical evidence on the effect of non-executive directors on disclosure practice is 
mixed. Table 3.18 shows a summary of some empirical results.  
 
Table 3.18: Non-executive directors and risk disclosure  
Study  Country Results  Measurement  
Risk disclosure studies     
Abraham and Cox (2007) UK Not significant Number of dependent non-
executives 
Deumes and Knechel (2008) Netherlands Not significant % of non-executive directors  
Non-risk disclosure studies    
Forker (1992) UK Not significant Proportion of non-executives  
Barako, Hancock & Izan 
(2006) 
Kenya Negative 
 
% of non-executive directors 
 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) Singapore Positive   % of non-executive directors 
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3.5.7 Independent directors and risk disclosure 
 
Agency theorists argue that the board of directors is a safeguard and an important aspect 
of corporate governance as an element for decision control and monitoring of activities 
(Cheng et al., 2006). Agency theory does not expect all classes of boards of directors to 
improve accountability and disclosure (Ho and Wong, 2001). Agency theory proposes 
that the board of directors comprises a mix of corporate insiders and corporate outsiders 
with different propensities regarding disclosure. Independent directors are expected to 
reduce agency problems and lessen the need for regulatory intervention in corporate 
reporting since they are independent of management and a key indicator of corporate 
governance quality (Abraham and Cox, 2007).  
 
Lopes and Rodrigues (2007, p.35) state that the premise of agency theory is that 
independent directors are needed on the boards to monitor and control the actions of the 
executive managers and therefore, with a higher proportion of independent directors, 
more disclosure can be expected from companies. Abraham and Cox (2007) found a 
positive association between risk disclosure and independent non-executive directors. 
Eng and Mak (2003) found a negative association between voluntary disclosure and 
independent directors. Table 3.19 provides a summary of previous empirical studies.  
 
Table 3.19:  Risk disclosure and independence of the board   
Study  Country Results  Measurement  
Risk disclosure studies    
Abraham and Cox 
(2007) 
UK Positive Number of independent directors 
Lopes and Rodrigues, 
(2007) 
Portugal Not significant Number of independent directors 
Non-risk disclosure studies    
Ho and Wong (2001) Hong Kong Not significant  % independent directors 
Eng and Mak (2003) Singapore Negative  Outside directors on board 
 
Chen and Jaggi (2000) Hong Kong Positive Independent directors 
Cheng and Courtenay 
(2006) 
Singapore Positive % of independent directors  
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3.5.8 Duality and risk disclosure  
 
Duality in this study refers to the combination of roles of the board‟s chair and CEO. 
Fama and Jensen (1983, p.311) argue that “boards always have the power to hire, fire and 
compensate the top-level decision managers and to ratify and monitor important 
decisions”. A combination of positions will signal the absence of decision management 
and decision control (Fama and Jensen, 1983, p.314). According to agency theory it could 
impair board functions of monitoring, disciplining and compensating senior managers 
(Barako, et al., 2006, p.111). Forker (1992, p.117) argues that duality may pose a threat to 
monitoring quality and is detrimental to the quality of disclosure and imposes higher 
opportunity losses to the disclosure of information and that the dominant personalities 
may resist some governance devices, such as audit committee and non-executive 
directors, which may place pressure on the board and create pressure for better disclosure.  
 
In addition, Apostolou and Nanopoulos (2009, p.404) argue that the person who occupies 
both chair and CEO roles would tend to withhold unfavourable information from 
outsiders. Therefore separation between these roles would help enhance monitoring 
quality and reduce the advantages gained by withholding information and hence 
improving the quality of reporting (Hannifa and Cooke 2002). Forker (1992) found a 
significant negative relationship between the existence of a dominant personality and the 
quality of disclosure. However, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found a positive association 
between voluntary disclosure and duality. The following table shows summary of the 
findings of the association between duality and disclosure.  
 
Table 3.20: Duality and disclosure   
Study  Country Results  Measurement  
Forker (1992) UK Negative Chairman and CEO 
Ho & Wong (2001) Hong Kong Not significant CEO duality 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) Malaysia  Positive   Non-executive chair 
Barako, Hancock and Izan 
(2006) 
Kenya Not significant Dual leadership  
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) Singapore Not significant CEO duality 
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3.5.9 Internal auditors and risk disclosure  
 
“Internal auditing is an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed 
to add value and improve an organization's operations bringing a systematic, disciplined 
approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, and 
governance processes” (IIA, n.d.). Theoretical justification and empirical work suggests 
the positive influence of internal auditors on financial reporting and disclosure practice. 
The Turnbull Report (1999, p.12) argues that senior management and the board may 
desire objective assurance and advice on risk and control which could be provided 
through an adequately internal audit function. Cox (n.d.) states that an internal audit has a 
responsibility to its stakeholders to provide reports on the operations of the organisation‟s 
risk management, control, and governance processes and to justify the value of its work 
and the organisation‟s spending on internal audit resources. 
 
Page and Spira (2004) found that internal auditors hold roles as facilitators and organisers 
of risk identification and assessment and management which include the production of 
risk information. They state that internal auditors‟ activities were involved in reporting on 
adverse events and making recommendations for improved controls. They said that an 
internal auditor has a strong relationship with audit committee, often with direct reporting 
channels. They found that an internal audit has a positive impact on risk reporting.  
 
Lin, Pizzini, Vargus & Bardhan (2011) argue that the internal audit function (IAF) is an 
important component of the financial reporting process and they expect that greater 
internal audit  function attention to financial reporting will affect both the detection and 
disclosure of material weaknesses since the internal auditor function is viewed as a third 
party that monitors managers‟ actions. In addition they argue that these monitoring 
activities can prompt managers to take preventative action in anticipation of the internal 
auditing review and the effective use of these activities increases the likelihood that the 
IAF discovers and discloses any existing control problems. In addition they argue that 
internal auditors can increase compliance processes, leading to greater material weakness 
detection and disclosure especially with external-internal auditor coordination.  
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Table 3.21: Risk disclosure and internal auditors 
Study  Country Results  Measurement 
Page and Spira (2004) UK Positive Internal auditors 
Lin, Pizzini, Vargus & 
Bardhan (2011) 
US Negative Internal audit activities related to 
financial reporting 
Cox (n.d.) Australia Positive Internal audit 
 
3.5.10 Audit committee and risk disclosure  
 
Many companies have assigned audit committees as part of the internal control process 
and corporate governance. An audit committee's members should act on behalf of the 
board of directors and for the benefit of the shareholders. Terrell and Reed (2003) suggest 
that an audit committee needs to understand the management's risk assessment and link 
financial reporting risks to their agenda. The influence of an audit committee on disclosure 
(e.g. risk disclosure) practice and levels is explained in terms of agency theory and 
information asymmetry. Barako et al. (2006, p.112) argue that an audit committee can be a 
monitoring mechanism that improves the quality of information flow between firm owners 
(shareholders) and managers, especially in the financial reporting environment where the two 
have disparate information levels. Forker (1992) argues that an audit committee as an 
effective monitoring tool would reduce agency cost and improve disclosure. Ho and Wong 
(2001, p.144) argue that since an audit committee consists consists mainly of non-executive 
directors, it has the influence to reduce the amount of information withheld.  
 
Taylor (2011) explains that the agency theory argument implies that the greater the 
independence of the audit committee from top management, the more likely it is to advocate 
the interests of the company‟s shareholders in terms of reducing information asymmetry. He 
identified that there are two key roles of audit committees which are firstly to ensure that 
risks are managed and internal controls exist to guard against risks, and secondly that 
corporate reports to shareholders are vetted for the integrity of financial and other 
shareholder-relevant disclosures. He also argues that institution investors put pressure on 
audit committees in order to provide more information and risk disclosure. Forker (1992) 
found a positive but weak association between audit committees and disclosure quality. 
Taylor (2011) found positive relationships between audit committee independence and risk 
disclosure. Neri (2010) found insignificant association between risk disclosure and the 
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presence of an audit committee. In the context of the UAE, establishment of an audit 
committee is a mandatory requirement of the UAE corporate governance code.  
 
Table 3.22: Risk disclosure and audit committee 
Study  Country Results  Measurement 
Risk disclosure studies    
Neri (2010) Italy  Not significant Presence of audit committee 
Taylor (2011) Australia  Positive  
 
Not significant 
Audit committee members‟ 
independence ratio 
Financial expertise of audit 
committee members 
Non-risk disclosure studies    
Forker (1992) UK Not significant Existence of audit committee 
Ho and Wong (2001) Hong Kong Positive  Presence of audit committee 
Barako, Hancock and 
Izan (2006) 
Kenya Positive Presence of audit committee  
 
3.6 Summary of prior empirical risk disclosure studies 
 
The ICAEW (1999) examines risk disclosure for a sample of UK companies‟ annual 
reports within the initial prospectuses and annual reports after floating. The study finds 
that companies make extensive disclosures about a wide range of risks, related actions 
and measures in prospectuses and they provide substantial but rather less complete 
information in annual reports. ICAEW suggests that there is no need to introduce further 
regulations regarding risk disclosure in the UK because the existing accounting standards 
and regulation of risk reporting in the UK satisfy the needs of investors. ICAEW argues 
that companies provide risk information should benefit through the lower cost of capital.  
 
Cabedo and Tirado (2004) show all the risks that can affect firms and propose a 
quantification model for each one. They state that investors take investment decisions 
based on the information disclosed about expected return and risk; however the current 
model for firms‟ accounting information is not wholly adequate when used for the 
decision-making process. The authors classify risk information into three main categories 
including 1) non-financial risks, for example business risk and strategic risks and 2) 
financial risks, for instance market risk (e.g. exchange risk, interest risk, commodity risk, 
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price risk), credit risk, operational risk, and liquidity risk. The study shows that value at 
risk (VaR) is a suitable method for quantifying most of a company‟s risks, for example 
business, credit and market risks. They found insignificant associations between risk 
disclosure and firm size and industry type.  
 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) examine the risk disclosures of UK companies‟ annual reports 
using the content analysis method. The sample UK companies comprise 79 non-financial 
firms listed within the FTSE 100 Index as at 1 January 2001. The authors suggest that 
directors need to provide more detailed risk disclosures rather than generalised statements 
of risk management policy. The authors confirm that it is important to be able to assess 
the risk profile of a company and this is only possible if relevant risk information is 
provided. Also, in order to understand the potential for future cash flows of a company, 
investors need proper understanding of the risks it undertakes. They found that there was 
a highly positive correlation between levels of risk disclosure and company size; however 
there was no association with gearing ratio, asset cover, book-to-market value of equity 
and beta factor. They state that forward-looking risk disclosures are valuable to the 
readers of the annual reports and that companies do provide forward-looking risk 
information. They conclude that stakeholders are not being provided with sufficient risk 
information particularly by those companies with a higher level of risk. Risk information 
disclosed by the companies is in the main general therefore more specific risk disclosure 
is needed.  
 
Konishi and Ali (2007) examine risk-reporting practice within Japanese companies. They 
reveal the relationship between corporate characteristics and level of risk disclosure. 
Also, they investigate the impact of issuing regulatory guidelines on risk reporting in 
annual reports. The findings consist of positive association between risk disclosure and 
firm size; however they find that there is no significant association with companies‟ 
leverage, profitability, ownership distribution patterns, cross-corporate shareholdings or 
industry type. The findings indicate that companies‟ risk disclosures are descriptive in 
nature and companies are reluctant to quantify risk. The study shows that the quantity 
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level of risk disclosure has increased in annual reports after the issuing of regulatory 
guidelines on risk reporting by the Financial Service Agency in Japan. 
 
Dobler (2008) analyses risk reporting incentives and their relation to regulation. He 
claims that risk reporting depends on disclosure incentives because of its inherent 
discretion. The overall results of the research show that the informativeness of risk 
reporting should not be overestimated even in a regulated environment. The author states 
that the results imply that incentives for risk reporting are less prevalent than those 
suggested by the extant literature. He suggests that the limited risk reporting observed in 
prior empirical studies can be explained by the following: 1) a manager may not report 
because he has no risk information or pretends not to have any 2) a manager may not 
report non-verifiable risk information because he cannot credibly do so or chooses to 
misreport or 3) a manager may withhold risk information available due to threats of 
commercial drawback. The findings also suggest that current regulation partly considers 
certain risks, such as the use of negative reports on certain risks, disclosure on corporate 
risk management and risk forecasts. The author concludes that the findings may explain 
why disclosure precision may not increase or why cost of capital may not decrease when 
extending risk reporting requirements.  
 
ASB (2007) found that overall there has been an increase and improvement in risk 
reporting by UK companies. They found that the greatest area of difficulty for companies 
is the disclosure of forward-looking information. They found that companies need to 
assess carefully what their principal risks and uncertainties are, and report on them, 
together with the approach to managing and mitigating those risks rather than just 
providing a long list of risks. They suggested that „safe harbour‟ provisions in the 
Companies Act of 2006 in the UK may encourage managers to provide greater 
information on risk, uncertainties and forward-looking information. 
 
ASB (2009a) found that immaterial clutter detracted from important information most 
frequently in the risk-reporting section of the narrative of UK companies‟ annual reports. 
They found that 66% of the companies were compliant with risk disclosure requirements 
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but this needs to be improved in order to provide best practice (e.g. go beyond what is 
required and commentary on the directors‟ approach to risks and how risks are managed) 
where only 6% of the sample companies were found to be fully compliant with best 
practice score. They found that some companies do provide „principal risks‟ but in an 
apparent preference for a long list of risks, allowed their good work to deteriorate to 
boilerplate. They concluded that companies appeared to be struggling to report on risks 
due to a lack of clarity of the requirements.  
 
Solomon, Solomon and Norton (2000) consider the corporate governance aspects in order 
to develop conceptual frameworks for internal control, risk management and risk 
disclosure. They state that companies in the UK are required to report on their internal 
control mechanisms and risk management. They claim that this is essential for 1) the 
maximisation of shareholders‟ wealth as this aims to maximise profitability while at the 
same time reducing the probability of financial failure and 2) improvements in the 
disclosure of risk-related information which represent an important part of these 
corporate governance reforms. The findings of a questionnaire survey indicate that 
institutional investors agree that increased corporate risk disclosure would help their 
portfolio investment decision-making; however they do not favour a regulated 
environment for corporate risk disclosure or a general statement of business risk. They 
conclude that the findings indicate strongly that risk disclosure is an important and 
relevant issue within the agenda for corporate governance reform.  
 
Spira and Page (2003) investigate the change in internal control and risk management 
within the UK corporate governance arena. They explain that in the UK a further 
influence upon the development of risk management has been the internal control and 
risk management disclosure requirements of the Combined Code of Best Practice in 
Corporate Governance produce by the Turnbull committee. They state that social 
ownership of resources shifted from debate over ownership to control, with a rise in 
regulation being the outcome. They uphold that corporate governance has become the 
arena in which this now multilateral competition takes place and that the concept of risk 
has become central to corporate governance and has become linked to the idea of internal 
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control. They state that risk taking is fundamental to business activity and these risks are 
managed within the corporate governance framework through accountability mechanisms 
such as financial reporting, internal control and audit. 
 
Abraham and Cox (2007) investigate in the light of agency cost theory the relationship 
between the quantity of narrative risk disclosure and the board of directors, ownership 
and dual-listed stocks. They argue that prior research proposes that whilst US companies 
tend to frame their disclosures to fit SEC reporting rules, UK companies interpret the 
same rules more broadly and thus report a greater variety of risk information. They apply 
a content analysis approach and examine reporting of business risk, financial risk and 
internal control risk within UK annual reports. The findings indicate a negative 
association with long-term institutional investors, a positive correlation with the number 
of executive and independent directors and finally a positive association with UK firms 
that dual list in the US. The study develops the understanding of disclosure and 
institutional investment within a fundamentally different institutional and regulatory 
environment. Some aspects of regulation inadvertently serve to censor firm-specific 
variation in internal control risk reporting. 
 
Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) study the determinants of disclosure levels in the accounting 
for financial instruments of Portuguese listed companies. The sample size is 55 
companies based on 2002 annual reports. A self-constructed index of disclosure based on 
IAS 32 and IAS 39 is developed. The results support the influence of size, industry type, 
auditor type and listing status on the financial instruments disclosure. The findings do not 
support the influence of the internationality degree, the capital structure and the corporate 
governance structure. The study indicates that there are several problems of compliance 
with IAS and effective enforcement mechanisms are needed. Regarding corporate 
governance practices, the market supervisor must develop studies of compliance with 
IAS based on annual reports and implement actions towards non-complying companies. 
Deumes and Knechel (2008) investigate managers‟ economic incentives for voluntary 
disclosure on risk management and internal control in the Netherlands which has a low 
regulation environment. They argue that in terms of internal control and range of risks, 
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the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the US is much narrower, than other existing 
frameworks such as the Turnbull Report (1999) in the UK, focusing entirely on financial 
information. The authors evidence that economic incentives for voluntary internal control 
reporting exist in a low regulation environment. The findings support that managers 
voluntarily report more on internal control if information problems and agency conflicts 
are higher. The implication of their study‟s findings recommends that regulators may 
wish to allow firms some flexibility in their internal control reporting choices as firms 
take a broad approach to internal control that goes beyond Sarbanes-Oxley Act-based 
regulations and tailor their internal reports to suit their specific environments.   
 
Lajili and Zeghal (2005) examine risk management disclosures in Canadian annual 
reports in 1991. The researchers claim that there has been attention to risk management 
and control from the external viewpoint especially of stakeholders, analysts and investors. 
They argue that risk management disclosure provides guidance in evaluating 
managements‟ effectiveness in dealing with increased market volatility and business 
uncertainty and their impact on firm-level economic value and growth and trading 
volume sensitivity to different risks. The authors applied regression tests and found that 
there is no significant association between quantity of mandatory and voluntary risk 
management disclosure and firm size, profit, beta, and leverage.  
 
The findings indicate that risk information is qualitative in nature and mostly located in 
MD&A and notes to financial statements. They found that risk disclosure focuses 
downside risks and the highest volume of disclosure related to financial risks. There was 
limited risk assessment and analysis. They found that risk sources include financial, 
market, environmental, government regulation, operational, supplier, natural resources, 
political, technology, weather, seasonality and cyclicality. They stated that the analysis of 
volume and intensity of risk disclosure can be used to classify firms and industries in 
order to analyse risk disclosure behaviour and information value by groups of firms 
facing similar risks.  
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3.6.1 Prior empirical risk disclosure research in emerging capital markets 
 
Amran, Bin, Hassan (2009) present an example of risk disclosure in an emerging stock 
market. The authors examine empirical risk in the non-financial section of annual reports 
of 100 Malaysian listed companies. They claim that to date, research on risk disclosure 
has been undertaken mostly in the western setting. The authors point out that the risk 
management disclosure is useful to improve investment decisions. The authors find that 
size and industry type are significant factors in explaining the risk disclosure practice of 
Malaysian public companies. The study finds that risk disclosure practice by Malaysian‟s 
corporation is still in the infancy stage. The authors conclude that the Malaysian 
government should devise the means to enhance companies‟ involvement in risk 
disclosure.  
 
Hassan (2009) examines the association between level of risk disclosure and corporate 
specific attributes for a sample of 41 UAE listed companies. The author examines the 
matter in the light of the positive accounting as a notion of “economic consequences” of 
disclosure and institutional theory as a notion of “social legitimacy” of disclosure. The 
author (p.679) argues that political sensitivity is not applicable to the UAE environment 
since the country has no history of anti-trust government actions. The research findings 
indicate that firm size (total assets) is not significantly associated with the level of risk 
disclosure. He found that the percentage of net income transferred to the corporation 
reserves is not significant correlated to risk disclosure. The results show that there is a 
positive and significant association between risk disclosure and leverage (measured by 1) 
debt to total assets and 2) debt to equity ratio). Industry type (financial and non-financial) 
is also found to be a significant factor in explaining risk disclosure practice in the UAE. 
The author argues that the empirical findings and the UAE institutional context suggest 
that social legitimacy drives risk disclosure in the UAE.  
 
Othman and Ameer (2009) examine market risk disclosure of 429 Malaysian listed 
companies in order to examine the level of compliance with FRS132: Financial 
Instrument - Disclosure and Presentation. They found that the majority (328 out of 429) 
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of firms complied with FRS132 but the extent of compliance varied. They found that 
62% of firms did not state whether their firms engaged in hedging instruments or not. 
They found that there was remarkable variation in the market risk disclosure and interest 
rate disclosure was favoured compared to other market risks disclosure. They found that 
the type of hedging instrument used by a firm determines its nature of disclosure within 
the annual report (e.g. quantitative/qualitative). They conclude that there is need for some 
standardised reporting format or guidelines. They state that while compliance is 
important, there is a greater need for financial transparency on market risks.  
 
3.7 Summary  
 
Chapter 3 provides a literature review on risk disclosure based on prior empirical studies. 
There is growing interest on risk reporting by researchers, professional accounting bodies 
and regulators. There is debate on voluntary risk disclosure. Researchers provide 
guidance on risk disclosure which could be useful in the absence of specific regulation 
and requirements. The literature shows there is large variation in risk disclosure practice 
by companies in terms of categories (i.e. financial and non-financial), nature (i.e. 
qualitative and quantitative), time frame (i.e. future and past) and type of news (e.g. good 
and bad). The literature shows that regulation on risk reporting has varied in practice, 
especially in terms of enforcement. The literature shows that there is debate about 
regulating risk disclosure. IASB has paid attention toward risk within IFRSs; however the 
focus was on financial risks. There is debate about a comprehensive accounting standard 
on risks. The empirical studies show different results on the determinants of risk 
disclosure. The literature presents two main determinants: firm specific characteristics 
and corporate governance characteristics. The work on the influence of firm 
characteristics on disclosure is widely tackled by the researchers; however, they report 
various results. There has been growing interest among researchers to examine the 
influence of corporate governance characteristics on disclosure practice. The next chapter 
describes the UAE background and financial reporting practice and requirements.  
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Chapter 4:  
UAE Background & 
Financial Reporting 
Practice 
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4.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides overall information on the UAE political system, its economy, the 
financial and business environment and some regulatory aspects. The main focus of this 
chapter is on explaining the regulatory and accounting bodies, the financial reporting 
system and aspects of corporate governance in UAE and linking them to the subject of 
disclosure and risk disclosures. This chapter describes the main stock markets and 
financial centres in UAE.  
 
4.1 The UAE political and economy system 
 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) is an Islamic, Arab country located in the Western region of 
Asia within the Arab region, specifically in the Arabian Gulf. UAE is a federal state that 
was established on the 2
nd
 of December, 1971. It consists of seven emirates, Abu Dhabi 
(the capital of the country), Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Um-Al Quwein, Ras-Al Khaimah 
and Fujairah. The seven Emirates have separate royal families, separate budgets but their 
security, immigration and foreign policies are in common. The seven Emirates have 
different sizes and enjoy varied levels of resources and wealth.  
 
In 1981 the UAE become a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); this was 
established to harmonise legislation and regulation, economics, finances, trade and 
customs among the member states, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and 
UAE (PWC, 2009, p.2). World Bank data shows that the population of UAE was 
4707703 in 2010; it rates UAE as a “high income” country with a GDP of 
$230,251,878,599 in 2009, and a life expectancy of 78 in 2004 (World Bank, 2011).  
UAE is one of the most liberal countries in the Gulf; its political system is a federal one. 
The UAE has its own constitution which contains the main rules regarding the political 
and constitutional organisation of the state (UAE-Cabinet, 2011). The UAE federal 
authorities consist of the federal supreme council, the president and vice-president, the 
cabinet, the federal national council and the federal judicial authority. The country is not 
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democratic but each Emirate is ruled by a royal family and has been formed as coalition 
of Sheikhdoms (Monarchism). 
 
 
Figure 4.1: UAE map 
 
UAE is a developing country which is trying to become part of the global economy. 
Since the discovery of oil in the UAE in the 1950s, it has become an open economy based 
mainly on one source of income, which is exporting oil and gas. Abu Dhabi has nearly all 
the UAE oil reserves. In recent years the government has set strategies to develop and to 
rely on alternative resources in order to minimise the risk of dependence on one source. 
UAE is a significant player in the world oil industry, but its wealth can increasingly be 
attributed to its non-oil sectors. This income has risen from a 35.4% share of GDP in 
1972 to a 37% share in 2003 (Kawach, 2003 cited by Irivine and Lucas (2006b). The 
UAE government is developing and diversifying its economy into ports, trade, services 
and finance. The UAE government has encouraged investment in several industries for 
instance banking, financial sector, real estate, industrial sector and the stock market. The 
banking system is capitalist like the system in Western countries (e.g. Europe and USA).  
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“The corporate sector developed in the middle of the seventies, when many companies 
were established due to the rise in oil prices, and it is the strong interest of the Federal 
government to build a strong national economy” (Aljifri and Moustafa, 2007, p.74). The 
government in UAE is appointed by the royal families, which to some degree gives 
stability to political system and economic conditions, but it cannot assure the free 
operation of market forces as is evidenced in the involvement of government agencies in 
private investments and public companies that allows for competitive disadvantage and 
monopoly to occur. The government of the UAE has faced several challenges in 
embracing globalisation and is attempting to reform its regulatory, legal and economic 
structures in order to overcome a culture of secrecy and limited regulation and 
accountability (Irvine and Lucas 2006a, p.3).  
 
4.2 Regulatory environment and bodies in the UAE  
 
There are three main regulatory bodies governing the corporate sector, accounting 
practice, financial reporting, and corporate governance in the UAE. The Ministry of 
Economy, UAE Central Bank, Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA) (Aljifri and 
Hussainey, 2007). These three authorities are Federal regulatory bodies; nevertheless 
there are many local authorities within each Emirate which govern the local business 
environment, for instance the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) in Dubai and 
Abu Dhabi Accountability Authority (ADAA) in Abu Dhabi.  
 
The Ministry of Economy issues federal regulations and rules, thus all companies in the 
UAE have to work under “The Federal Commercial Law no 8/1984” and its amendments 
(Aljifri and Mousafa, 2007). The Federal Commercial Law states the requirements of 
registration and licensing, the responsibilities and duties of auditors, penalties and 
disciplinary measures, and other general rules (Al-Qahtani, 2006). This law and its 
amendments govern accounting and auditing requirements for corporate entities and 
companies also have to comply with it when preparing their financial reports (PWC, 
2009). Feulner (1989, p. 216) stated that the law provides for the routine establishment of 
companies whereas formerly, in the absence of any relevant statute, limited liability 
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companies could be formed only by a decree from the Ruler of an individual Emirates 
which had become difficult to obtain; therefore, most foreign firms had engaged in joint 
ventures in the form of partnerships with local individuals or with entities which were 
made up of UAE nationals only.    
 
The Central Bank governs and lays down regulations for banks and financial institutions. 
The main responsibility of the Central Bank is the formulation and implementation of 
banking, credit and monetary policies, to ensure the growth of the national economy of 
the UAE in a balanced manner (Al Suwaidi, 2011). The Central Bank governs the 
preparations of financial reports of the banks and financial institutions in accordance with 
IASs (Hassan, 2009). The Security and Commodities Authority (SCA) has its foundations 
based on the Federal Law No. (4) of 2004 and it governs the main stock markets (e.g. 
ADX, DFM) and listed companies (SCA, 2000).   
 
There has been a considerable encouragement and pressure by regulatory bodies on the 
listed companies to fully disclose all available information. The importance of this is 
recognised within the disclosure regulations, rules and policies of the SCA which is 
considered to be the main influential regulatory body for the stock markets (e.g. ADX, 
DFM). The focus of disclosure and transparency regulations was on general disclosure 
but there have been some references to risk disclosure within these jurisdictions.   
 
In addition, the focus of regulatory activities and financial reporting requirements has 
been on the public sector (e.g. listed companies) and the financial sector (e.g. banks) 
whereas there is a lack of regulatory supervision of private sector and small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) which consist of approximately 80% of the 260,000 companies 
in UAE (ICAEW, 2010). This results in limited disclosure of public information and 
accessibility to financial information by UAE private and SME companies. This puts 
listed companies in a disadvantage position since the information they disclose could be 
exploited by their competitors in private sectors which are not required to provide public 
information, to apply IFRSs or to use an external audit firm.  
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4.3 Stock markets, commodities market and financial centres in UAE 
 
As of 2005 the major national exchanges in the GCC accounted for 20% of the total 
market capitalisation in the emerging markets (PWC, 2009). There are two main stock 
markets in UAE, the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) and the Dubai Financial 
Market (DFM) which are actual bourses and are eligible to carry out trading transactions 
of the listed companies‟ stocks.   
 
 4.3.1 Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) 
 
ADX was established in 2000 by Local Law No. (3) of 2000; its provisions vest the 
Market with a legal entity of autonomous status, independent finance and management, 
and give ADX the necessary supervisory and executive powers to exercise its functions to 
ensure the stability and liquidity of the market, to protect investors, provide investment 
opportunities, control securities transactions and develop investment awareness (ADX, 
2010). ADX has other branches outside the Emirate of Abu Dhabi in Fujairah, Ras al 
Khaimah, Sharjah and Zayed City. 
 
4.3.2 Dubai Financial Market (DFM) 
 
The Dubai Financial Market was established by Ministerial Resolution from the Ministry 
of Economy No 14 of 2000 and commenced operation on 26
th
 March 2000. DFM 
operates as a secondary market for trading of securities issued by public joint-stock 
companies, bonds issued by the Federal Government or any of the Local Governments 
and public institutions in the country, units of investment funds, and any other financial 
instruments, local or foreign, which are accepted by the Market (DFM, 2010). On 2005 
DFM was set up as a Public Joint Stock Company in the UAE with paid up capital of 
AED 8 Billion allocated over 8 Billion shares where 20% of DFM shares was offered for 
public subscription which generated more than AED 201 billion; trading in shares of 
Dubai Financial Market (DFM) began on Wednesday, 7
th
 March, 2007 (DFM, 2010). 
DFM has many objectives and roles: the regulation of the process of securities trading, 
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the protection of investors, controlling the  market‟s liquidity and issuing analyses and 
statistical reports based on market data and information.    
 
4.3.3 Emirates and Securities Market (ESM) 
 
ESM is an official electronic index of the UAE capital market and was founded by SCA. 
It is to be considered the starting point of the project or process of merging the two stock 
markets (e.g. ADX and DFM). ESM is just an electronic installation of live-market-watch 
screens that link both capital markets in UAE (e.g. ADX and DFM) and which show on a 
daily basis the ESM index which reflects the trading movement of the listed companies‟ 
shares in both stock markets (SCA, 2010).  
 
4.3.4 Dubai Gold and Commodities Market  
 
Historically, Dubai and UAE was the regional hub for some physical trading activities, 
such as trade in gold, pearls and other commodities; therefore, the establishment of 
DGCX was a continuing step for the region and the local economy. It has become the 
region‟s first and leading commodity derivatives exchange in the Middle East (DGCX, 
2010). SCA established and licensed DGCX in 2005 and is responsible for oversight and 
for regulatory supervision of DGCX, which provides some protection to the investors and 
participants (SCA, 2009). DGCX provides participants such as producers, manufacturers 
and end users, with a sophisticated means of hedging their price risk exposure, and robust 
risk management and surveillance systems. The product portfolio in DGCX offers a range 
of products ranging from precious metal (e.g. gold, silver), base metals (e.g. steel rebar), 
energy (e.g. crude oil, fuel oil), currencies (e.g. US Dollar, British Sterling and Euro), 
options on gold and futures (DGCX, 2010). 
 
4.3.5 Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) 
 
DIFC is a financial free zone and provides a secure and efficient platform from which 
business and financial institutions can reach into and out of the emerging markets of the 
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region. It was established in 2004 (eStandardsForum, 2010c). The Dubai Financial 
Service Authority (DFSA) regulates DIFC and grants licenses and regulates the activities 
of financial institutions in the DIFC (PWC, 2009). Although DIFC is regulated by the 
DFSA, it has granted authority to a self-regulatory system thus the range of independent 
regulation, the common law framework, the supportive infrastructure and tax-friendly 
regime result in an environment which is advantageous for financial investment and 
attractive for investors (DIFC, 2011).  
 
DIFC has its own set of civil and commercial laws and regulations and has developed a 
complete code of law governing financial services regulation as part of its autonomy; it 
has created an independent judicial system and courts which are responsible for 
independent administration and enforcement of justice in DIFC and which have exclusive 
jurisdiction over all civil and commercial disputes arising within DIFC and / or relating to 
bodies and companies registered in DIFC (DIFC, 2011). 
 
4.3.6 NASDAQ Dubai 
 
NASDAQ Dubai is an international stock exchange which is located between Western 
Europe and East Asia and which was established in 2005 and is in DIFC, This allows 
regional and international issuers to access regional and international investment through 
the exchange and through primary or dual listing (PWC, 2009). The exchange currently 
lists equities, equity derivatives, Dubai Gold Securities, structured products, Sukuk 
(Islamic bonds) and conventional bonds, and the issuers are based in countries all over 
the world which include Bahrain, Canada, China, Germany, India, Saudi Arabia, 
Switzerland, the UK and the US as well as the UAE (NASDAQ, 2011).  
 
Not only does the establishment of the DIFX facilitate the growth of FDI in the UAE, but 
it also reinforces the need for the UAE to demonstrate integrity, transparency and 
efficiency by adopting a set of IFRSs and establishing a regulatory regime to accompany 
them (AME Info, 2005 cited by Irvine, and Lucas, 2006b). In July 2010, NASDAQ 
Dubai outsourced its trading and other key operational functions for equities to DFM; this 
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has brought to the DFM more than 550,000 individual investors as well as NASDAQ 
Dubai‟s international institutional investors resulting in a deep liquidity pool (NASDAQ, 
2011). This action was one of the consequences of Dubai financial crisis and was taken 
by the government of Dubai in order to mitigate the crisis and to manage risk  
 
4.4 Accounting and financial reporting systems and bodies in UAE 
 
4.4.1 International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
 
In recent years the UAE has adopted developed systems and mechanisms for financial 
reporting. However, there is no specific accounting board to guide financial reporting 
standards and practices, as is the case in some developed countries, for instance ASB in 
UK, or FASB in US, or in some developing countries such as MASB in Malaysia. The 
Federal Commercial Laws do not specify or enforce the use of certain accounting 
standards (e.g. GAAP or IFRS); most corporations seem to adopt the IFRS (Hassan, 
2009) because of the mandatory requirements from other regulatory bodies for example 
Central Bank and SCA.  
 
Since 1999 the central bank has made it mandatory for all commercial banks in UAE to 
prepare their accounts to IASs (Hussain et al., 2002). Since 2003 it has been mandatory 
for listed companies on ADX and DFM to comply with IFRSs (Deloitte, 2011). All 
companies listed on NASDAQ Dubai have been required to publish financial statements 
according to IFRSs since 2005 (AMEinfo, 2005). Although IFRS is not required for 
unlisted companies other than banks, it is considered best practice for these companies to 
adopt IFRSs (Deloitte, 2011). ICAEW (2010, p.2) argued that “with heightened 
commercial risk particularly since the financial downturn of 2008/09, greater assurance in 
the quality and reliability of financial information in the UAE has never been more vital 
as financial institutions become increasingly selective as lenders and investors”. Irvine 
and Lucas (2006b) argued that the increased foreign trade with Western countries and the 
European Union's requirement for listed consolidated entities to follow IFRSs beginning 
January 1, 2005, put pressure on the UAE to move toward the adoption of IFRSs.  
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They stated that the DIFC legal framework required banks and companies listed on 
NASDAQ Dubai to apply IFRSs. They stated that there are several key factors that have 
influenced the UAE‟s move to adopt IFRS such as global trade, capital markets, 
international auditing firms (Big 4) and the World Bank. They concluded that that the 
UAE, in embracing globalisation and adopting IFRS, will need to develop appropriate 
regulatory systems to overcome cultural issues relating to secrecy, fraud, corruption and 
monopoly which could be alleviated by the presence of international auditing firms and 
multinational corporations and a strong legal system.   
 
4.4.2 Professional accounting bodies in UAE 
 
The professional accountancy associations and activities are immature, in a similar way 
to those in emerging economy countries (Hassan, 2009). The government in UAE 
regulates the financial reporting regulations and controls the accounting and auditing 
profession through Security and Commodity Authority (SCA) and the Ministry of 
Economy. However, recent years have seen an improvement in accountancy professional 
practice and witnessed the establishment of the Accounts and Auditors Association 
(AAA) in 1997. The AAA (1997, p.7) stated that that main objective is developing and 
consolidating the rules and standards for the practice of the profession of accounting and 
auditing in the country in general. However, accountancy professional bodies in UAE 
have no regulatory power to set or enforce any rules and to license accountants and 
auditors or to establish accounting and auditing standards, and do not offer educational 
programs or professional certificates (Hassan, 2009, p.673).  
 
4.4.3 Auditing bodies and practice in UAE 
 
According to International Monetary Fund report of 2007, the United Arab Emirates has 
no statutory requirements on auditing, no auditing standards, and no auditing oversight 
body (eStandardsForum, 2010b). However, “The Dubai Financial Services Authority” 
(DFSA) requires that "financial statements issued in a prospectus must be audited... [by] 
an independent, competent, and qualified auditor, in accordance with the standards of the 
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International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) or the Accounting and 
Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOFI), or in accordance with 
other audit standards acceptable to the DFSA" (PWC, 2009).  
 
In addition, the accounting and auditing practice in UAE is also dominated by 
international auditing firms (e.g. Ernst and Young, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, KPMG and 
Deliote), especially within the finance and banking industry (Hussain, Islam, 
Gunasekaran & Maskooki, 2002) through their auditing process, publications and training 
courses on accounting, financial reporting and auditing. Hassan (2009, p. 673) argued 
that big audit firms encourage their UAE client corporations to publish of risk related 
information. Within the jurisdiction of the DIFC companies must appoint an independent 
auditor; that audit firm must be registered with the DIFC through the DFSA 
(eStandarsForum, 2010b).  
 
4.5 Corporate governance in the UAE 
 
The corporate governance practice in UAE has developed over time. Interest in corporate 
governance has increased since 2004 and 2005, when both ADX and DFM engaged in a 
serious program for the implementation of corporate governance which in turn enhanced 
listed companies‟ interest in corporate governance (Zalami, 2005, p.3). This was followed 
by a considerable volume of conferences and seminars and courses on corporate 
governance and also witnessed the establishment of many institutes for corporate 
governance such as “Hawkama”2 which was founded in 2006 and which addressed the 
interest of the corporate sector, regulatory agencies and the media in corporate 
governance (Safia, 2008).  
 
Then, in 2007 the Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA) implemented a 
mandatory corporate governance code for listed companies in UAE capital markets 
(eStandardsForum, 2010a). In 2009 the Ministry of Economy published ministerial 
                                               
2 „HAWKAMAH‟ is the Arabic concept for „Corporate Governance‟ 
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resolution No. 518 of 2009
3
 which provides for enhanced corporate governance rules and 
discipline standards for UAE public companies (Ahmed, 2010). The corporate 
governance code within MR 518 (2009) defines corporate governance as “a set of rules, 
standards and procedures that aim at achieving corporate discipline in the management 
of the company in accordance with international standards and approaches through 
determination of responsibilities and duties of members of boards of directors and the 
executive management of the company, taking into consideration protection of 
shareholders' and stakeholders' equity”.  
 
The corporate governance code in UAE stresses the corporate governance mechanism, 
for instance board structure and responsibilities, shareholders rights, transparency and 
disclosure, directors‟ remuneration, internal control, shareholders‟ right, dividend policy 
and an annual governance review or report (MR 518, 2009). The code refers to the 
disclosure of corporations‟ risks, risk management, and internal control risks and 
encourages companies to have regular procedures, allowing the determination, 
measurement and disclosure of their risks to be a part of best practices (Hassan, 2009, 
p.673).  
 
4.6 Enforcement in UAE 
 
Enforcement of investor protection laws and disclosure standards is an important 
determinant of corporate ownership patterns, corporate governance and disclosure quality 
(Kothari, 2000, p.99).  Feulner (1989, p.222) stated that the Ministry of Economy in co-
ordination with the concerned local authorities is empowered to monitor compliance with 
the Companies Law by public and private shareholding companies and partnerships 
limited by shares, and also has the power to inspect a company‟s operations and accounts 
and to request whatever information the Ministry feel it needs from officials of the 
company and inspect and investigate serious offences by the directors or auditors.  
 
                                               
3 Will be referred to it as “MR 518” thereafter 
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The Commercial Company Law specifies certain penalties of both a civil and criminal 
nature relating for example to false statements or reports and breach of trust  which can 
be punished by fines ranging from AED 10000 to 100000 AED and imprisonment for 
three months to two years (Feulner, 1989, p.222). In the context of stock markets, SCA 
lays down some process and features to enforce and encourage listed companies to fully 
comply with the regulations and disclosure rules and mandatory requirements, for 
instance it assigns a compliance officer, and introduces penalties for any irregularities by 
listed companies.   
 
4.7 Reference to risk disclosure within UAE disclosure requirements  
 
An example of the reference to risk disclosure within UAE jurisdiction would be SCA‟s 
disclosure and transparency regulation section (Rule 4, Article 33, 2000) which states 
that:   
“The company …. shall notify the Authority and the management of the Market of 
any significant developments affecting the prices of such securities upon learning 
of the same, such as catastrophes, fires, mergers, the issue of new securities, the 
discontinuance of a production line, voluntary liquidation or lawsuits filed by or 
against the company affecting its financial position.” (SCA, 2000)  
 
The SCA allows for omitting commercial sensitivity issues, under the disclosure and 
transparency regulation (Rule 4, Article 35, 2000) in that: 
 
“It shall be permissible for the entity or company not to issue a press 
announcement regarding any given information, if its senior management has 
reasonable grounds to believe that the revealing of such information will lead to 
serious damage to its interests.” (SCA, 2000) 
 
In addition, Hassan (2009, p.673) stated that later amendments (decision no. 75 of 2004 
and decision 155 of 2005) provided further requirements that emphasise risk disclosure in 
that companies should supple the financial statement users with a report from the board 
of directors which includes 1) a statement of the significant events and unexpected 
circumstances that the company has experienced from its incorporation, and 2) 
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assessments and figures of the company‟s performance and achievements compared to 
the board expectations.  
 
The regulators have paid attention to general disclosure and transparency but risk 
disclosure has received little attention in the regulations and laws in UAE. In addition, it 
can be seen that the disclosure and risk disclosure related regulations and rules are not 
detailed but are general and tackle the risk disclosure in a broad sense and with overall 
policies regarding directors‟ responsibility for disclosing material risk issues to investors. 
However, the attention of regulators (e.g. SCA and Ministry of Economy) to risk 
disclosure could be seen as part of the requirement for implementing IFRS and the 
Corporate Governance Code in UAE; these are mandatory and include further 
requirements regarding risk disclosures, for instance disclosures of financial risks and 
internal control risk.   
 
4.8 Dubai Financial Crisis  
 
Dubai is the second largest Emirate and is strategically located at the cross roads of trade 
between Europe and US and the Far East; therefore it to be considered a regional hub. 
The Dubai government has established about 18 free economic trade and industrial zones 
to encourage foreign investment which cover a wide range of businesses such as financial 
services, manufacturing, media and technology (PWC, 2009, p.2). Financial scandals in 
the UAE have damaged its reputation as a reputable investment centre, with Dubai 
widely believed to be the centre of money laundering operations (Irvine & Lucas, 2006b, 
p.12). 
 
The Dubai financial crisis started in 2008 and the major debts crisis occurred in 2009 
when the Dubai government asked for a six month standstill on repayments which 
implied the rescue was in doubt (Spencer, 2009). This crisis occurred as a result of the 
global financial crisis that stated in 2007 in US and Europe. The Dubai government has 
declared that it has $80bn of debts; however, analysts say the true figure could be double 
that figure (Spencer, 2009). The major government owned holding companies and some 
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private companies have failed to meet their debts and pay back their creditors; for 
example Dubai World had liabilities of $60bn. The crisis has negatively affected real 
estate, for instance Al Nakheel, a Dubai state owned company, had huge debts and 
payments on bonds which were coming due. These amounted to about $3.5bn and the 
company appeared to have little cash to meet the payments.  
 
Financial markets in UAE have been significantly affected by the turmoil in the global 
economy, primarily due to the fall in oil prices, the contraction of global trade and 
logistics, as well as the bursting of the real estate bubble; an example of this is the debt 
problems experienced by Dubai World, a government-owned conglomerate, which 
further exacerbated these effects (eStandardsForum, 2010d). The Dubai government did 
not issue any detailed statements on how it was going to handle the crisis and the debts. 
The lack of transparency and relatively untested financial legal system in UAE means 
that no-one knows if these can be demanded as collateral against Dubai World and other 
government debts (Spencer, 2009).  
 
4.9 Summary  
 
The UAE political and economic system is developing over time. However, there is more 
to do to become a developed system in terms of being a democratic system and a free 
market economy. The regulatory environment and regulatory bodies have improved and 
they have established many regulations in order to protect the market. However, they are 
less effective and more enforcement actions and stricter rules are required. Professional 
accounting bodies are established in the UAE but with no power. The government 
governs the market through several agencies; however, there is overlap responsibilities 
between them. It can be concluded that as the UAE continues to strive for increased 
investor confidence and to attract foreign and institutional investors disclosure, 
transparency and compliance with internationally recognised standards will decrease risk 
to investors and help channel financial investment into the region (ICAEW, 2010). The 
next chapter explains the hypothesis development based on the literature review (chapter 
2 and 3) and the UAE context (chapter 4). 
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Chapter 5: 
Hypothesis 
Development 
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5.0 Introduction  
 
This chapter sets out the hypotheses which will be investigated using qualitative (chapter 
7) and quantitative (chapter 8) approaches. The main elements in the disclosure process 
are the users of financial statements and managers. In order to understand the nature of 
such a relationship, the relevant literature (chapter 2) discusses a variety of theories that 
are employed to explain disclosure practices (e.g. information asymmetry, agency cost, 
signalling and political cost). Furthermore, as has been noted in the literature review 
(chapter 3), researchers have investigated empirically the determinants of such disclosure 
practices. They have widely examined the determinants of disclosure in the light of the 
various disclosure theories. The determinants are related to company-specific variables 
and corporate governance characteristics. The hypothesis development is based on the 
literature review (chapter 2 and 3) and in the context of disclosure practice and 
requirement in UAE (chapter 4).  
 
The hypotheses in this chapter attempt to address the main research questions in more 
detail. The first group of hypotheses has been developed to examine the current risk 
reporting practices of UAE companies and the nature and type of risk information 
disclosed. The second set of hypothesis examines the influence of voluntary and 
mandatory risk disclosure requirements especially IFRSs. The third set of hypotheses 
investigates the determinants of risk disclosure and whether a relationship exists between 
risk disclosure and some firm-specific characteristics. The last set of hypotheses is 
employed in order to investigate whether an association exists between risk disclosure 
and some corporate governance variables.  
 
5.1 The practice, type, nature and time frame of risk disclosure  
 
R.Q.1: What is the current risk reporting practice of UAE listed companies? 
 
It is expected that listed companies will not provide the full potential of risk information 
because of certain reasons: 1) emerging capital markets may suffer from less regulation 
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and enforcement; 2) newness of disclosure regulation and requirements, so companies 
lack experience in dealing with such regulation; 3) lag in adopting practices of developed 
markets (e.g. IFRSs and the corporate governance code); and 4) following financial 
analysis in developing market is lower than developed market which could result in lower 
demand for information.   
 
5.1.1 Financial and non-financial risk disclosures 
 
The literature review (chapter 3) shows the main risk disclosure categories are financial 
and non-financial. The theoretical justification on why companies may provide more 
financial risk disclosure than other types such as non-financial ones is lined to disclosure 
requirements which focus on financial aspect. Accounting standards (e.g. IFRS) and 
regulatory requirements (SEC, 1997) focus on financial risks, therefore, it is expected that 
more information on financial risks will be disclosed than on non-financial risks. The 
previous empirical studies found mixed results. In the context of UAE, it is expected that 
listed companies will provide more information on financial risks than non-financial ones 
because of IFRSs which focus on the financial aspect. Therefore, the first hypothesis 
states that:    
 
H1: The number of financial risk disclosures will be higher than of disclosures of non-
financial risks (e.g. operation, environment, IT, strategic, regulatory, integrity, 
empowerment and political risks.) 
 
5.1.2 Quantitative and qualitative risk disclosure  
 
As is shown in the literature review (chapter 3) academic scholars and stock market 
regulators encourage companies to provide more quantified disclosure. They argued that 
quantified disclosure is useful for decision making. Most empirical works have found that 
there is a little quantified risk information. Therefore, it is hypothesised that: 
   
H2: The number of qualitative risk disclosures will be more than quantitative risk 
disclosures within companies‟ annual reports. 
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5.1.3 Forward-looking and past risk disclosures 
 
It is discussed theoretically in chapter 3 that some people argue for forward-looking 
information (e.g. Linsley & Shrives, 2006). The literature review suggests that companies 
should provide more forward-looking and forecast disclosures because it is more useful 
for decision-making purposes especially for stock market investors. Most of the reviewed 
empirical studies found that companies provide little forward-looking information. In the 
context of companies in UAE it is expected that similar results will be found because 
UAE companies follow IFRSs which are mainly concerned with historic information. 
 
H3: The number of forward-looking risk disclosures will be fewer than past risk 
disclosures.  
 
5.1.4 Good news and bad news disclosures  
 
There is mixed and asymmetric disclosure of good and bad news. The literature review 
section showed the theoretical argument based on signalling theory for the reasons 
managers tend to provide more good news than bad news. However, some writers have 
argued that managers may have no incentive to withhold bad news because keeping silent 
is more risky. Empirical studies show the number of good news disclosures was 
significantly higher than bad news ones. Based on the theoretical and empirical evidence 
it is hypothesised that: 
 
H4: The number of good news disclosures will be higher than the number of bad news 
ones. 
 
5.2 Voluntary and mandatory requirements for risk disclosure  
 
R.Q.2: Should risk disclosure be mandatory or voluntary for companies in UAE? 
 
This hypothesis investigates whether risk disclosure should be mandatory or voluntary. 
Theoretical justification of it being mandatory and of regulation is discussed in the 
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literature review (chapter 3). Cabedo and Tirado (2004, p.184) stated that “there is a wide 
consensus between authors and institutions on the need to report risks, however different 
opinions exist on the need for compulsory disclosure of information on risks”. The debate 
about regulating risk disclosure was illustrated theoretically in the literature review. 
Abraham and Cox (2007, p.227) argue that the pattern of the presentation of risk 
information in the annual report depends upon the form that reporting regulation takes.  
 
The empirical work found mixed results. Solomon et al. 2000 found that institutional 
investors in UK were not in favour of regulating risk disclosure. However, Konishi and 
Ali (2007) found that after the issue of mandatory guidelines on risk disclosures, the 
number of risk disclosures of Japanese companies was significantly higher than the 
number of risk disclosures before the guidelines were issued. Souabni (2011, p.9) found 
that companies adhere to legal requirement for disclosure of financial risk information 
and that most companies‟ annual reports stick to the minimum of required disclosures for 
their jurisdiction. He found that the companies that did not disclose information 
concerning regulatory or legal risks tended to be based in the Asian and Australian capital 
markets and their lack of disclosure may result from a lack of legal requirements 
especially for non-financial reporting.  
 
The empirical results confirmed that there would be mixed results on the influence of and 
preference for compulsory requirements for risk disclosures. Therefore, this hypothesis 
examines voluntary and mandatory risk disclosure in the light of the positions of capital 
market participants regarding regulating risk disclosure requirements. In addition, it 
examines whether the level of risk disclosure has significantly increased over time in 
response to the mandatory requirements and pressure by market participants. 
 
H5a: There will be more risk information revealed in response to mandatory risk 
disclosures than as voluntary risk disclosures.  
 
H5b: It is expected that market participants will be favour of more mandatory risk 
disclosure. 
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5.3 The influence of IFRSs on risk disclosure practice 
 
R.Q.3: What is the influence of IFRSs on risk disclosure practice of UAE companies? 
 
The hypothesis examines the influence of regulation and mandatory requirements on risk 
disclosure mainly in the context of IFRS. Souabni (2011, p.4) found that “financial risk 
information is generally disclosed in line with the requirements of IFRS, even where 
IFRS is not yet mandatory”. Naser (1998) measured the level of disclosure of Jordan 
listed companies before and after adopting IASs. He found that the level of disclosure has 
increased. He concluded that the number of financial reporting disclosures increase after 
the adoption of IASs. Konishi and Ali (2007, p.278) found that initiatives taken by ASBJ 
in Japan for enhancing risk disclosure rates have influenced companies to report more 
risk information in their annual report.  
 
Kajuter and Winkler (2003, cited by Araham and Cox, 2007, p.228) found that firms in 
Germany were not systematic in their reporting of risk and have relatively low 
conformance to statutory risk disclosure requirements of GAS. In UAE, both DFM and 
ADX have adopted the IFRS. Listed company in UAE are subject to IFRSs, which have 
been mandatory under SCA rules since 2003 (Deloitte, 2011). They are also subject to the 
corporate governance code which has been mandatory since April, 2007 
(eStandardsForum, 2010a). Therefore, it is expected that the level of risk disclosures will 
increase over time because of mandatory requirements and pressure.  
 
H6: In the absence of prior regulation, it is predicted that IFRSs will be the main 
determinants for risk disclosure levels and practice in UAE.   
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5.4 Firm-specific characteristics and risk disclosure 
 
R.Q.4: What are the firm specific characteristics determinants of risk disclosure by the 
UAE listed companies? 
 
5.4.1 The association between risk disclosure and company size 
 
Large companies, because of the greater range of their operations, face more risks than 
smaller ones. Moreover, the relative cost of disclosure is likely to be lower which covered 
through the huge resources and high skills they employed. The theoretical discussion on 
the association between firm size and risk disclosure is widely justified in risk disclosure 
literature and relies on certain theories for instance information asymmetry and political 
cost theory. The literature review chapter also discussed empirical works on the 
association between firm size and risk disclosure which show mixed results; for instance, 
some indicate positive association (Linsley & Shrives, 2005, Abraham & Cox, 2007) 
whereas other studies show insignificant association (e.g. Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004).  
   
With regards to UAE as an emerging market, it is expected that there will be different 
patterns of disclosure as firms have to operate in a different environment where there is 
no clear emphasis on voluntary risk reporting and there are no regulatory guidelines in 
this regard (except for IFRSs and the corporate governance code). In addition, it is 
expected that most of the sampled companies face many similar risks and show similar 
disclosure patterns, because the majority of businesses operate within the UAE and Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) region.  In contrast to many empirical studies in developed 
markets which found positive association, some disclosure studies in the UAE find no 
significant association between firm size and level of disclosure (Hassan, 2009; Aljifri & 
Hussainey, 2007). Based on discussion of the theoretical framework and empirical 
evidence on the correlation between corporate size and risk disclosure, it could be 
expected that large firms will provide more risk disclosure than small firms.  
 
H7: There is a positive association between the extent of risk disclosure and firm size. 
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5.4.2 The association between risk disclosure and company performance 
 
The literature review discussion shows that previous studies supported the existence of a 
relationship between company performance and risk disclosure in the light of signalling 
theory. It can be summarised that theoretically a positive association should be expected; 
however, empirical evidence shows mixed results in this regards to majority evidence 
being of no association as was shown in the literature review section. Some studies found 
a positive association whereas another reported insignificant association. Within the 
context of the UAE, mixed results were found in that some studies found a positive 
association (e.g. Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007) whereas other researchers found no 
significant association (e.g. Al-Shayeb, 2003). This hypothesis therefore states that:   
 
H8: There will be a positive association between performance level of company and risk 
disclosure level. 
 
5.4.3 The correlation between risk disclosure and liquidity 
 
The literature review (chapter 3) justified theoretically the association between liquidity 
and risk disclosure, in the light of capital need theory, and suggested a positive influence 
from liquidity level on risk disclosure. However, empirical works suggested either 
negative (e.g. Wallace, Naser & Mora, 1994) or no significant association (e.g. Al 
Shammari et al., 2008). It is expected that companies with a lower liquidity ratio would 
be willing to disclose more information on risks and their financial position in order to 
assure shareholders, regulatory bodies and debtholders of their healthy going-concern 
status.  
 
H9: There will be a negative association between the liquidity ratio of the company and 
risk disclosure.  
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5.4.4 The association between a company’s risk level and its risk disclosure 
 
Review of the literature (chapter 3) shows that the association between the levels of a 
company‟s risk and its risk disclosure has been discussed theoretically in the light of 
agency cost and signalling theories which justified a positive association. However, the 
empirical results show mixed results in that some studies found no significant association 
(e.g. Mohobbot, 2005) whereas some studies found a positive correlation (e.g. Deumes & 
Knechel, 2008).  
 
In the context of UAE, Hassan (2009) confirmed positive association between risk 
disclosure and companies' risk levels. Also, Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) find positive 
correlation between forward-looking information and companies‟ debt ratios as a 
measure of the level of risk within the company. They argue that this is because such 
firms prefer to share more relevant information with their creditors who consider firms 
with high debt ratios as high risk companies. Therefore, firm managers would seek to 
reduce financial costs (imposed by lenders) by disclosing more information.  
 
H10: There will be a positive association between the level of risk and of risk disclosure 
within a company. 
 
5.4.5 The correlation between industry type and risk disclosure  
 
The association between industry type and risk disclosure was explained theoretically in 
the light of political cost and signalling theories in the literature review (chapter 3) and 
positive association was suggested. The prior empirical studies indicate mixed results in 
that some studies found the association to be significant whereas other studies showed an 
insignificant association between industry type and risk disclosure. Based on the 
theoretical and empirical results within emerging markets, it is expected that the situation 
in the UAE as follows: 
 
H11: It is predicted that risk disclosure level will vary significantly according to industry 
type. 
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5.4.6 The association between auditor type and risk disclosure  
 
A theoretical justification of the influence of auditor type on risk disclosure was 
explained in the light of agency cost and signalling theories and a positive association 
was suggested (chapter 3). Empirical work shows mixed results in that some studies 
found a positive association (e.g. Lopes & Rodrigues) whereas other found a negative 
(e.g. Wallace & Naser, 1995) or insignificant one (e.g. Deumes & Knechel, 2008). 
Theoretical explanation and empirical evidence have found mixed results on the 
association between disclosure and auditor size. However, the majority of prior studies in 
the field found no association.  
 
In the case of the UAE, it is expected that higher risk disclosure rates may be positively 
associated with the Big 4. This is because the Big 4 have wider experience and 
understanding of the disclosure requirements comparing with local audit firms. Hassan 
(2008) found that the majority of corporations in the UAE are audited by one of the big 
audit firms. He stated that in the UAE such big audit companies require their clients to 
comply with disclosure requirements including ones regarding risk-related information. 
In addition, he argued that UAE corporations' managers employ big international audit 
companies and improve disclosure levels including levels of risk disclosure in order to 
obtain legitimacy in international capital markets, introducing measures to facilitate 
foreign investment and earn international investors‟ trust.  This hypothesis therefore is 
formulated as follows: 
  
H12: It is expected that companies audited by Big 4 audit firms will have higher levels of 
risk disclosure than those audited by non-Big 4 firms.  
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5.5 Corporate governance and risk disclosure 
 
R.Q.5: What is the influence of corporate governance code on risk disclosure practice of 
UAE companies? 
 
5.5.1 The influence of corporate governance code on risk disclosure  
  
The literature review (chapter 3) discussed theoretically the influence of corporate 
governance on risk disclosure in the light of agency cost, information asymmetry and 
accountability. Linsley and Shrives (2005, p.292) argued that “good corporate 
governance requires directors to be accountable to shareholders for the risks the company 
faces and improved risk disclosure facilitates greater understanding of the company risk 
profile”. Ownership and governance factors may play a vital role in firms‟ risk reporting 
because the annual report is prepared by the directors mainly for shareholders (Abraham 
& Cox, 2007, p.229).   
 
The empirical evidence showed mixed results in that some studies found that corporate 
governance structure has a positive association with voluntary disclosure (e.g. Ghazali, 
2007) whereas other found no significant link between disclosure and compliance with 
corporate governance requirements (e.g. Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007). Deumes and 
Knechel (2008) evidenced that economic incentives for voluntary internal control 
reporting exist in a low regulation environment. Their findings support the idea that 
managers voluntarily report on internal control more if the number of information 
problems and agency conflicts are higher. They argued that regulators may wish to allow 
firms flexibility in their internal control reporting choice as firms take a broad approach 
to internal control that goes beyond Sarbanes-Oxley Act based regulations and tailor their 
internal reports to suit their specific environments. Based on the theoretical discussion 
and some empirical studies, it could be hypothesised that: 
 
H13: Good corporate governance (as measured by the number of risk disclosure related 
to corporate governance requirements) will have a positive influence on risk disclosure 
practices. 
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R.Q.6: What are the influences of corporate governance characteristics on risk reporting 
in UAE? 
 
5.5.2 The influence of ownership structure on risk disclosure  
 
The literature review chapter shows that there is a theoretical justification for the 
association between risk disclosure and ownership structure in the light of agency cost 
theory, information asymmetry and signalling theory. The theoretical justification 
suggested different views for the different ownership structure variables. The review of 
the empirical literature in previous chapter shows that there are mixed results on the 
association between risk disclosure and ownership structure, in that some studies found a 
positive association whereas others found negative and not significant results.  
 
In the UAE, share ownership of listed companies is distributed among various main 
shareholder groups which include government agencies, dominant families (e.g. royal 
family), institutional investors and individual investors. These groups could be 
considered insiders because in many cases they have representatives on the boards of 
directors of listed companies. They have full access to internal information and do not 
need to rely extensively on public disclosure and therefore they may have no incentive to 
increase the level of disclosure and risk disclosure to external parties. 
    
H14: There will be a significant association between ownership structure and risk 
disclosure level.  
 
5.5.3 The association between board size and risk disclosure  
 
The review of the literature shows no existing theoretical arguments about connections 
between board size and risk disclosure. Also no previous empirical studies have 
examined the influence of board size on risk disclosure. However, there has been some 
work on the association between voluntary disclosure and board size which suggested a 
positive association based on the information asymmetry theory. In the context of UAE, 
there is no regulation that specifies board size; however there is regarding board 
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structure, for example the corporate governance code in UAE states that the board of 
directors should consist of independent and non-executive directors. It could be expected:  
 
H15: There will be a positive association between board size and risk disclosure levels.  
 
5.5.4 The association between non-executive directors and risk disclosures 
 
Prior research (chapter 3) suggested a positive association between non-executive 
directors and risk disclosure based on agency cost theory. Empirical studies found mixed 
results. Some empirical studies found insignificant results (e.g. Araham & Cox, 2007) 
whereas other studies found a negative association (e.g. Barako et al., 20006). In the 
UAE, the authorities, through the corporate governance code, encourage companies to 
increase the number of non-executive directors on the board. Based on the theoretical 
justification it could be expected that:  
 
H16: There will be a positive association between the proportion of non-executive 
directors and the level of risk disclosures. 
 
5.5.5 The association between independent directors and risk disclosure  
 
The argument for the influence of independent directors on disclosure is similar to the 
argument regarding non-executive directors. However, non-executive directors can be 
dependent or sometimes independent; therefore, the UAE corporate code provides a 
separate code for independent director. The theoretical argument discussed in the 
previous literature review (chapter 3) suggested the positive influence of independent 
directors on risk disclosure based on agency costs theory. In addition, empirical studies 
show mixed results in that some studies found a positive association (e.g. Chen and Jaggi, 
2000) whereas other studies reported not significant result (e.g. Lopes & Rodrigues, 
2007). The UAE corporate governance code encourages independent directors and 
requires that at least a third of the board members should be independent directors (MR 
519, 2009) which is considered a positive and favourable practice. Based on the 
theoretical argument and empirical evidence it is expected that: 
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H17: There will be a positive association between the proportion of independent 
directors and level of risk disclosures.  
 
5.5.6 The association between duality and risk disclosure  
 
The theoretical argument given in previous literature suggested a negative influence from 
duality in the role of the chairman and the CEO based on agency cost theory. Empirical 
evidence shows mixed results in that some studies found negative association (e.g. 
Forker, 1992) or insignificant results (e.g. Cheng & Courtenay, 2006). The corporate 
governance code in UAE does not allow for duality in the chairman and CEO, which 
implies that it is seen as an unfavourable or negative practice; nonetheless some people 
still argue that duality has some positive features and there is some non-compliance on 
the part of some companies in this regard. Therefore it is expected that: 
 
H 18: There will be a negative association between duality and level of risk disclosures. 
 
5.5.7 The association between internal auditors and risk disclosure  
 
The previous chapter shows that theoretical arguments suggest that internal auditors have 
a positive influence on risk disclosure. Also, some empirical studies found positive 
association (e.g. Page & Spira, 2004) whereas others found negative ones (e.g. Lin et al., 
2011). In addition, the UAE corporate governance code and the stock market authority 
(e.g. SCA) encourage companies to implement an internal auditing process.  
 
H19:  There will be a positive association between presence of internal auditors and risk 
disclosure levels.  
 
5.5.8 The association between audit committee and risk disclosure  
 
The review of the literature in previous chapter shows that some scholars in the field of 
disclosure and theoretical justification suggest the presence of an audit committee has a 
positive influence on risk disclosure. The theoretical argument is based on agency cost 
theory. Empirical evidence shows mixed results. Some studies reported positive association 
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(e.g. Taylor, 2011) whereas other studies reported no significant association (e.g. Froker, 
1992). Based on theoretical justification and some empirical evidence it was hypothesised: 
 
H20: There will be a positive correlation between risk disclosure level and the presence 
of audit committee.  
 
5.5.9 The influence of internal control on risk disclosure  
 
The literature review shows that there is theoretical justification for the influence of 
internal control on risk disclosure based on corporate governance, information asymmetry 
and agency cost. The theoretical argument suggested internal control has a positive 
influence on risk disclosure. However, empirical studies on the association between 
internal control and risk disclosure levels were limited. Based on theoretical arguments it 
is expected that companies that have a proper internal control system and report on their 
internal control activities would provide more information on risk.  
 
H21: There is a positive association between risk disclosure and internal control systems 
(measured by reporting on internal control). 
 
5.5.10 The influence of risk management on risk disclosure  
 
The theoretical argument on the association between risk management is well defined in 
the literature and suggested a positive association (see chapter 3). The literature review 
shows that risk reporting is an important stage in risk management. Therefore a proper 
risk management system would positively contribute to the companies‟ risk disclosure 
levels. However, empirical works found mixed results in that some studies showed 
positive association as was to be expected from the theoretical justification, whereas 
some studies found no significant association. In the context of UAE, the stock market 
authorities and the corporate governance code encourage companies to implement a 
proper risk management system. Therefore, this hypothesis states that: 
 
H22: There is a positive association between risk disclosure and risk management 
systems (presence of risk management department/committee/officer).  
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Table 5.1: Summary of research questions and hypotheses 
Risk disclosure practice Expected sign 
R.Q.1: What is the current risk reporting practice of UAE listed 
companies? 
 
H1 The number of financial risk disclosures will be more than non-
financial risks.  
Significant 
difference  
H2 The number of qualitative risk disclosures will be more than 
quantitative risk disclosures. 
Significant 
difference 
H3 The number of forward–looking risk information will be less 
than past risk disclosure.  
Significant 
difference 
H4 The number of good news disclosures will be higher than the 
number of bad news ones. 
Significant 
difference 
R.Q.2: Should risk disclosure be mandatory or voluntary for 
companies in UAE? 
 
H5a Will there be more risk information revealed in response to 
mandatory risk disclosure requirements than as voluntary risk 
disclosures?   
Significant 
difference 
H5b Are market participants in favour of mandatory rather than 
voluntary risk disclosure? 
 
R.Q.3: What is the influence of IFRSs on risk disclosure practice of 
UAE companies? 
 
H6 IFRSs will be the main dominants for risk disclosures levels 
and practices in UAE. 
Positive 
Firm-specific characteristics  
R.Q.4: What are the firm specific characteristics determinants of risk 
disclosure by the UAE listed companies? 
 
H7 Big companies will provide more risk disclosures than small 
companies. 
Positive 
H8 There will be a positive association between company 
performance and risk disclosure levels.  
Positive  
H9 There will be a negative association between liquidity ratio and 
risk disclosure. 
Negative  
H10 There will be a positive association between the level of risk 
within a company and risk disclosure. 
Positive 
H11 Risk disclosure level will significantly vary according to 
industry type. 
Significant 
difference  
H12 Companies audited by Big 4 audit firms will have higher levels 
of risk disclosure than companies audited by non-Big 4 firms.  
Positive 
Corporate governance characteristics   
R.Q.5: What is the influence of corporate governance code on risk 
disclosure practice of UAE companies? 
 
H13 Good corporate governance will have a positive influence on 
risk disclosure levels and practices.  
Positive  
R.Q.6: What are the influences of corporate governance characteristics 
on risk reporting in UAE? 
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H14 There will be significant association between ownership 
structure and risk disclosure levels. 
Significant 
influence  
H15 There will be a positive association between board size and 
levels of risk disclosure. 
Positive  
H16 There will be a positive association between the presence of 
non-executive directors and risk disclosure levels. 
Positive 
H17 There will be a positive association between independent 
directors and risk disclosure levels.  
Positive  
H18 There will be a negative association between duality and 
levels of risk disclosure. 
Negative  
H19 There will be a positive association between the presence of 
internal auditors and risk disclosure levels.  
Positive  
H20 There will be a positive correlation between the presence of 
an audit committee and risk disclosure levels.  
Positive  
H21 There will be a positive association between risk disclosure 
levels and internal control systems.  
Positive 
H22 There will be a positive association between risk disclosure 
levels and risk management systems.  
Positive 
 
5.6 Summary  
 
The hypotheses in this chapter are developed based on risk disclosure theory and 
empirical studies within the literature review (chapter 2 and chapter 3). There is 
disagreement among researchers in the field of disclosure, especially on the expected sign 
of the association between risk disclosure level and its determinants or variables. 
Therefore the hypotheses in this study are developed and based on theoretical argument, 
empirical evidence and, within the context of UAE practice, in terms of regulation and 
risk disclosure requirements. Some variables are widely examined and well evidenced 
(e.g. company size), whereas other variables have received little attention in the literature 
(e.g. internal auditors). There is weak theoretical argument on the association between 
some corporate governance variables and risk disclosure, for instance board size. To sum 
up, the main hypotheses concern risk disclosure nature, type and time-frame, the 
influence of IFRS on risk disclosure level, the association between risk disclosure and 
firm characteristics, the influence of corporate governance characteristics on risk 
disclosure level and practice. The next chapter describes the research methodology.  
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Chapter 6: 
Methodology  
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6.0 Introduction  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain and evaluate the research philosophy, design and 
methods employed in the study. The methodology chapter is organised as follows: the 
research design section explains the research philosophy and approach; the data 
collection methods are explained in the next section which is divided into two parts each 
dealing with the two main approaches, qualitative (interview) and quantitative (content 
analysis and regression analysis). The process and procedures of the two methods are 
explained in detail.  
 
6.1 Research design 
 
In general, researchers follow different approaches when carrying out a study. It is 
essential that authors are clear about their research approach because this helps in shaping 
the research strategy. Easterby, Thorpe and Jackson (2002) pointed out that an 
understanding of philosophical issues is very useful for researchers in clarifying research 
designs, and in foreseeing a practical or workable one. In addition, it helps researchers to 
be able to judge the appropriateness of the methods that have been employed and the 
validity of the conclusion reached (Walliman, 2001, p.52).  
 
6.1.1 Research philosophy: positivism   
 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2003) point out that there are different research 
philosophies, for instance positivism, interpretivism and realism. Anderson (2009, p. 134) 
states that the positivist research approach adopts a scientific method of collecting facts 
and testing for relationships between them in order to make generalisable conclusions, 
and that it tends to value quantitative data. She explains that the interpretivist research 
approach on the other hand examines the experiences of different people in different 
situations or cultures in order to understand the different realities, and that it values 
qualitative data. Saunders et al. (2003) cite some features of the positivist approach. For 
example 1) it is deductive, 2) it seeks to explain the causal relationship between variables, 
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3) it uses quantitative data, and 4) it employs controls to allow the testing of the 
hypotheses and uses highly structured methodology to facilitate replication.  
 
Ryan, Scapens and Theobald (2002, p.75) explain that accounting researchers become 
increasingly interested in positive theories which are concerned with explanation and 
prediction and being grounded in empirical data. They argue that the methodological 
basis of positive accounting theory proceeds as decision-makers choose particular courses 
of action based on their desires, needs, preferences etc, and these choices are informed by 
their choice of understanding of how the relevant variables interact (p.76). They argue 
that such methodological issue does not explain individual behaviour rather it is an 
abstract theoretical model that can be used to generate predictions, or hypothesis for 
empirical testing (p.78).   
 
The philosophy for this study follows a positivist approach. It is believed that theories 
play an important part in empirical studies because they are clearly stated and discussed 
and their roles are explained clearly. This research will examine risk disclosure practices 
in the light of disclosure theories such as agency cost, signalling theory and positive 
accounting theory. This study explains the relationship between dependent variable (e.g. 
risk disclosure level) and some explanatory variables (e.g. firm characteristics and 
corporate governance characteristics). 
 
6.1.2 Research approach: deductive   
 
This study follows the deductive approach. Saunders et al. (2009) state that the deductive 
approach is most common in the positivist approach. It involves starting with a theory 
and set of hypotheses and then testing using an empirical test (Saunders et al. 2003, p.85-
86). The study utilised the hypothesis technique in order to investigate the relationship 
between several variables. Using this approach authors should firstly identify relevant 
theories, hypotheses or models and then devises an empirical test. In the empirical test, 
authors should try to challenge the hypotheses and draw a clear justification. This study 
starts with set of hypotheses based on disclosure theories and linked to the current risk 
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reporting practices in the UAE public companies. Then the research examines the 
association between risk disclosures and different factors related to firm-specific 
characteristics and corporate governance characteristics.   
 
6.1.3 Discussion of issues of confidentiality and ethics  
 
There were no known physical risks for the researcher or the interviewees for this type of 
study since meetings and interviews took place on business premises during working 
hours. However, there are some ethical issues that should be taken into account mainly 
related to the interviewees. The author gained authorisation for the interview process and 
the research instrument from the Research Ethics Committee of Portsmouth Business 
School. When the interviews were carried out in the field, the author confirmed that the 
study fulfilled the ethics requirement of the University of Portsmouth.  
 
The author made the topic of the study clear to the interviewees, and made it clear that 
they were free to decide whether to participate in the study or not. The researcher got 
permission from the interviewed person before recording the interview. The author 
clarified to all participants that their names would be kept secret, and discussed all issues 
of confidentiality with the participants. The author‟s only interest was in the position and 
opinions of the interviewed people; it was therefore not necessary to include the name of 
the interviewed person. 
 
6.1.4 Data collection: Mixed methods 
 
This study adopted mixed methods; it includes qualitative and quantitative methods. 
Anderson (2009, p. 139) explains that there are many advantages resulting from using 
mixed methods, for instance this can reveal the complexity of issues, enable a deeper 
understanding, and provide a useful source for more in-depth analysis. In addition she 
explained that interpreting the relationship between different variables based on 
quantitative data and the use of qualitative data may permit an explanation of why such 
relationships are occurring. However, she explained that mixed methods researchers 
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should ensure a systematic, competent and justified research design, which should be 
based on research questions and objectives, because poor quality analysis will not lead to 
a valid outcome.     
 
The author applied mixed methods because disclosure is a multi-dimensional topic which 
it is difficult to capture using a quantitative approach (e.g. regression analysis); therefore, 
the author used a qualitative method (e.g. interview). Disclosure is a subjective issue 
(Wallace and Naser, 1995) which cannot be captured purely by using quantitative 
methods; therefore it is essential to obtain more support for the research by using a 
qualitative approach which could explore further aspects related to risk disclosure within 
the context of the UAE. Another reason for applying mixed methods is the sample size of 
the quantitative part of the study which is to be considered relatively small and imposes 
some limitations on the research. To overcome these limitations the author decided to use 
mixed methods. 
 
6.2 Qualitative method 
 
Miles and Huberman (1994, p.10) claimed the qualitative method is to be advocated as 
the best strategy for discovery, for exploring a new area, for developing hypotheses, for 
testing hypotheses, and for validating, explaining, illuminating or reinterpreting 
quantitative data gathered from the same setting. This section presents the procedures 
followed in the qualitative part of the study.  
 
6.2.1 Interview  
 
Primary data is generated from interview responses and findings. The main aim of the 
interview is to identify factors influencing risk disclosure practices in the UAE. Papa 
(2007) recommends that in order to appreciate the information value of risk reporting, 
analysts and investors should be interviewed with regard to the dominant risk categories. 
The interview approach provides opportunities for the interviewees to express their 
opinions freely. However, Saunders et al. (2003, p.264) state that interviewing is a time-
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consuming process and where the purpose is to explore themes or to explain findings, the 
process may call for a lengthy discussion.  
 
Semi-structured interviews were used in this study. Open-ended questions were 
formulated to achieve the purpose of this study based on the study aims, research 
questions, hypotheses and prior literature with emphasis on the situation within the UAE. 
In order to enhance the validity of the questions used in the interview, they were pre-
discussed with the researcher‟s supervisor, an external auditor, and an academic in the 
UAE. This discussion led to some changes in some questions in order to ensure that the 
questions were relevant to the study objectives and would complement the research 
questions. There were a total of 22 interviews. The interviewee groups were company 
managers, external auditors, individual investors, financial analysts, regulators and stock 
market authority members. The questions were then modified to suit the interviewee 
groups. This study did not focus on certain users or groups. The interviews were held in 
English and Arabic.  
 
Table 6.1: Summary of the interviewees  
Interview group No. Interview language  
Company managers 5 3 English  2 Arabic 
External auditors 6 5 English  1 Arabic 
Financial analysts 4 1 English  4 Arabic 
Regulators  2                   2 Arabic 
Stock market authority members 3 1 English  2 Arabic 
Individual investors 2 1 English 1 Arabic 
Total 22   
 
The English interview transcripts were carefully written by the author and he made sure 
that they represented the actual content by listening to the content several times. The 
Arabic versions of the interviews were written down by the author, and then were all 
translated into English by the author. The author re-read the original Arabic content and 
the translated content several times in order to ensure that the English translated version 
represented the original Arabic content and what the interviewee actually said without 
any changes in the meaning.  
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6.1.2 Analysis of interview: Grounded theory 
 
There are many methods of analysing interview responses, for example content analysis, 
thematic analysis, and grounded theory. Grounded theory was applied to analyse the 
interview transcripts. The original grounded theory approach was formulated by Glaser 
and Strauss (1967) who emphasised that it is necessary to come to the grounded theory 
without background or prior literature in order to make sure that the outcome theory is 
grounded on the data. On the other hand, the subsequent development of the grounded 
theory by Strauss and Corbin (1990) allows for theoretical background and the influence 
of prior literature. Suddaby (2006, p.634) argued that “a common misassumption is that 
grounded theory requires a researcher to enter the field without any knowledge of prior 
research”. Allan (2003, p.7) stated that “some people have interpreted the Grounded 
Theory method to mean field work before literature search but this is a misconception of 
the original premise put forward by Glaser & Strauss (1967, p.167) who encouraged 
researchers to use any material bearing in the area”.  
 
Page and Spira (2004, p.21) stated that grounded theory approach is widely accepted 
within the accounting literature and that it aims to arrive at theories about events and 
social processes from a position of minimum prior assumptions and theory.  However, 
they observe that grounded theory is to be criticised for its lack of objectivity, and 
because its results are not generalisable in a statistical sense; rather, it aims for theoretical 
generalisation in the sense that the outcome is a richer theory of events and processes. 
Also, it is a time-consuming method. In addition, the grounded theory approach will not 
necessarily lead to surprising findings since the outcome theory is inductively build up 
from data collected and interview questions which were initially based on prior literature 
and research questions.  
 
In analysing the transcribed interviews, the author followed the practical steps of the 
grounded theory approach presented by Charmaz (2006) and Beattie, Fearnley and 
Brandt (2001) which is summarised in Figure 6.1. The author applied all steps of 
grounded theory analysis stating with theoretical sensitisation through a literature review 
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of the study‟s field. The author applied a manual approach to analysing the data and used 
tables in a word processor. The author assigned a different colour to each interviewee 
before starting the coding. This allowed the original content to be tracked. The author 
kept referring to the original content in order to make sure that concepts, categories and 
core categories which arose represent the actual contents and interviewees‟ thoughts. 
Figure 6.1: Grounded theory steps  
 
Source: Beattie et al. (2001) 
 
The first stage is Open or initial coding. It was applied when reading all transcripts in 
order to identify concepts and themes. Throughout the open coding, there was constant 
comparison between concepts which was written down, summarised as memos and put 
into tables. These summarised the interviewees‟ thoughts and emerging phenomena. 
Similar concepts were grouped together and labelled. The second stage is axial coding. It 
was applied in order to discover different categories and the relationships and 
connections between different concepts. Constant comparisons were made in the data in 
order to build up the relationship between different concepts and to identify the causes 
and consequences of such relationships. The author also identified properties and 
dimensions among the categories. Throughout the axial coding refined memos, diagrams 
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and charts were used in order to formalise the opinions of interviewees and group the 
concepts into categories. Diagrams were constantly modified in the line of the progress 
and the relationship between different concepts.   
 
The third stage is selective coding which was applied in order to identify the core 
categories and themes. The author applied constant comparison in order to relate 
categories and build up the core category for each phenomenon. The diagrams and charts 
were further modified and restructured in the light of the new core categories and 
relationships and correlations.  There were advanced memos that formalised the emerging 
relationships and correlations between core categories which identified the core category.  
 
Then the main concepts, categories, and core categories were presented in 23 grids based 
on the analysis of the interviewees‟ responses and opinions.4 Each grid consisted of three 
columns and included concepts, categories and dimensions identified in the analysis of 
the transcripts and notes of the interviews. The first column presented open coding which 
labelled the concepts raised from initial coding of the interview transcripts. The second 
column summarised the axial coding and grouped the concepts into main categories and 
different relationships. The third column presented the properties and dimensions of the 
categories. The first row in each grid presented the selective coding and identified the 
core category and relationships with other categories.  
 
The final stage is the refining of the outcome theory and telling the story. The theory was 
presented in a diagram which was grounded in the data and the analysis of the 
interviewees‟ transcripts and thoughts. The theory then was described based on the 
discussion of the grids and the grounded theory analysis findings. Throughout all stages 
and analysis the author always made sure that the arising theory was valid in that it was 
grounded on the data and the interviewees‟ opinions. This was accomplished through 
constant comparison and reference to the original content and quotes from the interviews. 
Examples on the steps followed in the grounded theory approach is provided in Appendix 
(E).  
                                               
4 The grids technique was adapted from the work of Page and Spira (2004) 
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6.3 Quantitative approach 
 
6.3.1 Sample of listed companies and annual reports 
 
Secondary data was collected from listed companies' annual reports, and documents and 
the websites of the DFM and the ADSM were examined. The sample consists of 48 non-
financial listed companies in the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) and the Dubai 
Financial Market (DFM). The study examined risk disclosure practices of the companies 
over three years, 2007, 2008, and 2009. All annual reports of the sampled companies 
were obtained from websites of ADX, DFM and SCA authorities. Listing rules require 
companies to provide two versions of their annual reports, one in Arabic and the other in 
English. Only the English versions of the annual reports are considered for this study.  
 
The selection of listed companies is influenced by the extent of availability of the 
company because companies considered in the sample needed to be non-financial 
companies and were restricted to UAE companies since the study focused on risk 
disclosure in UAE. This is because non-UAE companies would be influenced by different 
regulations and laws applied by their own countries or governments. The sample 
consisted of companies from different industry sectors which included transportation, 
services, manufacturing, consumer goods, telecommunications, utilities, real estate, 
construction, industrial, energy and healthcare sectors. 
 
The focus of this study is on non-financial sectors. Financial firms were omitted from the 
study firstly because they are regulated by other and different rules which may influence 
disclosure practice (e.g. UAE central bank). Secondly the nature and type of financial 
firms and their business activities are different from those of non-financial companies. 
Thirdly, the risks which financial companies face are considerably different from and 
higher than those of non-financial corporations; the main product offered by banks is cash 
whereas non-financial companies offer different sorts of products. The risks associated 
with cash are different from those related to the production of milk for example. Linsley 
and Shrives (2006) argue that financial firms as risk management entities can be expected 
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to make significantly different types of risk disclosure. For the above reasons, if financial 
firms were included, this could confound the results and findings and the analysis would 
be unrealistic. The following table shows sample criteria. A full list of sample companies 
is provided in Appendix C. 
 
Table 6.2: Summary of the sample criteria 
 2007 2008 2009 
Total listed companies (ADX, DFM) 120 129 129 
Banks, insurance, investment, financial  (omitted) (62) (70) (68) 
Non-financial companies  58 59 61 
Non-UAE non-financial companies (omitted) (10) (11) (13) 
Final sample of the study 48 48 48 
Proportion of the sample companies 40% 37% 37% 
 
6.4 Content analysis  
 
Krippendorff (2004) describes content analysis as a research technique for making 
replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) on the basis of the 
contexts of their use. He stats that as a research technique content analysis provides new 
insights, increases a researcher‟s understanding of particular phenomena, or informs 
practical actions. He argues that content analysis techniques can be expected to be 
reliable and regarded as scientific research technique which must also yield valid results.  
For the purpose of this research a risk disclosure index was constructed in order to 
investigate the practice and the level of risk disclosure by UAE listed companies. The 
index is relevant to the case of UAE public companies. The focus of this part of the study 
is on investigating the quantity of risk disclosures rather than making inferences about 
their quality.  
 
The content analysis conceptual framework includes texts, coding unit, coding scheme, 
coding mode, coding rules, and reliability and validity evidence. Texts can be defined 
broadly as books, chapters, interviews, and so on; in this study „texts‟ comprise the 
annual reports of companies. The annual report is considered one of the most important 
sources of information for shareholders, prospective investors and others in making 
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investment decisions in developed markets (Botosan, 1997). A Coding Unit could be the 
number of words, page proportions, sentences, pages or themes. Linsley and Shrives 
(2006) argued that the unit of analysis should be consistent for coding and counting. 
Sentences are used as the coding unit in this study. Milne and Adler (1999, p.243) argued 
that “using sentences for both coding and measurement seems likely therefore to provide 
complete, reliable and meaningful data for further analysis”.   
 
A content analysis of the annual reports was performed based on detailed decision rules. 
The decision rules were mainly adopted from ICAEW (1999), Linsley and Shrives 
(2006), Konishi and Ali (2007) and Abraham and Cox (2007) with some modifications. 
For further clarification and details see Appendix C. The decision rules should be clear 
and detailed in order to minimise the difference between two coders and in order to 
enhance the reliability of the content analysis.    
 
The coding mode can be computer-aided or human coded with the latter having the 
advantage that it permits the quantitative assessment of achieved reliability (Beattie et al., 
2004). Abraham and Stevenson (2007) applied a manual method to code and extract 
themes from annual reports. They argued for the manual method of actually reading 
through the risk statements as the user of an annual report would do. Deumes (2008) 
stated that an advantage of the manual approach over a computer aided content analysis is 
that humans can better judge the meaning of words and phrases within a context. 
However, a disadvantage is that a manual approach is less cost-effective and less flexible. 
In addition humans can make mistakes and are prone to researcher bias (Krippendorff, 
2004).  
 
The coding scheme is based on a self-constructed risk disclosure index. Marston and 
Shrives (1991) stated that the usefulness of a disclosure index as a measure of disclosure 
depends on the selection of items to be included in the index. The framework used in this 
study provides a detailed checklist in order to reduce the possibility of ignoring any 
relevant risk topic. The use of a disclosure index has many advantages, for instance this 
method will enable researcher to make comparisons between different companies, and it 
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captures differences in the magnitude of corporate financial reporting (Cooke & Wallace, 
1989).  
 
Researchers in the field of disclosure have developed different approaches for 
constructing disclosure indices.  In this thesis the researcher constructed the disclosure 
index firstly based on risk disclosure items recommended by prior studies, then on items 
within the context of UAE disclosure practice, and finally it takes into account certain 
industry specific features. The selection of risk disclosure index items is tricky and a very 
important stage in constructing the check list used in subsequent coding. There is no 
comprehensive guidance on risk disclosure items that could be applied in all countries or 
companies, since there are differences in regulations, accounting standards and disclosure 
practices.  
 
In deciding which risk disclosure items should be included in the check list, the following 
rules have been used. In order to reduce subjectivity the following criteria were applied: 
1) extensive review of risk disclosure literature; 2) extensive review of UAE risk 
disclosure related regulations and requirements; 3) extensive review of risk related 
IFRSs; 4) extensive review of corporate governance code and requirements in UAE; and 
5) discussion of the selected items with a number of professional auditors and regulators 
in UAE. The final coding scheme is set out at Appendix C.  
 
The procedures applied were adapted from Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Beattie et al. 
(2004). A similar approach was adopted by Papa (2007) and Rajab and Schachler (2009). 
Firstly, each coder separately identified all risk related sentences and underlined them 
within the annual report and assigned them an appropriate code. The coders ignored any 
non-risk related disclosures or sentences. Through the reading the coders classified the 
identified risk disclosures according to the self-structured risk disclosure index (coding 
scheme, see Appendix C). The coders then examined the nature of risk disclosures and 
classified them as quantitative or qualitative ones. The coders examined the time-frame of 
risk disclosures whether it was past, forward-looking or non-time. The coders examined 
the news types of risk disclosures and decided whether the risk disclosures indicated 
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good, bad or neutral risk news. Then the author decided on the location of risk 
information. Figure 6.2 described the coding steps followed by the coders.  
 
Figure 6.2: Coding procedures  
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Reliability 
 
Many researchers emphasise the potential subjectivity of content analysis and bias in this 
method in the coding stage. This is due to the influence and bias that may originate from 
the coders. The researchers‟ subjectivity can be minimised by enhancing the reliability 
and validity of the study; however, it cannot be totally removed (Marston & Shrives, 
1991). Beattie et al. (2004) stated that for valid inferences to be drawn, it is important that 
the classification procedure be reliable (i.e. that different people code the text in the same 
way) and valid (i.e. the variables generated from the classification procedure represent 
what the researcher intended them to represent (Weber, 1985, p.12)).  
 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) claimed that content analysis is inevitably subjective and 
therefore the “coding method” needs to be reliable for valid conclusions to be drawn. 
They suggested that reliability can be improved by producing decision rules that the 
coder can refer to. There are three main types of measures of reliability, stability, 
reproducibility or inter-coder reliability, and accuracy. The most frequently reported 
measure is inter-coder reliability (Mile & Alder, 1999; Abraham & Cox, 2007).  
 
There are many measures for inter-reliability for example Scott‟s pi, Cohen‟s Kappa and 
Krippendorff‟s alpha. In this study Scott‟s pi test is used in order to test the reliability of 
the sample annual reports following some previous researchers (e.g. Linsley & Shrives 
2006, Abraham & Cox 2007). Scott‟s pi is a statistical test for measuring inter-rater 
reliability
5
 in data. In this thesis, Scott‟s pi is used to assess the extent of agreement 
between the coders. Scott‟s pi test improves on simple observed agreement by factoring 
in the extent of agreement that might be expected by chance and it makes the assumption 
that coders have the same distribution of responses (Wikipedia, n.d.). Scott‟s pi is 
calculated by using online statistical software: “ReCal”. Lombard, Snyder-Dutch and 
Bracken (2010) state that the results of ReCal software are apparently promising. This 
software is used in this study in order to calculate Scott‟s pi. 
 
                                               
5 Inter-rater reliability is the degree of agreement among coders. 
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Multiple coders were involved in the coding process (Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Konishi 
& Ali, 2007; Abraham & Cox, 2007; Bettie et al., 2004). The first coder was the author 
and the second was a colleague with postgraduate degree in Accounting. He works as an 
external auditor and who is familiar with auditing annual reports. To enhance the 
reliability of the coding stage, the two coders coded the first annual report separately. The 
Scott pi reliability test average score was 68.3 for the first annual report.  
 
Then the two coders discussed the differences and further reviewed the decision rules. 
There was further discussion and clarification with the PhD supervisor. Then another two 
annual reports were coded; the Scott‟s pi test scored 76.4 in the second one and 79.8 in 
the third one. There was further discussion of the differences to minimise any 
disagreements. In the third round both coders coded five annual reports separately. The 
reliability test scored 83.4, 81.2, 84.2, 86.5 and 84.6. A score of 75 in the reliability test is 
considered sufficient (Mile & Alder, 1999; Beattie et al., 2004; Abraham & Cox, 2007). 
After a satisfactory result had been achieved in the reliability test, the researcher carried 
on with the remaining annual reports.  
 
Validity  
 
Beattie et al. (2004) stated that validity can be enhanced through the use of a 
classification scheme that is rigorously grounded in empirical research and which is 
widely accepted and used extensively by researchers in disclosure index studies (i.e. 
Jenkins framework). Validity in this study was enhanced through the use of a 
classification scheme which based around a model created by Arthur Andersen and that is 
grounded in empirical research and recommended by professional accounting bodies (e.g. 
IACEW 1998) and widely applied by researchers (e.g. Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Konishi 
& Ali, 2007). In addition, risk disclosure items in a self-constructed index were reviewed 
against the IFRS disclosure checklist produced by the ICAEW. The self-constructed 
index was also reviewed against two detailed IFRS compliance checklists which were 
obtained from professional auditors (Deloitte and KPMG). The purpose of using these 
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checklists is to verify the completeness of the self-constructed checklist related to risk 
disclosure IFRSs.  
 
Moreover, the author then consulted some professionals in order to validate the self-
constructed checklist. Two professional external auditors who work for Ernst & Young 
(UAE office) and KPMG were consulted on the complete checklist with emphasis on risk 
item related IFRSs. An experienced employee in the Issuance & Disclosure Department 
of the Securities & Commodities Authority (SCA) in the UAE was consulted on the 
complete checklist. The emphasis was on the risk items that relate to regulation, 
disclosure rules and corporate governance. The author modified the self-constructed 
checklist according to the recommendations received from the above professionals. 
Finally, the completed checklist was reviewed by the PhD supervisor. 
 
6.5 Statistical tests and methods  
 
In order to analyse the outcomes from the content analysis, the author applied various 
statistical techniques. Descriptive statistics is the term given to the analysis of data that 
helps describe, show or summarise data in a meaningful way. However, it does not allow 
conclusions beyond the data which has been analysed to be made or conclusions 
regarding any hypotheses which might have constructed to be reached; it is simply a way 
to describe data (Laerd, 2011). The study also Scott‟s pi in order to test the reliability of 
content analysis as it was described in the previous section.  
 
The one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to determine whether there are any 
significant differences between the means of three or more independent (unrelated) 
groups (Triola, 1995, p.572). Moreover, the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test was performed. 
This is a nonparametric test which is used to compare two sets of scores and to 
investigate any change in scores from one time point to another or when the distribution 
of these differences is not normal (Wright & London, 2009, p.100). This test does not 
assume normality in the data; therefore it can be used when this assumption has been 
violated (Laerd, 2011). 
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6.6 Regression analysis methods 
 
The sample of UAE companies in this study comprised 48 non-financial firms that were 
listed within the ADX and DFM over the three year period, 2007, 2008 and 2009.  The 
aim of regression analysis is to examine the factors underlying levels of risk disclosures 
within annual reports of the sample of listed companies. The model consisted of firm-
specific characteristics and corporate governance characteristics. The author applied both 
univariate analysis and multivariate analysis. The following section describes the 
dependent variables and independent variables and explains the firm-specific 
characteristics and corporate governance characteristics which are summarised in Table 
6.3.   
 
6.6.1 Measurement of variables (dependent and independent variables) 
 
The main regression model examined total risk disclosures and factors of firm-specific 
and corporate governance characteristics. Firm-specific characteristics consisted of six 
variables which were company size, profitability, liquidity, company risk level, industry 
type, and auditor type. Corporate governance characteristics consisted of six variables 
which were ownership structure, board composition, independence, internal auditing, 
internal control, and risk management. Information on the dependent and independent 
variables were obtained from companies‟ guides, companies‟ annual reports, corporate 
governance reports, and websites of the companies and of SCA, ADX and DFM
6
.  
 
The selection of the variables was based on which ones the prior risk disclosure literature 
found to be relevant to risk disclosure. The selection was also based on the interviewees‟ 
suggestion and the grounded theory analysis that showed which variables are relevant to 
the UAE context and to risk disclosure. Some variables were suggested by the 
interviewees, for instance company liquidity, and were then considered in this study and 
the literature review was amended accordingly.   
 
                                               
6 Ho and Wong (2001) applied a questionnaire survey to measure some variables (e.g. audit committee) 
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6.6.1.1 Firm-specific characteristics measurements  
 
Company size was defined through three main measures for total assets, market 
capitalisation and revenues. This variable has been widely measured using these 
measures in previous studies (e.g. Linsley and Shrives 2005). The information on 
company size measurements was obtained from the companies‟ annual reports and 
companies‟ guide publications. Company performance was measured by profitability 
which is measured by Return on Asset (ROA). Another measure for company‟s 
performance would be Tobin‟s Q ratio which takes into consideration market influence. 
The Q ratio is calculated as the market value of a company divided by the replacement 
value of the firm's assets. 
Q = Market capitalisation / (Assets – Liabilities) 
 
A company‟s liquidity could be measured using many ratios such as the current ratio 
(working capital ratio) or the quick ratio (acid ratio). Pendlebury (2001, p.139) considers 
the working capital ratio to relate the current assets of the company to its current 
liabilities. It indicates the company‟s liquidity level and its ability to pay its current 
liabilities. It also indicates the company risk level in terms of liquidity in the sense that 
the liquid resources are sufficient to cover the short term payments. It is another indicator 
of the managers‟ performances in the sense that a ratio close to 1 implies good liquidity 
management.  
 
Company risk level was measured using the debt ratio which is indicated by the debt to 
equity ratio and the debt to assets ratio.  Debt to asset ratio measurement was applied in 
this study where it was measured by total liabilities over total assets.  It shows when total 
liabilities are covered several times over by assets and is used to examine a company‟s 
gearing. In addition there are no absolute guides to the maximum safety but if a company 
has a debt ratio of more than 50% it is highly geared. This affects a company‟s ability to 
raise loans with a low interest rate. In addition, it varies between different sectors in the 
sense that the manufacturing sector is less risky than the banking sector where the gearing 
is high risk. It is very difficult to determine definite guidance on which ratio is best; 
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therefore managers should set their company‟s capital gearing ratio by following what is 
normal for the particular industry.  
 
External auditor type was dealt with as a dummy variable where it was assigned 1 if the 
company was audited by a Big 4 firm and 0 if otherwise (non-Big 4). The Big 4 are the 
four largest international accountancy and professional services firms and handle the vast 
majority of audits for public companies and many large private companies, creating an 
oligopoly in auditing large companies. The term „Big 4‟ in this study refers to Ernst & 
Young, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC).  
 
Industry type was treated as a dummy variable where it was assigned 1 for the industrial 
sector and 0 for the service sector. Industry type is classified into services and industrial 
according to SCA classification. SCA divides the listed companies into four main sectors 
banking, insurance, services, and industrial. This study examined non-financial sectors 
for instance services and industries. The financial sector (e.g. banking and insurance) is 
not part of the research because of they are different from non-financial sectors in term of 
regulations, operations, nature of business and types of risks they face.    
 
6.6.1.2 Corporate governance characteristics measurements  
 
Corporate governance characteristics consisted of six variables which are ownership 
structure (e.g. institutional, concentration, individual, government, foreign), board 
composition (e.g. board size, non-executive directors), board independence (e.g. 
independent directors, duality), internal audit (e.g. audit committee, internal auditors), 
internal control, and risk management. Information on corporate governance variables 
were obtained from companies‟ annual reports and companies‟ corporate governance 
reports along with information from companies‟ websites and stock market websites (e.g. 
ADX, DFM). 
 
Ownership structure was measured by various variables for instance concentration, 
government, institution, individual and foreign ownership. Concentration ownership is 
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when the majority of shares were concentrated, or owned by a few shareholders. It is 
measured as the proportion of shares owned by major shareholders (who owns more than 
5%), for instance institutions, government agency, banks and individuals. Government 
ownership is where a percentage of shares is owned by the government or its agencies. 
Institutional ownership is where a percentage of shares is owned by institutional 
investors, for instance banks, investment funds and companies.  
 
Individual ownership is where a percentage of shares is owned by individual shareholders 
who may include outside and inside shareholders for instance board, managers and 
employees. Many companies provided information on the number of shares owned by 
their board and managers within their corporate governance annual review (e.g. 
ARAMEX 2009). Foreign ownership is where a percentage of shares is owned by foreign 
or non-UAE investors who may be individuals or institutions. Information on foreign 
ownership was obtained from the stock markets‟ websites, the websites of DFM and 
ADX.  
  
Board composition was measured by two variables, board size and non-executive 
directors. Companies provided information on these variables within their annual report 
and corporate governance report. The corporate governance code in UAE (MR 518, 
2009) defines a non-executive board member as “a member who is not dedicated on a full 
time basis to the management of a company or does not receive a monthly or annual 
salary from a company.” It further explains that “the remuneration received as a board 
member may not constitute a salary”.  
 
The term independence variable referred to the independence of the board and was 
measured by the proportion of independent directors and the presence of duality. 
Information on independent directors was obtained from the governance reports of the 
companies. The corporate governance code in UAE (MR 518, 2009) defined an 
independent board member as “a member who neither himself/herself, nor is the spouse 
or first-degree relative of someone who has not been a member of the executive 
management of a company during the last two years, or who has had no relationship that 
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creates financial deals with a Company, parent company, sister company or allied 
company during the last two years if the total amount of these transactions exceeds 5% of 
the paid-up capital of the Company, an amount of five million dirham (AED 
5,000,000.00) or an equivalent amount in a foreign currency, whichever is less”.  
 
Duality is dual leadership or when a board chairman or CEO has another position, such as 
for example a general manager. The duality variable was omitted from the regression 
model because the data was insufficient. According to the corporate governance code in 
UAE, duality between the chairman and CEO is not permitted. However this variable was 
examined using the qualitative method and based on the interviewees‟ opinions. 
 
Internal auditing was measured by two variables which were the presence of an audit 
committee and the presence of internal auditors. The information on these variables was 
obtained from companies‟ annual reports and governance reports where companies 
provided information on corporate governance. The presence of the internal auditors 
variable was treated as a dummy variable where it was 1 if the company had internal 
auditors and 0 if it had no internal auditors.  The data on this variable was obtained from 
information provided by the companies on their website and through content analysis of 
companies‟ annual reports and corporate governance annual reviews for 2007, 2008 and 
2009. 
 
The audit committee variable refers to the existence of an audit committee within the 
company. It could be treated as dummy variable (presence of an audit committee) or as a 
continuous variable (audit committee size). Taylor (2011) argued that the existence of an 
audit committee does not guarantee effective monitoring, therefore, the presence of a 
competent audit committee has been emphasised as the vital corporate governance 
mechanism in watching over financial reporting; indications of competence are the 
independence ratio of audit committee members, their financial expertise, committee size and 
the frequency of the committee meetings. In order to minimise the number of dummy 
variables in the final module, it was decided to include a continuous variable 
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(AuditCommitteeSize); if the audit size was 0, it indicates there was no audit committee 
within the company.  
 
Internal control system was considered as a dummy variable and 1 was assigned if the 
company reports on its internal control system or if there is an internal control department 
and 0 otherwise. This was decided through the content analysis of companies‟ annual 
reports and governance reports for the periods of 2007, 2008 & 2009.  
 
The risk management system variable was treated as a dummy variable; 1 was assigned if 
there was a risk management department or risk committee or risk officer in the 
company, and 0 was assigned otherwise.  The data on this variable was obtained through 
content analysis of companies‟ annual reports, corporate governance annual reviews and 
the companies‟ official websites for 2007, 2008 and 2009.  
 
Table 6.3: Summary of dependent and independent variable measurements 
Dependent variables Measurement  Code name in OLS 
Total risk disclosure Number of risk disclosures TotalRiskDisclosure 
Financial risk disclosure Number of financial risks Financial 
Non-financial risk disclosure Number of non-financial risks NonFinancial 
Independent variables: Firm-specific characteristics   
Company size Total assets Current assets + Fixed assets TotalAssets 
 Market capitalisation No shares*share price MarketCap 
 Revenues  Total Sales  Revenue 
Performance ROA Net income/ net asset ROA 
 Tobin‟s Q Market capitalisation/(assets–
borrowing) 
Tobin‟s Q 
Liquidity  Current ratio Current asset/current liability CurrentRatio 
Risk level Debt ratio Total liabilities/total assets DebtToAsset 
Auditor type Big 4 or non-Big 4 Dummy variable AuditorType 
Industry type 0 Service/ 1 Industrial  Dummy variable IndustryType 
Independent variables: Corporate governance characteristics  
Dependent variables Measurement  Code name in OLS 
Ownership 
structure 
Concentration 
ownership 
Percentage of shares owned by 
a few institutions or individuals 
Concentration 
 Government 
ownership 
Percentage of shares owned by 
government agencies 
Government  
 Institution ownership Percentage of shares owned by 
institutional investors 
Institution 
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Dependent variables Measurement  Code name in OLS 
 Foreign ownership Percentage of shares owned by 
foreign institution/individual 
Foreign 
 Individual ownership   Percentage of shares owned by 
individual investors 
Individual 
Board 
composition  
Board size  Number of directors on the 
board 
BoardSize 
 Proportion of non-
executive directors  
Non-executive directors 
divided by board size 
NonExecutive 
Independence Proportion of 
independent directors  
Independent directors divided 
by board size  
IndependentDirectors 
Internal auditing Audit committee  Number of audit committee 
members 
AuditCommittee 
 Presence of internal 
auditors 
Dummy variable InternalAuditors 
Internal control  Report on internal 
control 
Dummy variable  InternalControl 
Risk 
management  
Presence of risk 
management 
department/committee 
Dummy variable  RiskManagement 
 
6.7 Univariate Analysis 
 
The univariate analysis involves descriptive statistics which are calculated for the data; 
the summary is provided in table 8.2.1. Pearson‟s correlation coefficient is a measure of 
the strength of a linear association between two variables.  Correlation was used as a 
basis for regression to decide on the measurements of the variables that should be 
included in the multiple regression model during the later stage. The results of the 
correlation are summarised in table 8.2.1. Spearman‟s correlation is a nonparametric 
version of Pearson‟s correlation. The researcher applied Spearman‟s correlation for 
robustness because it is less sensitive to outliers. For example in the case of Tobin‟s Q, 
Pearson‟s correlation suggested insignificant association with total risk disclosure but 
Spearman‟s correlation showed strong significant association. The Mann-Whitney U test 
is used to compare differences between two independent groups. It is a non-parametric 
test which does not require the assumption of normality. This test was applied for many 
variables, for instance industry type and auditor type.  
 
 
  
139 
 
6.8 Multivariate Analysis 
 
There are various types of data which are subject to empirical analysis, for example time 
series, cross section and panel. In this study panel data (pooled data) was considered 
where the same cross-sectional unit was surveyed over time as is now increasingly the 
case in economic research (Gujarati & Porter, 2009, p.591). The aim of the study is to 
explore whether an association exists between dependent variables and independent 
variables rather than examining the causality association, in other word the study tests, 
and to explore whether a regression model can explain the variations in risk disclosure by 
the variations in firm-specific and governance-specific characteristics; both correlation 
and regression do not imply causation. 
 
Multiple regression is appropriate when a researcher wants to look at the combined 
effects of more than one variable in predicting a response variable (Wright & London, 
2009, p.172). The assumptions of multiple linear regression were checked. The 
assumptions of multiple linear regression are: 1) independence where the values of the 
dependent variable Y are statistically independent of each other, 2) linearity relationship 
in the linear relationship between dependent variable Y and independent variable X, 3) 
normality of the residuals in the normal distribution of dependent variables for every 
combination of value of the independent variables with constant variance, and 4) constant 
variance of the residuals.   
 
6.8.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
 
There are many forms for regression analysis, for instance OLS and logistic regression. In 
this study, OLS regression analysis was applied; this analyses the best fit to data in a line 
that minimises the distances between the residual sum squares RSS (data points and line). 
The main aim of regression analysis is to explain variation in the dependent variable (Y). 
Regression will always provides some sort of results; however these are meaningless if 
the data violate the assumptions on which the regression is based. Scholars undertaking 
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research on disclosure issues should pay attention to the structure of the data and where 
necessary consider the appropriateness of transformations (Cook, 1998, p.209).  
 
According to Abraham and Cox (2007, p.238) OLS estimation of influences on the extent 
of risk disclosure in companies will introduce sample selectivity biases and inconsistent 
parameter estimates. Therefore, in order to overcome these problems the selection of 
variables was based on the prior literature and the interview analysis. Besides this, the 
author examined regression assumptions and checked the validity of the assumptions for 
data before accepting regression results.  
 
6.8.2 Measurement error assumption  
 
Berry and Feldman (1985, p.33) defines measurement error as the error in the 
measurement of the variables that we wish to include in the model; this could be random 
or non-random error. This should be checked before carrying out regression because it 
may confound the results and findings; therefore the appropriate time to investigate the 
presence of measurement error is before a regression equation is calculated. For example 
Forker (1992, p.122) found insignificant association between the proportion of non-
executive directors and disclosure which was not in accordance with the expected 
positive direction, and he argued that this might be due to measurement error because of 
the limitation that the proxies for corporate governance variables were based on data 
disclosed in financial statements where firms may fail to disclose information about non-
executive directors.  
 
In order to avoid any measurement error, the author re-checked the variables‟ 
measurements and their validity theoretically and empirically. Measurement errors check 
in this study was carried out by re-checking the hypothesis development chapter to see 
whether the assumptions underlying the variables‟ measurements were theoretically 
justified and empirically supported. In addition the proxies for variables (firm data and 
governance data) were based on information provided in financial statements, corporate 
governance reports and companies‟ websites. There is no definite or certain theoretical 
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justification or specification regarding why certain measurement should be used, 
therefore researchers in the disclosure field tend to apply a variety of measurements for 
the explanatory variables, for example company size (measured by total asset, market 
capitalisation, number of employees) and level of risk (measured by beta, debt to asset 
and debt to equity).  
 
6.8.3 Model specification assumption  
 
According to Berry and Feldman (1985, p.18) a model specification error can occur 
firstly if the functional form of the relationship between the variables in the model is 
specified improperly, secondly if one constructs a model with the wrong independent 
variables, with either one or more relevant variables omitted from the model, or one or 
more irrelevant variables included in the model, or both. In the context of disclosure, 
Wallace and Naser (1995, p.339) noted that there was vague theoretical guidance on the 
correct model and it was more appropriate to begin analysis with variables which had 
been frequently proven useful by previous studies than to adopt a statistical search 
strategy such as stepwise regression.   
 
This assumption was checked through overall review of the research questions, research 
design, data collection method, and definition and measurement of the variables. It could 
be concluded that all variables (dependent and independent) had been theoretically and 
empirically reviewed. The association between risk disclosure on one hand and firm-
specific and governance-specific characteristics that were considered in this study on the 
other hand were specified theoretically and empirically in the literature review and 
hypothesis development. In addition, before performing multiple regression, the 
association between dependent and independent variables was explored through 
univariate analysis. Moreover, stepwise regression was performed in order to distinguish 
significant variables in risk disclosure practice.  
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6.8.4 Assumption of linear relationship 
 
In order to check the linearity researchers use a graphical method in the form of a scatter 
plot for each model of dependent variables and independent variables in order to see if 
nonlinearity is present as, for example, in a curved band or a big wave-shaped curve. The 
measure of the strength of the linear relationship was deducted through covariance. 
Covariance is a statistical measure of the strength of the linear relationship between two 
variables. The scatter plot for each model showed that there was a linear relationship 
between the dependent variables and each independent variable since most points in the 
diagrams lay close to the straight line and there was no curved band or wave shaped 
curve. Some of variables had an approximately positive linear relationship whereas others 
had an approximately negative linear relationship, and some showed no association. In 
addition the linearity assumption was also checked by means of partial regression plots 
between the predictor variables and the outcome variable. It could be concluded that the 
assumption of linearity held for all variables.  
 
6.8.5 Assumption of normality 
  
Assessment of the normality of data could be checked statistically by, for instance, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the Skewness test or the Kurtosis test., It could also be 
checked graphically (visually) by for example a histogram, a Normal Probability Plot (P-
P Plot) or a Normal Quantile-Quantile Plot (Q-Q plot). It is the residuals that need to be 
normally distributed and it important for only t-tests to be valid; however, the estimate of 
the regression coefficients do not require normally distributed residuals (Chen, Ender, 
Mitchell & Wells 2003). In order to test for normality, the researcher applied a graphical 
method; in this study Normal Probability Plot was used. It was found that some variables, 
for instance total asset, market capitalisation and revenue, were not approximately 
normally distributed and group sizes differed greatly. Therefore, they were transformed 
using natural logarithms.  
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Standardised residual plotting was also applied in order to analyse the distribution of the 
residuals. Residuals represent variation in the data that is not explained by the model. The 
author compared the observed distribution of the standardised residuals to the expected 
distribution under the assumption of normality by plotting the two cumulative 
distributions against each other. The points were found to approximately follow a straight 
line in most of the variables. It must also be pointed out that a histogram of residuals is a 
graphic device which used to learn about the shape of the Probability Density Function of 
a random variable (Gujarati & Porter, 2009 p.130). The histogram was applied in order to 
check for the normality of the residual. The results showed most diagrams hold the 
normality assumption except for some variables for instance Tobin‟s Q.  
 
6.8.6 Skewness and Kurtosis  
 
Field (2009) writes that in normal distribution the values of skew (asymmetry) and 
kurtosis (pointyness) are 0 and, the further the value is from zero, the more likely it is that 
the data are not normally distributed. If the score resulting from Skewness (when 
ignoring the minus sign) is greater than 1.96, then it is significant (p < .05) which 
indicates non-normality (for a large sample this score should be increased to 2.58) and for 
Kurtosis, the absolute values of about 3.29 are significant at p < .001 (Field, 2009, p.139). 
He suggested that for a large sample it is important to look at the shape of the distribution 
visually rather than the significance of the figure because standard deviation for a large 
sample tends to be small which result in significant ratios and hence result in less reliable 
or less accurate indication. Aspelmeier and Pierce (2009, p.65) argued that “many 
statistics can still be validly interpreted when the assumptions of normality are not met; 
they typically require other types of conditions to be met”.  
 
6.8.7 Transformation of data  
 
As expected, some variable such as company size and liquidity were clearly not normally 
distributed. Transformation of data is useful in regression analysis when there is non-
linearity, when the distribution of the errors is not normal or where there is a problem 
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with heteroscedasticity (Cooke, 1998). However, “transformations may not be 
appropriate for the model being tested or may affect its interpretation in an undesirable 
way and many transformation techniques require non-negative data which limits their 
application” (Osborne and Amy, 2004). There are many types of transformations for 
instance logarithms, square roots, rank regression, and normal score and Z-score 
transformations. In SPSS this would involve natural logarithms (LN), where LG10 stands 
for logarithms to base ten (Lg10), and square roots (Sqrt). The interpretation of 
transformed variables should be carefully discussed because after transformation, they 
represent a data set which is diverse from the original or raw material data.  
 
In this study two types of transformation were applied, logarithmic and normal score 
rank. Logarithmic transformation is commonly applied to address alternative functional 
forms for dependent and independent variables (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007, p.46). There 
is a good case for transforming some variables, for example company‟s size and liquidity, 
particularly when the relationship between the dependent and independent variables is 
likely to be non-linear. Quantity of disclosure, for example, is likely to be related to 
company size is a non-linear way. If company A is ten times as big as company B, it is 
likely to disclose more information, but not ten times as much. In keeping with previous 
discussion, a natural log transformation was used. Logarithms were applied to variables, 
for example total assets, market capitalisation and current ratio.  
 
6.8.8 Normal scores approach  
 
One of the approaches for transformation would be to create normal distributed variables 
by normalising their values and applying a transformation. Normal score transformation 
was applied to create whole set models and was also applied to some individual variables, 
for instance Tobin Q. In order to eliminate some weaknesses of rank regression, an 
alternative approach based on normal scores which could be considered an extension of 
the rank regression method was applied. The use of normal scores was recommended by 
some authors (e.g. Wallace & Naser, 1995; Cooke, 1998; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Cooke 
(1998) stated that normal scores effectively extend the rank regression approach to 
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eliminate some of the weaknesses while retaining the advantages. Row data were 
transformed to the normal distribution by following Van der Warden through SPSS 
software. This was achieved by dividing the normal distribution into the number of 
observations plus one segment, on the basis that each segment has equal probability (Van 
der Waerden, 1952, cited by Haniffa & Cooke, 2002).  
 
It was decided to use normal score transformation instead of another method in some 
cases because this would keep the sample size unchanged since some methods such as 
logarithms and square-roots do not apply to negative or zero figures and this leads to 
missed values. Another advantage of normal score transformation would be that it is able 
to correct for both Skewness and Kurtosis and it is effective in modelling where outliers 
are a serious problem; it yields distribution free test statistics, and the regression 
coefficients derived using normal scores are meaningful (Cook, 1998).  
 
6.8.9 Outliers  
 
An outlier is a data point that does not fit the general trend of the data but would appear 
to be a wayward (extreme) value and not what would be expected compared to the rest of 
the data points (Laerd, 2011). Outliers are case scores that are extreme and therefore have 
impact on the outcome of any statistical analysis and bias the results. The data set must be 
checked for both univariates and multivariates. Outliers can be deducted visually or 
statistically by using casewise diagnostics in SPSS.  
 
The outliers were deducted visually by plotting the two variables on a scatter plot and 
visually inspecting the graph for extreme points. The author found that some extreme 
outliers were caused by typing errors (e.g. the GMPC 2008 foreign ownership of 8.99 
was mistakenly typed as 8,99). In other case there was an incorrect calculation in the 
original source (e.g. in EMAAR 2009  the current ratio was 44.71 in the original source 
but, after recalculation, the right value was found to be 1.24). These corrections led to a 
change in the correlation significant level between liquidity and risk disclosure and it 
became significant.  
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In addition, Spearman‟s correlation was run in the univariate analysis and the results were 
compared with the Pearson‟s correlation results. This is because Spearman‟s correlation 
is much less sensitive to outliers whereas Pearson‟s is very sensitive to outliers in the 
data, therefore, in case of the presence of outliers and a sample not being normally 
distributed, using a non-parametric test such as Spearman‟s correlation would be 
advisable (Laerd, 2011). The author found that Spearman‟s test reported similar results to 
Pearson‟s correlation in most cases of univariate analysis except for Tobin‟s Q variable 
which appeared highly significant and positive for Spearman‟s, whereas Pearson‟s 
correlation showed it as insignificant.  
 
In addition, the outliers were also deducted statistically through the „Explore‟ function in 
SPSS and casewise diagnostics. The initial analysis for outliers was carried out with the 
„Explore‟ function in SPSS which identified extreme values in terms of highest and 
lowest for each variable individually. Furthermore, the models were run in order to 
identify the outlier through the casewise diagnostics table. Then the models were run 
without the outliers. The comparison between the results in both cases  (e.g. with outliers 
and without outliers)showed that adjusted R² and F test had not changed (increased or 
decreased) results significantly and there were relatively similar association results which 
suggested that there was no major effect from the outliers.  
 
Moreover, standardised residuals were not extremely large in all models (e.g. for example 
in Model 3 outliers Std. Residuals were 3.1 and 3.7) which indicated that they were not 
serious outlier cases. Beside this, the number of outliers were checked and found to be 
few (e.g. 1 or 2 cases). The outliers in the models were actual figures and represent the 
true values of variables and represent important information about the relationship 
between the variables. For example, some outliers represent large amounts of risk 
information disclosed by large size companies (e.g. ALDAR). Osborne and Amy (2004) 
stated that removal of extreme scores produces undesirable outcomes. They stated that 
outliers are in the minority and that data are more likely to be representative of the 
population as a whole if outliers are not removed. Therefore it was decided in this study 
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to run the models with the outlier cases especially since the data sample size is relatively 
small and omitting part of the sample might affect the degree of freedom. 
 
6.8.10 Dummy variable  
 
The addition of dummy variables always increases model fit (coefficient of 
determination), but at the cost of there being fewer degrees of freedom and loss of 
generalisability of the model.  Too many dummy variables result in a model that does not 
provide any general conclusions and which is extremely complex. Therefore, the author 
tried to keep the number of dummy variables to a minimum, for example presence of 
audit committee was measured by audit committee size. 
 
6.8.11 Adjusted R² 
 
The adjusted coefficient of determination (Adjusted R²) shows that variation in the 
dependent variable is explained by variations in the independent variables. It is a measure 
of goodness fit of the regression model and ranges from 0 to 1. It indicates how much of 
the dependent variable can be explained by the independent variable. It indicates the 
degree of correlation. ANOVA significance figures shows whether the linear regression 
model predicts the outcome variable significantly or not. 
 
6.8.12 Assumption of independence (Multicollinearity)  
 
The values of the dependent variable (Y) are independent of each other where the 
observations of it are not influenced by other observations. The assumption implies that 
all the regression coefficients (e.g. β1, β2) associated with the predictor variables (e.g. 
X1, X2) is zero. If one or more independent variable are correlated with each other there 
will be multicollinearity. Multicollinearity is a situation where two or more of the 
independent variables are highly correlated; this has a damaging effect on the regression 
analysis results (Hassan, 2009).  
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Multicollinearity is problem because it will make it difficult to identify the unique effects 
of each independent variable in predicting the dependent variable. However, even with 
high multicollinearity, the OLS assumptions are still unbiased and the OLS estimators are 
still Best Linear Unbiased Estimators (BLUE) (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). 
Multicollinearity is almost always present to some extent and cannot be removed totally, 
and researchers need to be aware of its consequences and provide a clear justification. 
Multicollinearity is not a serious problem if a researcher is only interested in the overall 
influence of the combined predictors.  
 
There are many ways to deal with multicollinearity for example dropping variables, 
adding additional variables or new data and the transformation of variables. Ho and 
Wong (2001, p.148) indicated that a serious multicollinearity problem occurs when the 
correlation coefficient exceeds 0.8. Another way of detecting multicollinearity would be 
the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) which shows the degree an independent variable is 
explained by another independent variable within the model. A large VIF figure indicates 
a high collinearity. Field (2005, p.175) suggested that a VIF of 10 or more would indicate 
a serious collinearity problem.   
 
Multicollinearity was checked by correlation analysis of the different variables. There 
was very high correlation between the different measures of company size for example 
LogTotalAsset, logMarketCap and LogRevenues, therefore only one measure was 
included in the model which showed less correlation with the other variables. Also, there 
was high correlation between internalControl and AuditCommitteeSize at 0.898. The 
model was run with one variable and then with the other.  When the model was run with 
both variables, the VIF was 8.03 for AuditCommitteeSize and 8.7 for InternalControl 
which indicated no serious problem with collinearity. Nonetheless, both variables were 
not included at the same time or in the same model. Another case was the collinearity 
between DebtToAsset and NSTobin‟sQ of 0.837 and between NSDebtToAsset and 
NSTobin‟sQ of 0.845. The author then ran the model with both variables and found the 
VIF was not a serious collinearity problem. It was decided to keep both variables in the 
same model while the checks for other assumptions are made. 
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In addition, ownership structure (e.g. institutional, government) variables were not 
included in the same model even though the multicollinearity test did not show serious 
problems. This is because some variables were related to each other, for instance 
concentration ownership consisted of institutional investors, government ownership and 
individuals who own high proportion of shares. Another reason is to not lose the degree 
of freedom especially if there is a small sample size and too many variables were 
included in the same model.
7
 A check for any multicollinearity problem was performed 
after each regression model was run; therefore, it can be concluded that the assumption of 
independence was upheld in this study.   
 
6.8.13 Assumption of constant variance of the residuals (Heteroscedasticity)  
 
For each set of values for the independent variables, it was assumed that the variance of 
error term is constant: errors in prediction of the value of Y have the expected value = 0 
and constant variance. If variance of errors depends on one or more of the independent 
variables there will be heteroscedasticity. This could be deducted graphically (e.g. plots 
of standardised residuals) or statistically (e.g. White test). This assumption investigates 
whether the residuals have constant variance in that the variance of every value of Y is 
the same for all values of X. The researcher checked the validity of this assumption by 
plotting standardised residuals against the predicted values. The author found that 
residuals exhibited no pattern; there was no observed relationship in the graph, and the 
residuals were randomly spread in the graph which means the assumption of constant 
variance was upheld approximately even though there was slight tendency for the 
residuals to spread in some graphs.    
 
6.8.14 Autocorrelation 
 
There is an assumption of independent errors where errors in prediction of the value of Y 
are all independent from each other. For any two sets of values for the independent 
variables, the error should not be correlated. If they are correlated there is 
autocorrelation. One possible solution for autocorrelation is to increase the sample size. 
                                               
7 Haniffa and Cooke (2002) examined 31 independent variables in one model 
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Autocorrelation could be a serious problem in time series regression but it is less serious 
in panel regression. Generally autocorrelation is not serious in cross sectional regression. 
Durbin-Watson statistics test was applied in order to test for autocorrelation. Field (2005) 
stated that values less than 1 or greater than 3 indicate a problem of autocorrelation and 
that the closer to 2 the value, the better the model. He also argued that the closer the 
Durbin-Watson result to 2, the better the model. The Durbin-Watson results for the 
regression models in this study ranged from 1.461 (Model 1) to 1.994 (Model 5). 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the problem of autocorrelation is not serious and the 
result is acceptable in this study.  
 
Table 6.4: Summary of assumptions validation  
Assumption Check  Action taken 
Measurement errors Review literature and hypothesis development 
Check variables measurements 
 
Model specification Review literature review, hypothesis, 
variables definitions and measurements  
Stepwise regression 
 
Linearity  Visually through scatter plot Y against X 
Partial regression plots 
Transformation  
Normality  Standardised residuals plot 
Histogram of residuals 
Normal Probability Plot  
Transformation  
Logarithm 
Normal Scores 
Assumption of 
independence 
(Multicollinearity) 
Pearson‟s correlation  
VIF 
Highly correlated 
variables were not 
included together in 
the same model 
Assumption of constant 
variance of the residuals 
(Heteroscedasticity) 
Plots of standardised residuals  Transformation 
Autocorrelation  Durbin-Watson test  
Outliers  „Explore‟ function in SPSS 
Scatter plot Y against X 
Casewise diagnostics  
Review the raw data 
and original source 
Normal Score 
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6.9 Summary  
 
This chapter explains the research methodology employed in this thesis. The mixed 
method approach used has considerable challenges for the researcher, however the most 
important issue is to demonstrate clearly how they both are applied and followed. Also it 
is important to show how the results and findings from both methods are reported and 
supported or complement each other. The use of mixed methods helps the researcher to 
overcome some limitations, for example, the small sample size. Grounded theory is 
applied for the qualitative part of this research. It is a well-defined and well-structured 
method; therefore, it is widely applied by the researchers in the field of disclosure.  
 
The quantitative part of the study applied content analysis and regression analysis. 
Content analysis has been widely criticized by the researchers because of its subjectivity. 
However, the researchers suggest many steps to minimize the limitations and subjectivity 
of the content analysis approach, steps which are followed in this thesis in order to 
achieve acceptable reliability and enhance the validity of this study. Regression analysis 
is widely applied within the literature. It is important that researchers make sure all the 
regression assumptions are met and valid before drawing any conclusion. Statistical tests 
and techniques are applied in this study in order to support the findings and draw a valid 
conclusion.  
 
It can be seen that it is not sufficient to simply run a regression model, but it is important 
to assess the assumptions and verify whether they have been upheld in order to obtain 
valid results and avoid any misleading interpretation. All regression models in the study 
were checked against the assumptions. Table 6.4 summarises the process followed. A 
sample of a histogram, normal plot and scatterplot are presented in Appendix D. The next 
chapter provides the findings of qualitative research based on grounded theory analysis.  
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Chapter 7 
Results of 
Qualitative Research  
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7.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the main findings of the analysis of the interviews using the 
grounded theory approach. As described in section 6.1.2, the steps of grounded theory 
analysis is discussed and summarised in grids that identify main topic areas (Grid title) 
and categories of concepts. This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first 
section presents the main findings on the risk disclosure practices which are explained in 
Grid 1 to Grid 10. The second section presents the main findings on the influence of firm 
characteristics on risk disclosure which are explained in Grid 11 to Grid 16. The third 
section explains the main findings on the influence of corporate governance 
characteristics on risk disclosure which are presented in Grid 17 to Grid 23. Grid 24 
describes the scope for improvement and change. The final section presents risk 
disclosure theory which is based on the grounded theory analysis of the interviews.  
 
7.1 Section 1: Risk disclosure practice of UAE listed companies 
 
Grid 1: The most important risks facing listed companies in UAE 
Concepts  Categories  Properties and dimensions 
Financial risks  
Non-financial risks 
Risk types  
Economic risks e.g. financial crisis  
Stock market risks e.g. volatility 
Listed companies risk e.g. liquidity  
Most important 
risks in UAE 
Direct vs. Indirect risks 
Local vs. International  
Financial crises 
Management manipulation  
External auditor manipulation 
What drives 
risks? 
Internal factors 
External factors 
Strict legislation  
Reporting requirements 
Corporate governance 
Risk management  
Controlling and monitoring 
Diversification  
How to minimise 
risks? 
Extent of regulation and 
control 
 
Most important risks facing UAE listed companies  
 
The interviewees identified many risks which could be classified as financial risks, for 
instance „credit risk‟, and „liquidity risk‟, and non financial risks such as „operational 
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risk‟ „human capital risks‟, and „management manipulation‟. Many interviewees 
emphasised that the most important risk facing the UAE companies is the global financial 
crisis which is followed by the Dubai financial crisis, whereas others named liquidity risk 
or credit risk, for example that involving Dubai World, NAKHEEL, AMLAK and 
TAMWEEL.
8
 Besides this they referred to some international causes such as the fall of 
the SAAD Al QUSEBI GROUP.
9
 The interviewees emphasised that risks that face 
companies could be due to internal rather than external factors. Individual investors and 
financial analysts related these risks to weaknesses in control and monitoring, lacks in 
regulation and low levels of transparency. A financial analyst said risks in the market are 
inter-connected in that risks in one sector can influence another sector, especially the 
banking sector. A company manager explained that: 
 
“I think the major risk that companies are facing in the UAE is the global financial crisis. 
I would say we are all badly affected by global financial crisis. Dubai is a global city 
where things are more exposed to the international environment.  Abu Dhabi is more 
secure and less impacted by the international market but no one is isolated from the 
international market crisis especially the US market.” (Company Manager 4) 
 
How to reduce and control risk levels? 
 
A company manager explained that risks caused by the global financial crisis could be 
minimised through new and stricter legislation and reporting requirements including risk 
disclosure, risk management and corporate governance. Financial analysts emphasised 
that strict control and monitoring systems would decrease the level of risks in the UAE 
market. A financial analyst said good risk management systems and internal control 
would control and reduce risk levels within companies. A stock market authority member 
emphasised the role and responsibility of internal auditors and external auditors who have 
to identify and monitor risk levels within the companies. A company manager explained 
that:  
“In my opinion the control authorities should play a vital role especially in the current 
period. We are a growing and still emerging market. Control authorities have to play a 
                                               
8The Dubai financial crisis is occurred as a result of the global financial crisis. Dubai Work and 
NAKHEEL, AMLAK and TAMWEEL struggled and represented the actual causes of the crisis.  
9 SAAD Al QUSEBI GROUP was a Saudi company which went bankrupt in 2009; many UAE banks were 
affected by this.  
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bigger role in promoting transparency and disclosure practice. Disclosure is the most 
critical issue you know. If a company discloses clearly and honestly it will reduce very 
much the risks. Besides, the investor will know where to invest his capital and will know 
the risk he is taking and the reward he will be receiving.” (Company Manager 2) 
 
Grid 2: Risk disclosure benefits and costs 
Concepts  Categories  Properties and dimensions  
Importance of risk disclosure   
Risk disclosure advantages 
Improved transparency  
Decision making 
Monitoring by disclosure  
Compliance by disclosure 
Benefits of risk 
disclosure 
 
Internal  
 
External 
 
Reduce cost of capital 
Cost of equity capital  
Cost of bonds capital 
Cost of loan capital 
Risk disclosures 
reduce cost of capital 
Extent of reduction 
Risk disclosure disadvantage 
Competitive disadvantage 
Commercially sensitive  
Compilation costs  
Complexity of risk disclosure 
Costs of risk 
disclosure  
 
 
Compilation cost  
Proprietary costs 
Information processing 
costs incurred by users 
 
Benefits and advantages of risk disclosure  
 
A company manager and a financial analyst pointed out risk disclosure is part of 
transparency. Two individual investors said transparency facilitates their investment 
decisions. A financial analyst and an individual investor recognised there is lack of 
transparency within listed companies and wanted more transparency. An individual 
investor and two company managers pointed out that reporting on risks enhances the 
credibility of company disclosures and enhances companies‟ reputations. A financial 
analyst, a company manager and an individual investor said that risk disclosure will help 
the companies to gain the trust of the investors and hence attract more capital and more 
foreign investors. A regulator claimed that reporting on risk will help in monitoring 
companies. An external auditor explained that: 
 
“If you force companies to disclose, managers will try to be more cautious and comply 
with all requirements because they will be aware that the users and the regulators will 
read the information and financial statements they produce. I think this is another way to 
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promote compliance levels by making companies disclose first and then monitor what 
they have disclosed.” (External Auditor 2)  
 
Two company managers and a stock market authority member thought that risk 
disclosure reduces the cost of capital including the cost of equity capital and the cost of 
borrowing. Financial analysts and individual investors explained that enhanced risk 
disclosures will reduce risk levels and help in clarifying the risk position within the 
company. One company manager considered that risk disclosure reduces the cost of 
bonds and borrowing. He explained that risk disclosures will reduce the risk level of the 
company and reduce risk and uncertainty among investors which makes the company 
more attractive to investors. He said this will make bond investors ask for less return on 
bonds because the risk level is low. A stock market authority member explained that: 
 
“Banks always check the companies‟ positions and ask for detailed information about the 
companies before lending. If the bank is not very comfortable about the company they 
will not lend to the company. Therefore companies‟ managers should think things 
through properly and provide full disclosures and risk disclosures transparently and 
honestly because this will make the risk position clear and lower the risk level of the 
company and hence the banks will feel safe about the company and may charge the 
company a lower interest rate on the loan. But if the bank feels the company is high risk 
they either will not lend to them or will lend to them with a high interest rate.” (Stock 
Market Authority Member 3) 
 
Costs and disadvantages of risk disclosures 
 
The interviewees explained that costs of risk disclosures could be caused by internal 
factors, for instance management, complexity and expense of disclosures, and by external 
factors for example competitors, lenders and users. Two company managers pointed out 
that disclosure and reporting production is expensive and therefore some managers may 
be reluctant to produce all information. A company manager pointed out revealing 
commercially sensitivity information may put the company in a disadvantaged position 
and competitors may exploit the information especially information about strategic 
projects and future plans.  
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Grid 3: Mix of voluntary and mandatory risk disclosures is a preferred approach 
Concepts  Categories  Properties and dimensions  
Regulated market 
Free market 
Ethics and moral  
Regulators‟ involvement  
Market reporting 
approach  
Regulation vs.  
unregulated market 
Additional risk information  
Capital need sources 
Capital need and risk disclosures 
Voluntary risk 
disclosure 
Extent  
Market vs. institution 
Local vs. foreign 
Risk disclosure requirements 
Why it should be mandatory 
Risk disclosure by regulation 
Mandatory risk 
disclosure  
Scope  
Extent  
Should risk disclosure be 
mandatory or voluntary? 
Company- and industry- specific 
risks 
Mix of mandatory 
and voluntary risk 
disclosure 
approach 
Extent of mandatory vs. 
voluntary 
  
Risk disclosure regulations 
Quality of regulatory requirements  
Shortcomings  
Evaluation of 
current regulatory 
requirements 
Strict  
Less strict   
 
Unregulated or free market vs. regulated market 
 
The interviewees expressed different opinions about the involvement of regulations 
within stock markets. Three company managers explained that they are in favour of free 
markets and free investment and they argued for minimising regulations within the 
market. A company manager encouraged the application of moral considerations and job 
ethics and accountability instead of regulatory involvement. He argued that the market 
participants should be allowed to determine the risk disclosure level.  
 
"I am always for the open market and free investors and unregulated markets. In general 
when the company is transparent and deals with its investors and other related parties in 
a transparent way, this will put the company in a position of respect position in the 
market generally.” (Company Manager2) 
 
On the other hand external auditors, financial analysts and individual investors 
emphasised the involvement of regulators with disclosure rules and legislations. A 
financial analyst explained that regulation is necessary to prevent concealment of 
information, fraud, misleading practices and to protect users especially in emerging 
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markets. An external auditor recommended that regulators and company managers play a 
complementary role in that sense.  
 
Incentives for voluntary and mandatory risk disclosure 
 
There is general agreement among the interviewees on the importance and benefit of 
voluntary or additional risk disclosure. A stock market authority member and financial 
analyst considered additional risk information helpful for users in making decisions. A 
regulator suggested some reasons that encourage companies to disclose risk on a 
voluntary basis include users‟ demands and pressure, trading in many countries, and 
capital need. However, a company manager said no one will go beyond what is required 
and provide additional risk information voluntarily. A regulator explained that: 
 
"The second reason that encourages companies to increase risk disclosure is the need for 
borrowing. Banks already disclose about their risk management. However, if companies 
need to borrow they should have a risk management department and accounting policies 
to manage risks, and explain what risks they are facing. Companies should comply with 
these in order that banks may provide them with loans." (Regulator 2)  
 
Mix of both voluntary and mandatory risk disclosure  
  
Financial analysts and investors would like risk disclosure to be mandatory. However, 
two company managers preferred it to be voluntary. A stock market authority member 
and an external auditor stated that manager will not be willing to disclose voluntarily 
about risks, therefore they emphasised IFRSs and regulation involvement. Two of the 
external auditor interviewees explain that they considered that a combination of voluntary 
risk disclosure and mandatory risk disclosure would be the best practice for UAE. They 
argued that this might allow for the control and protection of markets through mandatory 
risk disclosure and regulatory involvement and it would give managers room to introduce 
voluntary risk disclosures which could be company-specific and industry-specific.  
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Grid 4: IFRSs risk disclosure requirements dominate risk reporting practice in UAE 
Concepts  Categories  Properties and dimensions  
IFRSs influence risk disclosure 
practice   
IFRSs covers most risks  
Dimensions of reporting  
IFRSs risk reporting 
requirements  
 
Industry  
Experience level 
Non-compliance with IFRS 
Complexity of IFRSs 
Non updating with IFRS 
Shortcomings and 
complexity of IFRSs 
Extent of compliance and 
complexity  
 
Monitoring companies 
Compliance with IFRSs 
Compliance with 
IFRSs 
For preparer 
For users 
 
IFRSs‟ influences on risk disclosure practice in UAE 
 
Many interviewees recognised the benefits of accounting standards for decision-making 
and promoting risk disclosure practices in UAE. External auditors and stock market 
authority members confirmed that IFRSs have been a mandatory requirement in the UAE 
since 1998 and represent the main source of risk disclosures. A stock market authority 
member and external auditors suggested that IFRSs should cover all types of risks; 
therefore, there is no need for additional legal requirements for risk disclosure in UAE.  
 
"I think now the disclosure requirements of IFRSs have become so extensive, and cover 
so many aspects that I don‟t think there is anything which remains missing. For example 
after four or five months you see development in IFRSs and you see that they are being 
improved and revised. IFRSs covers most risk disclosures. They increase disclosure 
requirements. They are continuously increasing and improving their disclosure 
requirements. IFRSs are becoming more extensive and are more challenging now." 
(External Auditor 2) 
 
On the other hand, another stock market authority member and financial analysts said that 
there is a need for additional regulatory requirements. A stock market authority member 
and an external auditor explained that there are some risk disclosure areas which are not 
covered by IFRSs, for example board resignation risk and internal control risk, which 
could be addressed by corporate governance code.  
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Dimensions of reporting IFRSs risk disclosure  
 
The interviewees explained that the influence of IFRSs on risk disclosure was through 
three dimensions, firstly industry, secondly compliance level, and thirdly experience 
level. Financial analysts and external auditors explained that financial sector companies 
are better in terms of risk disclosures than non-financial sector ones because they are 
strictly regulated. Also, the financial sector companies adopted IFRSs much earlier than 
non-financial sector companies, therefore, they have had more experience with IFRS. A 
stock market authority member and the external auditors explained that risk disclosures 
vary in accordance with the level of compliance with IFRSs. They discussed the fact that 
companies which strictly follow IFRSs would be providing more information on risks.  
 
Shortcomings in applying IFRSs and risk disclosures 
 
An external auditor and a financial analyst observed that some companies in UAE do not 
apply IFRSs properly. They said some companies misreport with IFRSs and that some 
companies‟ managements manipulate the annual report. They said that manipulation is 
occurring because of flexibility and weaknesses in the IFRSs. In addition, an external 
auditor and a company manager recognised that there are shortcomings because of the 
complexity of IFRSs requirements. They observed that companies find it difficult to 
report on some complicated area such as risk disclosure and financial instruments.  
 
Grid 5: Risk disclosure requirements, compliance and enforcement  
Concepts  Categories  Properties and dimensions  
Risk disclosure related regulation  
Risk disclosure related IFRSs 
Corporate governance code 
 Risk disclosure 
requirements 
Extent of requirement  
Compliance level 
Non-compliance level 
Compliance determinants 
Shortcomings in compliance 
Extent of 
compliance 
 
High compliance  
Low compliance 
Serious non-compliance 
Non-serious  
Enforcement by regulatory bodies 
Enforcement by external auditor 
Dimensions of enforcement 
Enforcement level Direct enforcement 
Indirect enforcement 
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Compliance and non-compliance levels in companies in UAE 
 
The interviewees recognised that risk disclosures requirements in UAE are included 
mainly in the IFRS, which focuses on financial risks, and the corporate governance code, 
which focuses on internal control and risk management. An external auditor observed that 
the good compliance level is a result of the strict rules and enforcement but not of 
management intention. He said there is a tendency to comply with minimum regulatory 
requirements and a reluctance to voluntarily disclose risk. Some external auditors 
explained that there is non-compliance to accounting standards but they are more often 
due to misunderstanding the standard, the challenges of the complex standard, and not 
keeping up to date with the latest standards. However, a regulator said there are some 
examples of non-compliance to risk-related requirements and SCA has published these 
cases and punished the companies. An external auditor explained that: 
 
"Yes there are cases of non-compliance. What are the reasons? Accounting standards are 
not black and white. But companies' managers see the weaknesses in standards and try to 
exploit them. In the end accounting standards are man-made laws; they have weaknesses. 
Standards are modified and clarified every year in order to avoid any 
misunderstandings." (External Auditor 6) 
 
Enforcement of risk disclosure  
 
Some external auditors recommended that company managers should be more transparent 
and more open about risk disclosure. They said risk disclosure should be driven by 
management's intention rather than enforced by regulation and punishment.  Company 
managers explained that they aware that they have to be more transparent about risk and 
comply with all regulatory requirements in order to gain a good reputation and the trust of 
investors. They said they are aware of enforcement actions and penalties. This indicates 
there is effective enforcement and awareness among market participants.  However, the 
financial analysts and external auditors pointed out that there is a market failure in getting 
fair and true risk information, and that some companies provided inadequate risk 
disclosures and there was non-compliance. Therefore, most interviewees recommended 
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regulatory involvement and enforcement as vital elements in risk-reporting practice in the 
UAE. An individual investor pointed out that: 
 
"Stock market authorities in Abu Dhabi or Dubai should force companies to disclose 
their risks or have control. Stock markets have access to listed companies‟ projects and 
activities. Stock markets should play a bigger role just as the Central Bank does in 
connection with banks. Stock markets should oblige listed companies to disclose 
information about their risks." (Individual Investor 2)  
 
Grid 6: Risk disclosure for internal and external decisions making 
Concepts  Categories  Properties and dimensions  
Internal communication  of  risk 
disclosures 
Improved decision making  
Risk disclosure 
for internal 
decision making   
Internal  
External 
 
External communication channels 
for risk disclosures 
Importance of annual report 
Credibility of annual report  
Does annual report meet user 
needs? 
Risk disclosure 
for external 
decision making  
 
 
 
 
Extent of risk disclosure in 
annual report  
 
 
Internal communication of risk disclosure 
 
A company manager explained that good communication of risk information within the 
companies will help the managers and the board of directors in their decision making. An 
external auditor observed that if the companies start reporting on risks, the level of 
communication within the company between the top management and internal parties 
such lower management and employees will be improved. An external auditor pointed 
out that here there is a problem in the level of communication about risks between the 
different management levels in some companies in UAE. However, a company manager 
explained that risk disclosure issues are discussed internally within the various reports 
which are produced for top managements as follow: 
 
"Internal communication is key because it is important in internal decisions as it provides 
the management with the information about the company‟s financial position needed for 
business and investment decisions for certain financial periods. It is something we do as 
the financial section to deliver this information to the board of directors and executive 
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managers. Based on the available information they take their internal decisions." 
(Company Manager 3) 
 
External communication of risk disclosures 
 
Some company managers explained that company managers in general communicate 
about risks to external parties using various methods which include one-to-one 
communications, press releases, conferences, interviews, financial statements, quarterly 
reports, initial public offering board reports and management commentary reports. They 
emphasised the most important communication channel is the annual report. Two 
company managers said risk disclosures facilitate borrowing from banks in that banks ask 
for information on risk management within the company before lending. A company 
explained that: 
 
“We are more transparent about risks; we do communicate, we do respond to questions 
and we do answer. We do explain and we give press releases, press conferences and 
interviews and we share views on the economy. There are two reasons for this: first of all 
the investors not only want to look at the figures, which are important, they want to see 
that they can trust the management.” (Company Manager1) 
 
Grid 7: Users‟ need and decision-making processes influence risk disclosure  
Concepts Categories Properties and dimensions 
Users of the information 
Users' need for risk disclosures  
User types and 
needs  
Internal users 
External users 
Do users pay attention to risk 
disclosure? 
Promoting users‟ attention to risk 
disclosures 
Users and risk 
disclosures  
Foreign/Local  
Large/Small 
Do annual reports meet the need? 
Do risk disclosures meet the need? 
Meeting the need 
of the users 
Professional 
Non-professional   
User types influences risk disclosure 
level and quality  
Influence of users 
on risk disclosure  
Low  
High 
 
The interviewees explained that information needs depends on the type of the users, for 
example whether they are external or internal.  A company manager said that some users 
take note of companies‟ risk disclosures, market disclosures and annual report 
disclosures. He said some users go further and communicate privately with the company 
in order to get further information. On the other hand other interviewees said users do not 
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pay attention to market disclosures, risk disclosures and annual report disclosures. An 
external auditor said investors do not depend on the company‟s disclosure to take their 
investment decision. He said share trading did not reflect the disclosure announcement. A 
financial analyst, a company manager and a regulator said people in UAE market have 
little knowledge and experience in stock market trading.  
 
Some interviewees considered that the current information and risk disclosures given in 
the annual reports meet users‟ needs. A company manager argued that companies comply 
with the legal disclosure requirements and the annual report is produced in accordance 
with IFRSs and are designed to satisfy the users‟ needs. On the other hand, a financial 
analyst said annual reports and risk information given do not meet the users‟ needs 
especially in UAE and in the Arab region in general. He argued that the UAE market is 
an emerging market and suffers from lack of transparency and disclosure. A company 
manager stated that: 
 
“Also you are betting on the horse and the jockey. So you want to know there is a good 
management team in place, not a bunch of crooks, that they have got a good reputation 
and everything……You know in Australia the annual report outlines who the board 
directors and who the key management people in the company are. So you know the 
directors. However, over here you just get the annual report with financial figures. They 
do not say anything about the management team.” (Company Manager 5) 
 
Grid 8: Management‟s accountability, attitude and motivation regarding risk disclosure 
Concepts  Categories  Properties and dimensions 
Management quality  
Qualification and awareness 
Reporting on management team 
and performance  
Management quality High experience 
Low experience 
Management role in disclosure 
Management communication 
Management accountability 
Management role With inside people  
With outside people 
Hide information 
Manipulation  
Responsible for risk disclosure 
Management attitude 
towards risk 
disclosure  
 
Legal requirements  
Enforcement actions 
Job ethics 
Psychology 
Management 
motivation for 
disclosure 
External pressure 
Internal pressure 
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Interviewees observed the managers‟ quality, experience, and qualifications are very 
important and influence a company‟s disclosure, risk disclosure and performance. A 
company manager emphasised that company management should be more aware and well 
educated about the market and modern business. An external auditor and an individual 
investor pointed out that risk disclosure is part of managements‟ and the board‟s 
responsibilities and that disclosure could be used to make inferences about the quality of 
management. He said that: 
 
“Disclosure depends on the management…..When you read a company‟s financial 
statements you read it through the eye of the preparer which is the company or the 
managers. The disclosed risks are in according with the management vision but 
unfortunately you as a reader or shareholder cannot add your vision or suggestions. The 
management sees the risks and discloses them and you read them.” (External Auditor 6) 
 
However, another external auditor said the users also had a responsibility to challenge 
inadequate risk disclosures and demand more disclosure and information on risks. A 
financial analyst emphasised that managers play a vital role in disclosure practice because 
it is they who prepare the annual report and financial statements and provide risk 
information. A financial analyst and a stock market authority member emphasised 
management accountability regarding risk disclosure. 
 
The interviewees emphasised that if there is no manipulation there will be more risk 
disclosures. Two stock market authority members confirmed that there is strict 
monitoring and control in place and insider trading and manipulative actions have been 
stopped through strict rules and punishments. However, some financial analysts and 
individual investors thought that companies‟ management and the boards of directors 
exploit disclosure, financial statements and the market. A stock market authority member 
suggested strict regulation and monitoring, and corporate governance over the company 
management in order to control management behaviour.  
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Grid 9: Enhancing risk disclosures quantity and quality is demanded by interviewees 
Concepts  Categories  Properties and dimensions  
Level of risk disclosure 
Additional risk disclosures 
Quantity of risk 
disclosure 
More disclosure 
Less disclosure 
Quality of annual report 
Quality of company‟s manager and 
board of directors  
Quality of risk management quality  
Corporate governance  
Quality meaning Qualifications 
Experience  
Well structured  
Quality of risk disclosure 
Qualitative analysis  
Timely risk disclosure 
Forward looking risk disclosure 
All information (e.g. good and bad) 
Quality of risk 
disclosure 
dimensions 
 
High quality  
Low quality  
 
Company management  
Company status and size  
Ownership structure   
External audit firms  
Legal requirements  
Controlling and monitoring 
What drives the 
quality of risk 
disclosure? 
 
Internal factors 
External factors 
 
 
Risk disclosure quantity and quality   
 
Most interviewees confirmed that companies‟ disclosure levels have improved over time. 
They emphasised the need for improvement and better quality risk disclosure. An 
external auditor said the quantity or the level of risk disclosure is good but not the quality. 
The interviewees referred to quality on various occasions, for example quality of risk 
disclosure, quality of annual report, quality of risk management, quality of corporate 
governance, quality of internal control system, quality of the investors, quality of 
company manager and board of directors, and quality of external auditor. They described 
the quality of the requirement as much improved, more detailed and stricter and the 
quality of participants (e.g. investors and managers) as better with them having high 
levels of knowledge, experience and qualifications. The interviewees referred to the 
quality of systems as well-structured or well-defined and to the quality of markets as 
efficient and developed.    
 
The interviewees referred to good quality risk disclosure in different terms, for example 
“disclose all available information”, “full disclosure”, “relevant”, “accurate”, 
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“understandable”, “fair”, “true”, “honest”, “clear”, “detailed”, “complete”, “in an open 
way”, “future”, “timely”, “trust”, “meet the needs of the users”, “in accordance with 
IFRSs” and “in respect to the law and regulation”, “quantitative analysis”, “qualitative 
analysis” and “comparative figures”. A financial analyst explained that: 
 
“It depends on the type of risks and the economic position locally and internationally. I 
told you earlier, when I talked about banks that banks did not provide full information 
about their risks…. You know, companies that fully and honestly disclose risk information 
have less risky positions than those which have kept silent and have hidden it. I think 
financial statements should have accurate quantitative and qualitative disclosures.” 
(Financial Analyst 4) 
 
Forward-looking risk information is required by the users  
 
Two financial analysts recognised that risk disclosures within annual reports are historical 
which limited the usefulness of such disclosures. They demanded more forward-looking 
information. They said they depend not only on financial statement risk disclosures but 
also on other sources of information that give up-to-date and future information. 
Company manager said managers were reluctant to disclose forward-looking, strategic 
and sensitive information and risk disclosures. He said that: 
 
“If you want to do specific and quantitative analysis and you need some figures, 
numbers, notes, you will find that no one will give you strategic information or future 
plans and projects. No one will give you information on their project per sector per 
region for their clients and customers. No one will disclose that because as you know this 
is very sensitive information and these are commercial decisions related to the clients. 
This is especially so with the recent problems and risks and the collapse of the market 
and of some companies as a result of the global financial crash and the Dubai financial 
crash.” (Company Manager 1) 
 
Timely risk disclosure  
 
Many interviewees recognised the importance of timely disclosure and risk disclosure. 
Some company managers and external auditors recognised the right of investors and 
shareholders and other users to receive full information on time. Two members of the 
stock market authority member explained that the stock market sets rules to force 
companies to provide their disclosures on time. However, financial analysts said that 
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companies delayed information and did not provide risk information on time. They 
demanded timely risk disclosures. A financial analyst and an individual investor 
explained the disclosure of risk information is sometimes delayed by company 
management and the board of directors in order to exploit the market and delay disclosure 
as part of insider trading.  The financial analyst said that: 
 
“Most companies try to hide risks or postpone their disclosure for certain period and 
then it becomes too late. It has happened. Sometimes we hear news about some 
companies which have liquidity problems or are going bankrupt from foreign markets 
and later on we hear this news locally, for example in the cases of AMLAK and 
TAMWEEL.
10
 You know we heard about their problem through Dow Jones in the US. 
These companies denied anything at the beginning, then they admitted it and merged. 
Then trading stopped in these companies‟ shares in the market because they had liquidity 
problems.” (Financial Analyst 2)  
 
What influences quality of risk disclosure? 
 
The interviewees determined internal drivers and external drivers for risk disclosure 
quality. The interviewees observed that high quality risk disclosures depend on internal 
factors such as the company‟s management, company status, complexity of the business 
and ownership structure. Other interviewees said it depends on external factors, for 
instance the external audit firm and legal requirements and control. An external auditor 
said big and listed companies provide better disclosure than small or private companies 
because they have larger resources, are strictly monitored, follow the rules and tend to 
hire big audit firms which insist on full compliance to IFRSs and high quality disclosures 
by their clients. Another external auditor explained that: 
 
“I think risk disclosure and reporting quality in UAE companies are not high quality. It 
depends on a variety of factors, for instance the complexity of the business environment, 
the legal environment, the quality of the audit firm, and the stakeholders‟ involvement. So 
there are a variety of factors and if we consider the quality of risk information, it can be 
of low quality. The quality of such information depends upon management‟s beliefs on 
risk disclosure.  It is also depending upon the disclosures under IFRSs. So that we then 
can say it is up to the international standard.” (External Auditor 5)  
 
                                               
10 TAMWEEL and AMLAK were finance fund companies in Dubai. They struggled as a result of the 
Dubai financial crisis and the authorities stopped trading in their shares on the stock market. 
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Grid 10: Knowledge, awareness and education on risk disclosure 
Concepts  Categories  Properties and dimensions 
Knowledge of risk disclosure 
Knowledge about risk management 
Knowledge of annual report 
Knowledge in UAE 
Knowledge in developed market 
Knowledge of risk 
disclosure 
Lack of knowledge 
 
High  level of knowledge  
Awareness among investors 
Awareness among managers 
Awareness among board of 
directors  
Lack of awareness among market‟s 
participants  
Awareness of risk 
disclosures 
More awareness 
Less awareness  
Education as a solution  
Education on risk management 
Education on risk 
disclosure and risk 
management  
 
 
Knowledge and awareness about risk disclosure and risk management  
 
A financial analyst and an external auditor pointed out that there is a lack of knowledge 
on risk disclosure and risk management among the participants in the stock markets. A 
financial analyst explained the concepts of risk disclosures and risk management are just 
being introduced within the Arab region and UAE. A regulator observed that emerging 
markets are less developed in terms of risk disclosure and risk management than 
developed markets. Many interviewees acknowledged the importance of knowledge and 
education within the market. An external auditor explained that people in the market 
should be well-educated and more knowledgeable. Two company managers confirmed 
that a company's management should inform participants about the company's risks. A 
financial analyst said that simple evaluation is not effective nowadays because businesses 
have become more complicated; therefore, the users need to be well-educated and have a 
better understanding of the company's position through more disclosure and clarification.  
 
Who is responsible to increase the knowledge and awareness among participants?  
 
An external auditor said that it is companies‟ management who should play the main role 
in increasing knowledge and awareness among the users by providing more information. 
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However, a company manager suggested that it is the responsibility of government and 
regulatory bodies. He explained that regulators should monitor the market and protect the 
participants. An external auditor suggested that educating market participants is one of 
the main solutions. Some company manager interviewees confirmed that their companies 
did try to educate the users through publications and more disclosure. An external auditor 
interviewee emphasised all parties have to be educated in the field of accounting and 
finance in order to be able to interpret financial statements and risk disclosures. He said:  
 
“I think education is important. Educating all related people is important. The auditors 
are aware of these things but not the people who prepare financial statements, the 
accountants, the stakeholders, the creditors, the shareholders and the regulatory 
authority.  I think education for all these people should be required so they would know 
what they should see in the balance sheet. Has the risk management been considered and 
discussed.” (External Auditor 3) 
 
7.2 Section 2: Firm characteristic determinants of risk disclosure practices  
 
Grid 11: Company size influences on risk disclosure 
Concepts  Categories  Properties and dimensions  
Number of risks faced by company 
increases with company size 
Company size and 
number of risks 
Positive 
Company size increases tendency to 
disclose risk 
No association between company size 
and risk disclosure? Why? 
Risk disclosure is legal  
Company size and 
risk disclosure 
association  
Internal reasons 
External reasons 
 
 
Positive association between company size and risk disclosure level  
 
Many interviewees said firm size has a positive influence on risk disclosure. The 
interviewees explained various reasons which could be classified as internal or external. 
Firstly come internal reasons; for example an external auditor said management and 
employees in big companies are more knowledgeable because big companies tend to 
employ highly skilled people who could help in providing best practice and could 
enhance risks disclosure and risk management practices. Two external auditors and a 
member of the stock market authority explained that big companies have more 
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responsibilities towards investors and society than small companies; therefore, they have 
to provide more information and risk disclosure.  
 
"Yes, company size does influence risk disclosure. The bigger is the company, the bigger 
is the disclosure level. If the size of the company is getting bigger, the responsibility is 
getting greater. It is not only the financial direction but also the other responsibilities 
such as social responsibilities or what we call CSR, corporate social responsibility." 
(External Auditor 5)  
 
Secondly come external reasons; for example a financial analysts and a regulator said that 
big companies have more business activities and their business reaches over a wide 
geographic area. Therefore, they face more risks than small companies; hence they have 
to provide more information on risks than small companies. A regulator argued that big 
companies have more shareholders, investors and users than small companies. Therefore, 
there will be more people who demand more information. A financial analyst and a 
regulator explained that big companies face more regulations and IFRSs requirements 
which required more disclosure including risk disclosure especially those which operate 
in many countries. The financial analyst said that: 
 
"Of course, the bigger the company, the wider the geographic range of its business 
activities. Big companies will face more risks than small companies. They also have to 
satisfy the need of more investors and users for information than do small companies. 
They will have more investors than small companies who will demand more information 
including risk disclosures." (Financial Analyst 1) 
 
No influence of company size on risk disclosure 
 
Some interviewees said that company size has no influence on risk disclosure. A 
regulator and three company managers argued that risk disclosure is a legal requirement 
and IFRSs and all listed companies should disclose information about risks whatever 
their size. A regulator argued that all companies whether big or small have to comply 
with legal requirements and they are treated equally by the law. He said that companies 
which do not disclose would be punished and would appear in non-compliance company 
lists which would affect their reputations negatively. An external auditor and a company 
manager argued that it is a matter of applicability of risks and non-applicability of risks. 
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A company manager argued that if small companies faced more risks than big safe 
companies, they would disclose more risk information.  
 
Grid 12: The influence of companies‟ risk levels on risk disclosure practices 
Concepts  Categories  Properties and dimensions  
Risk level indicators 
Company risk level influences risk 
disclosure 
No influence of company risk level 
on risk disclosure 
Risk level and risk disclosure 
association is subjective  
Company risk level and 
risk disclosure 
association 
Positive  
 
Negative 
 
No influence 
Controlling by internal auditors 
Monitoring by external auditors 
Risk management 
How to minimise and 
control risk level? 
External parties 
Internal parties 
 
The association between risk level and risk disclosure  
 
The interviewees pointed out that various measurements indicate risk levels within 
companies, for instance gearing ratio, liquidity ratio, capital ratio and volatility of share 
returns. A company manager and an external auditor said that riskier companies need to 
provide more information on risk than less risky companies because they should clarify to 
their users all risks and provide detailed information in order to gain investor trust and 
make them feel safe, otherwise, investors will leave the companies or hesitate to invest in 
them. An external auditor said that banks are riskier than companies in other sectors and 
they disclose more information on risks. A company manager explained that: 
 
"Investors weigh up risk level in the company. Investors would like to know where to put 
their capital. They want to feel secure. If they are not fully informed about the company 
and if that company has high risks, the investors will hesitate to invest in such situations. 
Therefore, companies should increase their disclosure levels." (Company Manager 2)  
 
A financial analyst and an individual investor said that if a company feels that any risk 
information will lead to a higher perception of risk by investors and banks, the managers 
will hide it because they afraid of the negative response of the users. Also, financial 
analysts said some companies provide risk information when it is too late or when the 
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information became available from a third party or from sources outside the country. 
They argued that some companies did so because bad news might scare off the investors. 
A financial analyst said managers hide bad and risky news in order to signal to the market 
participants that the company is safe. He pointed out that: 
  
"I think risk levels within the company influence risk disclosure. If a company's position 
is good and it is not facing big risks, it will try to show off and disclose all information 
fairly. It will tell everybody that it is safe. However, if a company is in trouble and faces 
many risks, it will try to hide this information and disclose less." (Financial Analyst 1) 
 
Some regulators and company managers observed that risk disclosures should not be 
influenced by company risk level. They argued that risk disclosure is a mandatory 
requirement and all companies should satisfy these requirements despite their risk level. 
A company manager said disclosing risks should be part of the culture within the 
company and companies should disclose the risk regardless of its level. A regulator said 
that disclosing fairly and in full about risks would show the compliance level within the 
company, but most companies try to hide risk information and hence they do not fully 
comply with the requirements. He said that: 
 
"Risk level within a company should not influence risk disclosure level. This is because 
disclosure depends on regulations. Disclosure level represents the compliance level by 
the company. So whether the companies have high risks or low risks, companies should 
provide certain level of disclosure. If there is risk, the company has to disclose it despite 
its risk level. When the compliance level is high, the disclosure level will be high 
too."(Regulator 2) 
 
Risk level and risk disclosure association is subjective  
 
Interviewees suggested that company risk level and risk disclosure association is a 
subjective issue and depends on many aspects, for instance managers‟ attitudes, users‟ 
awareness and pressure, and industry type and size of the business. Two external auditors 
said that managers have full access to information on all risks and they decide on what to 
disclose, and managers may manipulate the information and market and try to overstate 
profits and understate the losses and risks, which impose further risks. Secondly, a 
financial analyst said it depends on how they interpret the risk information and whether 
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they interpret it negatively or positively. Thirdly, a financial analyst said some sectors are 
more risky than others and some companies are bigger than others which face more risks; 
therefore, they provide more information on risks. An external auditor explained that: 
 
"The risk level of the company and risk disclosure association depends on many things. It 
depends on the managers and on the users or readers of the information. I would say it is 
the company who has to put forward the facts and risk information. Then the users should 
analyse those facts and the risk information.” (External Auditor 5) 
 
Grid 13: Company's performance influences on the risk disclosure level 
Concepts  Categories  Properties and dimensions  
Companies‟ performance indicators 
Core business performance 
Shares‟ performance 
Company performance 
indicators  
Good performance 
Bad performance 
 
Company performance and attraction 
to share capital 
Attraction to bonds‟ capital 
Company performance 
and capital attraction 
Direct influence 
Indirect influence 
Profitability influences risk 
disclosure 
Profitability has no influence on risk 
disclosure 
Company profitability 
influences risk 
disclosure 
Positive  
Negative 
No influence 
 
Company performance influences on risk disclosure  
 
The interviewees described companies‟ performances in various terms for example sales, 
financial position, liquidity and share performance, company size, market capitalisation 
and share performance. The interviewees showed disagreement on the effect of 
performance on risk disclosure. The interviewees expressed three possible opinions on 
the association between risk disclosure and company performance. They could be 
classified into three categories which are: direct influence, indirect influence and no 
influence. None of the interviewees indicated negative association.  
 
Some financial analysts and a stock market authority member explained that there is a 
direct influence from company performance and profitability on risk disclosure. They 
indicated that there is a positive relationship between risk disclosure and the performance 
of the company measured by profitability. An external auditor considered that a high 
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profit company will have the ability to disclose more information because they can afford 
the expenses of additional disclosure delivered to wide range of people.  
 
Some financial analysts argued that more profitable companies will disclose more 
information to show their investors that they have good standards of disclosure and good 
risk management systems and explained that companies made high profits because they 
manage their risks effectively. Therefore, they disclose risk transparently in order to gain 
investors‟ trust. A company manager explained the matter in terms of signalling and said 
that companies with a high performance will be willing to show off and deliver the 
information to a wider audience. He said that: 
 
"I think that a profitable and well-run company will be more likely to signal more 
information about its risks. A poorly run company that sails very close to the wind and 
walks on the edge of liquidation will want to say a lot less to the market. This is because 
every day something negative can happen in that company for example there can be bad 
contracts and poor performance. You know they are not going to say anything about the 
company. They are going to try to withhold information from the market as much as they 
can. So I think profitability does matter and does influence risk disclosure." (Company 
Manager 5)   
 
An external auditor and a financial analyst indicated that companies with weak 
performance will be making lower profits or making losses and such companies will try 
to hide their losses and risks and will not discuss the risks they face in order to keep the 
remaining investors. He explained that some companies' managers believe in keeping 
silent and that if they speak out about all the risks the investors will run off. A company 
manager explained that a person‟s psychology is influenced by the performance or 
profitability of the company. They explained that a company's good performance and 
high profitability will affect positively the psychology of the company‟s managers. This 
would motivate them psychologically to disclose more about risks and become more 
transparent.      
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Companies‟ performance has no influence on risk disclosures 
 
Many interviewees indicated that there is no influence from company performance or 
profitability on risk disclosure level. Regulators and a member of the stock market 
authority justified this by saying that risk disclosure is determined by law and IFRSs 
which all companies should follow whatever their performance. They explained that 
companies should all disclose at the same level since they are all subject to the same set 
of rules and requirements. A company manager argued that ethics and management 
accountability imply that company managers should disclose all information regardless of 
the company‟s financial position and whether they are making losses or profits. A 
regulator explained that investors have the right to know the company‟s true position in 
order to take the right investment decision. He explained that: 
 
"We say that risk disclosure degree or level is determined by the legal framework, 
financial reporting standards and mandatory legal requirements. Risk disclosure is not 
supposed to be influenced by profitability level or any other elements. Disclosure should 
be the same in all cases. If the company made a loss it should disclose all information. If 
the company made a profit it should disclose all information. Companies should disclose 
in all cases. In all cases disclosure should be complete and in accordance with the 
requirements. Then it is up to the investor to keep investing in the company or leave the 
company." (Regulator 1)  
 
Grid 14: Liquidity influences on risk disclosure and management practice 
Concepts  Categories  Properties and 
dimensions  
Liquidity perception  
Importance of liquidity  
Disclosure on liquidity risks is required by 
IFRSs 
Liquidity indications 
and importance 
Performance  
Risk level  
Effects of liquidity risk disclosure 
Effects local level and international level   
Effects of liquidity 
risk disclosure   
Local effects  
International effects 
Liquidity influences risk disclosure  
Liquidity does not influence risk disclosure 
Liquidity and risk 
disclosure association  
Positive  
Negative  
No influence 
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Positive association between risk disclosure and liquidity 
 
Financial analysts, external auditors and company managers explained that liquidity risk 
is the most important risk that faces companies in UAE. An external auditor explained 
that liquidity problems will harm companies‟ going concerns. A company manager 
pointed out that liquidity risk would lead to other risks such as legal risks and bankruptcy.  
 
The interviewees discussed the influences of liquidity on risk disclosure. Some 
respondents affirmed that liquidity influences risk disclosure whereas others did not 
support the influence of liquidity on risk disclosure. The majority of interviewees 
suggested a positive association between risk disclosure and the liquidity of the company. 
None of the interviewees indicated a negative association. Many interviewees explained 
the association in terms of signalling. A financial analyst and a stock market authority 
member argued that the management of companies with a good liquidity position would 
disclose more risk in order to send positive signal to their shareholders and lenders. A 
company manager observed that company managers would like to signal that they are 
liquid and do not have financial difficulties. He explained that: 
 
"Liquidity matters and influences risk disclosure especially with financial risks. Have you 
ever heard of signalling theory? If you are a bank, you would like to tell the market that 
you are liquid.  In your annual report you want to disclose in bold print that the bank is 
the best bank in the world. You want to say „we are the most liquid bank in the UAE‟. It is 
a really important thing for shareholders to know that you are liquid, that you are not in 
financial trouble and that you do not have difficulties. So you want to signal all that to 
market participants." (Company Manager 5) 
 
An external auditor, a stock market authority member and individual investors explained 
that a company with proper risk disclosure and a good risk management system would 
achieve a good liquidity position within the market. They indicated that if the company 
liquidity is good, it will disclose more information on risk. Financial analysts and a stock 
market authority member confirmed the companies that suffer from liquidity problems 
will hide risk information.  
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A stock market authority member indicated that the management of companies try to 
manipulate the information provided through the annual report. A financial analyst 
pointed out that companies will hide liquidity risk information from their lenders, 
investors, supplier and partners. He said that companies‟ managers will hide liquidity risk 
information from lenders so that lenders do not stop financing them. They might not 
show their partners or suppliers their liquidity risks so that they will not stop doing 
business or stop supplying the company. In addition they do not want to tell their 
investors so they do not scare them off and lose the capital.   
 
No influence of liquidity on risk disclosure 
 
A company manager and a regulator suggested that there is no association between 
liquidity and risk disclosure. He argued that risk disclosure is the legal requirements 
according to the laws and IFRSs. A regulator said that all companies are required to 
comply with these requirements regardless of their liquidity position.   
 
“I think there is no association between liquidity and risk disclosure. This is because, at 
the end of the day, risk disclosure depends on the laws produced by SCA. Also, it depends 
on the level of compliance to these requirements within the company. (Regulator 2)  
 
Grid 15: Industry type influences risk disclosure practice in UAE with emphasis on banks 
Concepts  Categories  Properties and dimensions  
Industry types 
Industry-specific factors and 
differentiation 
Industry-specific 
differentiation 
  
 
Industry type influences risk 
disclosure. How? 
Industry-type does not influence risk 
disclosure. Why? 
Industry type and risk 
disclosure association 
Influence by regulation 
Influence by industry-
specific factors 
 
Industry-specific differentiation and risk disclosure requirements 
 
The interviewees identified risk disclosure practice for different industries, for example 
for the financial and non-financial sectors. A company manager and an external auditor 
explained that different industries involve different activities. They suggested that 
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regulation and accounting standards should take into consideration industry-specific 
environments within the requirements. They suggested there should be room in the 
regulations for industry-specific disclosures especially when it comes to risk disclosure.  
 
Industry type influences on risk disclosure 
 
The majority of the interviewees confirmed the industry type does impact on risk 
disclosures. An external auditor observed that different industries face different risks 
which in turn influence risk disclosure practices. In addition, two company managers 
explained that risk disclosures differ from one industry to another because of differences 
in the regulations and IFRSs. An external auditor explained that the financial sector is 
subjected to further rules applied by the Central Bank along with the Ministry of 
Economy and SCA.  He explained that some IFRSs may not apply to some sectors which 
in turn influence the risk disclosure of the companies or industry. A stock market 
authority member said that additional disclosure is required from the financial sector 
under some circumstances, for example financial crisis. 
 
Beside this an external auditor said that risk disclosures differ from one industry to 
industry because of voluntary disclosures. He explained that some companies disclose 
beyond what is required whereas others stick to mandatory requirements. A company 
manager also said that one requirement could be interpreted by a company‟s manager as 
voluntary and no disclosures be made, whereas it could be interpreted by others as 
mandatory leading to disclosure.  
 
An external auditor pointed out that not all risks are applicable to all companies or 
industries, therefore risk disclosures differ from one industry to another. A company 
manager said that the operations and the nature of the business can be very different from 
one company to another. He said that some companies are involved only in simple 
business transactions and face fewer risks whereas others may be involved in complicated 
business operations and face more risks. An external auditor thought that because 
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companies in the financial sector are involved heavily with financial instruments, they 
should make more risk disclosures.  
 
An external auditor and a financial analyst observed that risk disclosures differ according 
to industry because of the size and resources available. They discussed the fact that banks 
are big and have more departments which face many risks and hence have more to say 
about risk disclosure. Also, the interviewees recognised that some companies are big and 
have huge resources and can afford reporting and disclosure costs. They considered that 
banks are the best in terms of risk disclosure. The external auditor said:   
 
"Industry type influences risk disclosure, for example the banks face risks such as 
currency risks, and interest risks, whereas real estate companies face risks due to 
building material prices. So I think their risks are less complicated. I think it is more to 
do with industry type. Some sector may be in trouble for a certain time which may lead 
the companies to disclose more. IFRS 7 requires detailed disclosures about financial 
instrument risks. If you are in the financial sector you have to disclose a great deal. If you 
see the annual report for companies in two different sectors,  one from the financial 
sector for example, and the other from the non-financial, you will find the report from the 
financial one is 90 pages long whereas the non-financial one is 60 pages. So, industry 
type is a fundamental element that influences risk disclosure." (External Auditor 6) 
 
No influence of industry type on risk disclosure  
 
Some interviewees did not acknowledge any influence of industry type on risk disclosure. 
Two external auditors explained that when looking at the companies' annual reports and 
risk disclosures in the UAE they appear to be relatively similar. An external auditor said 
“risk is risk” and all companies face risks and they have to report on them if the risk is 
material, regardless of the industry type. An external auditor said that IFRS requirements 
require all companies to disclose risks and that IFRS applied to all industries. In addition 
a company manager said that risk disclosure is supposed not to differ according to 
industry type because risk disclosure is a legal requirement. He said that:  
 
"There should not be different degrees of risk disclosure because of industry type because 
regulations apply to all sectors and all industries. The rule is the rule and all companies 
should be treated equally." (Company Manager 1) 
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Grid 16: The influences of external audit type on risk disclosure practice 
Concepts  Categories  Properties and dimensions  
Auditing procedures and roles 
Auditing is risk based 
External auditor and company 
management relationship 
External auditor role   
 
Extent of independence  
External auditors  report on risk 
Auditor type influences risk 
disclosure. How? 
No influence of auditor type on risk 
disclosure. Why? 
The influence of auditor 
type on risk disclosure 
Direct  
Indirect  
 
Positive 
Negative  
 
External auditor type influences risk disclosure 
 
The majority of the interviewees emphasised that external auditors influence risk 
reporting in the company in direct and indirect ways. They said there is a positive 
influence from the Big 4 on risk disclosure. None of the interviewees said there was a 
negative impact. The interviewees explained that direct influences could be through the 
auditing process.  
 
Four external auditors and a stock market authority member emphasised that auditing is 
risk-based work. They said auditors pay a great deal of attention to risks within the 
company and assess the risk of the company when they audit their clients. They said that 
the auditing process involves risk identification, risk assessment, risk checking, looking 
at additional risk, assessing going-concern risk and whether all risk that have been 
required by IFRSs to be disclosed are disclosed or not, and if not they will mention this to 
their clients and report  it.  
 
A regulator said external auditors would recommend their clients to comply with IFRSs 
and regulatory disclosure requirements. An external auditor said audit firms sometimes 
help their clients by handling a complicated area of financial reporting or by giving 
advice about it with an emphasis on risk disclosure. A company manager and a regulator 
said external auditors point out to their client some risks and ask them to include the risks 
in the annual report and if the management does not include them or follow the audit 
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firm‟s recommendations, they will report them to the regulatory authority and issue a 
disqualifying audit report.  An external auditor said that: 
 
"The straightforward answer to this question is that the Big 4 put the highest emphasis on 
risk disclosure issues in the financial statements. This is basically because the risk issues 
are what make us engage in the audit process. If any company is audited by the Big 4, the 
risk disclosure issues have definitely been taken into consideration. Risk disclosure is the 
major concern of the auditor. If we found that anything is going wrong or things are not 
in accordance with IFRSs or the law in the company, we are actually going to say this in 
our audit report." (External Auditor 5) 
 
An external auditor and two stock market authority members explained that the Big 4 put 
a great deal of emphasis on risk disclosure issues, require their clients to strictly follow 
financial reporting standards, and ensure that all material risks are disclosed by their 
clients. An external auditor said the Big 4 require that their clients provide high quality 
disclosures, and ensure that risk disclosures are complete, correct, relevant and in 
accordance with IFRSs. Two financial analysts and a company manager observed that the 
Big 4 is concerned for their credibility and reputation which influences risk disclosure 
practices. They explained that the Big 4 has higher credibility and a better reputation than 
small audit firms. They said they are not willing to lose their credibility and reputation by 
being involved in any manipulation by company management. A regulator said the Big 4 
will not hesitate to point out any risk issues to their clients and if they do not follow their 
advice they would report them to the authorities or issue a disqualifying report if there is 
material risk.   
 
External auditor type does not influence risk disclosure  
 
Some interviewees considered that there is no influence by the auditor type on risk 
disclosures. A regulator and a company manager argued that risk disclosure is a legal 
requirement and all companies should report risk whatever the audit type. A company 
manager explained that risk reporting is required by IFRSs which applies to all 
companies; therefore this would not affect the risk disclosure level.  An external auditor 
stated that: 
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"Not really. Auditor type does not influence risk disclosure. This is because risk 
disclosure is determined by IFRSs. It is not the auditors‟ priority nor is it not up to the 
auditor to decide on how and what the companies should be doing or what they should 
disclose. I do not know what other small audit firms are doing with their clients in this 
case. …. But I think a risk is a risk whether the company‟s auditors are working for one 
of the Big 4 or not. Risk disclosures are mandatory." (External Auditor 4) 
 
7.3 Section 4: Corporate governance characteristic determinants of risk disclosure 
 
Grid 17: Corporate governance influences on risk disclosure 
Concepts  Categories  Properties and dimensions 
Corporate governance importance  
Corporate governance role 
Corporate governance 
advantages 
 
Corporate governance influences 
company performance  
Corporate governance influences 
managers‟ performance   
Corporate governance 
influences 
Positive  
Negative 
Corporate governance influences 
risk disclosure 
Corporate governance has no 
influence on risk disclosure   
Corporate governance 
influences on risk 
disclosure  
Positive influence  
 
No influence 
 
Corporate governance influences risk disclosure 
 
The interviewees confirmed that there is a positive influence from corporate governance 
on risk disclosure practice. A financial analyst said that risk disclosure and risk 
management are part of corporate governance. He explained that corporate governance 
imposes risk management on companies which in turn helps to promote risk disclosure.  
A stock market authority member observed that corporate governance will enhance risk 
disclosure through the internal control system within the company when risk reporting is 
part of the system. A regulator, a financial analyst and a company manager recognised 
that corporate governance could help in reducing risks within the company and force 
companies to provide full and clear disclosures. They considered that corporate 
governance enhances disclosure requirements, risk management systems, and internal 
control within the company, which in turn reduces risks and prevent companies‟ 
managers from hiding risk information.  
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A regulator explained that the main objective of corporate governance is to reduce risks, 
especially internal risks, within the company which in turn affects the risk disclosure 
practices of the company. A stock market authority member pointed out that corporate 
governance covers risk disclosures and requirements that are not covered by IFRSs, for 
example internal control risk, board of directors risk and resignations. A regulator 
explained that there is a strict corporate governance code in UAE, and companies that 
follow it strictly will enhance the value and the credibility of their disclosures and annual 
reports. He said: 
 
“Of course corporate governance influences risk disclosure. Actually the main objective 
of corporate governance is to reduce many risks, especially risks resulting from internal 
determinants.” (Regulator 1)  
 
Only one interviewee said that corporate governance has no influence on risk disclosure. 
A company manager said corporate governance mechanisms have no influence on risk 
disclosure but do have on company performance. He argued that risk disclosure is 
mandatory and not voluntary. He said risk disclosures are imposed by legal requirements 
of SCA, IFRSs and recommendations from audit firms.  
 
Grid 18: Risk management system promotes risk disclosure practice  
Concepts  Categories  Properties and dimensions 
Importance of risk management  
Risk management process 
Risk management 
system roles 
Comprehensive  
Risk management dimensions 
Manageable and non-manageable 
risks 
Risk management 
dimensions  
Inside  
Outside  
Risk management influences on 
risk disclosure 
Positive influence Direct influence 
Indirect influence 
 
Risk management is important and influences risk disclosure  
 
The interviewees recognised the importance of risk management systems within the 
company. An external auditor said that companies face various risks every day; therefore, 
managers should manage these risks in order to survive. The interviewees suggested that 
risk could be divided into two main criteria which include manageable and non-
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manageable risks. They observed that risks established to be inside the company are 
manageable, for instance employee risk and business risk. However, risks that occur due 
to external causes are difficult to manage or are non-manageable, for instance ones due to 
the global financial crisis or to clients or suppliers.  
 
Interviewees confirmed that risk management influences companies‟ performance and 
risk disclosure. An individual investor said risk management systems help in identifying 
and avoiding risks. A financial analyst said that many companies have not been affected 
by the recent crisis because of their good risk management department and mechanisms. 
Financial analysts observed that companies with good risk management systems and 
policies will be better at predicting, dealing with, and finding solutions to risks than 
companies with poor risk management systems and policies. 
 
A financial analyst explained that a good risk management mechanism will imply proper 
checks and ensure proper compliance with IFRSs and regulatory requirements which 
imply giving information on risks. An external auditor pointed out that it is more 
important to have a proper risk management mechanism than to just establish a risk 
management department in order to satisfy the mandatory requirements or to satisfy 
shareholders‟ demands. Interviewees emphasised the importance of disclosure and the 
presentation stage within risk management processes. They explained that risk disclosure 
is an important stage within risk management and disclosure policies. They said IFRSs 
require companies to present quantitative and qualitative discussion on risks. An external 
auditor said that: 
 
"I can say there are many clients who discuss risk management disclosures. These 
disclosures particularly can be seen at the end of financial statements where you have 
discussion of the risk management disclosures of the company. These discussions 
enhance the risk disclosures of the companies. As I told you, these are for example 
currency risk disclosures, capital management disclosures, liquidity risk disclosure, and 
the fair value disclosures." (External Auditor 2) 
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Grid 19: Internal control influences risk disclosure practice  
Concepts  Categories  Properties and dimensions 
Internal control system roles 
Monitoring by disclosure  
Internal control 
system importance   
External parties 
Internal parties  
Independence of internal control Independence 
importance  
Extent of independence  
Internal control influences risk 
disclosure 
Internal control does not influence 
risk disclosure 
Internal control 
influences risk 
disclosure  
Positive impact  
Negative impact 
Well-defined  
Well-structured 
Quality of internal 
control system 
High function 
Low function 
 
Internal control influences risk disclosure practices  
 
Most interviewees confirmed the positive influence of internal control on risk disclosure 
practices. Financial analysts, company managers and external auditors pointed out that 
the internal control system will help companies to practice risk management and help in 
identifying the problems and risks at an early stage and help managers to take actions to 
solve and mitigate the risks. Regulators, financial analysts and stock market authority 
members explained that internals control and reporting on internal controls will enhance 
the accountability of the management through a strict monitoring and controlling process 
which in turn will encourage the manager to fully comply with risk disclosure 
requirements and corporate governance.  
 
External auditors said that existence of an internal control system would send positive 
signals to the market about the company and company management which might 
motivate the managers to disclose more about the internal control system. Individual 
investor said badly performing managers do not want to set up a proper internal control 
system and report on internal control because this will uncover things that the 
management is trying to hide.  
 
Many interviewees said the internal control system enhances the quality of financial 
reporting and financial statements. A company manager explained that an internal control 
system will motivate clear, analytical, qualitative and quantitative disclosure and risk 
disclosure. A company manager and an external auditor explained that an internal control 
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system facilitates the flow of information within the organisation which in turn helps in 
providing more information and more accurate information. 
 
A financial analyst said UAE is an emerging and inefficient market where strict 
legislation should be in place in order to protect people and ensure proper internal control 
and risk management systems are in place within the companies. Stock market authority 
members, a company manager and two financial analysts emphasised the need for 
external control by legal authorities and an external auditor as well as for internal audit 
and internal control. He said that: 
 
“Yes. I think of course internal control will help revealing the risk at an early stage, 
dealing with risk after that, and then disclosing the risks. However the system should be 
independent, otherwise there is no point in having an internal control system.  We also 
need external control by the legal authorities and external auditors. We cannot depend 
totally on a company‟s internal control or internal auditors because they are, at the end 
of the day, working for the company and receive their salary from the company.” (Stock 
Market Authority Member 2)  
 
Grid 20: Audit committee and internal auditors influence on risk disclosure 
Concepts  Categories  Properties and dimensions 
Audit committee important  
Internal auditors 
Independence 
important  
Extent of independence  
Reporting to audit committee 
Reporting to the board  
Checking and auditing  
Internal audit 
influence on risk 
disclosure 
Positive  
 
Audit committee and risk disclosure  
 
External auditors said that good governance structure implies having an audit committee.  
They emphasise the importance of the independence of the audit committee and that it 
should comprise independent directors or non-executive directors. Two company 
managers said that the audit committee should not be directly under executive 
management but should provide the board with their report and they should monitor 
company performance and executive management performance. Some interviewees 
emphasised that audit committees had a positive influence on risk disclosure.  
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A company manager said that audit committees affect risk disclosure by encouraging the 
company to fully comply with disclosure requirements. An external auditor said that audit 
committees monitor risks within the company and report directly to the board and would 
recommend direct disclosure on some issues; however, the final decision on what is to be 
disclosed is up to the board. Many interviewees suggested that the audit committee 
influences risk disclosure through internal auditors who may be linked to the audit 
committee and provide reports on internal risks. A company manager said that: 
 
“There should be an audit committee. This committee should be directly under the board 
of directors, should be independent and should control the executive management of the 
company. Besides, it should monitor executive management actions regarding risks. It is 
very important that the internal control committee is not under the executive management 
in any way because otherwise it will lose its credibility and then the internal control 
system will become a routine system and do ineffective work. Therefore it should be 
totally independent, work under and report directly to the board and never follow the 
executive management.” (Company Manager 2) 
 
Internal auditor influences on risk disclosure 
 
Many interviewees observed that internal audits have positive impact on company 
performance and disclosure. Financial analysts said internal auditors will ensure a proper 
risk management and encourage the managers to practice more disclosure and disclose 
risks. A stock market authority member explained that internal auditors enhance financial 
reporting through the reduction of error in the financial statements. Interviewees 
suggested there should be coordination between internal and external auditors. A 
financial analyst said that:  
 
“Most companies have external auditors but few companies have internal auditors. There 
should be internal auditors and controllers. If there is internal control and internal audit, 
this will enhance information accuracy and provide better reports. The usefulness of the 
information will be enhanced. I think monitoring and control will be better because we 
will not only depend on external auditors but also on internal auditors.” (Financial 
Analyst 3) 
 
A company manager pointed out that internal audit would ensure proper checks and 
proper flow of the information within the company, and hence reduce risks and influence 
risk disclosure positively. Internal auditors will help in the decision-making process of 
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the management and the board of directors. They said this could be through the reports 
that the internal control committee provides to the board or the management which 
includes the report on the risks within the company.  
 
Grid 21: Board of directors‟ size, structure and qualifications influence on risk 
disclosure 
Concepts  Categories  Properties and dimensions 
Making decision  
Discussion strategies 
Risk monitoring and disclosure  
Board role  
High board size balance 
Low board size  
Structure of the board    
Board size and 
structure  
Minimum size 
Maximum size 
Board size influence on risk 
disclosure 
Board size influence on company 
performance 
Influence of board 
size on risk disclosure  
Positive  
Negative 
Qualifications  
Experienced board  
Knowledge of modern business 
Quality of board of 
directors 
 
Number of directors  
Quality of directors  
 
Board size influences risk disclosure 
 
Some interviewees suggested that board size influences risk disclosure. They said 
increased board size has a positive impact on company risk disclosure. An external 
auditor said that a big board will promote monitoring and controlling activities in the 
company and go over executive management. A financial analyst said there will be more 
transparency and it will prevent any information being hidden from the public, and will 
enhance accountability within the company. An external auditor and a stock market 
authority member argued that more members on the board will lead to more opinions, 
arguments and exchanges of experience which is good for the company, and expert 
members will recommend enhancing disclosures, including risk disclosure. A financial 
analyst explained that when there are more people on the board it will be difficult for a 
few people to influence the decisions and hide information. An external auditor stated: 
 
“Suppose if the board of a bank needs to make a decision to give a huge loan to a person 
or a company. Then this person runs away or that company goes bankrupt. I would 
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question the board of directors if it is small, for example one or two members. The small 
board will judge themselves by themselves. They will simply say this is a bad debt. They 
will not say it was risk and it was their fault.  They will try to hide risk information and 
will not want to expose their faulty decisions to the public. This is a faulty system. 
Therefore, board size is a very important issue.” (External Auditor 6) 
 
Board size has no influence on risk disclosure  
 
Some interviewees said there is no influence of board size on risk disclosure or company 
performance. A company manager suggested that increased board size makes it difficult 
to hold board meetings with all directors attending which may reflect on board decisions 
and effectiveness. Another company manager and a regulator argued that board size is a 
legal requirement and all companies should comply with it and therefore there should not 
be any influence from it.  
 
Board structure and quality 
 
Many interviewees emphasised the board members should be qualified and have high 
levels of experience. A company manager and an individual investor argued that the 
qualifications and experience of the board is more important than the number of people 
on the board. They said having highly experienced and well-qualified people on the board 
will enrich the risk disclosure. A company manager and a regulator said the board should 
consist of a variety of people, for example executive and non-executive and independent 
directors. An external auditor recommended that instead of having a big board, 
companies should consider to have different committees along with the main board of 
directors. The committees should be working in different areas and the responsibilities 
should be distributed among them. He said: 
 
“Actually, in my opinion, instead of having a large board size and more members on the 
board, it is better to divide them into different committees.… I also think the structure of 
the board of the director is more important. So instead of having one board of directors 
with 10 members, why do we not have 4 committees that consist of 3 or 4 members who 
should report directly to the board of directors” (External Auditor 2) 
 
 
  
191 
 
Grid 22: Independent and non-executive directors influence on risk disclosure  
Concepts  Categories  Properties and dimensions 
Independence and segregation 
principles  
Independent and non-executive 
directors' importance and roles 
Independent directors 
importance and roles 
Degree of independence  
Independent and non-executive 
directors‟ impact on company 
performance 
Impact on performance Positive  
Negative  
Independent and non-executive 
directors‟ influences on risk 
disclosure 
Disclosure  Positive influence 
No influence 
 
Independent directors and non-executive directors influence risk disclosures 
 
Most interviewees confirmed the influence of independent directors and non-executive 
directors on risk disclosure. They emphasised it will be a positive impact and no one said 
that independent directors have a negative impact on risk disclosure. However, some 
interviewees said independent directors have no influence on risk disclosure.  
 
A financial analyst and a company manager pointed out that independent directors and 
non-executive directors can enhance the controls and can monitor the board. A financial 
analyst explained that internal auditors and executive managers are responsible to deliver 
risk information to the board internally, but the board is responsible for deciding on what 
risks to disclose. Therefore they said independent and non-executive directors can play a 
role in monitoring the board‟s actions and decisions. A regulator said they are 
independent and do not get their salaries from the executive management. Therefore, they 
will encourage the company to disclosure more and to be transparent about risk 
information. A financial analyst said independent directors will motivate the board to 
disclose more and show more transparency and he explained that independent directors 
have no incentives to hide any information. He said that: 
 
“The board needs to decide on what the company should disclose and what they should 
not, whether the company should solve issues before disclosing them, and what the 
regulatory point of view is about these risks. All these issues should be discussed and 
coordinated with executive managers who have direct access to the information about 
these risks, know more about companies' performance and who are responsible for 
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producing the financial statements. I think the presence of independent directors on the 
board is vital in order to monitor executive directors and help the board in taking the 
right decisions.” (Financial Analyst 4) 
 
Independent and non-executive directors have no influence on risk disclosure 
 
Some interviewees said that independent or non-executive directors have no influence on 
risk disclosure. A financial analyst said that with time independent directors will identity 
with the board and will not perform their duties properly and they will become routine 
duties after all. An external auditor argued that risk disclosure is something to do with the 
regulations and IFRSs but not with the independent directors.  
 
Grid 23: Duality influence on companies risk disclosures 
Concepts Categories Properties and dimensions 
What is duality? 
Duality influences decision making 
Duality role 
Duality influences company 
performance 
Duality 
perceptions and 
importance 
 
 
 
Positive 
Negative 
Duality has negative effects on risk 
disclosure 
Duality has positive effects on risk 
disclosure 
Duality influence 
on risk disclosure 
Positive 
Negative 
 
Duality perceptions and effects on risk disclosure 
 
There is disagreement about the pattern of the impact of duality on risk disclosure.  Some 
people said duality has a negative effect on risk disclosure whereas other said it has a 
positive influence. They discussed the matter of duality and risk disclosure association in 
terms of corporate governance, decision-making, independence and manager‟s skills and 
qualifications. While in governance research “duality” has tended to mean combining the 
board chair and CEO roles, the interviewees referred to duality in various forms. A 
company manager discussed it in term of the duality between the board chairman and 
executive manager positions. A regulator explained it in terms of the separation between 
ownership of the company and management of the company. A stock market authority 
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member explained non-duality for a member of the board of a listed company as meaning 
that he or she should not be a member of the board of another company.  
 
An external auditor said non-duality enhances the effectiveness of the corporate 
governance mechanism through the separation of duties and responsibilities which in turn 
influences risk disclosure practices positively. A regulator confirmed that non-duality 
enhances the independence of disclosure and reporting processes within the company 
especially at the board level which will motivate more disclosure.  Another regulator said 
that non-duality will reduce internal risks such as risk of fraud by the managers and will 
prevent managers from hiding any information from the public. A part from this a 
financial analyst and an external auditor observed that non-duality will increase 
accountability and self control on the part of the management and will encourage them to 
disclose all information. A company manager said non-duality will enhance monitoring 
and control of the executive management by the board of the directors, preventing 
managers from taking any actions that might harm the company or minimise risk 
disclosure. He said: 
 
“Duality would affect disclosure levels because in this case the company is not complying 
with corporate governance requirements. Suppose the internal audit committee 
recommends to the board to disclose certain risks. If the executive manager and the 
board chairman is the same person, he may not follow the audit committee 
recommendations in this case. He may try to influence the decision of the board.” 
(Company Manager 4)   
 
An individual investor argued duality is a good thing and has positive effects on 
disclosure and risk disclosure. He observed that it will help in minimising the conflicts 
between managers and help in getting managers to perform their duties properly. A 
financial analyst suggested that the matter of duality and risk disclosure depends on the 
managers‟ qualifications, skills and experience, and there are companies with non-duality 
which have low standards of disclosure.   An individual investor suggested duality has a 
positive impact because it helps make management perform their roles, responsibilities 
and duties properly and effectively and without disturbance. He stated that: 
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“Non-duality will have negative effects on company performance and disclosure. The 
work should be completed and complement itself. If a certain job is done by two 
managers there may be conflicts between them and the work may never get done, or may 
not be done properly. If one manager is doing the job, he will know everything about it 
and will do it perfectly. In order to have a successful company, the work should be done 
effectively and there should be team work.” (Individual Investor 1) 
 
Grid 24: Ownership structure influences on risk disclosure practice 
Concepts  Categories  Properties and dimensions 
Ownership types 
Ownership structure importance  
Disclosure about ownership is 
part of corporate governance 
Ownership structure 
types and importance  
Government % 
Foreign %  
Institutions % 
Concentration % 
Ownership structure influence on 
companies performance 
Ownership structure influences 
risk level 
Ownership structure 
influences 
companies‟ 
performance  
There is influence 
No influence 
Direct influence 
Indirect influence 
Ownership structure influence on 
risk disclosure 
Ownership structure does not 
influence risk disclosure  
The impact of 
ownership structure 
on risk disclosure 
Positive impact 
Negative impact 
 
Ownership structure influences risk disclosure  
 
Many interviewees confirmed the influence of ownership structure on risk disclosure. 
However, they disagreed about whether the direction of the impact is positive or negative. 
Some interviewees said ownership structure has a direct influence on risk disclosure 
whereas others said it has indirect influence. An external auditor said ownership structure 
is an important part of corporate governance which can encourage disclosure. A regulator 
said corporate governance recommends segregation between management and ownership 
of the company. A regulator recommended separation between ownership and 
management observing this could minimise some risks. He said that: 
 
“Ownership structure has influence on risks. However, corporate governance implies the 
separation between ownership and management, and this minimises some risks. In 
general if the ownership structure is mis-structured, this will introduce many risks such 
as internal risks and the risk of someone being able to manipulate the company.” 
(Regulator 1) 
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Positive impact of ownership structure on risk disclosure  
 
Most of the interviewees emphasised that institutional ownership has a positive influence 
on risk disclosure. None of the interviewees suggested a negative influence due to 
institutional investors. They suggested that institutional investors tend to invest huge 
amounts of capital which allows them to exert pressure and demand more disclosure and 
transparency. A company manager and a financial analyst explained that if companies‟ 
shares are owned by institutional funds, this enhances the companies‟ reputations and the 
credibility of the companies‟ disclosures. The companies will be encouraged to disclose 
more information and become transparent about their risk in order to attract more capital. 
However, another financial analyst said some companies did have institutional ownership 
but their risk disclosure level was still low.  
 
A company manager explained that foreign ownership has a positive impact on risk 
disclosure because of their high quality and advanced knowledge of stock market trading; 
therefore they demand more information on risks before investing in the company and 
providing their capital, which in turn encourages the manager to provide a fuller risk 
disclosure. A company manager explained that ownership structure influences risk 
disclosure through monitoring and control activities. He said government-owned 
companies are subjected to strict monitoring and are controlled by many control 
authorities set up by the government which forces them to disclose more information and 
prevents them from hiding risk or losing information. An individual investor suggested 
that government ownership has a positive impact on risk disclosure due to group or team 
decisions from government agencies. He explained that: 
 
“If the government owns 51% of a company, it is good. Government ownership has a 
positive effect on risk disclosure. Government is not an individual decision-maker but a 
group makes decisions and acts for the benefit of all. Personal ownership will enhance 
personal interests and put off group interests. Government ownership is better for all, for 
investors and the company, because there will be more strict monitoring and more risk 
disclosure.” (Individual Investor 2) 
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Negative impact of ownership structure on risk disclosure 
 
Some interviewees observed that there is a negative impact on risk disclosure from 
concentration ownership, and government ownership. In contrast a stock market authority 
member pointed out that with diffusion ownership there is a positive impact on risk 
disclosure because disclosure will be directed to wide range of investors who may 
demand more information and different types of information. A stock market authority 
member explained that in concentration ownership the decisions will be made by a few 
people who will try to maximise their benefits at the expense of shareholder wealth and 
hence disclose less. A company manager said that in concentration ownership the demand 
for information will be low and therefore, risk disclosure will be less and will be directed 
to a few people.  
 
A financial analyst said communication with government-owned companies is difficult 
and this influences negatively the demand for information and risk disclosure. He said in 
some companies such as EMAAR the government owned 40% and was represented by 
only one person on the board who influences the disclosure practice negatively. An 
external auditor and a financial analyst said that although companies that owned by the 
Abu Dhabi government provide financial support and business benefits, there is an 
adverse impact on the disclosure level because of the UAE specific culture which is 
mostly less transparent. The financial analyst said: 
 
“The concentration ownership such as in family-owned company or in one owned by one 
person, risks will be hidden and risks will not be disclosed. It can be a wrong decision to 
invest in such companies.  Risk disclosure will be less than in government-owned 
companies.  If there is diversification especially with foreign portfolios, international 
banks, and investment banks, then risk disclosure will be enhanced and excellent.” 
(Financial Analyst 4) 
 
A stock market authority member asserted that individual investors made up about 80% 
of investors in ADX; however, ADX is now trying to attract more institutional investors 
and long-term investment in order to have more stability. Many interviewees suggested 
that individual investors do not follow risk disclosures in making their investment 
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decisions and they did not have enough experience, awareness and knowledge especially 
in UAE, or local individual investors may only be interested in share performance or 
movement.   
 
Ownership structure has no influence on risk disclosure 
 
A company manager argued that companies should report in the same way regardless of 
their ownership structure. Two regulators explained that reporting on risk is a legal 
requirement and is an accounting standards requirement which all companies should 
comply with no matter what their ownership structure. They said companies are treated 
by the regulation equally which implies that they all should disclose information in same 
way. A company manager argued that risk disclosures depend on the risks that a company 
faces and it has nothing to do with ownership structure.  
 
Grid 25: Scope for improvement and change 
Concepts  Categories  Properties and dimensions 
Stock market improvement Market improvement Developed  
Emerging 
Improvement in risk disclosure 
Improvement of annual report 
Risk disclosure 
improvement 
High 
Low  
Regulatory improvement  
Risk disclosure improvement   
Improvement in risk management  
Requirement and 
policy improvement 
 
Strict  
Developed  
 
 
Improvement of company's 
management 
Improvement of board of 
directors  
Employees improvement 
Improvement of investors 
Participant 
improvement 
 
Good  
Bad   
Culture of risk disclosure and 
management  
Culture effects  
 
Many interviewees said there is a need for improvement and illustrated its influence on 
risk disclosure practice. They referred to improvement using various terminologies for 
instance “development”, “change”, “update”, “amendment”, and “efficiency”. They 
pointed out there is a need to improve the way the stock market functions, risk disclosure 
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practices, legal requirements and market participants' awareness. Many interviewees 
emphasised the companies should establish a culture of risk disclosure, a culture of 
transparency, and a culture of reporting between the management, the board and 
employees. A company manager said that the stock markets need to improve the control 
and monitoring of share trading in order to prevent inside trading activities and to 
enhance disclosure and risk disclosure. The interviewees identified the regulatory bodies 
and legal requirements in respect to disclosure as another area that needs to be improved. 
A company manager said that stock market authorities should promote companies‟ 
development through more rules and legislation and control and monitoring actions. 
Another company manager expected that there will be stricter requirements and rules in 
the near future as a result of global financial crisis and the Dubai financial crash. An 
external auditor said: 
 
“Yes, I think listed companies need to improve their risk management disclosures. They 
should report on risks and risk management honestly and in more detail. The existing risk 
management disclosures are general information about the risk management policy. It is 
not really helpful for decision-making purpose. They should report some trends, do some 
risk analysis, and explain how they manage the risks. If you see an annual report of US 
listed companies, you will find detailed risk management analysis and disclosures.” 
(External Auditor 5) 
 
Many interviewees emphasised there is a need to improve the knowledge of market 
participants and related people for instance managers, boards of directors, employees, 
investors and external auditors. Two external auditors observed that these people need to 
be educated and have knowledge on modern business, stock market investment, basic 
accounting and how to analyse financial statements and disclosures. A company manager 
said there is the need to improve the local audit firms in order to enhance disclosure 
practice. A financial analyst explained the need for improving people as follow:  
 
“Yes, risk management practice needs to be improved. Risk management policies and 
regulation should be improved. The people and employees who work in the risk 
management field need to have better standards of knowledge and be qualified. These 
two areas of risk management have been neglected and need some development.” 
(Financial Analyst 1) 
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7.4 Risk disclosure theory 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Risk disclosure theory 
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Statement on risk disclosure theory 
 
Reporting on risks by UAE companies is based on voluntary incentives, for example, 
capital needs. Also it is based on mandatory requirements, for example, The Companies 
Act, IFRS and the Corporate Governance Code. Risk disclosure is useful for decision 
making and management accountability purposes. Disclosure is perceived to benefit 
companies through reduced cost of capital and less risky performance. The main 
determinants of risk disclosure practice are firm-specific characteristics and corporate 
governance characteristics. Scope for improvement and change is needed in order to 
improve risk disclosure practice.  
 
Explanation of risk disclosure theory  
 
Figure 7.1 above sets out in diagrammatic form the connections between the different 
categories identified by the interviewees and a grounded theory analysis. As expected the 
core category is risk disclosure. This section summaries interviewees‟ perceptions and 
describes the underlying basis of the different categories and grids in the context of “Risk 
Disclosure Theory”. The theory consists of six main dimensions where some dimensions 
are further divided into sub-dimensions. These dimensions may vary from country to 
another according to the jurisdiction framework (e.g. legal, soft law, self regulation), the 
accounting standards framework (e.g. IFRS, GAAP), corporate governance, disclosure 
rules, and the efficiency level of the capital market (e.g. developed or developing).  
 
Dimension 1 is about risks occurring and faced by the companies which could be internal 
or external risks. The interviewees said there are various types of risks facing companies 
which can be classified into many categories, for instance financial vs. non-financial, 
internal vs. external and local vs. international. The interviewees explain there are inter-
connected effects between different risks in that economic risk could influence the stock 
market and influence companies, or that sector risk could influence another sector. They 
said drivers of risks within the companies could be internal or external factors. There are 
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many elements and ways to help to minimise risks level, for example regulation, 
monitoring, disclosure, corporate governance and risk management (Grid 1). 
 
Dimension 2 explained the voluntary incentives and mandatory requirements of risk 
disclosure which are based on the regulatory and accounting framework. (Dimension 2-
A): The interviewees said reporting on risk could be in the form of voluntary risk 
disclosure or mandatory risk disclosure. Companies are motivated to disclose information 
about risks voluntarily by the benefits or discouraged from doing so because of the costs 
of risk disclosure. There are many benefits from risk disclosure, for instance it enhances 
transparency, maximises shareholder wealth and reduces cost of capital. Risk disclosure 
has many costs which can be divided into internal and external costs. The costs are 
largely compilation and proprietary costs (Grid 2, Grid 3). 
 
(Dimension 2-B): the interviewees observed that there is support for the concept of 
unregulated free markets and leaving risk disclosure practice to be guided solely by the 
ethics of management and participants‟ pressure; however there are instances of 
misbehaviour by company management, the market is not mature, and managers are 
reluctant to voluntarily disclose information about risks. Therefore, there is general 
support for regulatory involvement in the UAE and emerging markets. The main 
mandatory risk disclosure requirements in the UAE are accounting standards (IFRS) and 
the Corporate Governance Code. Regulations are recommended as a tool for promoting 
risk disclosure practice in that regulation would enhance risk disclosure (Grid 3). 
 
A mix of mandatory requirements and voluntary risk disclosures is recommended by the 
interviewees as the best practice approach because it will ensure proper risk disclosure by 
regulation and will also leave a room for managers to disclose company-specific or 
industry-specific risks. There is an inter-relationship between regulations, compliance and 
enforcement and the three complement each other. Regulation is needed because of 
market failure in respect to risk disclosure and to monitor compliance by listed 
companies. If there is non-compliance and market failure there should be enforcement 
actions available (Grid 4 and Grid 5). 
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Dimension 3: This is concerned with the outcome of risk reporting, mainly for decision-
making purposes for the users and to create less risky performances on the part of the 
companies. (Dimension 3-A): Risk disclosure is useful for internal and external decision 
making. Management uses many channels to communicate risk disclosure externally 
including interviews, press releases and conferences together with the annual report. The 
main channel is the annual report because it is considered a credible report, audited and 
required by law (Grid 6). 
 
(Dimension 3-B): This is about reduced cost of capital and producing less risky and 
better performance. The interviewees explained that enhancing risk disclosure will reduce 
uncertainty levels among the investors and the users especially regarding companies‟ 
future performance. The interviewees explained that risk disclosure would help 
companies with raised equity capital at a reduced cost and help in raising debt capital or 
loans at a lower interest rate (Grid 6). In addition, the interviewee explained that risk 
disclosure would result in less risky performance, in that disclosing risks would make 
managers have good risk management practices and hence produce better and less risky 
performance (Grid 18). Moreover, the interviewees explained corporate governance 
disclosure and risk disclosure would encourage companies to have good corporate 
governance mechanisms, which in turn would positively influence companies‟ 
performances and imply less risky performance by the companies (Grid 17).   
 
Dimension 4 explains the attitude toward risk disclosure of the users and managers. 
Company management plays a vital role in risk disclosure practice. (Dimension 4-A): It 
is important that management has good communication regarding risk information with 
people inside the company and with the users outside the company in terms of disclosure. 
Management styles, goals, intentions, and beliefs regarding risk disclosure are important 
in promoting disclosure practice. Company management and directors of the board are 
responsible for risk disclosure. Management quality and qualifications are a very 
important element of risk disclosure (see Grid 7).  
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(Dimension 4-B): Users of the information are very important elements in disclosure and 
risk disclosure practices. Users‟ needs vary according to the purpose of the decisions and 
according to the users‟ quality and level of knowledge, but the current information and 
risk disclosures practices do not meet the needs of the users. Users want better risk 
disclosures by companies in term of both quantity and quality. Users‟ quality, knowledge 
and experience influence risk disclosure levels, quality and practices (see Grid 8). 
Knowledge and awareness of risk disclosure and risk management is very important and 
new to the UAE emerging market. There is a lack of knowledge and awareness regarding 
risk disclosure and risk management among company management, participants and the 
users. Management and government bodies are responsible to improve knowledge and 
awareness among the market participants. Education is the main solution (see Grid 10). 
 
Dimension 5 explains the determinants of risk disclosure which can be firm-specific 
characteristics or corporate governance characteristics. Dimension 5-A shows the 
influence of firm-specific characteristics. There is disagreement among the interviewees 
on the influence of the firm characteristics variable as it is shown in Grid 11 (firm size), 
Grid 12 (firm risk level), Grid 13 (company performance), Grid 14 (liquidity), Grid 15 
(industry type) and Grid 16 (auditor type). Some interviewees confirmed the influence of 
some firm characteristics on risk disclosure; whereas other said there was no influence.  
 
 Dimension 5-B explains the influence of corporate governance characteristics on risk 
disclosure.  Corporate governance has a positive influence on companies‟ performance 
and helps in monitoring managers. Good corporate governance has a positive influence 
on the risk disclosure practices of the company. There is a demand for stricter corporate 
governance mechanisms and involvement of the government and regulation (Grid 17). 
The interviewees explain the association between risk disclosure and corporate 
governance characteristics namely the risk management system (Grid 18), internal control 
system (Grid 19), audit committee (Grid 20), internal auditors (Grid 20), board size (Grid 
21), independent directors (Grid 22), non-executive directors (Grid 22), duality (Grid 23), 
and ownership structure (Grid 24). The interviewees expressed various opinions on the 
influence of these corporate governance characteristics on risk disclosure.  
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Dimension 6 is about improvement and changes in the regulatory, accounting framework 
and participants‟ attitudes and knowledge. This in turn influence risk disclosure practice 
and level. The interviewees demand improvement and change. Companies have to keep 
up-to-date with the latest requirements of IFRSs, corporate governance and disclosure 
rules. They said there is a need to improve risk disclosures, risk management, and the 
annual reports produced by listed companies in terms of quantity and quality (Grid 25). 
 
7.5 Summary  
 
This chapter shows the findings of the qualitative research based on the grounded theory 
approach. The results show that the interviewees expressed different opinions regarding 
risk disclosure practice in the UAE and the most important risks facing UAE companies. 
The results suggested that a mix of voluntary and mandatory risk disclosure is preferred 
by the interviewees. The interviewees confirmed the influence of IFRS on risk reporting 
practice and level, especially financial risks. The interviewees recommended more 
actions to enhance compliance by companies through more enforcement. The 
interviewees explained the need for more information by the users for decision making 
purposes. The interviewees explained the importance and role of management toward risk 
disclosure and suggested that disclosure would enhance management accountability.  
 
The interviewees said the quantity or level of risk disclosure has improved, however they 
demanded enhancement of the quality of risk disclosure. The determinants of risk 
disclosure are explained by the interviewees in terms of firm characteristics and corporate 
governance characteristics. The interviewees provided different opinions and disagreed 
on the association between risk disclosure and some variables (i.e. liquidity). However, 
there is agreement on the influence of other variables on risk disclosure practice or level 
(i.e. risk management and corporate governance). Risk disclosure theory is provides the 
influence of the various variables on risk disclosure. The next chapter will provide the 
findings on the quantitative research based on the content analysis and regression 
analysis.  
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Chapter 8 
Results of 
Quantitative 
Research 
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8.1 Results of quantitative research part 1: content analysis results 
 
8.1.0 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents the results of the quantitative research. The chapter is divided into 
two main sections: content analysis results and regression analysis results. The first 
section presents the main results of the content analysis of the annual reports of the 
sample companies. Content analysis methodology is described in chapter 6 (section 6.4). 
It provides comments on the overall picture and trends in risk disclosures. The next part 
describes in more detail the results for each risk category. Then results on risk sentence 
characteristics are explained in detail. The second section provides the results of the 
regression analysis. It provides data description, univariate analysis results and 
multivariate analysis results. The methodology and definitions of variables are provided 
in chapter 6 (section 6.6).  
 
8.1.1 Overall trends in risk disclosures  
 
The results of the descriptive statistics are shown in Table 8.1. There was an increase in 
the number of total risk disclosures provided by the listed companies over the examined 
period; this averaged 74, 95 and 120 sentences in 2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively with 
a mean of 97 sentences for all the years. The results showed that all companies provided 
information on their risks; however, some companies provided as little risk information 
as 12 sentences whereas other companies provided extensive risk information, the 
maximum being 367 sentences. One way ANOVA test is performed on the whole sample 
of the different risk categories. The test results are shown in Table 8.3. The test results 
confirmed that the means of the different risk categories are significantly different. 
 
The mean for risk disclosures and the average proportion for each risk disclosure 
category over the three years are shown in Figure 8.1. The most frequently disclosed risks 
were financial risks (58.07%). The most frequently disclosed non-financial risks were 
operational risks (14.47% of disclosures). Disclosures of other risks were relatively 
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infrequent. The least frequently disclosed risks were regarding information processing 
and technological risks (1.81%). The results showed that there was an increase over the 
examined period in financial, operational, environmental and integrity risks disclosures. 
However, values for the remaining risk categories had fluctuated over the examined 
period. In addition the results showed that all companies provide information on financial 
risk and operational risk, however not all sample firms published information on the other 
risk categories which show 0 in the “Minimum” column in Table 8.1. 
 
Figure 8.1: Average percentages of risk categories  
 
 
8.1.2 Total number of risk disclosures  
 
The total number of risk disclosures provided by the companies increased over time. The 
main number of total risk disclosures in this study was 96.45 which can be compared 
with that found by Linsley and Shrives (2006) which was 78.08, by Beretta and Bozzolan 
(2004) which was 75.08, by Rajab and Schachler (2009) which was 93.50, by Mohhobbot 
(2005) which was 51.6, by Konishi and Ali (2007) which was 47.14, by Greco (2010) 
which was 64.58, and by Lajili and Zeghal (2005) which was 20.17. These differences 
could be explained as being due firstly to the risk definitions adopted by the particular 
study; in this study comprehensive definitions were adopted for risk and risk disclosures. 
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Table 8.1: Descriptive statistics  
  Year 2007      Year 2008        Year 2009        
  Total Mean Min Max Std. Dev. Total Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. Total Mean Min Max Std. Dev. 
Total risks 3575 74 14 238 42.55 4571 95 12 339 66.09 5743 120 21 367 60.06 
Financial risks 1997 42 7 75 17.44 2688 56 6 180 33.92 3419 71 13 198 34.12 
Non-financial risk 1578 33 3 170 32.31 1883 39 5 164 34.10 2324 48 5 169 38.92 
Operational risks 529 11 2 46 8.06 612 13 2 87 15.70 869 18 1 65 14.06 
Environment & 
social risks 149 3 0 39 7.56 185 4 0 44 7.67 256 5 0 31 6.85 
Information 
processing & 
technological risk  79 2 0 17 3.15 77 2 0 7 2.30 89 2 0 12 2.88 
Strategic risks 194 4 0 24 5.22 149 3 0 16 3.60 189 4 0 11 3.47 
Regulatory risks 158 3 1 17 2.98 166 3 0 11 2.39 193 4 0 17 3.71 
Integrity risks 244 5 0 17 3.63 300 6 0 24 4.93 397 8 0 23 5.86 
Empowerment  121 3 0 13 2.28 136 3 0 9 1.97 120 3 0 14 2.95 
Political & 
economic risks 104 2 0 18 3.57 258 5 0 15 4.10 211 4 0 16 4.38 
Qualitative risks 2557 53 3 172 30.16 3125 65 5 226 45.89 4016 10 295 84 48.59 
Quantitative risks  1018 21 5 89 14.23 1446 30 4 128 21.57 1727 11 77 36 17.12 
Past risks 2776 58 14 152 26.79 2789 58 6 197 33.96 3923 17 279 82 45.81 
Future risks 269 6 0 34 7.86 374 8 0 39 9.88 424 0 107 9 16.36 
Non-time risks 530 11 0 69 11.95 1408 29 3 144 25.80 1396 1 75 29 16.39 
Good news 1525 32 6 145 27.58 2143 45 2 144 31.61 1689 3 98 35 20.05 
Bad news 1139 24 4 53 10.33 1530 32 3 117 17.51 1875 6 104 39 19.21 
Neutral news 911 19 0 47 11.37 898 19 2 155 25.87 2179 4 165 45 28.32 
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Also, the differences could also be dependent on the section that was examined within the 
annual reports, in that some research examines only one section whereas in this study all 
sections of annual reports were examined, an extensive amount of material. Moreover, 
these variations could be due to the differences in the examined period in the sense that 
this study examines the period of the global financial crisis and the Dubai financial crisis 
(2007, 2008 and 2009). 
 
8.1.3 Risk disclosure by categories  
 
8.1.3.1 Most frequently disclosed risks 
 
The descriptive statistics results of the study showed that the most frequently disclosed 
risks were financial risks. The total number of financial risk disclosures constantly 
increased over the three year period. This result is consistent with the findings of many 
researchers, for example Linsley and Shrives (2005, 2006) in UK, and Lajili and Zeghal 
(2005) in Canada, who found that financial risks were most frequently disclosed risks. 
However, it is not consistent with the findings of some other researchers, for example 
strategic risks were found to be the most frequently disclosed by Greco (2010) in Italy 
and by Amran, Bin, and Hassan (2009) in Malaysian companies which they stated was 
due to Bursa Malaysia requirements.  
 
One reason for the dominance of financial risks in my study would be the global financial 
crisis which mainly affected the financial side of the companies, increasing financial 
risks. Listed companies were forced by stock market authorities to disclose on their 
exposure to events related to the global financial crisis and the Dubai financial crisis. 
Another reason for this is the need for compliance with IFRSs which focuses mostly on 
financial risks (for example financial instruments, credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk, 
price risk, interest rate risk and capital risk) rather than non-financial risks. In addition 
this result reflects the influence of mandatory disclosure requirements because IFRSs 
have been mandatory since 2003 for all listed companies in the UAE (Deloitte, 2011). 
Also, many companies have recently adopted IFRS 7 and have started to comply with it 
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which has increased their disclosures on financial instruments and provided more 
information on hedging accounting.  
 
“In the current year the Group has adopted International Financial Reporting Standard 
(IFRS) 7 Financial Instruments Disclosures (IFRS 7)….  
The impact of the adoption of IFRS 7 and the changes to IAS 1 has been to expand the 
disclosures provided in the consolidated financial statements regarding the Group‟s 
financial statements and management of capital” (ALDAR, 2007, p.63) 
 
8.1.3.2 Financial vs. non-financial risks 
 
The number of financial risk disclosures is greater than the number of non-financial risk 
disclosures (sum of the remaining risks) in each of the three periods 2007, 2008 and 
2009. The mean of financial risks were 59.53% and of non-financial risks were 40.47%. 
The Wilcoxon Signed Rank test was applied to the number of financial risks and non-
financial risks declared by the companies in all years. The test results are presented in 
Table 8.2 and show that the number of financial risks is significantly greater than the 
number of non-financial risks for all years.  
 
This result is consistent with the work of Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) who found that the 
number of financial risk disclosures was greater than of disclosures of non-financial risks 
in Italy. However, this is not consistent with the findings of Linsley and Shrives (2005, 
2006) in UK, those of Mohobbot (2005), of Konishi and Ali (2007) in Japan and of Greco 
(2010) in Italy who found the opposite in that non-financial risk disclosure was more 
frequent than financial risk disclosure. These results confirmed the influence of 
mandatory requirements on disclosure practices which leads to an increase in risk 
disclosures provided by companies. The result suggested that companies are less 
motivated to disclose their risks voluntarily since the percentage of non-financial risk 
disclosures was significantly less than that of financial risk disclosures.  
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Figure 8.2: Percentages of risk disclosure categories  
 
 
In addition the results show that the number of risk disclosures for some risk categories 
(e.g. operational, environmental & social responsibility and integrity) increased slightly 
between 2007 and 2009. The results also indicated that levels of some types of non-
financial risk categories have fluctuated over the sample period (e.g. political & 
economic and empowerment). Besides this, the result showed that there was a dramatic 
increase in risk disclosure levels for political and economic categories in 2008 which 
reflects the consequences of the global financial crisis and the Dubai financial crisis. 
Figure 8.2 shows percentages of risk disclosure for the different categories over three 
years (2007, 2008 and 2009). Souabni (2011) reported that the most frequently disclosed 
types of non-financial risks were regulatory & legal risks, political & economic risks, and 
sustainability risks as a result of legal requirements especially for the companies based in 
the West. The results show empowerment risk disclosure levels were low over the three 
years. Similar results were obtained by Souabni (2011) in that personal and people risks 
were seldom disclosed. 
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Table 8.2: Wilcoxon signed rank test results  
    N Mean rank Sum of ranks 
Financial - Non-financial Negative ranks ¹   31 -65.13 -2019 
  Positive ranks ² 113 72.63 8207 
  Ties  0    
  Total  144     
Qualitative - Quantitative Negative ranks ¹ 8 -7.94 -63.5 
  Positive ranks ² 136 76.30 10376.5 
  Ties  0    
  Total  144     
Past - Future  Negative ranks ¹   0 0.00 0 
  Positive ranks ² 144 72.24 10402 
  Ties  0    
  Total  144     
Good - Bad Negative ranks ¹   60 -66.88 -4013 
  Positive ranks ² 84 76.51 6427 
  Ties  0    
  Total  144     
Test statistics    
  
Financial –  
Non-financial 
Qualitative - 
Quantitative Past - Future  Good – Bad 
Z -5.96 -10.28 -10.33 -2.43 
Significance (2 tailed) < 0.001 0.003 < 0.001 0.014 
 
8.1.4 Risk disclosure characteristics 
 
8.1.4.1 Forms of risk disclosure: Qualitative vs. Quantitative 
 
The results showed that the number of qualitative risk disclosures is much greater than 
the number of quantitative risk disclosures. The values for qualitative risk disclosures 
were 72%, 68% and 70%, whereas quantitative disclosures scored 28%, 32% and 30% 
over the periods of 2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively. Although the number for 
quantitative and quantitative risk disclosures has increased over the examined period; the 
number for qualitative risk disclosures remains the dominant in all years. The Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank Test was run on the number of qualitative and quantitative risk disclosures 
for all years and the results are reported in Table 8.2. The results confirmed that the 
number of qualitative risk disclosures was significantly greater than the number of 
quantitative risk disclosures.  
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Table 8.3: ANOVA test results for the differences in means between risk disclosure categories 
 
Financial-Operation-Environment-Technological-Strategic-Regulation-Integrity-Empowerment-Political 
 Fin. Ope. Env. IT. Str. Reg. Int. Emp. Pol. F test  P-value F crit. 
Mean risk disclosure score 56.28 13.86 4.10 1.70 3.69 3.53 6.53 2.62 3.98 298.90 0.0000 1.9456 
 
Past – Future – Non-time 
 Past  Future Non-time  F P-value F crit. 
Mean risk disclosure score 66.51 6.78 23.15 213.58 0.0000 3.0167 
 
Good – Bad – Neutral  
 Good-news Bad-news Neutral-news F P-value F crit. 
Mean risk disclosure score 37.20 31.56 27.69 5.739 0.00347 3.0167 
 
Key words: 
Fin: Financial. Ope: operational, Env: Environment & Social Responsibility, IT: Information Processing and Technology, Str: 
Strategic, Reg: Regulatory, Int: Integrity, Emp: Empowerment & Employee, Pol: Political and Economic. 
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This result confirmed the indications of earlier studies which have shown that most 
disclosures are qualitative in nature. This result is consistent with the findings of 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) in UK who found that 5.3% risk disclosures were 
quantified, and is in keeping with Beretta and Bozzolan‟s (2004) findings in Italy 
(15.5%), Konishi and Ali‟s (2007) in Japan (36.65%), and Rajab and Schachler‟s 
(2009) in the UK (10.93%). Quantitative risk disclosures appeared in different places 
in annual reports, in financial statements, tables, graphs or highlights within narrative 
sections for example. The following table shows some typical examples of 
quantitative risk disclosures.  
 
Table 8.4: Examples of quantitative risk disclosures  
The gearing ratio at the year end was as follows:        72.29%        (FOODCO, 2009, p.41) 
At 31 December 2007, 98% of the Company‟s bank balances were held with two banks 
and bank overdraft was held with one bank only.                             (NMDC, 2007, p.37) 
 
8.1.4.2 Time frame of risk disclosures: Past vs. Future vs. Non-time  
 
The descriptive statistics show that the number of items of past information disclosed 
by the examined companies is also much greater that the number of future and non-
time risk disclosures. Figure 8.3 below shows the characteristics of risk disclosures in 
2007, 2008 and 2009. The results showed that listed companies provided very little 
forward-looking risk information; this consisted of 8%, 8% and 6% of the total risk 
disclosures in 2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively. In addition, the number of non-time 
risk information increased dramatically in 2008 and 2009 when it jumped from 530 
risk sentences in 2007 to 1408 in 2008.  
 
One Way ANOVA test was performed to examine the difference between past, future 
and non-time risk disclosures. The statistical test result confirmed that there was a 
significant difference between the three categories. Although the ANOVA Method 
gives sufficient evidence to reject the claim of equal sample means, it cannot be used 
to reach the conclusion that any variable is greater than another; therefore, other tests 
are used to investigate such issues (Triola, 1995, p.595). Therefore, the Wilcoxon 
Signed Ranks Test has been applied to draw such conclusions. The Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks Test was performed on past-future risk disclosures. The test results are 
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presented in Table 8.1 and confirmed that the number of past risk disclosures were 
significantly greater than future risk disclosures.  
 
Figure 8.3: Time-scale of risk disclosures 
 
 
The results above are consistent with the findings of Konishi and Ali (2007) in Japan 
who found 18.22% risk disclosures were future-risk disclosures and 81.77% were 
past-risk information. However, Linsley and Shrives (2006) in UK found that 25.98% 
were past-risk disclosures, 35% were future-risk disclosures and 38.82% were non-
time risk disclosures. Also, Rajab and Schachler (2009) found on average that 12.69% 
were past, 31.27 % were future and 56% were non-time in the UK. The results 
confirmed that companies in the UAE provide historical data which is consistent with 
the traditional view that annual reports are mainly historical sources of data. However, 
this result confirmed that UAE companies provide less useful information in terms of 
timely disclosures and in terms of usefulness in the decision-making process. 
Forward-looking information is recommended as being more useful for investment 
decision-making. The literature in this regard found various results.  
 
8.1.4.3 Type of news: Good vs. bad vs. neutral 
 
The descriptive statistics in Table 8.1 show that the number of disclosures of bad 
news increased over time from 1139 to 1530 to 1875 in 2007, 2008 and 2009 
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dramatically increased from around 900 sentences in 2007 and 2008 to 2179 
sentences in 2009. Figure 8.4 demonstrated that the number of reports of good news 
has increased between 2007 and 2008 from 1525 to 2143, but it sank in 2009 to 1689. 
There was a constant increase in the amount of bad-news information over the 
examined period which may reflect the critical conditions and risks due to the 
economic and business environment surrounding the companies as a result of the 
global financial crisis and the Dubai financial crisis. There were slight differences 
between levels of good news and bad news in the three examined years. Therefore, 
the One-Way ANOVA Test was performed to test whether or not there is any 
significant difference between levels of good, bad and neutral risk disclosure news. 
 
Figure 8.4: Types of news 
 
 
The ANOVA Test results show that there are significant differences between them. In 
addition the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test was run in order to examine which is the 
greatest amount of news type, good news or bad news. The results of the test were 
presented in Table 8.2. The result of the test indicated that the amount of good risk 
information is significantly more than of bad information. This result indicated that 
management may signal to the market that their company is safe and is managing the 
risks efficiently by providing more good news risk information (Linsley & Shrives, 
2000, p.125; Konishi & Ali, 2007, p.272). Similar results were found by Mohobbot 
(2005) in Japan who found that there were significantly more good-news risk 
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disclosures than bad-news and neutral news risk information, and that the number of 
bad and neutral news risk disclosures is not significantly different. 
 
In addition, it was observed that there was a dramatic decrease in the amount of good 
news information reported in 2009, while on the other hand there was a dramatic 
increase in the amount of neutral news risk information provided in the same year. 
This is consistent with the theory that when the companies do not have good news 
risk information or do not want to provide more bad news risk information, they 
replace this with neutral information. Besides, this is also considered a negative 
indication because sometimes companies disclose a large amount of neutral 
information that makes reporting a „boiler plate‟ (Konishi & Ali 2007, p.272). Linsley 
and Shrives (2006) found that levels of neutral risk information were significantly 
greater than those of good and bad risk news by 54.23%, 24.75% and 21% 
respectively. They concluded that general statements of risk policy (non-
monetary/neutral/non-time) dominated risk disclosures.   
 
8.1.5 Location of risk disclosures within annual report 
 
The findings on the location of risk disclosures showed that they appeared in four 
main sections: these were firstly the directors‟ report section (for instance reports 
from the chairman, CEO, CFO, COO, Board Report and General Manager) –  12%. 
The second possible location was the management discussion section (this included 
MD&A, operational review, financial review, business review and management 
review) – 16%. The third location was in other sections (such as Corporate 
Governance Report CGR, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Health & Safety, 
Security, Environment (HSSE) and Risk Management Policy) – 13%. The fourth 
location was in the notes on the financial statements (including consolidated financial 
statements and their notes). Figure 8.4 shows the percentage of risk disclosures within 
each section of the annual report and shows that risk disclosure sentences appeared 
mostly within notes on financial statements (59%) whereas they appeared 12% in 
directors‟ reports.  
 
The previous empirical studies reported different findings in this regards. Lajili & 
Zeghal (2005) examined Canadian companies and found risk management disclosures 
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located in MD&A and notes to financial statements. Amran et al. (2009) examined the 
annual reports of Malaysian companies and found risk information concentrated 
within the chairman‟s statement. Konishi and Ali (2007) found that most Japanese 
companies report risk information through MD&A (49%) or OFR (38%). They found 
that only 3% of companies use separate sections for risk disclosure. 
 
The results showed that none of the companies allocate a separate section for risk 
reporting within annual report. All companies provided a section on financial risk 
management policies and objectives which was located mostly at the end of the 
annual report. This section presented risk disclosures on financial instruments, 
headings, capital risk management, market risks, liquidity risks, interest rate risks, 
foreign currency risks, price risks and credit risks. Alongside the previous section 
some companies added additional and separate section on risk management for 
example ALDAR (2009 p.59); AِLDAR (2007 p.42) and DANA GAS (2009 p.30). 
Lajili and Zeghal (2005) found that most risk disclosures were in MD&A and the 
notes to financial statements in Canada. In Japan, Mohobbot (2005) found that 48% of 
risk information was within OFR and 10% appeared in directors‟ reports. Amran, Bin 
and Hassan (2009) found most risk disclosures located within the chairman‟s 
statement (65%) followed by operation review (35%) in Malaysia.   
 
Figure 8.5: Location of risk disclosures 
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Table 8.5: Typical example of risk disclosures  
 
Risk disclosure sentence  Risk category Sub-category Characteristics 
The group manages the liquidity risk through a risk management framework for the group‟s short-, 
medium-, long-term funding and liquidity management requirements by maintaining adequate 
reserves, sufficient cash and cash equivalents and the availability of financing through banking 
arrangements to ensure funds are available to meet its commitments for liabilities as they fall due 
(ASMAK, 2007, p.20). 
Financial risks  Liquidity risks Qualitative 
Non-time 
Good  
 
Our performance during 2007 was adversely affected by high energy costs. These rose due to the 
need to substitute natural gas with diesel for electricity production and with heavy fuel oil for burning 
in the kiln (RAKCC, 2007, p.1). 
Operation risks  Performance  Qualitative  
Past 
Bad 
The Group applies effective environmental management by: * propagating awareness of any risks to 
the environment which may occur within or outside the agreed site area as a result of the Group‟s 
activities (ALDAR, 2009, p.78). 
Environmental 
and social risks 
Environment incidents 
and policy 
Qualitative 
Non-time 
Good  
At the beginning of 2007 the company took a challenging but visionary decision to implement a new 
ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) system to replace the previous non-integrated system 
(AGTHIA, 2007, p.3). 
Information 
processing & 
technology  
Technological change Qualitative  
Past  
Good  
This was due to the high competition in the market; moreover a high portion of the consumers shifted 
towards purchase of 5 gallon bottles instead of PET as the 5 gallons is cheaper (GULFA, 2007, p.1). 
Strategic risks High competition  Quantitative  
Past  
Bad  
Claims and counterclaims are being pursued by the company and a contractor in the courts of Abu 
Dhabi in connection with the construction of Jazira Hotel & Resort property in Abu Dhabi, for extra 
work, loss of productivity by the contractor and liquidated damages (ADNH, 2007, p.25). 
Regulatory  Legal and court case Qualitative 
Past 
Bad 
The Group‟s approach to managing liquidity is to ensure, as far as possible, that it will always have 
sufficient liquidity to meet its liabilities when due, under both normal and stressed conditions, 
without incurring unacceptable losses or risking damage to the Group‟s reputation(UPP, 2009, p.23). 
Integrity risks Reputation risk Qualitative  
Good  
Non-time 
During the year, we reached a significant milestone of 100 million man hours worked on our sites 
without lost injury time, a frequency rate of 0.28% against an international benchmark of 0.60% 
(ALDAR, 2009, p.9). 
Empowerment 
risks 
Employees risk and 
work environment 
Quantitative 
Good 
Past 
However, from a macroeconomic perspective, the Company remains cautious of the uncertainties 
surrounding the current economic and financial environment in the UAE, regionally and globally 
(AGTHIA, 2009, p.13). 
Political and 
economic risks 
Economic conditions 
and problems  
Qualitative  
Non-time 
Bad 
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8.1.6 IFRS risk disclosure 
 
The content analysis revealed that financial risk disclosures scored the highest rate for 
disclosed information which confirmed that there was a big influence from IFRS 
requirements on the risk reporting practice of UAE listed companies. The content 
analysis results showed that compliance to IFRSs risk related disclosure was very high 
among the sample companies. Also it indicated the influence of mandatory requirements, 
since compliance with IFRSs is mandatory in the UAE, especially during the sample 
period (2007, 2008 and 2009). 
 
Table 8.6: Examples of IFRS risk related disclosures  
The key assumptions concerning the future and other key sources of estimated 
uncertainty at the balance sheet date, that have a significant risk of causing a 
material adjustment to the carrying amounts of assets and liabilities within the 
next financial year, are discussed below (ARTC, 2007, p.21). 
IAS 1.113 
During the year, additional specific allowances for doubtful debts were 
identified for customer receivables based on future cash flows estimated in the 
consolidated balance sheet. Trade receivable balances past due are provided 
for, based on estimated irrecoverable amounts determined by reference to past 
default experience (ADAVIATION, 2008, p. 28). 
IFRS 7.9 
 
The content analysis shows that companies focus on IFRS 7, that is to say on derivative 
financial instruments and heading accounting. The results of the content analysis showed 
that some companies provide detailed information in this regard (e.g. TABREED 2007 
p.29, UPP 2007 p.23) whereas other companies provide little information. Some 
companies disclosed that they were not involved in derivative hedging whereas other 
companies did not report whether they were involved in derivatives or not.  
 
Table 8.7: Examples of derivative and hedging disclosures  
The company and its joint venture use derivative financial instruments such as interest 
rate swaps and forward currency contracts respectively to hedge risks associated with 
interest rate and foreign currency fluctuations respectively (TABREED, 2007, p. 29). 
The Group has three interest rate swap contracts outstanding on 31 December 2007 
designated as hedges of expected interest rate fluctuations (GULFNAV, 2007, p.48). 
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8.1.7 Boiler-plate risk disclosures  
 
The content analysis results showed that there were examples of boiler plate risk 
disclosure in that some risk information appeared typically in different annual reports for 
different companies and some sentences were repeated by companies over different 
years. Also, there were general statements on risk disclosures related to risk management 
policy, corporate governance policy and on risk disclosures related to IFRSs. The 
following table (8.8) illustrated some examples. Furthermore, the results show there was 
a dramatic increase in the amount of neutral-news information between 2008 and 2009 
which could be considered boiler-plate information. According to Konishi and Ali (2007, 
p.272) sometimes companies disclose a huge amount of neutral information that makes 
reporting „boiler-plate‟.  On the other hand, the result of the content analysis showed that 
boiler plate risk information appeared less and was repeated less and was not in general 
statements or more specifically within other types of risk disclosures or sections, for 
instance within operational and political and economic risk disclosures. Also, it appeared 
less within directors‟ reports and MD&A sections where companies tend to spot-light 
operational and business risk information during the accounting year.  
 
Table 8.8: Examples of boiler plate risk disclosures   
Risk disclosure sentence Companies 
The main risks arising from the company‟s financial instruments 
are cash flow interest rate risk, liquidity risk, foreign currency risk 
and credit risk. The Board reviews and agrees policies for 
managing each of these risks which are summarised below. 
SCIDC, 2009, p.35 
ADNH, 2008, p. 54 
NCTH, 2008, p.23 
UFC, 2007, p.25 
The Group‟s risk management policies are established to identify 
and analyse the risks faced by the Group to set appropriate risk 
limits and controls and to monitor risk and adherence to limits. 
Risk management policies and systems are reviewed regularly to 
reflect changes in market conditions and the Group activities.  
RAKPROP, 2008, p.17 
AGTHIA, 2008, p.62 
ARKAN, 2008, p.15 
 
8.1.8 Discussion of risk events: global financial crisis  
 
The global financial crisis which was followed by the Dubai financial crisis influenced 
the risk reporting of the companies especially in the 2008 and 2009 annual reports. 29 out 
of 48 companies provided risk information about the global financial crisis within their 
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annual reports in 2009. Some companies provided a separate section on the effect of the 
global financial crisis (e.g. ALDAR 2009 p.56, FTC 2008 p.13). Content analysis results 
showed that the negative impact of the global crisis and the Dubai financial crisis was in 
different areas and imposed different types of risk, for example, financial, operational, 
empowerment, strategic and economic risks. Table 8.4 below shows some examples of 
risk disclosures related to the global crisis. In addition, the content analysis revealed that 
companies disclosed much specific risk information related to industry context, for 
example real estate companies provided risk information related to reale-state sector. 
 
Table 8.9: Examples of global financial crisis related risk information  
Risk disclosure Type of risk 
Following the sub-prime crisis in the US and its consequent domino effect 
on world economies, the real estate markets have also felt the effects of the 
severe financial crisis across the globe. UAE has not been spared from these 
recessionary conditions because of the real estate sector‟s large contribution 
to the total GDP of the country. This has resulted in a reduced demand for 
real estate in the UAE (RAKPROP, 2008, p. 1). 
Operational 
level 
 
8.1.9 Timeliness of risk disclosures  
 
Content analysis results confirmed that risk events were reflected in companies‟ 
disclosures and within their annual reports. Some companies provided information about 
changes in profits and declining profitability, and exposure to risks such as those due to 
the global financial crisis. Content analysis results showed that examined companies 
provided assurance and acknowledged the importance of timely disclosures. Some 
companies assume that the Board of Directors is responsible to ensure timely disclosures, 
including risk disclosures, are delivered to investors and shareholders.  
 
Table 8.10: Examples of timely disclosure 
It maintains timely reports about its risk management function and monitors risks and 
policies implemented to mitigate risk exposures (GMPC, 2009, p.26). 
As a DFM listed company we are committed to effectively communicating with the 
financial community and all stakeholders and to providing complete, timely and 
transparent information about the company with full, fair and comprehensive disclosure 
(GULFNAV, 2009, p.7). 
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8.1.10 Analysis and measurement of risk and actions taken to manage it  
 
Some companies provided within their annual report information on analysis and 
measurement of risks and the actions taken to mitigate and manage the risks. Such 
information appeared within the sensitivity analysis section which consists of qualitative 
and quantitative information on the risks the company faced, for instance interest rate and 
equity price risks, foreign currency cash flow and fair value (e.g. FOODCO, FCI, DU, 
SCIDC, UNIKIA, NCC, ARMX). The disclosure of such information and such an 
analysis is recommended by ICAEW (2002, p.21) which considers that information on 
risk analysis, assessment; management and actions are very importance.  The following 
table provided some examples of sensitivity analysis.  
 
Table 8.11: Examples of sensitivity analysis disclosures     
The sensitivity analysis below has been determined based on the exposure to equity price 
risks at the reporting date. If equity had been 5% higher/lower, the company‟s equity 
reserves would have increased/decreased by AED 8.9 million… (FOODCO, 2008, p.38). 
Cash flow sensitivity for variable rate instruments: a change of 100 basis points in 
interest rate at the reporting date would have increased (decreased) equity and profit or 
loss by the amounts shown below….. (UNIKAI, 2007, p.23). 
 
8.1.11 Corporate governance risk disclosures  
 
The governance related risk disclosure category is computed by combining three 
categories: environmental & social, integrity, and regulatory risk disclosures. The number 
of governance risk related disclosures has increased over the time from 551, 651, to 846 
in 2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively. The One Way ANOVA Test was run on governance 
risk disclosures of 2009 and 2007. The result showed that the Sig. level was 0.002 which 
indicated significant differences exist between the group means. 
 
Table 8.12: ANOVA result  
 Sum of Squares df. Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 6869.450 18 381.636 3.366 .002 
Within Groups 3287.800 29 113.372   
Total 10157.250 47    
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The increase in the number of corporate governance disclosures over time reflects the 
pressure of corporate governance code and disclosures requirements introduced by 
authorities in the UAE (e.g. SCA and Ministry of Economy). The content analysis results 
show that several companies specifically identified corporate governance as a means of 
mitigating risk and improving transparency and risk reporting practices. However, I 
found that the influence was limited because the increase in the amount of risk 
information related to corporate governance in the examined period was relatively small. 
The content analysis results show that the main focus of corporate governance disclosure 
within annual reports and governance reports was on company performance, management 
performance and governance of the board. In addition, the results show that there were 
limited items regarding risk disclosure within corporate governance codes which mainly 
focus on internal control risk disclosure. Tale 8.13 below shows some examples of risk 
disclosure in corporate governance codes. 
 
Table 8.13: Corporate governance risk disclosures  
While the company has continued to achieve exceptional results, the world has witnessed 
significant challenges against the backdrop of the financial crisis. The need for 
commitment to good governance has never been greater. We have operated under a 
strong corporate governance culture since inception (DU, 2009, p.27). 
The legacy of the global financial crisis will be enduring, but what is clear is that it 
underscores the importance of strong and transparent corporate governance. Since its 
inception, TAQA has worked hard to ensure that shareholders can have complete 
confidence in the governance of the company (TAQA, 2009, p.3). 
 
Internal control disclosures  
 
The content analysis of annual reports and corporate governance reports of the sample 
companies confirmed the influence of internal control systems on companies‟ risk, and 
risk management which involve risk reporting. The corporate governance code in the 
UAE requires companies to report on internal control risks. The table below showed 
some examples which were extracted from annual reports of sample companies.  The 
content analysis results show that there is some influence from international practice, for 
example from the UK corporate governance practice (e.g. Turnbull Report 1999).  
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Table 8.14: Examples of internal control risk disclosures 
Under Article 8 of MR-518, the Board must provide guidance to the management on the 
implementation of both an internal control and a risk management system…The Board of 
TABREED meets this obligation by requiring: 3. That the risk and audit function oversees 
the management responsibility to provide internal controls (TABREED, 2009, p.75) 
The Board is responsible for the Group‟s system of internal control and for reviewing its 
effectiveness. Such a system is designed to manage rather than eliminate the risk of 
failure to meet business objectives and can provide only reasonable and not absolute 
assurance against material misstatement or loss (ALDAR, 2009, p. 65). 
 
Risk management disclosures  
 
The content analysis results showed that risk management systems influence risk 
reporting practices for internal and external reporting. In addition some companies 
provided, within their annual report, a separate section on risk management policies and 
disclosures (ALDAR 2009 p.56, DANAGAS 2009 p.29). The example below provided 
evidence on the influence of the risk management system on risk reporting.  
 
Table 8.15: Examples of risk management disclosures  
TAQA is implementing an expanded global portfolio and risk management strategy to 
extract maximum value and generate new competitive advantages from its diverse global 
portfolio” (TAQA, 2009, p.27). 
Our business decisions are based on stringent risk management processes that have been 
built around a carefully crafted, integrated risk management function. This develops and 
evolves the company‟s corporate risk profile, and builds risk management capacity and 
capability throughout the strategic planning process (DU, 2009, p.26). 
 
Who is responsible for companies‟ risks, risk disclosures and risk management? 
 
The content analysis showed that responsibility for companies‟ risks is distributed 
between the boards of directors, executive management, committees (e.g. audit 
committee, risk committee) and senior management. The results provided evidence on 
the responsibility of boards of directors for the companies‟ risks and risk management 
policy overall. Nineteen out of 48 companies stated clearly within their annual report and 
corporate governance report the responsibility of the board for the company‟s risks and 
risk management. They explained that the board is responsible for overall risk policies 
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and the risk management systems. They are also responsible for reviewing company risks 
regularly and for approving what is to be disclosed within the annual report.  
 
In addition, the content analysis results show that some companies explained within their 
annual reports that responsibility for risks, risk management and risk disclosure rests with 
high level management, for example with the executive management, the audit 
committee, the risk management committee and the group‟s finance department, as part 
of their duties. However, the content analysis showed that some companies stated that 
lower management is responsible for company risks and risk management, for instance 
operational risks or liquidity risks. 
 
Table 8.16: Responsibility for company risks and risk disclosure  
The Board of Directors have overall responsibility for the establishment and oversight of 
the Group‟s risk management framework (NMDC, 2008, p.31). 
The objectives and responsibilities of the executive committee are: ……. Overseeing the 
establishment and operation of the risk management system, including reviewing the 
adequacy of risk management practices for material risks such as credit, market, project, 
legal risks, regulatory compliance and operational risk (EMAAR, 2009, p.27).  
The primary responsibility for the development and implementation of controls to 
address operational risk is assigned to senior management within each business unit. This 
responsibility is supported by the development of overall Group standards for the 
management of operational risk (UNIKAI, 2009, p.18). 
 
Independent directors‟ and non-executive directors‟ roles in relation to risk disclosure 
 
The content analysis results indicated that some companies showed that they recognised 
the importance of a diversified board of directors by choosing independent directors and 
non-executive directors. The result of the content analysis confirmed the role of 
independent directors and non-executive directors in enhancing disclosure and risk 
reporting within the company. The result showed that some companies stated that part of 
the independent directors‟ responsibilities is promoting risk management and internal 
control, which involves risk reporting. In addition, some companies emphasised the 
importance of the independence of non-executive directors and independent directors. 
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 Table 8.17: Roles of independent and non-executive directors 
The role of the non-executive directors on the Board is to contribute to the development 
of strategy to scrutinise the performance of management to ensure that financial 
information is accurate and that the financial controls and systems of internal control and 
risk management are robust and effective (DANAGAS, 2009, p. 34). 
 
Audit committee and risk disclosure  
 
The content analysis results showed that some companies assigned responsibility for 
company risks, risk disclosures and risk management to an audit committee or a risk 
committee. This result confirmed the influence and role of audit committees in promoting 
risk disclosure practice within companies.   
 
Table 8.18: Audit committee roles 
The Group Audit Committee oversees how management monitors compliance with the 
Group‟s risk management policies and procedures, and reviews the adequacy of the risk 
management framework in relation to the risks faced by the Group. (EMAAR, 2009, p.55) 
The Audit Committee is actively involved in internal control and risk management matters. 
Significant issues are also escalated to and effectively dealt with by the full Board. When it 
comes to risk management, the Committee assists the Board in management oversight by 
providing reasonable assurance that these risks are identified, assessed, managed, and 
monitored in a timely manner. While the Board sets the tone and establishes the risk 
appetite level of the Company, the committee assists by reviewing risk strategies and 
endorsing policies for risk management (TABREED, 2009, p.74). 
 
Roles of internal auditors with emphasis on risks 
 
The content analysis of annual reports and corporate governance reports of listed 
companies showed that internal auditors play a vital role in relation to company risks. 
Some companies confirmed the responsibility of internal auditors regarding companies‟ 
risks in terms of controlling, monitoring, reporting and developing an effective risk 
management framework. In addition the results of the content analysis showed that the 
internal audit process is more to do with internal reporting than reporting to external 
parties, for instance through annual reports and governance reports. However, the internal 
auditors‟ contribution to financial reporting or to external reporting was seen in their duty 
to ensure the accuracy of financial statements. Moreover, the results showed some 
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companies stated that the internal auditors have a direct line or reporting line to the audit 
committee and the board of directors.     
 
 Table 8.19: Internal audit roles 
The Head of Internal Audit and Risk Management is also responsible for developing, 
maintaining and implementing the risk management framework, strategy and policy, and, 
in addition, for communicating and reporting the key risk management issues and 
recommendations for improvement where necessary (DU, 2009, p.10, governance). 
Internal audit undertakes both regular and ad hoc reviews of risk management controls 
and procedures, the results of which are reported to the Audit Committee (EMAAR, 
2009, p.55). 
 
8.1.12 Influence of international practice 
 
Content analysis results showed that international practice influenced risk reporting 
practices. The main influence was the adoption of IFRS which has been mandatory for 
banks since 1998 and for all listed companies since 2005 and in addition, the adoption of 
corporate governance codes, which were mainly based on best internal practice from 
certain developed countries, for instance the US and UK. The table below illustrates 
examples of the influence of international practice.   
 
Table 8.20: Examples of the influence of international practice  
To help promote these activities, the company commissioned the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) in Washington, a member of the World Bank Group, to assist and 
advise the company in achieving its stated objective to adopt and implement sustainable 
policies for best practice in the following areas: 1) corporate governance, 2) health, 
safety, and 3) environment management and corporate social responsibility 
(DANAGAS, 2007, p.24). 
The management team constantly strives to ensure timely and open disclosure of 
material information to shareholders, in line with international best practice and SCA 
guidelines (DU, 2009, p.26). 
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Results of the quantitative research part 2: results regression analysis  
 
8.2 Results of regression analysis  
 
8.2.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the empirical results of the regression analysis. It is divided into 
four main sections, descriptive statistics, univariate analysis, multivariate regression 
analysis, and summary. This section should be reviewed in line with the discussion 
provided in the methodology (chapter 6) which explains the process and techniques 
applied for regression analysis. Also chapter 6 provides definitions for the measures and 
variables.   
 
8.2.1 Descriptive statistics  
 
The descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables considered in the 
study are shown in Table 8.21. All companies report on their risks, financial risks and 
non-financial risks to some extent. The table shows that there was a fair amount of a 
variation in the risk disclosure scores for the sample companies. The overall total risk 
disclosures levels range from 12 to 367 sentences. In addition, the independent variables 
figures for company size and profitability also showed a large variation, and a markedly 
non-normal distribution. A transformation was applied to the variable using natural 
logarithms for total assets, market capitalisation, revenue and net profit. The table also 
shows the categorical variables which were treated as dummy variables (auditor type, 
industry type, internal audit, internal control, and risk management). Duality roles 
involving board chair and CEO variable were excluded because only 2 companies had 
duality and the corporate governance code in the UAE does not permit duality.  
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Table 8.21 Descriptive Statistics 
 Variables*  N Min Max Mean SD 
TotalRiskDisclosure 144 12 367 96.45 59.66 
FinancialRisk 144 6 198 56.28 31.75 
NonFinancial 144 3 170 40.17 35.55 
LogTotalAssets 144 7 11 9.23 0.80 
LogMarketCapitalization 144 7 11 9.07 0.79 
LogRevenues 144 6 10 8.76 0.81 
ROA % 144 -20 58 7.21 9.19 
ROE % 144 -90 53 11.50 17.13 
Tobin's Q 144 -2 0 -0.09 0.26 
CurrentRatio (times) 144 0 30 3.81 5.07 
DebtToAsset % 144 1 91 35.37 24.17 
Concentration % 144 7 94 52.19 21.68 
Government % 144 0 71 14.05 18.80 
Institution % 144 0 94 37.02 23.00 
Individual % 144 6 93 48.46 21.28 
Foreign % 144 0 96 14.85 19.40 
BoardSize 144 3 17 7.71 2.33 
NonExecutive 144 0 100 75.58 26.58 
IndependentDirectors 144 0 100 57.51 30.46 
AuditCommitteeSize 144 0 6 2.49 1.50 
Descriptive statistics for categorical independent variables  
 N Category (1) Category (0) Mean SD 
AuditorType 144 104 40 0.72 0.45 
IndustryType 144 75 69 0.44 0.50 
InternalAuditors 144 84 60 0.58 0.49 
InternalControl 144 108 36 0.75 0.43 
RiskManagement 144 67 77 0.47 0.50 
* The definition of the variables is provided in chapter 6 (section 6.6.1) 
 
8.2.2 Univariate analysis  
 
Table 8.22 provides a summary of univariate analysis including Pearson Correlation 
Coefficients and simple linear regression between total risk disclosure (dependent 
variable) and the independent variables. The simple linear regression results should be 
interpreted with caution since they are not taking into the account the effect of the other 
independent variables on the equation. Also, some variables scored insignificant results 
and very low adjusted R².  In order to enhance the robustness of some results Spearman‟s 
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Rank Order Correlation and the Mann-Whitney U test were applied. Univariate analysis 
helped in deciding the relevant measures for the independent variables.  
 
Table 8.22 Summary of effect of correlation results on total risk disclosures  
 Variables  Correlation  
Firm-specific characteristics   
Firm size Log total Assets .562*** Positive  
 Log market capitalization .401*** Positive  
  Log revenue  .447*** Positive  
Performance ROA -.142* Negative 
 Tobin's Q .127 Not significant  
  Spearman‟s correlation  .357*** Positive  
 Normal score Tobin‟s Q .447*** Positive 
Liquidity Current ratio -.218*** Negative 
 LogCurrentRatio -.210** Negative 
Company risk Debt to asset ratio .387*** Positive  
Industry type  Service/Industrial -.240** Negative  
Auditor type Big 4/non-big 4 .437*** Positive  
Corporate governance characteristics   
Ownership  Concentration .322*** Positive  
Structure Government .053 Not significant 
  Institution .265*** Positive  
  Individual  -.326*** Negative 
  Foreign .047 Not significant 
Board  Board size .152* Positive 
Composition Non-executive .016 Not significant  
Board 
Independence  
Independent directors .223*** Positive 
Internal  Internal auditors .180** Positive  
Auditing Audit committee size  .276*** Positive  
Internal control Report on internal control system .273*** Positive  
Risk management Presence of risk management 
department or committee 
.355*** Positive  
*** significant at < 0.01; ** significant at < 0.05; *significant at < 0.1 
 
Overall, the results of univariate analysis (based on Pearson Correlation and Spearman‟s 
Correlation) showed that firm-specific characteristics are associated with risk disclosure 
practice because the majority of variables appeared to be significant. The results showed 
there is a positive relationship between risk disclosures and three measures of company 
size (untransformed and transformed data).  
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There were mixed results on the association between risk disclosure and company 
performance measured by profitability. Although net profit was positively associated 
with total risk, R² was very low (0.047). ROA was negatively correlated with total risk 
disclosure. However, ROE was insignificant. Tobin‟s Q ratio showed insignificant 
correlation, however, when Spearman‟s correlation was applied, a significant correlation 
between Tobin‟s Q and total risk disclosures appeared. There was a positive association 
between normal score Tobin‟s Q and total risk disclosures. The results for risk 
disclosures and company risk level (measured by debt to asset ratio) showed a strong 
positive association. 
 
Industry type appeared to be significant in explaining risk disclosure levels; companies in 
the service sector provide less risk disclosures than in the industrial sector. Further 
investigation was carried out using Mann-Whitney U test which scored Z = -2.485 
(p<0.013); the results confirmed that there was a significant difference in risk disclosure 
levels and that industrial companies provide more risk disclosures than service 
companies. The correlation result showed that companies audited by the Big 4 provided 
more risk information than companies audit by non-Big 4 companies.  This result was 
also confirmed by the Mann-Whitney U test which scored Z statistics = -6.644 (p<0.000) 
which indicated that there was significant difference in the means of companies audited 
by the Big4 and Non-Big 4 companies.  
 
Among corporate governance characteristics the R² of all associations was small. It 
appeared that three variables of ownership structure had significant association with risk 
disclosure; these were concentration, institution and individual, although they had low R² 
of 0.097, 0.064 and 0.100 respectively. However, two ownership variables were 
insignificant and with small R² which were government and foreign ownership. 
 
In addition the results showed that board size and the presence of non-executive directors 
resulted in insignificant association with risk disclosures. However, the influence of 
independent directors appeared to be significant and risk disclosure level seemed to rise 
in response to the presence of independent directors. Furthermore, the results showed that 
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the presence of internal auditors, internal control and risk management had a positive 
association with risk disclosures. These results were confirmed by the Mann-Whitney U 
test which showed that that there was a significant difference between levels of risk 
disclosures for companies with these variables and companies without these variables 
(internal control Z=-4.070, p<0.000, Internal auditors Z = -2.038, p=0.042 and risk 
management Z = -4.002, p=0.000). 
  
8.2.3 Multivariate Analysis  
 
The following multiple regression models were structured based on the theoretical 
framework (Chapter 3), previous empirical works (Chapter 4), the outcome of grounded 
theory analysis of the interviews (Chapter 7) and finally the results of univariate analysis 
(Chapter 8). Multiple regression analysis was run in order to explain the joint effects of 
the independent variables on the dependent variables. 
 
Regression model  
 
Y = Performance + β3 Liquidity + β4 Company risk level + β5 Industry 
+ β6 Auditor type + β7 Ownership structure + β8 Board Composition + β9Independence 
+ β10 Internal Auditing + β11 Internal Control + β12 Risk management + ε  
 
Following the approach applied by Wallace and Naser (1995) and Hannifa and Cooke 
(2002), two regression techniques were applied in this section. The first is the standard 
regression model and the second is the normal scores rank regression. The standard 
regression model was run after checking that all assumptions held. The normal score was 
run after transforming all variables to their normal scores (both dependent and 
independent variables) in order to make more robust the results obtained from the 
standard regression model. 
 
The multiple regression results are presented in Table 8.23. The first set of models 
present standard models (Mode 1, 2, 3). The results showed that F-ratio is significant at 
level 0.01 in all models. Adjusted R² ranged from a low score of 0.177 in Model 2 to a 
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reasonable score of 0.455 in Model 3. The levels for explanatory power (adjusted R²) 
have improved and are slightly higher after applying normal scores to the variables (both 
dependent and independent).  
 
Examples of normality checks mainly through Skewness and Kurtosis test and a 
histogram of the residuals are presented in Appendix D. Multicollinearity check results 
between the different variables based on Pearson Correlation and VIF indicated that this 
assumption held (example in Appendix D). Highly correlated variables were not included 
in any of the examined models at the same time. The average VIF of the models indicated 
that there is no serious collinearity problem (example in Appendix D). A summary of 
autocorrelation test results using Durbin-Watson statistics was presented in Table 8.23. 
Durbin-Watson test results showed that there was no serious autocorrelation problem in 
the study models. 
 
The second set of models showing normal score regression models (NS-Model 1, 2, 3) is 
presented in Table 8.23. Results for F-ratio tests of the models were similar and 
significant. The results show that values for the adjusted R² of the models have improved 
and are slightly higher than adjusted R² for the standard regression models. Since the 
adjusted R² of Model 3 and NSModel 3 was higher than in Model 1 and NSModel 1, and 
since the study aims to examine the joint effect of all independent variables on risk 
disclosure, the results of Model 3 and NSModel 3 will be considered to be main results 
and other results will be considered supportive and for further exploration purposes, 
especially when mixed or opposite results were obtained.  
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Table 8.23 Regression models and results  
 Standard Regression   Normal Score Regression  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  NS-Model1 NS-Mode2 NS-Model3 
Dependent variable TotalRisk 
Disclosure 
TotalRisk 
Disclosure 
TotalRisk 
Disclosure 
 NSTotalRisk 
Disclosure 
NSTotalRisk 
Disclosure 
NSTotalRisk 
Disclosure  
Constant -4.198*** 0.623 -4.817***  -4.685*** -2.243** -3.608*** 
X1 = Company size¹ 4.690***  4.943***  3.267***  3.457*** 
X2 = Firm Performance² -1.485  -0.304  -2.883***  -1.465 
X3 = Liquidity³  2.408**  2.047**  .798  -0.004 
X4 = Company risk level
4
 2.941***  2.731***  .992  0.512 
X5 = Auditor type
5 
 3.811***  2.698***  6.117***  4.556*** 
X6 = Industry type
6
 0.745  1.067  .496  0.560 
X7 = Ownership structure
7
   2.025** 1.830*   2.959*** 2.333** 
X8 = Board composition
8
   2.076** -0.313   2.914*** 0.489 
X9 = Independence
9
   2.054** 0.421   2.072** 1.031 
X10 = Internal auditing
10
   -0.211 -1.902*   -1.012 -1.956* 
X11 = Internal control
11 
  0.325 0.648   1.293 1.260 
X12 = Risk management
12
   3.040*** 2.228**   2.559** 1.501 
Adjusted R² 0.389 0.177 0.427  0.412 0.223 0.455 
F 16.177*** 6.115*** 9.886***  17.733*** 7.854*** 10.950*** 
Durbin-Watson 1.461 1.323 1.589  1.641 1.489 1.802 
N 144 144 144  144 144 144 
 ¹LogTotalAssets, ²ROA, ³LogCurrentRatio, 
4
DebtToAsset, 
5
Big4/Non-Big4, 
6
Industrial/Services, 
7
Institution, 
8
BoardSize, 
9
IndependentDirectors, 
10
InternalAuditors, 
11
Report on internal control, 
12
risk management   
 ¹NSTotalAssets, ²NSROA, ³NSCurrentRatio, 
4
NSDebtToAsset,
5
NSBig4/Non-Big4, 
6
NSIndustrial/Services, 
7
NSInstitution, 
8
NSBoardSize, 
9
NSIndependentDirectors, 
10
NSInternalAuditors, 
11
NSReport on internal control, 
12
NSrisk management 
*** significant at < 0.01; ** significant at < 0.05; *significant at < 0.1 
Definitions of variables provided in chapter 6 (section 6.6.1) 
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8.2.4 Firm-specific characteristics and total risk disclosure  
 
Company size 
 
Table 8.23 shows a summary of multiple regression results. The results showed that 
there was a strong positive association between company size (measured by 
TotalAsset) and risk disclosures in all models (e.g. Model 1, 3, and NS-Model 1, 3). 
Further investigation was carried out using different size measurements, for instance 
logMarketCapitalization and logRevenue, and all other variables were kept 
unchanged. Table 8.24 show that the different ways of measuring size are highly 
correlated therefore they could not be included in the same regression model at same 
time. Then the same technique was used in the normal score regression model. The 
results are presented in the table below. The results showed that both measurements 
had a positive association with total risk disclosures in all models. These results 
indicated that risk disclosure could be explained in terms of company size and showed 
significant positive association. 
   
Table 8.24: Association between company size variable and risk disclosure  
 Model 1 Model 3 NS-Model 1 NS-Model 3 
MarketCapitalisation 2.237** 2.016** 1.69* 1.296 
Revenues  2.708*** 2.727*** 5.277*** 2.255*** 
 
Company performance  
 
Table 8.23 showed that performance was represented by profitability (e.g. measured 
by ROA). The results show there was an insignificant result of the association 
between ROA and total risk disclosure in Model 1, Model 3, NS-Model 3. However 
there was a significant negative association in Model NS-Model 1.  On the other hand 
when another measurement of company performance was applied using NSTobin‟s Q, 
where ROA was replaced by NSTobin‟s Q in all models, the results showed there was 
a significant and positive association between NSTobin‟s Q and Total Risk Disclosure 
in all models as it is shown in Table 8.25. It can be concluded that company 
performance and risk disclosure association reported mixed results.  
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Table 8.25: Association between company performance and risk disclosure  
 Model 1 Model 3 NS-Model 1 NS-Model 3 
NSTobin‟s Q 2.100** 2.978*** 1.712* 2.620*** 
 
Liquidity  
 
Table 8.23 shows that liquidity (measured by LogCurrentRatio) has a positive 
association with risk disclosures in the standard regression (e.g. Model 1, 3). 
However, this association became insignificant with normal score regression (e.g. NS-
Model 1, 3). The results suggested a mixed result for the association between liquidity 
and total risk disclosure.  
 
Company risk level 
 
The results in Table 8.23 showed that debt-to-asset ratio was positively linked to total 
risk disclosure in Model 1 and Model 3. However, there is insignificant association 
for normal score regression models (e.g. NS-Model 1 and NS-Model 3) but the 
association sign remained positive. It can be concluded that the overall results suggest 
a positive association between company risk levels and total risk disclosures.   
 
Industry type 
 
Industry type appeared to be insignificant in explaining risk disclosure practices of the 
sample companies. Industry type (Industrial/Services) was insignificant in all models 
as was shown in Table 8.23. The results also appeared insignificant. One explanation 
for these insignificant results is that all companies in our sample are non-financial 
firms which may be expected to face similar risk types and may provide similar risk 
disclosures.
11
 
 
External auditor type 
 
Regression results in Table 8.23 showed that external auditor type was positively and 
strongly associated with risk disclosure in all models. The results implied that 
                                               
11 Financial and investment companies; banks and insurance companies were omitted 
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companies audited by the Big 4 provide more risk disclosures than companies audited 
by non-Big 4 companies. This result evidences the influence of international audit 
firms on companies‟ disclosure practices.  
 
8.2.5 Corporate governance characteristics and total risk disclosure 
 
Ownership structure  
 
The standard models were presented in Table 8.23 where ownership in this table is 
classified by type of institutional ownership. Then further investigation on the 
relationship between ownership structure and risk disclosure was carried out by 
applying different variables for ownership structure in that the institution ownership 
variable was replaced by the other ownership variables. The other variables were then 
kept unchanged and each model was run separately. The results are reported in Table 
8.26. Another investigation was carried out with normal scored regression. The 
normal scored models (NS-Model) were also reported in the Table 8.26 for 
comparison and robustness purposes.  
 
Table 8.26: Association between ownership structure variables and risk disclosure 
 Model 2 Model 3 NS-Model 2 NS-Model 3 
Concentration ownership 3.794*** 2.684** 3.795*** 2.159** 
Government ownership 1.870* 0.791 1.692* 0.227 
Individual ownership -3.794*** -2.653** -3.900*** -2.356** 
Foreign ownership  0.219 1.582 -0.106 0.902 
 
Institutional ownership  
 
Table 8.23 showed that ownership structure (measured by institution) was 
significantly and positively associated with total risk disclosures in all models. This 
result indicates that pressure from institutional investors‟ and demand for more 
information would improve risk disclosure levels in listed companies.    
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Concentration ownership 
 
The results in table 8.26 show that there was a strong positive association between 
risk disclosure and concentration ownership in all models.  
 
Government ownership 
 
The results showed that there was a weak positive association between government 
ownership and risk disclosure in Model 2 and NSModel 2. However, this turned into 
insignificant association when all variables were considered as it was shown in Model 
3 and NSModel 3 in Table 8.26.  
 
Individual ownership  
 
Moreover, there was a strong negative association between total risk disclosure and 
individual ownership in all models. It could be argued that this result indicates that 
individuals do not exert pressure for or demand more risk disclosure which would 
encourage companies‟ managers to put off risk disclosures.   
 
Foreign ownership  
 
Foreign ownership appeared to have insignificant association with total risk disclosure 
as it is shown in table 8.26 above and in all models (standard and normal scores).   
 
Board size  
 
Multiple regression results in Table 8.23 showed there was a significant and positive 
association between total risk disclosure and BoardSize in Model 2 and NSModel 2. 
However, BoardSize appeared to be insignificant when included together with firm 
specific variables as was shown in Model 3 and NSModel 3.  
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Non-executive directors  
 
Board size was replaced by a variable indicating the proportion of non-executive 
directors in the models and all other variables were kept unchanged. The results are 
reported in Table 8.27. It showed that there was insignificant association between risk 
disclosure and the presence of non-executive directors in all models.  
 
Table 8.27: Association between Non-executive directors and risk disclosure 
 Model 2 Model 3 NS-Model 2 NS-Model 3 
Non-executive directors  0.47 1.049 -0.223 0.087 
 
Independent directors 
 
The association between the proportion of independent directors‟ variable and risk 
disclosures as it is presented in Table 8.23 confirms a positive correlation in all 
models. However, in Model 3 and NSModel 3, when all variables are considered, the 
results become insignificant, whereas it was significant in Model 2 and NSModel 2.  
 
Internal auditors  
 
Multiple regression results in Table 8.23 showed there was weak significant and 
negative association between total risk disclosure and internal auditors as was 
reported in Model 3 and NSModel 3.  
 
Audit committee  
 
The presence of an audit committee was measured as a continuous variable by audit 
committee size. The model was run after replacing internal control with the audit 
committee size variable and all other variables were kept unchanged. The internal 
control variable showed strong correlation with the audit committee size variable 
(0.898). Therefore, they are not included in the same model. The results are reported 
in Table 8.28. The results showed that there was insignificant association between risk 
disclosure level and the size of audit committee in all models. The comparison 
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between standard models and the normal scored model showed that the correlation 
sign changed from positive to negative.     
 
Table 8.28: Association between audit committee and risk disclosure 
 Model 2 Model 3 NS-Model 2 NS-Model 3 
Audit committee size 0.023 0.216 -0.098 -0.121 
 
Internal control  
 
The results in Table 8.23 showed that there was a positive but insignificant 
association between the internal control system (measured by reporting on internal 
control) and risk disclosures within annual reports in all models.  
 
Risk management  
 
Multiple regression results in Table 8.23 showed that the risk management system 
(measured by the presence of a risk management department or committee) was 
positively associated with risk disclosure in all models and this association was 
significant in most models (Model 2, Model 3, NSModel 2). However, there was 
insignificant association in NSModel 3. 
 
8.2.6 Stepwise regression model  
 
Stepwise regression was run including all variables for comparison and robustness of 
the results obtained from the previous standard and normal scored regressions. The 
stepwise regression applied a probability of 0.09 for entry and a probability of 0.10 
for removal. The results of the stepwise regression models are presented in Table 
8.29. The results showed that independent variables that appeared to have significant 
association with total risk disclosure in both stepwise models were company size (+), 
company performance (+), auditor type (+), ownership structure (+). In addition some 
variables appeared to be significant in the standard regression only, for instance 
liquidity (+) and risk management (+), whereas the presence of internal auditors 
appeared to has negative association. It can be seen that these results are similar and 
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confirmed the previous results obtained from the above standard and normal score 
rank regression.     
 
Table 8.29: Stepwise regression  
Standard regression  Normal score rank regression 
Constant  -4.144*** Constant  -4.363*** 
LogTotalAssets 4.586*** NSTotalAssets 3.443*** 
NSTobin‟s Q 4.813*** NSTobinQ 1.780* 
LogCurrrentRatio 3.264***   
AuditorType 1.784* AuditorType 4.885*** 
Concentration 3.843*** NSInstitution 3.078*** 
InternalAuditors -1.995**   
RiskManagement 3.607***   
Adjusted R² .495 Adjusted R² .458 
F 21.058*** F 25.162*** 
Durbin-Watson 1.436 Durbin-Watson 1.704 
Dependent variable: TotalRiskDisclosure 
N = 144 
Dependent variable: NSTotalRiskDisclosure 
N = 144 
 
8.2.7 Risk disclosure categories  
 
Financial risk disclosure  
 
Financial risk disclosure appeared to be dominated by company performance 
measured by Tobin‟s Q (positive), auditor type (positive), concentration ownership 
(positive) and individual ownership (negative) in that they appeared to be significant 
in both standard and normal score regression models. On the other hand, the other 
variables were insignificant. The results from standard regression models and normal 
score regression models show that there was insignificant association between 
Financial Risk Disclosure and company size in almost all models. One explanation for 
this result would be that most financial risk disclosure items in the index were related 
to IFRS requirements (82%) where all companies have to comply with IFRS 
regardless of their company size. Auditor type appeared to have significant positive 
association with financial risk disclosure. One explanation would be that large audit 
firms (Big 4) tend to make sure that their clients fully comply with IFRS 
requirements. Most items in our financial risk disclosure index consist mainly of 
IFRS-related risk disclosure requirements.  
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Non-financial risk disclosure  
 
Non-financial risk disclosure is a variable consisting of operational, environmental 
and social responsibility, information processing and technological, strategic, 
integrity, regulatory, empowerment and political disclosures. The explanatory 
variables that appeared to have significant association with non-financial risk 
disclosure in both standard and normal score regression models were company size 
(positive), auditor type (positive), institutional ownership (positive), independent 
directors (positive), internal auditors (negative), and risk management (positive).   
 
Governance-related risk disclosures 
 
This variable related to governance-related risk disclosures and is calculated on the 
basis of environmental and social responsibility, integrity and regulatory risk-related 
disclosures. The new dependent variable was regressed on the other independent 
variables following a similar procedure to that reported previously; the results on the 
association between governance risk-related disclosures and firm and governance 
characteristics are presented in Table D-4 and D-4.2 in Appendix D. The regression 
analysis results show that the significant variables in both models (standard and 
normal scores) were company size (+, TotalAsset), company performance (+, 
NSTobin‟s Q), ownership structure (+, concentration), internal auditors (-) and risk 
management (+).  
 
The variables that appeared significant in at least one of the two models were liquidity 
LogCurrentRatio (+), DebtToAsset (+), auditor type (+), ownership structure 
institution (+), individual (-), foreign (+), board size (+), independent directors, (+). 
On the other hand, the variables that appeared insignificant in both models were 
ROA, industry type, internal control, government ownership, non-executive directors, 
and audit committee size. 
 
Quantitative risk disclosures 
 
The variables that significantly influence quantitative risk disclosure in both models 
were company size (+), NSTobinsQ (+), foreign ownership (+), and risk management 
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(+). In addition, there were some variables that appeared to be significant in at least 
one of the models for example company risk level (+), auditor type (+), institution 
ownership (+), board size (+), independent directors (+), and internal auditors (-). 
However, some variables reported non-significant association with quantitative risk 
disclosure in both models for instance ROA, current ratio, industry type, internal 
control, concentration, government, individual ownership, proportion of non-
executive directors, and audit committee size.    
 
Forward-looking risk disclosure  
 
The results on the association between forward-looking risk disclosure and firm and 
governance characteristics showed that the variables that have significant and positive 
association for both variables include company size, auditor type and risk 
management, whereas the variable internal auditors has negative correlation with 
future news risk disclosure. In addition, some variables reported significant 
association in at least one of the two models for instance liquidity NSROA (-), 
NSTobin‟s Q (+), LogCurrrentRatio (+), DebtToAsset (+), independent directors (+), 
and foreign ownership (+). On the other hand, the remaining variables, for instance 
industry type, board size, proportion of non-executive directors, audit committee size, 
internal control, ownership by institution, concentration, government, and individual 
ownership, appeared to be insignificant in both models. 
 
Summary of regression results 
 
Table 8.30: Summary of regression analysis results  
Independent variables Univariate 
analysis 
Standard 
regression 
Model 3  
Normal score 
regression 
NS-Model 3  
Stepwise 
regression  
Firm size + + + + 
Company performance     
     ROA - Not significant Not significant Not significant 
     Tobin‟s Q  + + + + 
Liquidity  - + Not significant + 
Risk level + + Not significant Not significant 
Industry type Significant Not significant Not significant Not significant 
Auditor type + + + + 
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Ownership structure     
     Institutional + + + + 
     Concentration + + + + 
     Government Not significant Not significant Not significant Not significant 
     Individual - - - Not significant 
     Foreign Not significant Not significant Not significant Not significant 
Board size  + Not significant Not significant Not significant 
Non-executive directors  Not significant Not significant Not significant Not significant 
Independent directors + Not significant Not significant Not significant 
Internal auditors  + - - - 
Audit committee  + Not significant Not significant Not significant 
Internal control  + Not significant Not significant Not significant 
Risk management  + + + + 
Dependent variable: Total Risk disclosure, (+) positive, (-) Negative 
 
8.2.8 Summary 
 
This chapter presents the findings of the quantitative research, divided into two main 
sections: content analysis results and regression analysis results. The results show 
there is an increase in the number of total risk disclosures over the period. However, 
the findings also show there is a large variation in risk disclosure practice among the 
companies. The results show that UAE companies provide little forward risk 
information which limits the usefulness of disclosure for decision making and 
investment purposes. The content analysis results show that there is increased 
attention by management to provide information on risks as a part of their corporate 
governance and as a result of the pressure by regulations and investors or users. 
 
In addition, this chapter reported the results of univariate analysis and multiple 
regression analysis. In order to decide on the variables to be considered in the models, 
relevant literature is reviewed within the context of the UAE market. Various models 
are employed in order to make the findings more robust. In some cases, different 
measures are employed in order to enhance the conclusion. The different models 
show different results on the association between risk disclosure level and some 
variables, for example, ownership structure. However, in some cases the results show 
similar findings, for example, company size. These issues will be discussed further in 
the next chapter and these results will be complemented by the results obtained from 
qualitative research. The next chapter comprises an analytical discussion on the 
findings of qualitative research and quantitative research.  
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Chapter 9:  
Discussion and 
analysis of the 
findings 
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9.0 Introduction  
 
This chapter discusses and analyses the main findings of the study in the light of the 
results obtained using qualitative method (interview) and two quantitative approaches 
(content analysis and regression analysis), relating the results to the previous 
literature. This section brings the results from both methods into one context. Then 
the main results are related to prior literature and previous findings. The aim is to 
bring the results from both qualitative and quantitative methods into one discussion 
set and provide a comprehensive discussion and analysis.  
 
The findings show that there are differences between the qualitative results (e.g. 
grounded theory) and quantitative results (e.g. content analysis and regression 
analysis) in a number of cases. Table 9.29, located at the end of this chapter, provides 
a summary of the main findings and shows the conflicting results. The table shows 
that some hypotheses are supported by both methods, for instance H1, H2, H3, H4, 
H5a, however, mixed results were reported on other hypotheses, for instance H8, H9 
and H10. Table 9.29 provides a summary of the main findings and outlines the 
differences between the qualitative and quantitative methods in terms of findings.  
 
It can be argued that the mixed results and contradictory findings are due to using 
mixed methods. The study applies qualitative and quantitative research methods 
which result in different findings. Rather than regarding this as a shortcoming of 
mixed methods, it cautions against relying on the findings of research based on a 
single approach. Furthermore, it is also due to the theories applied and the theoretical 
arguments in order to understand the association between risk disclosure and 
variables. In addition, the contradictory findings are also due to the interviewees who 
gave different opinions in relation to some issues, for example, some interviewees 
said company risk level has a positive influence on risk disclosure, whereas others 
suggested a negative influence. Moreover, these contradictory findings reflect the 
literature on disclosure in that some studies found positive association whereas other 
studies found negative association (see chapter 3). Another source for contradictions 
in findings is the use of different measures to some cases and variables, for example, 
ownership structure and company performance.  
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This chapter is divided into 6 main sections based on the research questions which are 
further divided into sub-headings based on the research hypotheses. The main sections 
are divided into 1) risk reporting practice, 2) mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure, 
3) the influence of IFRSs, 4) the influence of corporate governance, 5) firm-specific 
characteristics and 6) corporate governance characteristics.  
 
9.1 Risk disclosure practice, nature, type and time-scale   
 
R.Q.1: What is the current risk reporting practice of the UAE listed companies? 
 
9.1.1 Financial and non-financial risk disclosures 
  
Table 9.1: Financial and non-financial risk disclosure  
Qualitative method Quantitative method 
Interview Content analysis Multivariate analysis  
- Interviewees identified financial 
risks as being the most important 
and dominant risk disclosure type 
(see Grid 1) 
- The need for capital encourages 
companies to provide more risk 
disclosure, especially of financial 
risks, to meet the requirements of 
the lenders.  
(see Grid 2) 
The most frequently 
disclosed risks were 
financial risks (58.07%) 
- Little risk information 
on non-financial 
categories  
Financial risk 
disclosure was 
dominated by: 
firm  performance (+), 
auditor type (+), 
concentration 
ownership (+), and 
individual ownership 
(-) 
 
The results from both qualitative and quantitative methods supported the first 
hypothesis in that financial risk disclosure was more frequent than other types of risk 
disclosure. This result is consistent with prior literature which found similar results 
(e.g.  Linsley & Shrives 2005, 2006; Abraham & Cox, 2007). The results showed that 
companies were good at providing financial risk disclosures, however non-financial 
risk categories suffered from lacks in terms of quantity and quality. Even though there 
has been an increase in companies reporting environmental, social and employee 
issues over time, there is still room for some improvement.  
 
These results supported the argument of the capital need theory (Chio, 1973) in that 
when companies are seeking finances in order to expand and cover other costs, the 
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capital providers require information on the companies‟ financial state including 
financial risks. This conclusion was also supported by interview findings in that banks 
ask for detailed information about a company before providing capital (Grid 2). The 
results of regression showed that the level of financial risk disclosure was positively 
and significantly influenced by company performance, which implies that the bigger 
the company, the more finance is needed in order to expand and cover costs. The 
regression results showed that there is a positive association between financial risk 
disclosure and auditor type, and ownership concentration, but the association is 
negative with respect to individual ownership. 
 
9.1.2 Qualitative and quantitative risk disclosures  
 
Table 9.2: Qualitative and quantitative risk disclosure 
Qualitative method Quantitative method 
Interview Content analysis Multivariate analysis 
- The level of risk 
disclosure has 
increased over the 
time - Quantity is a 
dimension of 
disclosure quality 
- Quality levels 
need to be 
improved. 
(see Grid 9) 
The number of both quantitative and 
quantitative risk disclosures has increased 
over the period. 
- The number of qualitative risk 
disclosures was more than that of 
quantitative ones  
- There were examples of boiler plate risk 
disclosures, especially disclosures related 
to IFRS and risk management policy. 
- However, there was less boiler plate 
risk information within operational and 
directors reports and the MD&A section. 
Variables that have strong  
significant association 
with quantitative risk 
disclosures are:  
company size (+),  
firm performance, foreign 
ownership (+), risk 
management (+), auditor 
type (+), institutional 
ownership (+), board size 
(+), and independent 
directors (+) 
 
The results of both qualitative and quantitative methods supported hypothesis 2 in that 
qualitative risk disclosure was more frequent than quantified risk disclosure. This 
result is consistent with prior studies, for instance Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), 
Konishi and Ali (2007) in Japan, Rajab and Schachler (2009) in UK, and Lajili and 
Zeghal (2005) in Canada. In addition, even though the results suggested that the 
number of risk disclosures has been increasing, there was demand from the users to 
improve the quality of risk disclosures. The content analysis results showed there 
were examples of boiler plate risk information within the annual reports of the 
examined companies.  These results implied that the usefulness of risk disclosure was 
limited especially for investment decision-making purposes.  
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The regression results show that providing quantitative risk disclosures within annual 
reports was strongly and positively influenced by governance-related characteristics. 
This result indicated that corporate governance characteristics have significantly more 
influence on companies‟ quantitative risk disclosures than other firm-specific 
characteristics variables. This mutual association may mean that users of financial 
statements can use risk disclosure as an overall indicator of corporate governance 
quality, along with other variables such as board independence. In addition, this result 
implies that some corporate governance elements (e.g. independent directors) might 
help in improving risk disclosure quality. In addition, institutional and foreign 
investors could exert pressure and demand more information that is useful for their 
investment decisions such as quantified risk disclosure.  
 
9.1.3 Future-oriented and past-oriented risk disclosures  
 
Table 9.3: Future-news and past-news risk disclosures 
Qualitative method Quantitative method 
Interview Content analysis Regression 
- There is demand for 
other sources of 
information that give up-
to-date and future 
information. 
- Managers reluctant to 
disclose forward-looking 
risk disclosure  
(see Grid9) 
The results showed 
that listed companies 
provided very little 
forward-looking risk 
information. 
Strong significant and positive 
association between future-
news risk disclosures and 
company size, auditor type, 
risk management, firm risk 
level, and foreign ownership. 
-  Presence of internal auditors 
has a negative association 
 
The findings obtained using qualitative and quantitative methods showed that 
companies provided little forward-looking information within their annual reports. 
The interviewees stated that managers are reluctant to disclose forward-looking 
information. The results above are consistent with some prior studies (e.g. Beattie et 
al., 2004; Lajili & Zeghal, 2005; Konishi & Ali, 2007) who found that companies 
provide little forward-looking information. In contrast the results were not consistent 
with other empirical studies (e.g. Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Rajab & Schachler, 2009) 
in the UK who found the amount of forward-looking risk disclosure was higher than 
of past-risk disclosure. This result is in line with the discussions in ICAEW (1999) 
and Emm et al. (2007) in that companies‟ managements were reluctant to provide 
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commercially sensitivity information because competitors might exploit such 
information and hence the company would be at a competitive disadvantage.   
 
Regression results show that there is a strong positive association between auditor 
type and forward-looking risk information, which suggests that external auditors 
could play an important role in passing on forward-looking risk information by means 
of their advice to their clients. Foreign ownership is also positively associated with 
future-news risk disclosures. Additionally the results suggested that foreign investors 
could exert pressure and demand better quality risk disclosure and more useful 
information for their investment decision-making.    
 
9.1.4 Good new vs. bad news  
  
Table 9.4: Good news and bad news  
Qualitative method Quantitative method 
Interview Content analysis 
- Companies‟ managers try to hide 
information on risk and bad news. 
- Companies should provide all 
available information whether it is 
negative and bad or positive and good.  
(see Grid 9) 
 - The results of the test indicated that there 
is significantly more “good-news” risk 
information than “bad-news” information 
- Some companies provided information 
about changes in profits and declines in 
profitability and exposure to risks such as 
the global financial crisis. 
 
The results of the interviews and the content analysis supported hypothesis (H4) in 
that companies tend to provide more good-news risk information than bad-news. The 
findings from the analysis of the interviews suggested that regulatory bodies 
encourage listed companies to be more transparent about their exposure, for example, 
the UAE Central Bank forced listed banks to provide information on their exposure to 
SAAD Al QUSEBI GROUP. This result is consistent with some prior studies, for 
instance Mohobbot (2005) in Japan. It is in the line with signalling theory in that 
companies who provide more good information are not only informing the market that 
the company is in a good position with strong risk management and internal control 
systems in place (Linsley & Shrives, 2000, p.125) but are also raising expectations 
that similar disclosures will be made in future years, thus making management more 
accountable.  
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9.1.5 Timeliness of risk disclosure  
 
Table 9.5: Timely risk disclosure  
Qualitative method Quantitative method 
Interview Content analysis 
-There was demand by users and financial 
analysts and individual investors for timely 
risk disclosures.  
- Stock market authorities set rules and put 
pressure on listed companies to provide 
information on time. 
- Companies delayed giving out 
information, especially bad-risk information 
such as exposures to Dubai financial crises. 
(see Grid 9) 
- Content analysis results showed that 
examined companies provided 
assurance, and emphasised the 
importance of timely disclosures.  
- Some companies provided 
information showing that the Board of 
Directors is responsible to ensure 
timely disclosures.  
 
The content analysis results show that some companies recognised the importance of 
timely disclosures and considered that the board of directors is responsible to make 
sure they are included within the annual report and the corporate governance annual 
review.  However, the results from the interview analysis showed that there was a lack 
of timely risk disclosure by the listed companies. Besides this the users (e.g. financial 
analysts and investors) complained about delays in some information, especially bad-
news information, being made known; this influenced negatively the usefulness of 
disclosure in investment decision-making for the users. Therefore, there has been 
increased pressure from regulatory bodies (e.g. SCA) and stock market authorities 
(e.g. ADX) to encourage listed companies to provide information on time.  
 
9.1.6 Environmental and social responsibility risk disclosures  
 
Table 9.6: Environmental and social responsibility risk disclosures  
Qualitative method Quantitative method 
Interview Content analysis 
- An external auditor explained that best 
practice of disclosure implies that companies 
report not only on financial factors but also 
on social responsibility and environmental 
factors. He said social responsibility should 
be promoted and protected by strict 
regulation and enforcement by the 
government and regulators. 
- There was some risk information 
available on environmental and 
social responsibility issues but the 
volume was relatively low.  
- The results showed that the number 
of risk disclosures on environmental 
and social responsibility issues 
increased between 2007 and 2009. 
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An important improvement and change in the risk reporting practice of the UAE 
companies was the reporting of risks and harms related to the environment and social 
factors, however, the quantity of information disclosed in this category was low. The 
results showed that there has been an increase in the number of companies reporting 
environmental and corporate social responsibilities between 2007 and 2009. The 
interview analysis showed that many interviewees emphasised that part of change and 
improvement is to report on risks and harms related to these issues. 
 
9.1.7 Information needs of the users and their attitudes to risk disclosure  
 
Table 9.7: Information needs of the users  
Qualitative method Quantitative method 
Interview Content analysis 
- Useful for internal decision-making 
- Useful for external decision-making 
- Annual report is the main source of risk 
information  
(see Grid 6)  
 - Managers recognise the right of 
shareholders, especially minority 
shareholders, to receive 
information in a timely manner. 
- Current risk disclosures do not meet the need 
of the users 
- Risk disclosures meet the needs of the users.  
(see Grid 7)  
 
 
The results of the interview analysis showed that risk disclosure was useful for 
decision-making purposes for internal parties (e.g. the board and senior managers) 
and external parties or users (e.g. shareholders and stakeholders). The results 
confirmed that some external users did pay attention to risk information (e.g. financial 
analysts) and some users did not pay attention (e.g. individual investors). However, 
the degree of attention varied according to the level of their experience and 
knowledge of stock market investments. The interviewees suggested some solutions 
in order to enhance the amount of the attention given to risk information, for instance 
devoting separate sections to risk information within annual reports, and education to 
increase knowledge and awareness regarding risk disclosure. In addition, the results 
show that managers recognised the rights of the users, especially minority 
shareholders, to receive all information in a timely manner.  
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The results confirmed that the annual report was considered the main channel for 
communicating risk information by both management and external users. This result 
is in the line with some prior studies which stated that the annual report is the main 
source of information (Botosan, 1997) and a useful source in decision-making 
(Linsley & Shrives, 2000). However, the part played by the annual report was 
considered somewhat out-of-date by some interviewees, especially financial analysts, 
who demanded more timely disclosures. Therefore they said that they rely on other 
sources alongside the annual report, especially ones that give up-to-date information, 
for instance disclosures, news, announcements, and private meetings.    
 
9.1.8 Management accountability and attitude towards risk disclosures 
 
Table 9.8: Management accountability and attitude towards risk disclosures 
Qualitative method Quantitative method 
Interview Content analysis 
- Risk disclosure is part of 
management accountability and 
board responsibility; this disclosure 
can be used to make inferences 
about the quality of management.  
(see Grid 8) 
 
- Companies variously stated that the board, 
audit committee, executive management, or 
internal auditors were chiefly responsible for 
risk management and risk reporting. 
-“The company recognises that transparency, 
disclosure, financial controls, and 
accountability are the pillars of any good 
systems of corporate governance” (ADSB, 
2009, p.3, Governance Report). 
 
The results from the interview analysis and the content analysis reported mixed results 
about the perception of the responsibility for company risks and risk disclosure in that 
some people said it lay with the board and other said it lay with lower level 
management. Both interview analysis and content analysis recognised management 
accountability for risk management and risk disclosures. In addition, the results 
showed that risk disclosure within the companies took place between the board and 
lower level management and between audit committee and internal auditors. It can be 
concluded that this matter depends on the type of risks in the sense that strategic level 
risk is the responsibility of the board whereas operational level risk would be senior 
management‟s responsibility. This result is consistent with Grant and Marshall (1997) 
who found that the use of derivatives by large UK companies was accompanied by 
significant control mechanisms inside companies and was reported at the board level; 
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they also stated that since derivatives can be complex, the need for them to be 
understood and authorised by senior management was seen as essential.  
 
9.1.9 Influence of international practice  
 
Table 9.9: Influence of international practice  
Qualitative method Quantitative method 
Interview analysis Content analysis Regression analysis 
- An external auditor explained 
that big international audit 
firms provide their clients with 
up to date information on 
financial reporting, and any 
developments in IFRSs, 
corporate governance and 
regulatory requirements 
 - “The management team 
constantly strives to ensure 
timely and open disclosure of 
material information to 
shareholders, in line with 
international best practice and 
SCA guidelines” (DU, 2009, 
p.26). 
The Big 4 audit 
firms have a 
significant and 
positive influence 
on risk disclosure 
levels. 
 
Both interview analysis and content analysis results showed that international practice 
influences risk disclosure practice in the UAE. The influence of international practice 
was seen firstly in the adoption of IFRSs since there is no specific set of accounting 
standards for the UAE as was the case in some developing countries (e.g. Saudi and 
India). The second influence of international practice especially practices from US 
and UK was on corporate governance which was reflected in the UAE corporate 
governance code. However, one of the interviewees (Company Manager1) claimed 
that “regulators in SCA simply cut rules from different international regulations and 
practices and paste them together into the UAE code which was not always good 
because the business environment in the UAE is different from the one in the US or 
UK”.  
 
Another international influence on risk disclosure practice was through international 
audit firms (the Big 4). Both qualitative and quantitative results confirmed the 
positive influence of the Big 4 on risk disclosure. The influence of the Big 4 on risk 
disclosure practices was explained in terms of them encouraging the companies to 
implement IFRSs and updating their clients about new international standards. In 
addition the content analysis results found that some companies individually adopted 
international practices for disclosure and governance as part of their improvement and 
best practice policy.  
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9.2 Mandatory requirements or voluntary risk disclosure  
 
R.Q.2: Should risk disclosure be mandatory or voluntary for companies in UAE? 
 
Table 9.10: Mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure requirements  
Qualitative method Quantitative method 
Interview Content analysis 
- A mixture of voluntary and 
mandatory risk disclosure 
requirements was recommended 
by some interview participants. 
(see Grid 3) 
- Monitoring compliance level 
and strict enforcement action are 
demanded by some interviewees 
(see Grid 5)  
-  Some managers and boards 
hide information and manipulate 
risk disclosures  
(see Grid 8) 
 - The results indicated mandatory requirements 
were an important influence.  
- IFRSs and corporate governance were the main 
dominants in risk disclosures since they are 
mandatory in the UAE. 
- Influence of international practice in risk 
reporting, IFRS and corporate governance 
- These results confirmed the influence of 
mandatory requirements on disclosure practice 
which led to an increase in risk disclosures 
provided by companies. The result suggested 
that companies are less motivated to disclose 
their risks voluntarily since the percentage of 
non-financial risk disclosures was significantly 
less than of financial risk disclosures.  
 
The results indicated that companies provided both mandatory and voluntary risk 
information. The study found that regulation on disclosure, for example the SCA 
(2000) disclosure requirements, is vague and lacks detail. There was a big variation in 
risk reporting practice within annual reports, and some companies provided little 
information which appeared to be a result of lack of clarify and detail in disclosure 
requirements. A similar result was found by ASB (2009a, p.3); companies in the UK 
appeared to be struggling to report in details due to a lack of clarify regarding the 
requirements.  
 
The findings suggested that the level of risk disclosure in the annual report is driven 
more by current regulatory requirements than by voluntary or best risk disclosure 
practices or the desire of the company to develop its level of risk disclosure. The 
results showed the dominant sources of mandatory risk disclosures were IFRSs and 
the corporate governance code. The results of the content analysis showed that risk 
disclosure related to mandatory requirements (e.g. financial, governance) was more 
frequent than risk disclosure related to voluntary risk disclosure (e.g. operational, 
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empowerment, political and economic). This result is consistent with Souabni (2011) 
who found that legal requirements and voluntary guidance shape much of the risk 
disclosure information within the annual report, but some companies go beyond the 
mandatory requirements. 
 
Furthermore, the interview analysis results showed that many companies‟ managers 
were not in favour of regulating disclosures and argued for minimising regulatory 
involvement, whereas some investors and financial analysts demanded regulatory 
involvement and would like to make risk disclosure mandatory. These results 
indicated that some companies‟ management were reluctant to disclose risk 
information voluntarily and that boards of directors in some companies manipulate 
and hide risk information. Hence regulators involvement is advisable in the case of 
emerging capital markets such as the UAE. This result is in line with the findings of 
Linsley and Shrives (2005, 2006) in the UK who also found UK managers reluctant to 
disclosure risks voluntarily.  In addition, the results suggested that best practice for 
risk disclosure in the UAE would be a balance of voluntary risk disclosures and 
mandatory requirements. The interviewees suggested this approach might allow for 
market and investor protection through mandatory requirements, and might give 
managers room to voluntarily disclose risks that are company-specific and industry-
specific.    
 
Table 9.29, located at the end of this chapter shows there is contradictory results in 
this regard. The contradiction in this finding is not significant because the opinion of 
some interviewees who preferred more mandatory requirements over a voluntary 
approach on risk disclosure is supported by the quantitative research which found that 
risk disclosure related to mandatory requirement is higher than risk disclosure related 
to voluntary incentives. The discussion on this issue justifies the contradiction in that 
a mix of mandatory requirements and a voluntary approach would be a suitable 
approach for the UAE environment.   
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9.3 The influence of IFRS risk disclosure requirements 
 
R.Q.3: What is the influence of IFRSs on risk disclosure practice of UAE companies? 
 
Table 9.11: IFRSs and risk disclosure  
Qualitative method Quantitative method 
Interview Content analysis Multivariate analysis  
- IFRSs are the main determinants of 
risk disclosure.  
- IFRSs cover all types of risks 
especially financial risks. 
- There is a need for additional 
regulatory requirements especially in 
issues that are not covered by IFRSs 
- The influence of IFRSs on risk 
disclosure was on three dimensions, 
firstly, industry level, secondly, 
compliance level, and thirdly, 
experience level 
- Some companies in the UAE did 
not apply IFRSs properly and hence 
did not fully comply with IFRSs.  
(see Grid 4) 
- IFRS disclosure 
requirements are the 
main determinant of 
risk disclosure by 
UAE companies.  
- Compliance with 
IFRSs is mandatory in 
the UAE especially 
during the sample 
period (2007, 2008 
and 2009). 
- Financial risk disclosures 
consist mainly of IFRS 
risk-related disclosures.  
- IFRS was positively 
correlated with company 
performance, auditor type, 
and concentration 
ownership. 
- Companies comply with 
IFRS regardless of their 
company size. 
- Companies audited by 
the Big4 audit firms tend 
to comply more fully with 
IFRS requirements 
 
The results of both the qualitative (interviews) and quantitative (regression and 
content analysis) research showed that IFRSs have positive impact on risk disclosure 
practice and level. The results showed that IFRSs were the main determinant of risk 
disclosures in the UAE especially disclosure of financial risks. The interviewees 
explained that IFRSs are mandatory and many companies and banks had adopted 
IFRSs from the early stages which reflected on the level and practice of their 
disclosures and risk disclosures.   
 
The interview results showed that some companies did not accurately apply IFRSs 
and did not fully comply with them which could explain some of the variation in risk 
disclosure level and practice among the companies. One of the solutions would be to 
use an external audit firm which could play a major role in ensuring full compliance 
with IFRSs and encouraging companies to disclose risks more, especially since the 
results of multivariate and univariate analysis showed audit firm size had a strong 
positive influence on the level of risk disclosure.  
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The results of multivariate analysis showed that the majority of explanatory variables 
appeared to have insignificant correlation with the level of IFRS-related risk 
disclosure (e.g. financial risk).  This result was in the line with some prior studies 
which found for example that company size has insignificant correlation with 
compliance with IFRSs (e.g. Street & Bryant, 2000). This result is also consistent 
with the argument of some interviewees. It could be justified that compliance with 
IFRSs was mandatory within the study period (2007-2009) and that compliance with 
mandatory requirements applied to all sample companies especially since all 
companies in this study were non-financial firms and in non-financial sectors and 
were subject to similar regulations and face similar risks. Many interviewees 
(especially regulators) emphasised that risk disclosure levels should not be variable 
because risk disclosure is mandatory and all companies should comply with the 
mandatory requirements fully.   
 
9.4 Firm-specific characteristics  
 
R.Q.4: What are the firm specific characteristics determinants of risk disclosure by the 
UAE listed companies? 
 
9.4.1 Company size and level of risk disclosure 
 
Table 9.12:  Company size and risk disclosure  
Qualitative method Quantitative method 
Interview Univariate 
analysis 
Multivariate analysis  
- Positive influence 
- No one said there was 
negative association. 
- No influence  
(see Grid 11) 
Positive and 
strong 
significance  
- Positive and strong significance  
- Never reported negative sign 
- No association in results between 
financial risk disclosure and firm size 
 
The results of both qualitative and quantitative methods confirmed a positive 
association between total risk disclosure and firm size. Most interviewees argued that 
big companies provide more risk disclosure which was also confirmed by most of the 
regression models. This supports the argument of information asymmetry (Akerlof, 
1970) and political costs (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) in that political costs increase 
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with an increase in company size and there is greater pressure and demand for more 
disclosure (e.g. risk disclosure) by investors and the users especially with an increase 
in information asymmetry between managers and investors (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
Therefore, this result implies that management in big companies tries to reduce 
political costs and information asymmetry problems by providing more information 
on risks. It is likely that this is also because big firms face more risks and that relative 
compilation costs are lower for big firms.   
 
When examining financial risk disclosure rather than total risk disclosure, regression 
analysis showed there was insignificant association between firm size and financial 
risk disclosures (most items related to IFRSs). Similar results were obtained from the 
interview analysis in that some interviewees said there was no influence from 
company size on financial risk disclosure. This result is in line with the argument by 
Lopes and Rodrigues (2007, p.46) who stated that “studies that analyse compliance 
with disclosure requirements of several IAS at the same time found no significance 
for company size”. It also depends on jurisdiction in that, if compliance with 
accounting standards (e.g. IFRSs) is mandatory as is the case with our sample in the 
UAE, company size shall have no influence since all companies are supposed to 
comply with IFRSs regardless of their size.  
 
9.4.2 Company performance and level of risk disclosure 
 
Table 9.13: Company performance and risk disclosure 
Qualitative method Quantitative method 
Interview Univariate analysis Regression analysis 
- There are several indicators for 
company performance. 
- Positive association 
- No influence  
- No one said there was negative 
association.  
(see Grid 13) 
ROA: Negative 
Tobin‟s Q: Positive 
ROA: Not significant 
Tobin‟s Q: Positive  
 
The results on the association between risk disclosure and company performance 
show mixed results in that some interviewees said there was no influence, and 
regression found insignificant association between ROA and risk disclosure. In 
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contrast, the majority of interviewees said there was positive association, and 
regression found a strong positive association between Tobin‟s Q and risk disclosure. 
It could be concluded that this association depends on the measures applied (e.g. 
Tobin‟s Q, ROA, ROE). Also it depends on whether risk disclosure is related to 
mandatory requirements or voluntary incentives. As was explained by some 
interviewees, if risk disclosure is mandatory, managers should comply with them 
regardless of the company‟s performance. The interview analysis showed that there 
are different indicators for company performance which could be classified as 
accounting measures (ROA, ROE) or market measures (e.g. share performance and 
Tobin‟s Q).   
 
The regression results show that there was insignificant association between 
accounting measure such as ROA and risk disclosure. However, the regression results 
showed that there is a positive association between market measures such as Tobin‟s 
Q and risk disclosures. The implication of this result indicates that market measures 
are more influential and useful than accounting measures. In addition, the positive 
association result is in line with the signalling argument as was also expressed by 
some interviewees, in that well-run companies with a good performance would 
provide more risk disclosure in order to signal to the users that good risk management 
systems are in place within the company (Linsley & Shrives, 2000).  
 
Table 9.29 shows there are contradictory results in the association between company 
performance and risk disclosure level. The contradiction in the finding in this section 
is not significant because both methods reported similarly mixed results. The 
contradiction here is due to using different measures for company performance: ROA 
and Tobin‟s Q. Some interviewees suggested a positive association whereas others 
said there is no influence, which is equivalent to the multiple regression results which 
also suggested a positive association in the case of Tobin‟s Q and not significant in 
the case of ROA.  
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9.4.3 Liquidity and level of risk disclosure  
 
Table 9.14: Liquidity and level of risk disclosure 
Qualitative method Quantitative method 
Interview Content analysis Multivariate analysis 
Mixed results 
- Positive 
- No influence 
- No one suggested 
negative influence  
(see Grid 14) 
- Many companies provided 
disclosures on their liquidity risks. 
- It has been an increase such 
disclosure during 2008 and 2009 as a 
result of the credit crunch and the 
global financial and the Dubai crisis.    
Mixed results 
- Positive  
- Not significant 
 
The interviewees explained that liquidity risk is the most important risk which 
companies in the UAE face, it may lead to other risks such as credit risk, legal risk 
and financial distress or bankruptcy. The results of qualitative and quantitative 
methods reported mixed results, for instance a positive association or no influence (or 
not significant). However, none of the two multiple regression methods reported 
negative association which is not in accordance with some prior studies which found a 
negative association (e.g. Wallace et al., 1994; Naser, Al-Khatib & Karbhari, 2002). 
The insignificant association results obtained from regression analysis are in line with 
some prior studies which reported insignificant association, for instance Owusu-
Ansah and Yeoh (2005) and Al Shammari et al. (2008). This result can be understood 
in the light of the argument given by one of the interviewees (Regulator2) who 
explained that risk disclosure especially disclosures of financial risks was a 
mandatory requirement which all companies have to comply with regardless of their 
liquidity position.  
 
The result of positive correlations obtained from the interview analysis and regression 
supported the argument regarding signalling as expressed by one of the interviewees 
(Company Manager 5) in that companies with good liquidity will provide more risk 
disclosure to signal to the market that good risk management is in place. Besides this, 
it supports the capital needs argument in that companies tend to provide more risk 
disclosures as a result of pressure or demand on the part of their lenders. In addition 
this result supports the agency cost argument which is that managers provide risk 
disclosure in order to reduce agency costs and information asymmetry between 
managers and debtholders or shareholders especially in the event of financial crisis.  
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Table 9.29 presents a summary of the main findings and shows there are contradictory 
results in this regard. The contradiction in this case is significant to the overall 
findings because the results from both methods do not support the expected sign and 
both methods did not report negative association. The interviewees suggest a positive 
association whereas other interviewees suggest no influence which is also observed 
by quantitative research in that some models reported positive association and other 
models reported insignificant association between liquidity ratio and risk disclosure.  
 
9.4.4 Level of company risk and risk disclosure  
 
Table 9.15: Level of company risk and risk disclosure  
Qualitative method Quantitative method 
Interview Univariate analysis Multivariate analysis 
- Level of company risk is indicated 
by market measures (e.g. risk and 
return on shares) and accounting 
measures (e.g. gearing). 
- It is subjective.  
- Mixed results (Positive, Negative, 
No influence)  
(see Grid 12)  
 Positive  Mixed results  
- Positive 
- Not significant 
 
The results on the association between level of company risk and risk disclosure from 
both qualitative and quantitative analyses were mixed as is shown in the above table. 
Linsley and Shrives (2005) also found mixed results where risk disclosure was not 
significantly correlated with certain risk level measures (e.g. gearing, beta, asset 
cover) but had a positive association with other measures (e.g. environmental risk 
measure). This result also confirmed what some interviewees said in that risk level / 
risk disclosure association is subjective as it depends on the measures, managers‟ 
attitudes and how the users perceived risk information (see Grid 12). The positive 
association observed supported the argument of agency cost in that companies with 
high risk levels would provide more risk disclosures in order to reduce monitoring 
costs that shareholders might incur (Abraham, Solomon & Stevenson, 2007) and in 
order to reduce conflicts between shareholders and debt holders since higher levels of 
risk would mean higher return for investors but might put off debt holders.    
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The negative association suggested by analysis of the interviewees was not supported 
by the regression results from this study and from prior empirical studies which found 
a positive association (e.g. Hassan, 2009; Deumes & Knechel, 2008). However, the 
interviewees who suggested a negative association argued that managers in high risk 
firms would reduce levels of risk disclosure because they do not want to lose their 
investors and capital provider such as banks who may give up on investing in high 
risk companies. Also they argued that some companies hide risk information to signal 
to the market that they are in a safe position. The regression results also suggested 
there was insignificant association which was in accordance with some prior 
empirical studies (e.g. Konishi & Ali, 2007; Amran et al., 2009). This result could be 
interpreted, as being linked to risk disclosure being a mandatory requirement which 
companies should comply with regardless of their risk level.   
 
Table 9.29 shows there are contradictory results in this regard. The contradiction in 
this case is not significant because the expected sign, based on the theoretical 
argument, is partially supported by some findings. Some interviewees suggested a 
negative association between risk level and disclosure level, whereas other 
interviewees suggested positive association and others suggested no influence. Similar 
findings were reflected in the regression results in that some models reported positive 
association (standard regression model) whereas normal score regression models 
reported insignificant association. These contradictory results suggested that 
theoretical argument, based on disclosure theory, should be complemented by 
empirical results and clearly justified in order to draw a valid conclusion.  
 
9.4.5 Industry type and risk disclosure  
 
Table 9.16: Association of industry type and risk disclosure  
Qualitative method Quantitative method 
Interview analysis Content analysis Univariate 
analysis 
Multivariate 
analysis  
Mixed results  
- There is influence.  
- There is no influence. 
(see Grid 15) 
Companies provide 
industry-specific risk 
disclosures (e.g. 
real-estate, food). 
- Significant 
difference  
- Not significant 
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The results of qualitative and quantitative methods reported mixed results. Some 
interviewees said risk disclosure varies according to industry type which was also 
supported by univariate analysis. Besides this, content analysis results confirmed that 
companies tend to provide industry-specific risk disclosures. This result is in 
accordance with some prior empirical studies (e.g. Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Amran, 
Bin & Hassan, 2009; Rajab & Schachler, 2009). It supported the argument by one of 
the interviewees who stated that risk level and regulations may vary according to the 
industry type, which indicated that there would be variations in the level of risk 
disclosure. In addition, this result supports the political cost argument in that the 
degree of demand for information by the users and lenders varies according to the 
industry and that manager may disclose more risk information in order to reduce the 
political costs such as costly requirements from regulators or lenders (Linsley & 
Shrives, 2000, p125).    
 
On the other hand some interviewees argued that industry type has no influence on 
risk disclosure which is also supported by multivariate analysis which found no 
significant association. Similar results were obtained from prior empirical studies (e.g. 
Konishi & Ali 2007; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004). Some interviewees argued risk 
disclosure is mandatory and should not vary according to the industry type. The 
regression result of insignificant correlation could be interpreted as being due to both 
industries in this study being non-financial (e.g. services, industrial) which are subject 
to the same set of regulations and disclosure requirements and face similar types of 
risks. Therefore, it could be concluded that this result did not contradict the previous 
results which found that industry type was significant and that variations occurred 
according to industry type.   
 
Table 9.29 illustrates the main results and shows there is contradiction in such 
association. The contradictory findings in the association between industry type and 
risk disclosure level are not significant in this case because both methods partially 
supported the expected sign and the theoretical argument in this association. 
However, the result of insignificant association (regression) or no influence 
(interview) is due to that all sample companies belonging to non-financial sectors 
which are subjected to similar rules and requirements.  
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9.4.6 Auditor type and level of risk disclosure 
 
Table 9.17: Auditor type and risk disclosure  
Qualitative method Quantitative method 
Interview Univariate analysis Multivariate analysis 
Mixed results 
- Positive influence 
- No influence  
- None of the interviewees said there 
was negative association.  
(see Grid 16) 
-Positive 
-Strong 
significance   
- Positive 
- Strong significance 
 
 
The result of the interview analysis showed mixed results, whereas the regression 
analysis showed a strong positive association between auditor type and level of risk 
disclosure. However, neither of the two methods found a negative association. The 
strong positive association is consistent with the view that the effectiveness of the 
monitoring activities on the agents (managers) for the principals (shareholders) 
through high quality external auditors reduces the agency costs (Watts & Zimmerman, 
1983; Inchausti, 1997; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This result also supports the 
signalling argument in that high quality or big companies try to hire big audit firms in 
order to signal to the market that the company is strong and give greater validity to the 
disclosures which are prepared or approved by the board. This is costly and therefore 
may be difficult for lower quality or small firms. 
 
This positive association was also found in some prior studies on risk disclosure (e.g. 
Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Deumes & Knechel, 2008) and non-risk disclosure 
empirical studies (e.g. Singhvi & Desai, 1971). In some developed markets such as 
the UK nearly all listed companies employ Big 4 auditors because of the pressure 
from the market for the enhanced credibility that a Big 4 audit is supposed to provide. 
As there is very little variation in this, it is hard to research the impact of auditors on 
disclosure.  
 
On the other hand, the suggestion by some interviewees that audit firm size did not 
have any influence on the level of risk disclosure is in the line with some previous 
empirical studies which found insignificant correlation (e.g. Wallace et al., 1994; 
Ahmed & Courtis, 1999). The interviewees argued that risk disclosure is part of 
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compulsory requirements and IFRSs which are supposed not to vary according to 
audit firm size, but there are arguments against this in that not all risk disclosures are 
mandatory but there are voluntary risk disclosures which might create variations in 
risk disclosure level. Therefore, it could be concluded that the positive association 
obtained from our results was more reliable in the case of risk disclosure in the UAE 
because this influence was theoretically justified and empirically evidenced.  
 
9.5 The influence of corporate governance on risk disclosure  
 
R.Q.5: What is the influence of corporate governance code on risk disclosure practice 
of UAE companies? 
 
Table 9.18: Corporate governance and risk disclosure 
Qualitative method Quantitative method 
Interview Content analysis Regression analysis  
- Positive influence 
- No influence  
- Some interviewees 
emphasised the influence of 
corporate governance on 
company and manager 
performance. 
- A stock market authority 
member pointed out that 
corporate governance covers 
risk disclosure and 
requirements that are not 
covered by IFRSs. 
(see Grid 17) 
- There was moderate influence 
from corporate governance on 
risk disclosure practices but this 
is growing with increased 
pressure from regulatory bodies 
and stock market authorities. 
- The focus of corporate 
governance was mainly on 
company performance and 
governance of the board  
- The number of items of risk 
disclosure related to the 
corporate governance code was 
limited. 
The results show 
that some variables 
have influence on 
risk disclosures 
whereas some other 
variables did not. 
 
The qualitative method reported mixed results with some interviewees suggesting 
there was a positive influence from corporate governance on risk disclosure whereas 
others said there was no influence on risk disclosure and that corporate governance is 
more to do with company performance than disclosure (see Grid 17). Similar results 
were obtained from the quantitative analysis which showed mixed results. The 
multiple regression analysis results on the association between corporate governance 
characteristics and risk disclosure levels show mixed results with some corporate 
governance characteristics appearing to be significant (e.g. ownership structure, risk 
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management) whereas other appeared insignificant (internal control, presence of non-
executive directors).  
 
There were mixed results regarding the influence of corporate governance on risk 
disclosure levels and practice. The results showed that the degree of the influence of 
corporate governance on disclosure was limited although there has been a growth in 
the amount of influences. This is because the corporate governance code in the UAE 
is relatively new and was only recently introduced (in 2007) by SCA 
(eStandarsForum, 2010a).  
 
Although some interviewees emphasised that corporate governance is more to do with 
company and manager performance than risk disclosure, the majority of interviewees 
suggested a positive influence from corporate governance on risk disclosure either in 
a direct way through corporate governance code requirements or in an indirect way 
through risk management and management accountability. This result is in line with 
the theoretical justification for the influence of corporate governance on disclosure in 
that corporate governance is considered an element for reducing agency conflicts and 
information asymmetry problems which help in enhancing monitoring and control 
activities; disclosure is seen as one of these tools.   
 
These results are consistent with some prior studies (e.g. Mallin, 2002; Ho & Wong, 
2001) which suggested corporate governance has an influence on disclosure and 
transparency. It could be concluded that corporate governance influences risk 
disclosure level and practice but in the case of the UAE the influence is still limited 
because the corporate governance code was only introduced in 2007 and the number 
of items of disclosure-related requirements within the code are limited.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
269 
 
9.6 Corporate governance characteristics  
 
R.Q.6: What are the influences of corporate governance characteristics on risk 
reporting in the UAE? 
 
9.6.1 Ownership structure and risk disclosure level  
 
Table 9.19: Ownership structure and risk disclosure level  
 Qualitative method Quantitative method 
 Interview analysis 
(see Grid 24) 
Univariate 
analysis 
Multivariate 
analysis 
Institutional 
ownership 
Positive  Positive  Positive  
Concentration 
ownership 
Negative  Positive  Positive  
Government 
ownership 
Positive 
Negative 
Not significant  Not significant  
Individual 
ownership 
- Weak experience and 
knowledge 
- Less demanded  
Negative  Negative 
Foreign 
ownership 
- Positive  
- Much experience and 
good level of knowledge  
Not significant  Not significant  
 
The overall results from both qualitative and quantitative methods supported the 
hypothesis that ownership structure has a significant influence on risk disclosure 
levels. The results showed that some ownership types, for instance institutional, 
concentration and individual ownership, have significant influence, whereas other 
types, for instance government and foreign ownership, appeared to be insignificant. In 
addition, some types of ownership have positive influence on risk disclosure whereas 
other ownership types have negative association. These results support the suggestion 
by some scholars that ownership structure has a major influence on attitudes to 
financial reporting and risk disclosure (Beattie et al., 2001; Abraham and Cox, 2007). 
 
Institutional investor ownership appeared to be significant and positive in both 
interviewee and regression analysis. This result supports the theoretical argument that 
institutional investors exert pressure and demand more disclosure in order to reduce 
information asymmetry (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Hassan, 2008). This result is also in 
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the line with some empirical studies for instance Abraham and Cox (2007) and Taylor 
(2001) who found a positive correlation between risk disclosure and short-term 
institutional investors.  
 
The results on concentration of ownership and risk disclosure were mixed. The 
interview analysis results suggested negative influence of concentration ownership on 
risk disclosure. Deumes and Knechel (2008) had similar findings. This result was in 
the line with the theoretical justification in that concentration ownership, capital 
owners have greater access to private and internal information and may not have any 
incentive to rely on public disclosure or increased risk disclosure especially in such 
cases where they do not experience a high degree of information asymmetry.  
 
On the other hand, the results of regression analysis showed significant and positive 
association between concentration ownership and risk disclosure. This result is not 
consistent with the argument in prior literature that ownership diffuse patterns 
promote a high level of public demand for disclosure and that in the case of 
concentration ownership risk disclosure patterns, the demand will be low and the risk 
disclosure level would be low (Kothari, 2000; Konishi & Ali, 2007). 
 
The results showed that the association between individual ownership and risk 
disclosure was significantly negative. This result is not consistent with some prior 
empirical studies which found insignificant association, for instance Konishi and Ali 
(2007) in Japan and Alsaeed (2006). This negative association could be justified in 
that insider ownership may be linked to board members and executive managers who 
may have full access to all information so they do not have any incentive to increase 
the level of risk disclosure and will even put off giving risk information in some cases 
especially if the managers see risk disclosure will be costly; their attitude to it may be 
in favour of decreasing the risk disclosure level or hiding risk information. For 
example in some cases the founder of the company is a member of the board and an 
executive manager of the company as in, for example ARAMEX.  
 
Another possible explanation of the negative association would be in keeping with 
some interviewees‟ opinions that individual investors, especially local (UAE) ones, 
did not have enough experience and knowledge, and did not demand more risk 
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disclosures, hence companies have no incentive to increase the number of risk 
disclosures and will even put off risk information disclosure (see Grid 24). This result 
is also in the light of the findings of Owusu-Ansah (1998) who argued that when there 
is more widely dispersed ownership, individual shareholders do not have bargaining 
power to access internal information.  
 
In the case of foreign investors the results were mixed in that multivariate results 
showed insignificant association which is in the line with some prior empirical studies 
(e.g. Mohobbot, 2005; Konishi & Ali, 2007) in the context of risk disclosure. 
However, the interview analysis suggested a positive association which was in line 
with Barako et al.‟s (2006) study in the context of voluntary disclosure. The 
interviewees discussed the fact that foreign investors, especially those from developed 
countries, may have had a lot of experience and therefore demand more disclosure 
and transparency before investing in a company. Also, they argued that companies 
have an incentive to provide more disclosure and risk disclosure in order to attract 
foreign capital.  
 
The results on the association between government ownership and risk disclosure 
were mixed in that some interviewees suggested a positive influence whereas others 
suggested the reverse. Qualitative analysis showed it was not significant in both 
univariate and multivariate analysis.  This mixed result is in the line with prior 
literature in that some studies found insignificant association (e.g. Cook, 1998), while 
others (e.g. Eng & Mak 2003, Cheng & Courtenay 2006) found a positive one  in the 
context of voluntary disclosure. In addition some interviewees argued for the negative 
influence of government ownership on risk disclosure practices which could be 
explained in the light of Owusu-Ansah‟s (1998) theoretical justification that 
government ownership may have exceptional access to company information 
therefore their level of reliance on public information would be low and companies 
then would have less incentive to increase the amount of public information. 
 
In addition, the results suggested the intervention of the government agencies in the 
UAE market has placed risk to competition and harmed free market. The results show 
that there is a considerable number of companies owned or majority owned by the 
government (e.g. EMAAR 40%, ETISALAT 60%) and in some cases the company is 
  
272 
 
established and financed by the government (e.g. ALDAR). This type of the 
government intervention did not consist with the modern theory of finance which 
suggests the role and involvement of government in the market should be minimised, 
assuming a capitalist and free market system. Also, it suggests the government role is 
to enforce the legal system, regulate the financial system to ensure full, accurate and 
timely disclosure of public information, and to introduce a fair competition law to 
prevent monopolies. 
 
The above theoretical concepts regarding the governmental role in market is 
somewhat questionable, especially after the recent global financial crisis where many 
governments in different countries (including capitalist and developed countries such 
as US and UK and in Europe), became involved in the market and supported private 
banks and private companies using taxpayers‟ money, which is supposed to be 
invested in public services (e.g. the case of the US government and General Motors 
Company). Another case in the context of the UAE would be the Dubai Financial 
Crisis where the Dubai government was involved in the market and invested in 
private companies (e.g. Dubai World) and private banks (e.g. Dubai Bank) and ended 
up with huge debts and in a crisis situation as a result of the global financial crisis.  
 
This result is in the line with OFT (2009, p.29) who argue that although government 
subsidies played a particularly important role in avoiding systemic collapse of the 
banking system during the recent financial crisis, there are significant risks to 
competition from this type of intervention and government may be rewarding 
inefficient firms and dampening competition. The implication of this result suggests 
that government and policy makers should consider carefully the cost and benefit of 
such intervention in the market and competition.  
 
Table 9.29 shows the main results and presents that there is a contradiction between 
the quantitative and qualitative results in this regard. The overall results of qualitative 
and quantitative research partially supported hypothesis 14 (H14) of significant 
influence of ownership structure on the risk disclosure level. However, there are 
contradictory findings for some individual variables, for example, concentration 
ownership and government ownership and foreign ownership as shown in Table 9.19. 
The contradicted finding in concentration ownership is not significant to the overall 
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findings because all results supported the hypothesis of significant influence although 
the direction sign is different in that some variables show positive influence whereas 
others reported negative association.  
 
However, the contradiction in the findings related to government ownership and 
foreign ownership is significant to the overall findings. This is because both 
quantitative research methods (univariate and multiple regression analysis) show 
insignificant association which is not in line with the qualitative results which suggest 
that government ownership (positive/negative) and foreign ownership (positive) have 
significant influence on the risk disclosure level. However, this contradiction reflects 
the literature in that some studies reported significant association whereas other 
studies found insignificant similar findings (chapter 3). It can be concluded that the 
matter of ownership structure on risk disclosure is subject to various factors. For 
instance, there are the attitude and experience of owners towards risk disclosure and 
whether jurisdiction may impose some rules that structure or restrict ownership, for 
example, some companies in UAE do not allow for foreign ownership (e.g. Etisalat). 
 
To sum up, the results showed that the influence varies according to the ownership 
type. This result implies that stock market authorities should promote awareness of 
and knowledge about disclosure practices among the participants in the stock market. 
Institutional and individual investors may place pressure on companies and demand 
more information since they appear to have significant influence on disclosure level.   
 
9.6.2 Board size and level of risk disclosure 
 
Table 9.20: Board size and risk disclosure  
Qualitative method Quantitative method  
Interview Content analysis Univariate 
analysis  
Multivariate 
regression 
Mixed results 
- Positive influence 
- Negative influence  
- No influence  
- The quality, qualification and 
structure of the board are more 
important than board size 
(see Grid 21) 
 The board of 
directors is 
responsible for 
company risks, risk 
management and 
risk disclosure. 
Weak 
positive 
significant 
association  
Positive but 
not significant  
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The results on board size and level of risk disclosure were mixed in both qualitative 
and quantitative analyses. These mixed results were consistent with some prior 
empirical studies; for example Cheng and Courtenay (2006) found insignificant 
correlation whereas Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) found significant and positive 
association in the context of voluntary risk disclosure. The content analysis results 
suggested that risk management and risk reporting are part of the boards‟ 
responsibilities. Some interviewees suggested that increased board size may result in 
less effective boards because it will be difficult to hold meetings with all members 
and this may impact negatively on risk disclosure levels.  
 
This result is in the line with the theoretical argument that increased board size will 
increase costs and hence have an adverse impact on disclosure levels (Jensen, 1993). 
The positive correlation obtained from the interviews and regression analysis 
supported the theoretical argument that bigger board size enhances the board‟s 
monitoring, control and management activities and hence enhances risk disclosure 
levels and practice (Cheng & Courtenay, 2006). Some interviewees argued that the 
qualifications and the amount of experience of the board members are more important 
than the number of members or the size of the board.  
 
Table 9.29 shows there are contradictory results; however, the contradiction within 
the results in this case is not significant because the both qualitative and quantitative 
research reported positive association which is in accordance with the expected sign 
and theoretical argument. Some interviewees suggested negative association which is 
not supported by the two regression analyses: univariate and multiple regression.  
 
9.6.3 Non-executive directors (NED) and level of risk disclosure   
 
Table 9.21: Non-executive directors and risk disclosure  
Qualitative method Quantitative method  
Interview Content analysis Univariate 
analysis  
Multivariate 
analysis  
- Positive impact 
- No one said there 
is a negative 
influence. 
- No influence 
- NED shall ensure that financial 
information is accurate and that 
the financial controls and 
systems of internal control and 
risk management are effective. 
Not 
significant 
Not 
significant  
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The results on the association between the proportion of non-executive directors and 
risk disclosure show mixed results which is similar to prior empirical literature. Some 
interviewees suggested positive association which is also supported by the content 
analysis results. This is in the line with Cheng and Courtenay (2006) who found a 
positive association in the context of voluntary disclosure. This result is in line with 
the argument that more disclosure is to be expected when non-executive directors play 
their roles effectively by monitoring board decisions, participating in committees, and 
recommending that management increase the level of disclosure (Haniffa & Cooke, 
2002; Eng & Mak, 2003). 
 
In contrast, other interviewees said there was no influence; this is supported by the 
result of „insignificant correlation‟ obtained from univariate and multivariate analysis. 
Similar results were obtained in risk disclosure studies by for instance Abraham and 
Cox (2007), and Deumes and Knechel (2008). Assigning non-executive directors to 
the board is a relatively new practice in the UAE where it has not been a priority and 
its influence has been limited. In addition, none of the interviewees expected a 
negative association, which was in contrast with Barako et al.‟s (2006) findings that 
there was negative correlation.  
 
This result implies that the presence of a non-executive director was considered good 
practice which was also in line with the corporate governance code in the UAE which 
encourages companies to increase the level of independence of the board and says that 
at least a third of the board should be comprised of non-executive directors. However, 
merely to focus on the structure or independence of the board or its compliance with 
the code does not necessarily result in significant or positive effects on the disclosure 
levels and performance of the company, therefore, the focus should be on how this 
mechanism could firstly affect company performance and secondly how it could 
manage conflicts of interest and serve the shareholders properly and increase their 
wealth, and finally how it could enhance transparency and disclosure practice within 
the company.   
 
The results are summarised in Table 9.29. The contradictory results on the association 
between NED and risk disclosure level are not significant. This is because the 
expected positive sign is supported partially by qualitative research in that some 
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interviewees suggested that NED have a positive influence on the risk disclosure 
level. Also content analysis results supported the positive association. This is in 
accordance with the theoretical justification within the literature (chapter 3) and 
hypothesis development (chapter 5).  
 
In addition, there were comments by some interviewees who said there is no influence 
which was supported by both regression analysis methods (univariate and 
multivariate). These results reflect some empirical studies which suggested non-
significant influence of NED on risk disclosure level (e.g. Abraham and Cox, 2007). 
It could therefore be concluded that the matter of the influence of NED on risk 
disclosure is subjective and depends on various issues which may vary from market to 
market.  
 
9.6.4 Independent directors and risk disclosure  
 
Table 9.22: Independent directors and risk disclosure  
Qualitative method Quantitative method  
Interview Content analysis Univariate 
analysis  
Multivariate 
regression 
- Positive  
- No one said it 
was negative. 
- No influence 
(see Grid 22) 
 Part of independent 
directors‟ responsibilities 
is promoting risk 
management and internal 
control through 
participation in audit or 
risk committees. 
Strong 
significant and 
positive 
correlation  
Significant 
positive but when 
all variables were 
included this 
became 
insignificant  
 
The results from both qualitative and quantitative methods show mixed results. Some 
interviewees and regression analysis suggested a positive association between the 
proportion of independent directors and the level of risk disclosure. Positive signs 
were also observed by some prior empirical studies (e.g. Abraham & Cox, 2007; Chen 
& Jaggi, 2000; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006). The positive sign of the association 
implied that independence of the board was considered good practice especially since 
stock market authorities encourage companies in such practices for example through 
the corporate governance code in the UAE. Independent directors can positively 
influence risk disclosure through the board decision-making process and through their 
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participation in committees such as the risk committee and the audit committee, as 
was suggested by the content analysis results.  
 
However, when all variables are considered in one regression model there appeared to 
be insignificant association in contrast to the argument of some interviewees that the 
presence of independent directors influenced risk disclosure (Grid 22). Similar results 
were obtained by some prior studies (e.g. Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Ho & Wong, 
2001; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). This could be explained in the sense that independent 
directors become identity with the board and undertake routine duties (Financial 
Analyst 1). In addition, neither of the methods (qualitative or quantitative) reported 
negative correlation, contrary to the finding of Eng and Mak (2003) who detected a 
negative association between outside directors and voluntary disclosures.  
 
Table 9.29 summarises the main results and shows there are contradictory results in 
this matter. The contradiction observed within the findings of the influence of 
independent directors on risk disclosure is not significant to the overall findings. This 
is because both research methods (qualitative and quantitative) reported similarly in 
that part of the results reported positive association and part of the results reported 
insignificant association. Similar findings were also observed within the literature. 
However, it can be concluded that the overall results support a positive association 
since grounded theory, content analysis, univariate analysis and multivariate 
regression partially reported positive association. This is also in line with the 
theoretical justification based on agency theory discussed in the literature (chapter 3).   
 
9.6.5 Duality and risk disclosure  
 
Table 9.23: Chairman and CEO duality and risk disclosure 
Qualitative method Quantitative method  
Interview Content analysis 
- Negative   
- Positive  
(see Grid 23) 
“On the executive front, our new CEO, Mr. Ahmed 
Rashid Al Arbeed, has very capably taken over the 
leadership of the management team from last May. 
This is in line with the corporate governance 
guidelines of the Company which called for separation 
of the Chairman and CEO functions”. (DANA GAS, 
2009, p.15) 
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The results from the qualitative method (interview) show mixed results regarding the 
influence of duality on risk disclosure. The study did not examine duality in 
regression analysis because of the data was insufficient. Content analysis results show 
that some companies referred to duality as a negative practice. It also shows that 
companies comply with the requirement of the UAE corporate governance code on 
separation of the position of chairman and CEO. These results are consistent with 
Forker (1992) who found a negative association between duality and disclosure in 
UK. In contrast some interviewees suggested a positive association between duality 
and risk disclosure. It is in line with Haniffa and Cooke (2002) who found a positive 
association between voluntary disclosure and duality.  
 
The implication of this result is less important for the UAE case since it is mandatory 
for all listed companies to separate the roles of chairman and CEO. However, this 
result suggests that the subject of the influence of duality on disclosure practice is a 
matter for debate. Therefore, regulators should be cautious about making non-duality 
a mandatory requirement.   
 
9.6.6 Internal auditors and risk disclosure  
 
Table 9.24: Internal auditor and risk disclosure  
Qualitative method Quantitative method  
Interview Content analysis Univariate 
analysis  
Multivariate 
analysis 
-  Internal auditors should 
ensure proper risk 
management 
- Promote company‟s 
performance which in turn 
encourages the managers to 
disclose more 
- Enhance financial 
reporting through the 
reduction of errors in the 
financial statements 
 - Responsibility of 
internal auditors regarding 
company‟s risks is in 
terms of controlling, 
monitoring, reporting and 
developing effective risk 
management. 
- Internal audit process is 
more to do with internal 
reporting than reporting to 
external parties  
Positive  
Significant  
Negative 
but weakly 
significant  
 
 
Both qualitative and content and univariate analyses confirmed the positive influence 
of the presence of internal auditors on risk disclosure and risk management. This 
result is in line with Page and Spira (2004). The interview analysis suggested internal 
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auditors help in managing risk and reducing error in financial statements. The 
interviewees emphasised the independence of internal auditors from executive 
management and they suggested they should be linked to the board or audit 
committee. The content analysis results confirmed the responsibility of internal 
auditors regarding companies‟ internal risks and fraud; however, the results suggested 
that the internal auditor‟s role is more to do with internal risk detection and reporting 
to internal parties than with reporting to external parties. However, some interviewees 
suggested that communication between internal auditors and external auditors may 
eventually influence disclosure and the process of reporting to external parties.  
 
Multivariate regression analysis results reported weakly significant and negative 
association which was unexpected and did not support our hypothesis. This result is 
consistent with Lin et al. (2011) who found that some functions of internal audit (e.g. 
internal audit activities related to financial reporting) were negatively associated with 
disclosure of material weakness. This result could be justified in that an effective 
internal auditing by internal auditors would reduce risks within the company; 
therefore there will be fewer risks to report on and hence a lower number of risk 
disclosures.  
 
Another explanation was given by some interviewees (see Grid 8), which was that the 
board decides on what is to be disclosed in the annual report but they are responsible 
for financial statements and reporting; some directors may try to hide the internal risk 
information provided by internal auditors in order to save a company‟s reputation and 
not put off their shareholders and investors. This result implied that the mere 
existence of internal auditors does not necessarily lead to increased risk disclosure or 
result in a better quality of risk disclosure. The results suggest that a high quality in 
internal auditors and their activities and practices are necessary in order to promote 
informative risk reporting.   
 
The contradiction of the results regarding the influence of internal auditors on risk 
disclosure is shown in Table 9.29. The contradictory result is not significant to the 
overall findings. This is because the overall results suggested positive influence of 
internal auditors (e.g. interview, content analysis and univariate analysis). The 
negative association observed by multiple regression does not contradict the previous 
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results (positive) because it was justified that internal auditors have a positive overall 
role in risk management which may lead eventually to reduced risks and hence the 
company has few risks to disclose or report on.     
 
9.6.7 Audit committee and risk disclosure  
 
Table 9.25: Audit committee and risk disclosure  
Qualitative method Quantitative method  
Interview Content analysis Univariate 
analysis  
Multivariate 
regression 
- Encourages the company to 
fully comply with disclosure 
requirements 
- Recommends that the board 
discloses risk information  
- Monitors internal risks 
- No one said there was negative 
influence 
 Responsibility for 
company‟s risks, risk 
disclosures and risk 
management 
Significant 
positive  
Not 
significant 
 
 
Both qualitative and quantitative results showed that the audit committee has a 
positive influence on risk disclosure practice by encouraging the company to fully 
comply with disclosure and reporting requirements and recommending the board to 
disclose certain information, by monitoring internal risks and reviewing internal 
auditors‟ reports. The result supported the theoretical argument based on agency 
theory and information asymmetry that an audit committee is to be considered a 
monitoring element which may reduce agency conflicts between agent and principals. 
Also, an audit committee could help in reduce information asymmetry by their 
recommending that the board disclose certain items and by providing an internal 
reporting channel.  
 
In addition, some interviewees emphasised the importance of audit committees being 
independent from executive management which is consistent with Taylor (2011) who 
found a positive association between risk disclosure and audit committee members‟ 
independence ratio. The content analysis results confirmed that some companies make 
audit committees responsible for company risks, risk disclosures and risk 
management. The results are consistent with Ho and Wong (2001) and Barako et al. 
(2006) who found positive correlation between voluntary disclosure and the presence 
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of an audit committee. On the other hand, the multivariate analysis result shows 
insignificant association between risk disclosure and audit committee size which 
indicated that size is irrelevant in terms of risk disclosure. Similar insignificant results 
were reported by Forker (1992) in UK and Neri (2010) in Italy.  
 
9.6.8 Internal control and risk disclosure  
 
Table 9.26: Internal control and risk disclosure  
Qualitative method Quantitative method  
Interview Content analysis Univariate 
analysis  
Multivariate 
analysis 
Most interviewees 
confirmed a positive 
influence from 
internal control on 
risk disclosure.  
(see Grid 19) 
 Confirmed the influence 
of internal control 
systems on risks and risk 
management practices 
which include risk 
reporting 
Strong 
significant and 
positive 
correlation  
Positive but 
insignificant 
association 
 
The results of both qualitative and quantitative analysis showed that internal control 
was positively associated with the risk disclosure level and practice. Although the 
multiple regression results showed positive but insignificant correlation in all models, 
the univariate analysis showed strong significant and positive association between 
internal control and risk disclosure levels. The result of the internal control system 
and reporting having a positive influence on risk disclosure levels was in keeping with 
the theoretical justification in the sense that internal control is considered a 
monitoring tool which reduces agency conflict (Deumes & Knechel, 2008). 
 
The interview analysis results suggested that an internal control system will 
encourage companies to have proper risk management and financial statements and 
reporting. The results also suggested that reporting on internal control enhances 
management accountability, monitoring and control processes, motivates managers to 
disclose risk more accurately and clearly, and to fully comply with disclosure 
requirements and to facilitate the flow of information within the organisation.  
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9.6.9 Risk management and risk disclosure  
 
Table 9.27: Risk management and risk disclosure  
Qualitative method Quantitative method  
Interview Content analysis Univariate 
analysis  
Multivariate 
analysis  
- Risk management part 
of corporate governance 
and financial reporting 
standards (IFRSs) 
- Positive influence of 
risk management system 
on risk disclosures  
- Education and 
knowledge regarding 
risk management 
- Limited risk 
management disclosures 
needs to be improved  
(see Grid 18). 
- Risk management 
processes include 
reporting on risks for 
internal parties and 
external parties.  
- Some companies 
provide separate section 
on risk management 
- Responsibility for 
company‟s risks and risk 
management was 
observed to be with the 
board of directors, 
executive management, 
committees (e.g. audit 
committee, risk 
committee) and senior 
management. 
Significant and 
positive  
Positive in all 
models and 
significant in 
most models 
 
The results from both qualitative and quantitative methods showed that risk 
management system has positive influence on risk disclosure. This association was in 
the line with some prior empirical studies (e.g. Hassan, Saleh & Abd Rahman, 2008; 
Neri, 2010; Beasly et al., 2005). In addition, this result supported the theoretical 
argument that companies employ risk management in order to reduce agency cost and 
information asymmetry as the risk management system is considered a monitoring 
tool by shareholders (Kajuter, 2006) and hence a way of maximising shareholder 
wealth (Solomon et al., 2000). This result also suggested that setting up a separate risk 
management department or appointing a committee or officer would help in 
promoting a risk management system and hence increase the level of risk disclosure.  
 
The results showed that there was an increase in risk management disclosures as a 
result of the growing demand by the users (e.g. shareholders and financial analysts) 
and pressure due to regulatory requirements (e.g. IFRSs and corporate governance 
code) since risk management disclosure would provide guidance in evaluating 
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management performance in dealing with risks and uncertainties (Lajili & Zeghal, 
2005). The results showed that there were limited risk management disclosures by 
some companies because risk management is considered a new practice in the region 
(Financial Analyst 1) and therefore some interviewees suggested more improvements 
and risk disclosures related to risk management. 
 
9.7 Risk disclosure theory  
 
The detail discussion on risk disclosure theory is provided in chapter 7 (section 7.4). 
This section explains the support of the risk disclosure theory of quantitative research.  
 
Table 9.28: Risk disclosure theory  
Qualitative method Quantitative method  
Interview Content analysis Multivariate analysis  
Sources of risks (Dimension 1): Management explains 
various internal and external 
risks in the annual report 
 
Voluntary incentive for risk 
disclosure (Dimension 2) 
Management provides 
additional or voluntary 
information  
 
Mandatory requirements on risk 
disclosure (Dimension 2-B): 
Compliance with IFRSs and 
corporate governance  
 
Decision-making and 
management 
(Dimension 3-A) 
Management and board 
responsibility for risk 
disclosure 
 
For less risky performance 
(Dimension 3-B) 
 Positive association between risk 
disclosure and risk management  
Management attitude to risk 
disclosure  
(Dimension 4-A)  
Managers recognise the 
right of shareholders to 
receive all information in a 
timely manner 
 
Users‟ needs  
(Dimension 4-B)  
 Institutional ownership   
Foreign ownership 
Individual investors  
Firm-specific characteristics 
(Dimension 5-A)  
 Confirmed the influence of some 
firm-specific characteristics  
Qualitative method Quantitative method  
Interview Content analysis Multivariate analysis  
Corporate governance 
characteristics (Dimension 5-B)  
 Confirmed the influence of some 
firm-specific characteristics 
Scope of improvement and 
change (Dimension 6) 
Some companies have 
adopted best international 
practices  
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One of the main findings of this research is regarding the theory of risk disclosure 
which explains it in six main stages which are summarised above (for further details 
on the theory see risk disclosure theory and the chart in chapter 7). The theory was an 
outcome of the qualitative method and was based on the analysis of the interviewees‟ 
responses. The quantitative method and findings provided some support for the stages 
in the theory. The content analysis results support Dimension 1 in that some managers 
explained various internal and external risks within the annual report.  
 
Dimension 2-A, voluntary incentives for risk disclosure, was supported by the content 
analysis where companies were found to provide addition information above 
mandatory disclosure requirements. Dimension 2-B explained the influence of 
compliance and mandatory disclosure requirements on risk disclosure which is 
supported by the evidence of increased mandated risk disclosures due to IFRSs and 
corporate governance requirements.  
 
Dimension 3-A explained the outcomes of risk disclosure, for instance for decision 
making purpose for internal users and external users, which is supported by the 
evidence on the influence of management and the board on risk disclosure and the 
influence of institutional and individual investors on risk disclosure practices. 
Dimension 3-B was supported by the evidence on the positive influence of risk 
management on risk disclosure. Dimension 4 is also supported by the evidence on 
management attitude toward risk obtained by the content analysis.  
 
Dimension 5 is concerned with the determinants of risk disclosure which were 
supported by the evidence of regression analysis on the influence of firm 
characteristics and corporate governance characteristics on risk disclosure. Finally, 
Dimension 6 in the risk disclosure theory is the scope for improvement in risk 
reporting practices for instance in terms of regulations and rules, and market 
participants. Content analysis results showed that companies tend to adopt best 
international practice in order to improve their disclosure practices which could 
confirm Dimension 6.  
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Summary of the results  
 
Table 9.29: Summary of the main results  
Risk disclosure practice Expected Qualitative Quantitative Result 
R.Q.1: What is the current risk reporting practice of the UAE listed companies? 
H1 Financial more than non-financial 
risk disclosure 
Significant 
difference 
Supported Supported Supported 
H2 Qualitative more than quantitative 
risk disclosure 
Significant 
difference 
Supported Supported Supported  
H3 Forward-looking less than 
historical risk disclosure  
Significant 
difference 
Supported  Supported  Supported  
H4 More good news than bad news 
disclosures 
Significant 
difference 
Supported  Supported  Supported  
R.Q.2: Should risk disclosure be mandatory or voluntary for companies in the UAE? 
H5a Mandatory risk disclosure more 
than voluntary risk disclosure 
Significant 
difference 
Supported  Supported  Supported  
H5b Mandatory more favoured than 
voluntary risk disclosure 
Significant 
difference 
Mixed 
results 
Supported Mixed 
results 
R.Q.3: What is the influence of IFRSs on the risk disclosure practice of the UAE companies? 
H6 IFRSs will be the main dominants 
for risk disclosures 
Positive  Supported Supported Supported  
Firm-specific characteristics     
R.Q.4: What are the firm characteristic determinants of risk disclosure by the UAE companies? 
H7 Firm size and risk disclosures Positive Supported Supported Supported  
H8 Company performance and risk 
disclosures 
Positive  Mixed 
results 
Mixed 
results 
Mixed 
results 
H9 Liquidity ratio and risk disclosure Negative  Mixed 
results 
Positive  Mixed 
results 
H10 Level of company risk and risk 
disclosure 
Negative Mixed 
results 
Positive Mixed 
results 
H11 Level of risk disclosure differs 
according to industry type  
Significant 
difference  
Mixed 
results  
Not 
significant 
Mixed 
results 
H12 Audit firm and risk disclosure Positive Supported  Supported  Supported  
Corporate governance characteristics      
R.Q.5: What is the influence of corporate governance on risk disclosure of the UAE companies? 
H13 Corporate governance has positive 
influence on risk disclosure 
Positive  Supported  Supported Supported  
R.Q.6: What are the influences of corporate governance characteristics on risk reporting in UAE? 
H14 Ownership structure and 
level of  risk disclosure 
Significant 
influence 
Supported  Mixed 
results 
Mixed 
results 
H15 Board size and level of risk 
disclosure 
Positive  Mixed results Supported  Mixed 
results 
H16 Non-executive directors and 
level of risk disclosure 
Positive Positive  
No influence 
Positive/ 
insignificant 
Mixed 
results  
H17 Independent directors and 
level of risk disclosure   
Positive Positive 
No influence 
Supported Mixed 
results  
H18 Duality and risk disclosures Negative  Supported  Supported  Supported 
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H19 Internal auditors and level 
of risk disclosure  
Positive  Supported  Negative Mixed 
results  
H20 Audit committee and level 
of risk disclosure  
Positive  Supported  Supported  Supported  
H21 Internal control system and 
level of risk disclosure  
Positive Supported  Supported Supported  
H22 Risk management system 
and level of risk disclosure  
Positive Supported  Supported Supported  
 
9.8 Summary 
 
The overall discussion shows that there is large variation in risk disclosure practice 
among UAE companies. Financial risks are the most dominant risk disclosure 
category and there is demand to go beyond financial and market risks and provide 
more information on non-financial risks. Quantitative risk disclosures and forward-
looking risk disclosures are much less frequent within annual reports, which limit the 
quality of risk disclosures and their usefulness for investment decision making. Risk 
disclosure is part of management responsibility and such disclosure enhances 
management accountability. A mixture between voluntary risk disclosure and 
mandatory requirements is found to be suitable for the UAE market. The discussion 
suggests that IFRSs has a positive influence on risk reporting level and practice; 
however the focus of IFRS was mainly on financial risks. Therefore, there is a 
demand to provide standards or requirements on non-financial risks. 
 
The discussion of the determinants of the risk disclosure level or practice reported 
various findings in that some variables are confirmed by both methods whereas other 
variables reported different results. The overall discussion showed that firm-specific 
characteristics influence risk disclosure level and practice in the UAE. UAE risk 
reporting practice is dominated by the influence of international practice. The 
discussion shows there are mixed results on the association between risk disclosure 
and most corporate governance variables. The discussion suggested that the influence 
of corporate governance characteristics is a matter of debate and further research are 
needed. The risk disclosure theory produced in this thesis as an outcome of the 
qualitative research is found to be valid since its different dimensions were supported 
by quantitative research. Next chapter will draw an overall conclusion of the study 
along with the contribution, limitations and suggestions for further research.  
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Chapter 10  
Conclusion  
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10.0 Introduction  
 
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section draws an overall 
conclusion on the main findings of the research. The next section describes the 
contribution of the study to the knowledge and practice of risk disclosure. The third 
section explained some implications of the study.  The fourth section shows the 
limitations of the research. Finally, some recommendations for further research are 
provided.  
 
10.1 Conclusion 
 
This study provided an empirical investigation into the risk disclosure practice of a 
sample of listed UAE companies. The main purpose of the study was to study 
different types of risk disclosure and the factors determining and influencing risk 
disclosure level and practice. The thesis presented an up-to-date description of such 
practices. This research examined corporate risk disclosure over a three years period 
(2007, 2008, and 2009). The study then examined the correlation between risk 
disclosure level and some determinants, for instance firm-specific characteristics and 
corporate governance characteristics. 
 
Risk disclosure practice  
 
The findings of the research confirmed that there was a trend of increasing amounts of 
risk disclosure over the period which reflects the increasing pressure from regulators 
and users. The thesis examined the current state of corporate risk disclosure levels and 
practice in the context of the UAE environment. There was variation in risk in the 
reporting practices of the sample companies in terms of the total level of risk 
disclosure, the risk disclosure categories (e.g. financial and non-financial), the nature 
and volume of risk disclosure (e.g. qualitative and quantitative), the time orientation 
(e.g. forward-looking and historical), and the types of news (e.g. good-news and bad-
news). This could be because of the absence of any kind of comprehensive standard 
or specific regulations on risk reporting and risk management.  
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Some companies did not disclose risk information as such or give priority to 
disclosing their risks or to inform shareholders; rather, they disclosed risk information 
as part of their regular financial disclosure requirements, especially ones which result 
from IFRSs and corporate governance codes. Some companies were not fully 
practicing proper risk reporting. In addition, instead of a mere count of the number of 
items disclosed, this research adopted content analysis using a checklist in order to 
capture the diverse risk disclosure categories which at the same time helped in 
capturing some dimensions of the quality of risk disclosure for example in terms of 
volume and nature, the time-frame, and the type of risk news.   
 
The volume of risk disclosure (as one of the quality dimensions) of listed companies 
varied significantly between different companies. Also, although the companies 
provide risk information on the different risk disclosure categories (e.g. financial, 
operational, environmental and social responsibility, strategic, information processing 
and technology, integrity, regulation, empowerment, political and economic, and 
governance), the results showed there was considerable variation in risk disclosure 
level. Some risk disclosure categories were extensively disclosed (e.g. financial and 
operational) whereas little attention was paid to other categories (e.g. information 
processing and technology, and empowerment).  
 
In addition, the study found that the sample companies disclosed very little forward-
looking risk information which limited the usefulness of the information given for 
investment decision-making by investors and financial analysts. The results show 
there was bias towards qualitative, historical and good-news risk disclosures which 
may indicate that managers tended to provide ineffective risk disclosure. It can be 
concluded that the quality of risk disclosure needs to be improved as was observed in 
the analysis and that this was also recommended by many interviewees (e.g. Financial 
Analyst 1). 
 
Information needs of the users and management attitudes  
 
There has been growing attention and calls from accounting standard setters and in 
the accounting literature to improve financial reporting in order to satisfy the 
information needs of the users and to have more accountability or stewardship on the 
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part of management. Such attention reflects the disclosure practice and requirements 
in the UAE where compliance with IFRSs and a corporate governance code has 
become mandatory. The users of information value the annual report as a source of 
information and as a communication channel but there is demand for more timely 
disclosure and forward-looking information. A recent development is the governance 
annual review which is mandatory and has been part of the corporate governance code 
since 2007. There is a need to increase the level of knowledge of risk disclosure and 
risk management among capital market participants in UAE (especially individuals). 
The managers‟ attitudes towards risk and risk management were generally supportive 
of increasing risk disclosure levels and improving risk management practices but this 
was limited to what is required by the mandated risk disclosures since little risk 
information was found from the voluntary risk disclosure categories.   
 
It can be concluded that the overall findings of this study suggested that information 
needs of users were not being fully met and companies are not providing the full 
picture of the risks that they face. In order to gain investor confidence in UAE, 
companies should provide credible and reliable financial and risk information, 
especially the kind on which investment decisions are based. In addition, the financial 
crisis and economic downturn have increased the appetite of investors, especially 
institutional and foreign ones, for entities that provide credible financial and risk 
information that can be compared and is transparent.  
 
Mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure  
 
UAE companies did disclose voluntarily some risk information but most of the risk 
information was related to the mandatory requirements, for instance IFRSs. The 
results show there was bias towards financial risk disclosure (mandatory) which 
indicated that companies‟ managers may be reluctant to provide information on risk 
voluntarily. The study showed that accounting standards and corporate governance 
(both are mandatory) influence risk reporting and help in enhancing the risk 
disclosure level.  
 
The implication of this conclusion is that regulation involvement should be enhanced 
in order to offer clear guidance for risk reporting and risk management. In addition, 
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mandating risk disclosure may reduce the incentive for managers to enhance 
disclosures, especially firm-specific or industry-specific risk information; therefore, 
when introducing rules on disclosure, regulators should assess carefully the cost and 
benefits of disclosure for the companies and the information needs of the users in 
order to set out effective rules for risk disclosures. A typical example would be the 
concept of „safe harbour‟ in the Company Act 2006 in the UK which encourages 
companies to disclose more information details, especially forward-looking and risk 
disclosures (ASB, 2007, p.3), without risk of civil litigation arising.     
 
Accounting standards (IFRS)  
 
Accounting standards are intended to deal with information gaps in the market, thus 
encouraging companies to improve their financial reporting; however, the focus of 
existing accounting standards (IFRS in the case of UAE) is on financial aspects which 
may explain the dominance of financial risk disclosure over other risk disclosure 
categories. The results indicated that mandatory compliance with IFRSs has 
influenced the increases in the level of risk disclosure given by the companies; 
however, it cannot ensure the best quality of risk information and best practice. 
Therefore, there should be more effort to enhance the financial reporting standards‟ 
quality and include not only financial aspect but also other categories of information 
as well as requirements for forward-looking and forecast information.  
 
This gap in the international accounting standards seems to be filled by IASB which is 
being included in the upcoming accounting standards, “Management Commentary”, 
in that it requires companies to include information on risk exposures, strategies and 
company future plans, and a description of the most important risks and uncertainties 
(IASB, 2005) which in turn may help users of the annual reports to understand the 
company‟s position and help in their decision-making process.  
 
This new standard would also address the gap and the call by many accounting 
scholars for the traditional financial reporting model form to develop from being 
merely historical to including forward-looking information (e.g. Beattie et al., 2004). 
Besides this, the new standard would allow managers to have room to disclose their 
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company-specific and industry-specific risks as recommended by some prior studies 
(e.g. Schrand & Elliott, 1998). 
 
Firm-specific characteristics  
 
The study investigated some potential determinants of risk disclosure for instance 
firm-specific and governance-specific characteristics. It examined some relationships 
between firm-specific characteristics and risk disclosure which were identified by 
prior risk disclosure studies and the recommendations of the interviewees which 
minimised the bias of variables selection. The qualitative and quantitative analysis 
results on the correlation between risk disclosure levels and corporate-specific 
characteristics varied in that some variables were found to be positive (e.g. firm size, 
auditor type) whereas all other variables reported mixed results (e.g. company 
performance, company risk level).  
 
These results suggest that the associations between risk disclosure and firm specific 
characteristics cannot be the same in all capital markets because it depends on many 
factors, for instance 1) theoretical justification, in that different studies employ 
different theories and set different hypothesis, 2) the measures, in that some variables 
can be measured by different measures, 3) sample size (e.g. large or small), 4) 
industry type (e.g. financial or non-financial). Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
correlation between disclosure or risk disclosure and corporate-specific attributes is 
still ambiguous, which is evidenced by the various results among the prior empirical 
studies and is also evidenced by this study.    
 
Corporate governance characteristics  
 
The thesis examined the influence of corporate governance on risk disclosure level 
and practice. The study investigated the relationship between some corporate 
governance characteristics and risk disclosures. The influence of corporate 
governance characteristics on risk disclosure was mixed in that some variables have 
positive correlations (e.g. risk management) and other variables have significant 
negative association (e.g. duality) and some variables have mixed results (e.g. board 
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size, non-executive directors). It can be concluded that good corporate governance has 
a positive influence on risk disclosure practices in general terms.  
The results showed that corporate governance disclosure plays a complementary role 
to other disclosure requirements, for instance IFRSs, and covers aspects that have not 
been covered by IFRSs, for example non-financial disclosure items such as 
environmental and social responsibility, regulation and empowerment. However, the 
mere existence of a corporate governance code or governance practice does not 
necessarily ensure good governance and risk disclosure practice. There are some other 
elements influencing such practices which should be considered, for instance in the 
area of internal control, companies should ensure that proper and effective internal 
systems exist. Besides this, in terms of internal auditors, it can be concluded that 
companies should ensure that internal auditors‟ functions and activities are clearly 
defined and any procedures followed in order to contribute positively to financial 
reporting and risk reporting.  
 
When setting out regulation and rules, regulators in UAE need consider the context of 
the UAE business environment for example in setting out and implementing a 
corporate governance code not to just follow or adopt international best practice. For 
example one of the critical issues in the UAE capital market is the increased influence 
of government ownership in the market through a government agency involvement in 
listed companies which is considered negative by both Modern Finance theory and by 
some interviewees (e.g. financial analysts) in that it may put other private or non-
government owned companies at a competitive disadvantage.  
 
10.2 Contribution of the research 
 
This study aimed to contribute to knowledge and to practice. The study contributes to 
the knowledge and the disclosure literature by examining risk disclosure level and 
practice firstly from an emerging capital markets perspective (e.g. the UAE) and 
secondly from a broad perspective, for example, regulation, IFRS and corporate 
governance. Since most risk disclosures empirical studies have focused on the 
developed capital market, this study attempted to address the gap in the risk disclosure 
literature by examining the emerging capital market which has different conditions 
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and a different environment from developed markets, for instance developing markets 
are less regulated and have less transparency.  
 
The study contributes to knowledge by producing a „risk disclosure theory‟ which is 
based on qualitative research (chapter 7) and quantitative research (chapter 8). The 
theory is discussed in detail in chapter 7. The dimensions of the theory were 
supported by quantitative research as shown in the discussion (chapter 9). 
Furthermore, the study contributed to the literature by studying the joint effect of 
firm-specific and corporate governance characteristics on risk disclosure level.  
 
There has been growing interest in corporate governance mechanisms and disclosures 
by academics and stock market participants; however, the focus of much of the 
corporate governance research has been the influence of corporate governance on 
companies‟ performance. This study attempted to contribute to the literature by 
examining the influence of corporate governance on disclosure level and practice in 
the context of risk disclosure. In addition, the association between disclosure and 
firm-specific characteristics has long been of interest in accounting and disclosure 
literature. Therefore, this study attempts to contribute to the literature on the influence 
of corporate governance characteristics on risk reporting along with the influence of 
firm-specific characteristics. 
 
In addition, the study attempted to contribute to financial reporting practice and 
corporate governance practice in the UAE and to provide recommendations for 
improvement. There have been considerable efforts to improve such practices, for 
instance implementing IFRSs and the corporate governance code. It has become a 
mandatory requirement for all listed companies to comply with IFRSs since 2003 
(Deliotte, 2011) and with the corporate governance code since 2007 
(eStandardsForum, 2010a).  
 
Another contribution was mixed methods based on qualitative and quantitative 
approaches. The study includes discussion and analysis on the matter of risk 
disclosure based on findings obtained from market participants, regulators and 
preparers and users of financial statements, together with findings from empirical data 
obtained from quantitative research which is based on content analysis and regression 
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analysis. The findings and implications of this thesis would be of interest to different 
groups of market participants, for instance company managers, financial analysts, 
investors and regulators.  
 
10.3 Implications   
 
The study contributes to policy debate through the risk disclosure index which is 
produced in this study. The index is self constructed and based on the IFRSs, the 
corporate governance code in the UAE and previous disclosure indices recommended 
by prior studies. The risk disclosure index in this study adopted international sources 
and practice along with the local culture and business environment, for example, the 
Arthur Andersen Business model which has been widely applied in previous 
disclosure studies. Therefore, it would be of benefit for regulators and policy makers, 
especially those who analyse or monitor disclosure and transparency. The risk 
disclosure index in this study provides detailed items and is well classified and 
structured, for example, it demonstrates financial risks, operational risks, environment 
and social risks, information processing and technology risks, strategic and business 
risks, regulatory and compliance risks, integrity and governance risks, empowerment 
and employee risks and political and economic risks.  
 
The study contributes to regulatory policy and accounting standards which focus on 
disclosure, especially risk reporting. The implication of this study for policy makers is 
to go beyond financial risk and produce requirements on non-financial risks. In 
addition, accounting standards setters and bodies could benefit from the findings and 
implement the risk disclosure index of this thesis. Many scholars criticise the current 
model of financial reporting in that most standards focus on financial aspects. IASB 
tries to overcome this problem within the upcoming standard “Management 
Commentary”. The findings and the disclosure index in this study could be 
implemented within this new standard. The standards setters could include the risk 
disclosure index of this study in their discussion and draft of the upcoming standard.  
 
Furthermore, the policy makers of corporate governance codes could see the findings 
and the disclosure index of this study is useful, especially in the UAE. The focus of 
the UAE corporate governance code is on internal control risk and risk management 
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aspects. This study provides different and detailed risk items related to corporate 
governance, for example, management and employee fraud.  
 
10.4 Limitations  
 
This study extends our understanding on risk reporting practices and our empirical 
knowledge on disclosure especially in terms of risk disclosure quantity and quality, 
for instance their volume, nature, the time frames, and types of news published. Also 
it extends our knowledge on the determinants of risk reporting, for instance firm-
specific and governance-specific characteristics. There is no research without 
limitations and this study is no exception. The first limitation is that the study only 
examined risk disclosure from one source, the annual report, whereas several 
communication channels are existed which might be considered timely sources of 
information, for example daily disclosure presses on the stock market website, press 
releases, conference calls and one-to-one private meetings. Investigating risk 
information within such sources of information could be a suggestion for further 
research.  
 
The second limitation is the small sample size in the study which may limit the 
generalisability of the findings. However, this sample was the best available because 
the study only focused on  non-financial companies and omitted other financial 
sectors for instance banking, financial institutions and fund managers, and insurance. 
In order to overcome this limitation the study employed a mixed methods approach 
using qualitative (e.g. semi-structured interview) and quantitative (e.g. content 
analysis and regression analysis) methods. These were combined with regression 
results and interviewees‟ opinions to allow valid findings and conclusions to be drawn 
and the subjectivity of qualitative approaches to be overcome.  
 
The third limitation is related to the content analysis approach in that interpretation 
was potentially subjective. This subjectivity cannot be fully removed; however, the 
researcher applied various solutions to minimise this limitation. For instance, firstly 
precise definitions of categories were laid out. Then detailed decision rules were 
formulated and procedures for coding were applied. The study employed two coders 
approach in order to enhance the reliability of coding and minimise the bias of 
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researcher influence which would have been the case if there had been only one 
coder.  
 
The fourth limitation is that measures of risk disclosure were limited to the volume of 
disclosures made within companies‟ annual reports. Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) argued 
that the quantity of disclosures alone cannot determine the effectiveness of risk 
disclosure. However, some quality dimensions of risk disclosures were studied in this 
research via specific risk categorisations (volume, nature, news type and time frame) 
which enabled inferences to be made about the extent of decision-making usefulness of 
risk information.  
 
10.5 Recommendations for further research  
 
This study focused on the quantity of risk disclosure and captured some dimensions of 
the quality of disclosure; however, the quality of risk disclosure would be a matter for 
further empirical investigation. In addition, future research could be conducted over a 
longer time period and could examine multiple countries in order to gain better 
understanding and deeper insight into risk disclosure practices in different regulatory, 
cultural and economic environments. Furthermore, this study focused on non-
financial companies, and research on financial companies and banks would be a 
matter of further investigation especially as they are subject to different regulations 
and disclosure rules.  
 
Another area of exploration would be the influence of annual report risk disclosures 
on cost of capital for instance cost of equity capital and debt capital. The usefulness of 
risk disclosure could be further investigated by examining the value relevance of risk 
disclosure. This study investigated annual reports which are merely historical, 
therefore, researchers could undertake further investigations of risk disclosure using 
other sources for instance press releases, interim reports and press on the stock market 
website. One could investigate the effect of timely risk disclosure on stock market 
volatility and share price movement.  
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Appendix A:  
 
Table A.1: Summary of empirical studies on risk disclosure 
Authors Country Methods Sample/period Theoretical 
explanation 
Results 
Developed capital markets     
ICAEW (1999) UK Content 
analysis, 
Benchmark- 
Study 
14firms/1998 Proprietary 
costs 
Capital need 
Signalling  
 
- Companies do provide some risk information 
voluntarily. 
- Regulatory reform in UK includes risk related 
requirements  
- The best practice would be achieved within the 
current reform 
- Companies need to explain risks, actions and 
measurements applied.  
Cabedo and 
Tirado (2004) 
Spain Regression 11 years 
(1991-2001) 
 - Value at Risk is a suitable method for quantifying 
most of a company‟s risks. 
- The measure of the risks would improve the user‟s 
investment decision e.g. the estimations of the 
“expected return and risk”  
Beretta and 
Bozzolan (2004) 
Italy - Content 
analysis  
- Disclosure 
index,  
- Regression 
85/2001  - Risk disclosures are mainly qualitative 
- Firm size            Not significant 
- Industry          Not significant 
Linsley and 
Shrives, (2005) 
UK - Content 
analysis  
- Disclosure 
index,  
- Regression 
79 firms/2001 Proprietary 
costs 
Agency cost 
Signalling 
- Forward looking risk information is significantly 
higher than past  
-  Lack of monetary risk disclosure 
- Numbers of neutral risk disclosures is the greatest 
followed by good news risk disclosure and then bad 
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news risk disclosure.  
- Size: Positive  
- Level of risk: Not significant 
Authors Country Methods Sample/period Theoretical 
explanation 
Results 
Mohobbot 
(2005) 
Japan - Content 
analysis  
- Disclosure 
index,  
- Regression 
90/2003  - Large variation in risk reporting 
- Risk disclosures are descriptive and little 
quantitative. 
- Little forward-looking risks  
- Firm size: Positive  
- Level of risk: Not significant 
- Profitability:  Not significant  
- Ownership distribution: Not significant 
Linsley and 
Shrives 2006 
UK - Content 
analysis  
- Disclosure 
index,  
- Regression 
79/2000 Agency cost 
Corporate 
governance  
Signalling 
- Large variation in risk disclosure 
- Few quantitative disclosures  
- Size                  Positive 
- Level of risk    mixed results 
Abraham, 
Solomon 
Stevenson 
(2007) 
UK - Content 
analysis  
- Disclosure 
index,  
- Regression 
14/2002  Size                    Positive 
Leverage           Not-significant 
 Deumes (2008) Netherland - Content 
analysis  
- Disclosure 
index,  
- Regression 
90/1991 
 
Agency cost Adequate material risk information is provided 
within prospectuses. 
Total return risk (standard deviation of stock 
return): Positive 
Systematic risk (Beta):      Positive 
Decline in stock price:       Positive 
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Authors Country Methods Sample/period Theoretical 
explanation 
Results 
Konishi and Ali, 
2007 
Japan - Content 
analysis  
- Disclosure 
index,  
- Regression 
100 /2003 Agency cost - Size                           Positive 
-  Level of risk       Not significant 
- Profitability        Not significant  
- Ownership distribution: Not-significant. 
- Cross-firm shareholding: Not-significant  
- Industry type:    Not significant  
- Descriptive risk information  
- Little quantity risk information 
- After, regulatory guideline on risk reporting, the 
level of risk disclosure has increased 
Papa (2007) Italy Content 
analysis, 
Disclosure 
index.   
12/2002-2005  - Both manufacturing and IT companies disclose 
similar risk categories. 
- Much emphasis is on external risks. 
- Qualitative risk disclosure is dominant in both 
sectors 
- IT companies disclose higher forward-looking 
information than manufacturers. 
Dobler (2008)  Reviews 
discretionary 
disclosure, 
Cheap talks 
models 
  - Regulation may mitigate the incentives-driven 
restrictions but can have adverse affect on risk 
reporting. 
- Should not overestimate the informativeness of 
risk reporting even in a regulated environment  
Rajab and 
Schachler 
(2009) 
UK Disclosure index 52/1998, 2001, 
2004 
 Firm size: Not-significant, Leverage: Not-
significant, US dual listing: positive 
Industrial investment: Positive 
Risk disclosures level has increased over the time in 
response to regulation pressure.  
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Authors Country Methods Sample/period Theoretical 
explanation 
Results 
Taylor, Tower, 
Neilson, (2010) 
Australia  Disclosure 
index, 
Regression 
111/ 2002-
2006 
Agency cost 
Information 
asymmetry  
Adoption of IFRS: Positive 
Strength of Corporate governance: Positive 
Capital raising: Positive 
Overseas listing: Negative  
Firm size: Positive 
Top 20 shareholding: Not significant 
Leverage: Positive 
Sub-industry: Not significant 
ROA: Not significant  
b) Emerging stock markets     
Amran, Bin, 
Hassan, 2009 
Malaysia - Content 
analysis  
- Disclosure 
index,  
- Regression 
100/2005 
 
Stakeholder Firm size:        Positive 
Industry: Positive 
Leverage: Not significant 
Product diversifications:  Not significant 
Geographical diversifications: Not significant 
Hassan, Saleh 
and Abd-
Rahman (2008) 
Malaysia - Content 
analysis  
- Disclosure 
index/ 
Unweighted 
- Regression 
484/1999-2003 Agency cost  Firm size:     Positive 
Leverage:     Positive  
Existence of RMC: Positive 
Implementation of MASB 24       
Profitability and auditor type are Not significant 
Hassan (2009) UAE Disclosure 
index,  
Unweighted 
Regression 
41/2005 Positive 
accounting 
Political costs 
Signalling  
Institutional 
Firm size:           Not-significant  
Industry type:    Significant 
Leverage:           Positive 
Reserves:            Not-significant  
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Table A-2: Summary on corporate governance and risk disclosure empirical studies  
Authors Country Method  Sample/Year Theoretical 
explanation 
Results  
Association with disclosure 
Solomon, 
Solomon and 
Norton (2000) 
UK Questionnaire 
survey 
95/1999 Corporate 
governance 
- Increased risk disclosures help in portfolio 
investment decision. 
- Risk disclosure is an important issue within 
corporate governance.  
- Voluntary framework of disclosure should be 
maintained and include risk disclosure.  
Lajili and 
Zeghal, 2005 
Canada Content analysis 300/1999 Agency cost 
Enforcement  
- Large variation in risk disclosure 
- Risk information qualitative,  
- Few disclosures on risk assessment and forecast  
- Less forward-looking risk disclosure 
- No association is found with firm size, profit, beta 
and leverage  
Beasley, Clune 
and Hermanson 
(2005) 
US - Survey 
- Regression 
123/2004 Agency cost  
Corporate 
governance 
- Presence of a chief risk officer: Positive 
- Board independence: Positive 
- CEO and CFO apparent: Positve 
 - The board and senior management leadership is 
critical to ERM implementation.  
- Big4 auditor: Positive   
- Company size: Positive  
- ERM of US organisations was less developed than 
international organisations.  
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Authors Country Method  Sample/Year Theoretical 
explanation 
Results  
Association with disclosure 
Lopes and 
Rodrigues 
(2007) 
Portuguese - Content 
analysis  
- Disclosure 
index,  
- Regression 
 
55/2002 Agency cost 
Information 
asymmetry  
 
- Size and Auditor are:    Positive 
- Listing status are:         Positive 
- Industry type                Negative 
- Multinationality: Not-significant 
- Leverage: Not-significant 
- % of independent directors: Not-significant 
- Compliance with corporate governance 
requirements: Not-significant 
Abraham and 
Cox, 2007 
UK - Content 
analysis  
- Disclosure 
index,  
- Regression 
71/2002 Agency cost 
Institutional 
theory 
 
Executive directors & Independent non-executive 
are:           Positive 
Dependent non-executive: Negative 
Short-term institutions:    Positive  
Long-term institutions:    Negative 
Dual-listed, Firm size, Industry type, Stock 
volatility:  all are Positive 
Leverage: Not significant 
Deumes and 
Knechel (2008) 
Netherland Disclosure 
index,  
6 items, 
unweighted 
155, 168, 167/ 
(1997, 
1998, 1999) 
Agency cost 
Information 
asymmetry  
Ownership concentration Negative 
Managerial ownership: Negative 
Leverage: Positive, Firm size: Positive 
Foreign operation: Positive 
Profitability: Positive, Sales growth: Not-significant 
Inventory: Not-significant  
Industry: 1-Trade:  Positive 
             2-Manufacturing: Not-significant.  
Cross listing: 1-UK  Positive 
                    :2-US    Not-significant  
Auditor: Not-significant, Outside directors: Positive 
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Authors Country Method  Sample/Year Theoretical 
explanation 
Results  
Association with disclosure 
Taylor (2011) Australia Disclosure 
index, content 
analysis, 
Regression 
66/2009 Agency cost 
Information 
asymmetry  
Institutional ownership  
Audit committee 
Non-risk disclosure studies (e.g. general voluntary disclosure)   
Forker (1992) UK Disclosure 
index/ 
Regression 
 
182/ 
1987-1988 
Agency cost  
Information 
asymmetry 
Shares held by directors: Positive 
Audit committee: Positive 
Firm size:             Positive 
Non-executive directors: Not significant 
The interest of directors in the equity: Not sig.  
Dominant personality: Negative 
The interest of director in with- holding 
information: Negative 
The interest of director in the gain from 
withholding: Negative 
 Audit size:         Negative  
- Negative relationship between disclosure quality 
and costs of disclosure 
Chen and Jaggi 
(2000) 
Hong Kong Disclosure index 
Regression 
 
87/1993-1994 Agency cost  
Political cost 
- % of independent non-executive directors has 
positive association with disclosure. When control 
for family owned, this relation become weaker. 
-Family owned:    Positive 
-Size (asset: Positive, sale & market value: Not-
sig.)  
-Profitability (ROE), 5-Industry type are: Negative 
-Leverage          Not-significant 
-Auditor:           Not-significant 
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Authors Country Method  Sample/Year Theoretical 
explanation 
Results  
Association with disclosure 
Ho and Wong 
(2001) 
Hong Kong Disclosure 
index/ 
Questionnaire 
survey/  
Weighted/  
Regression 
610 CFO,  
535 Financial 
analyst 
1997, 1998 
Corporate 
governance 
Agency costs 
Information 
asymmetry 
% of Independent directors, Dominant personalities 
are:  Not-sig., Audit committee: Positive 
Family member: Negative, Size (assets): Positive 
Assets-in-place, Leverage, Profitability are: Not-
sig.  
Industry: (Conglomerate, Manufacturing: Not-sig 
Bank & Finance: Positive) 
Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002) 
Malaysia Disclosure 
checklist, 
Regression 
167/1995 Agency cost 
 
Non-executive chairman: Negative  
Dominantion of family member: significant 
% of Malay directors: significant 
Eng and MaK 
(2003) 
Singapore Disclosure 
index, 
Regression 
158/1995 Agency costs 
 
Ownership structure: (Managerial: Negative,  
Blockholder: Not-sig. Government: Positive), 
Outside directors on board: Negative  
Leverage: Negative, Firm size: Positive 
Growth, Industry, Auditor, Analyst following, 
Stock price performance and Profitability are: Not-
sig. 
Cheng and 
Courtenay 
(2006) 
Singapore Disclosure index 
Regression 
104/2000 Agency costs 
 
% of Independent non-executive director: Positive 
Executive director: Not-significant,  
Board size: Not-significant 
CEO duality: Not-significant 
Listing status: Not-significant 
Leverage:  Not-significant 
Firm size: Positive, Profitability: Positive 
Analysts coverage: Positive 
Inside block ownership: Positive  
Government ownerships: Positive  
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Authors Country Method  Sample/Year Theoretical 
explanation 
Results  
Association with disclosure 
Al-Shammari, 
Al-Sultan 
(2010) 
Kuwait  Disclosure index 
Regression 
170/2007 Agency costs  % Non-executive directors: Not significant  
% Family members on the board: Not significant 
Duality: Not significant  
Audit committee: Positive  
Barako, 
Hancock and 
Izan (2006) 
Kenya Disclosure 
index, Weighted  
Unweighted 
Regression 
54/1992-2001 Agency cost  
Information 
asymmetry 
Non-executive:  Negative 
Dual leadership: Not sig. 
Audit committee Positive 
% shares held by top 20 shareholders: Negative 
Foreign and institutional  ownerships firm size  and 
Leverage are:     Positive  
Audit size, Profitability & Liquidity were: Not-
significant  
Industry type: Agriculture & Financial were: 
Positive  
but Industrial was Not-significant 
 
Key abbreviations within the tables: 
Not-sig. = Not-significant or Not supported, Sig. = Significant, % = Percentage of or proportion of, CEO = Chief Executive Officer, ROE = 
Return on equity, Sales = Total sales, Assets = Total assets 
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Appendix B  
 
Questions from the interview questions (adaptations were used depending on the 
group of the interviewee) 
 
Q1. Could you please tell me generally about your experience? How long have you 
been in the current role?   
 
Q2. What do you think is the main role of annual reports?  What do you think about 
the quality and quantity levels of risk disclosures of UAE companies? 
 
Q3.  What are the most important risks that face companies in the UAE? 
 
Q4. Companies routinely include some information about risks in their financial 
reports. Do investors and users take note of companies risk disclosure? Would 
addition risk disclosure help investors and users of such information in their 
investment decisions? 
  
Q5. What do you think are the factors that cause some companies to disclose more 
than others about risks within their annual report?   
 
Q6. Should corporate risk disclosure be voluntary or should it be regulated through 
government legislation? Why? 
 
Q7. Are you aware of any instance of non-compliance with risk reporting 
requirements of any listed companies?  
 
Q8. Do you believe there are shortcomings in the current accounting reporting system 
related to risk reporting?  
 
Q9. Do you think risk management system will enhance risk disclosure and have you 
seen any examples of reporting on risk management?  
 
Q10. Do you think UAE companies need to improve their risk management 
disclosure? 
 
Q11. Corporate governance code in UAE requires companies to report on their 
internal control with emphasis on risk disclosure? Do you support such policy? Do 
you think it would improve risk disclosure practice? 
 
Q12. Do you think aspects of corporate governance mechanism are important in 
explaining risk disclosure practice in the UAE?  
 
Q13. Do you believe that ownership structure is an important aspect in explaining risk 
disclosure practice? Why? 
 
Q14. Do you think companies in UAE make more or fewer risk disclosures than 
comparable companies elsewhere?  
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Consent Form 
 
An Empirical Analysis of the Extent and the Determinants of Risk Disclosure in 
Emerging Capital Markets: the Case of the United Arab Emirate Listed 
Companies.  
 
A research study is conducted by Abdulla Muzahem 
 
I hereby acknowledge that:   
 I have agreed to take part in the above research.  
 I have received a copy of the information sheet that explains the objectives 
and nature of this research.  
 I understand its contents and agree to participate in this research. 
 I can withdraw from the research at any point of time by informing the 
principal Investigator and all my data will be discarded. 
 I will not have any rights to any commercial benefits that result from this 
research.   
 I also acknowledge that I will not derive any monetary or other benefits from 
this research. 
 
 
___________________________ ________________  ___________ 
Name of Participant                  Date    Signature 
 
 
___________________________ ________________      ___________    
Name of Consent Taker  Date      Signature 
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Cover letter 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am a postgraduate researcher in Accounting and Finance department at Portsmouth 
Business School, University of Portsmouth, United Kingdom. I am undertaking a PhD 
research project on the topic “An empirical analysis of the extent and the determinants 
of risk disclosure in emerging capital market: the case of the United Arab Emirates” 
under the supervision of Professor Mike Page. I am seeking your help in carrying out 
this research. 
 
As part of my research methods design, I am carrying out semi-structured interviews. 
The interviews seek opinions about issues associated with reporting on risk disclosure 
and risk management within the context of disclosure policy and regulation, 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) and corporate governance 
guidelines. The interviews will cover participants in stock markets, listed companies, 
audit firms and investors. The interviews are designed to take between 45 to 60 
minutes. It will aim to discover participants experience and opinions about companies 
risk disclosure, risk management and internal control.  
 
There will be recording process for the interview such as tape recoding and note 
taking. However, if you prefer that the interview is not tape recoded, please let me 
know and I will arrange for note taking only. You can be absolutely sure that all 
information you will provide is strictly confidential. It will be used for research 
purposes only. Thank you in advance for your help. 
 
Best regards 
 
Abdulla Muzahem 
Student ID: 381769 
PhD candidate in Accounting and Finance 
University of Portsmouth 
muzahem@hotmail.com  
Mobile: 0097150/ 6661065 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
TITLE OF PROJECT 
 
An Empirical Analysis of the Extent and Determinants of Risk Disclosure in 
Emerging Capital Markets: the Case of United Arab Emirates listed companies. 
 
INVITATION TO TAKE PART IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
 
You are being asked to take part in this research study. Before you decide, it is 
essential for you to understand why the study is being carried out and what it will 
involve and the potential risks and benefits. Please take your time to read the 
following information. Also, feel free to discuss this with your colleagues, friends or 
family. Then take your decision as to whether or not you are willing to participate in 
the research. Once you understand the study, you will be asked to sign this form if 
you wish to participate.  
 
PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH STUDY 
 
The study aims to achieve a better understanding of risk disclosure practices within 
the stock market and listed companies in the United Arab Emirates. The study also 
investigates whether or not the current regulation regime in the stock market needs to 
be improved in order to achieve better risk reporting. Although there are no 
immediate or direct benefits for participants in this study, it is expected that this work 
will be useful to many stakeholders such as investors, shareholders, financial analysts, 
listed companies and the stock market authorities. If you agree to take part in this 
study, you will be asked to participate in an interview. There will be a recording 
process for the interview, such as tape recording (optional) and note taking.  
 
TERMINATION OF PARTICIPATION 
 
You may decide to stop being a part of the research study at any time without 
explanation.  
 
RISKS 
 
There are no known risks for you in this study as the research is mainly based on 
published materials, such as annual reports and regulations (e.g. the corporate 
governance code and International Financial Reporting Standards IFRSs). However, if 
you feel the participation in this study might affect you, you still have the full right 
not to provide your personal details or withdraw from the study.  
 
COST, REIMBURSEMENT AND COMPENSATION 
 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You will not receive any payment after 
completion of the interview or participation in the study. 
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CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
The data I collect will contain your opinions and some personal information about 
you along with information that identifies your position, for instance investor, 
manager, auditor or regulator. It is optional to provide your personal information; 
however, on doing so, your responses will be recorded as coming from an investor, 
companies‟ manager or stock market authority member. Abdulla Muzahem confirms 
that no one will link the data you provided to your identity and/or name except the 
author and the supervisor. The study and the ethical issues related to this study have 
been reviewed and approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the University of 
Portsmouth.  
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THIS RESEARCH STUDY 
 
If you would like further information about the research or would you like to speak to 
someone about your rights please contact the following: 
 
Supervisor of the study: Professor Mike Page 
Portsmouth Business School 
Richmond Building 
Portland Street 
Portsmouth PO1 3DE 
Tel: +44 (0) 23 9284 4148 
 
Any person with concerns or complaints about the conduct of a research study can 
contact the Research Ethics Committee of the University of Portsmouth or email:  
Mr. Sharman Rogers  
sharman.rogers@port.ac.uk 
Senior Administrator 
Faculty office 
University of Portsmouth 
Portsmouth Business School 
Tel: +44 (0) 23 9284 4202 
 
Thank you.  
 
Abdulla Muzahem 
PhD candidate  
Student ID: 381769 
Accounting and Finance Department 
Portsmouth Business School 
University of Portsmouth 
Tel: +97150 6661065 
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Appendix C 
 
Table C.1: IFRSs effective date 
Standard Title Effective date
(1)
 
IFRS 1 First-time Adoption of International Financial Reporting 
Standards 
1 January 2004 
IFRS 2 Share-based Payment 1 January 2005 
IFRS 3 Business Combinations 31 March 2004 
IFRS 4 Insurance Contracts 1 January 2005 
IFRS 5 Non-current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued 
Operations 
1 January 2005 
IFRS 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources 1 January 2006 
IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures 1 January 2007 
IFRS 8 Operating Segments 1 January 2009 
IAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements 1 January 2009 
IAS 2 Inventories 1 January 2005 
IAS 7 Statement of Cash Flows 1 January 1994 
IAS 8 Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates 
and Errors 
1 January 2005 
IAS 10 Events after the Reporting Period 1 January 2005 
IAS 11 Construction Contracts 1 January 1995 
IAS 12 Income Taxes 1 January 1998 
IAS 16 Property, Plant and Equipment 1 January 2005 
IAS 17 Leases 1 January 2005 
IAS 18 Revenue 1 January 1995 
IAS 19 Employee Benefits 1 January 1999 
IAS 20 Accounting for Government Grants and Disclosure of 
Government Assistance 
1 January 1984 
IAS 21 The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates 1 January 2005 
IAS 23 Borrowing Costs 1 January 1995 
IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures 1 January 2005 
IAS 26 Accounting and Reporting by Retirement Benefit Plans 1 January 1988 
IAS 27 Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements  1 January 2005 
IAS 28 Investments in Associates 1 January 2005 
IAS 29 Financial Reporting in Hyperinflationary Economies 1 January 1990 
IAS 31 Interests in Joint Ventures 1 January 2005 
IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation 1 January 2005 
IAS 33 Earnings Per Share 1 January 2005 
IAS 34 Interim Financial Reporting 1 January 2009 
IAS 36 Impairment of Assets 31 March 2004 
IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets 1 July 1999 
IAS 38 Intangible Assets 31 March 2004 
IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement 1 January 2005 
IAS 40 Investment Property 1 January 2005 
IAS 41 Agriculture  1 January 2003 
Source: Deloitte (2009) 
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Table C.2: Example of risk disclosure requirement within IFRSs 
 
Risk information item or source of risk Studies refer the item 
IAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements  
Encourages enterprises to present Financial Review by 
Management which describes and explains the main 
features of the enterprise financial performance 
uncertainties 
Dobler (2005), Thuelin, 
Henneron and Touron (2006), 
GASB (2000), Taylor, Tower, 
Neilson, (2010) 
Material going concern uncertainties 
IAS 1.23, IAS 1.24, IAS 1.25  
Identification of assumptions concerning the future 
viability of the company 
Dobler (2008), Linsley and 
Shrives (2000) 
IAS 14 Segment reporting  
Segment information on: Business major segments, 
geographical concentration, customer/(asset/liabilities) 
concentration 
Linsley and Shrives (2000), 
Hassan (2009) 
IAS 21 The effects of changes in foreign exchange rates  
IAS 21.47 encourages the disclosure of an enterprise's 
foreign currency risk management policy 
GASB (2000) ICAEW (1997, 
1999)  Linsley and Shrives 
(2005), Lajili and Zeghal 
(2005) 
IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation  
Requires information on credit risk, liquidity risk and cash 
flow risk and market risks: currency, fair value, interest 
rate, price 
Thuelin, Henneron and Touron 
(2006), Taylor, Tower, 
Neilson, (2010) 
IAS 36 Impairment of Assets  
It is required the entity to recognise an impairment loss 
and prescribes disclosures 
Hassan (2009) 
IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent liabilities and 
Contingent assets  
Contingencies: Accrual/disclosure of potential losses and 
gains  
Linsley and Shrives, (2000) 
GASB (2000) 
IAS 39 Financial instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement  
Objective of holding derivatives, derivatives hedging, 
change in fair value of assets or liabilities, cash flow 
hedge 
Hassan (2009), Rajab and 
Schachler (2009), Taylor, 
Tower, Neilson, (2010) 
IFRS 7 Financial Risk Disclosure Principle: 
Significance of Financial Instruments for Financial 
Position and Performance 
Dobler (2008), Taylor, Tower, 
Neilson, (2010) 
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Table C.3: Risk disclosure coding scheme 
Risk disclosure categories  Risk information item or source of risk  
Financial risks disclosure Going concern uncertainties IAS 1.23 
 Transaction cost, loss and uncertainties IAS 1.106 
 Judgments made in the process of applying 
accounting policy 
IAS 1.113 
 Key sources of estimation uncertainty IAS 1.116 
 Capital risk management: objectives and policies IAS 1.124 
 Cash flow risk and uncertainties IAS 7 
 Change in accounting estimate IAS 8.39 
 Segment reporting and segment risks  IAS 14.26 
 Impairment losses IAS 16.73 
 Effects of changes in foreign exchange rates and 
risks  
IAS 21.47 
 Borrowing cost and related risk and uncertainties  IAS 23 
 Financial instruments: Presentation  IAS 32 
 Interest rate risk IAS 32.67 
 A description of the hedging financial instruments IAS 32.91 
 Impairment of Assets IAS 36.126 
 Provisions nature, uncertainties and the 
assumptions of future events. 
IAS 37.85 
 Contingent liabilities nature and uncertainties IAS 37.86 
 Contingent assets uncertainties and nature IAS 37.89 
 The effect of the change in intangible assets‟ nature 
and amount 
IAS 38.121 
 Fair value hedges  IAS 39.89 
 Derivatives hedging IAS 30 
 Share-based Payment information including the 
expected volatility 
IFRS 2 
 Business Combinations information about the 
financial effect of gains, losses, error corrections 
and other adjustments 
IFRS 3.72 
 Insurance risk  IFRS 4 
 Disposal of the assets and discontinued operation 
uncertainties 
IFRS 5.33 
 Financial instruments disclosures IFRS 7.7 
 Trade receivable impairment, exposure and 
uncertainties  
IFRS 7.9 
 Price risk, Commodity price risk IFRS 7.10 
 Allowance account for credit losses IFRS 7.16 
 Defaults and breaches IFRS 7.18 
 Hedge accounting IFRS 7.22 
 Fair value of financial assets and liabilities through 
profit or loss 
IFRS 7.25 
 Nature and extent of risks arising from financial 
instruments 
IFRS 7.31 
 Qualitative disclosures for each risk arising from 
financial instrument 
IFRS 7.33 
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Risk disclosure categories  Risk information item or source of risk 
 Quantitative disclosures for each risk arising from 
financial instrument 
IFRS 7.34 
 Credit risk, exposure to credit risk IFRS 7.36 
 Liquidity risk IFRS 7.39 
 Market risk IFRS 7.40 
 Debt contract  and Excessive debt   
 Change and prolonged decline in the fair value   
 Lease risk and uncertainties   
 Equity price risk  
 Accounting and financial statement risk  
 Change in financial reporting  
 Taxation loss, risk and uncertainties   
 Pension fund  
 Investment evaluation  
 Financial markets  
 Opportunity cost and future investments  
 Capital availability or Capital structure  
 Loss and probability for loss  
 Variance: volatility of share price  
 Breakdown of accounting system   
 Treasury risk  
 Loss of physical assets  
Operational risk Business segment and geographic risk information 
Disclosure Customers relations and satisfaction,  
 Loss of a big customers   
 Seasonality of demand 
 Product development, defects and service failure and variation 
 Performance measurement 
 Sourcing 
 Development and efficiency  
 Health and safety 
 Brand name erosion,  
 Insufficient resources and raw materials 
 Accidents  
 Key supplies and not secure suppliers 
 Insufficient reserves (natural resources)  
 New alliances, joint ventures and acquisitions 
 Industry 
 Business interruption  
 Contract commitment 
 Variance: variability of operating results 
 Takeover defences and targets 
Environmental and social  Environment incidents 
risk disclosures  Use of environmentally sensitive products 
 Environment activists  
 Environment laws and regulations 
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Risk disclosure categories  Risk information item or source of risk 
 Extreme weather conditions 
 Natural disasters 
 Severe climatic and weather conditions 
 Physical disasters (fire and explosion) 
 Social cost and harm actions  
 Social Responsibility Disclosure negative events 
Information processing  Access 
and technology  risk  Availability  
Disclosures Infrastructure 
 Relevance 
 Technical and system failure 
 Internet  
 Rapid technological change 
 Lack of information 
 Accuracy of forward looking information 
 Limited operating history 
 Report for decision making information 
 Technology and equipment quality and risks 
Strategic and business  Wrong Business strategy 
risk disclosures  Business portfolio 
 Competitors, High Competition 
 Pricing  
 Valuation 
 Planning  
 Life cycle 
 Organization structure 
 Research and development 
 Budget and planning uncertainty 
 Risk forecast  
Regulation and compliance  Legal risk information 
risks disclosures Litigation risk  
 Relation to government  
 Compliance 
 Changing regulatory requirements and control 
 Tax laws 
 Many levels of regulations  
 Government's funding cuts 
 High degree of government regulation  
 Legislation restricting exploration natural resources  
 Catastrophes, fires, the discontinuance of a production line,  
Integrity and governance  Management fraud 
risks disclosures Management role and responsibility towards risk 
 Employee fraud 
 Illegal acts 
 Reputation 
 Shareholder relations 
 Influence of large shareholders 
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Risk disclosure categories  Risk information item or source of risk 
 Unauthorized use 
 Ethical issues 
 Business honesty issues 
 Corporate governance risk disclosure   
 Report on insider trading  
 Report on penalty and fines  
Integrity and governance 
risk disclosure 
Report on internal auditors role towards risks and risk 
management 
 Report on internal control risk 
 Risk management policies 
 Narrative discussions on risk assessment, measurement and 
monitoring 
 Information on risk management and reporting system 
 Information on risk management committee 
 violations committed during the financial year, reflecting their 
causes as well as the method of remedy and avoidance of future 
occurrence 
 efficiency of the Company's operations in respect of financial 
reporting and adherence to listing and disclosure rules 
Empowerment and  Leadership and management 
employees  risk  Outsourcing  
Disclosures Performance incentives 
 Change readiness 
 Communication 
 Human error, Human resources 
 Loss of certain key employee 
 Recruiting of qualified and skilled professional 
 Skills shortage 
 Loss of key people  
 Employee ration 
 Ineffective and inefficient management process 
 Employees risk and work environment  
 Lack of employee motivation 
Political, economic,   Change in political environment 
and international risk  Working in an international environment 
Disclosures Complex local procurement practices  
 Adverse political developments 
 Sovereign and political risk 
 War and unstable political situation 
 Economic conditions and problems 
 Global financial and economic crisis  
 Domestics financial and economic crisis  
 Inflation  
 Economic rescission  
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Table C.4: Coding sheet for content analysis 
Company:  
Year: 
           
Risk disclosure sentence 
characteristics  
 Fin
an
cial risk
s  
O
p
eratio
n
 risk
s 
E
n
v
iro
n
m
en
t &
 
so
cial an
d
  
In
fo
rm
atio
n
 &
 
tech
n
o
lo
g
y
  
S
trateg
ic risk
s 
R
eg
u
latio
n
 risk
s 
In
teg
rity
 risk
s 
E
m
p
o
w
erm
en
t risk
s 
P
o
litical &
 eco
n
o
m
ic 
T
o
tal risk
 d
isclo
su
re 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Quantitative/good news/future A           
Quantitative/bad news/future B           
Quantitative/neutral/future C           
            
Qualitative/good news/future D           
Qualitative/bad news/future E           
Qualitative/neutral/future F           
            
Quantitative/good news/Past G           
Quantitative/bad news/Past H           
Quantitative/neutral/Past I           
            
Qualitative/good news/Past J           
Qualitative/bad news/Past K           
Qualitative/neutral news/Past L           
            
Qualitative/neutral/non-times  M           
Qualitative/good news/non-time N           
Qualitative/bad news/non-time O           
            
Quantitative/good/non-time P           
Quantitative/bad news/non-time Q           
Quantitative/neutral/non-time R           
            
Total             
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Table C.5: List of sampled companies 
 
Companies 
 1 Al Dar Properties Co.  ALDAR 
2 RAK Properties  RAKPROP 
3 Sorouh Real Estate SOROUH 
4 Abu Dhabi National Hotels  ADNH 
5 Emirates Food Stuff & Materials Co.  AGTHIA 
6 International Fish Farming Co. ASMAK 
7 Emirates Driving Company DRIVE 
8 Foodco Holding FOODCO 
9 National Corp. for Tourism & Hotels NCTH 
10 Ras Al Khaimah Poultry & Feeding RAPCO 
11 Fujairah Trade Centre FTC 
12 Arkan Building Material Co. ARKAN 
13 Fujairah Building Industries FBICO 
15 Umm Al Quwain Cement Industries  QCEM 
14 Fujairah Cement Industries FCI 
16 Gulf Cement Company GCEM 
17 Ras Al Khaimah Cement  Company RAKCC 
18 Ras Al Khaimah Ceramics Co. RAKCEC 
19 Ras Al Khaimah White Cement RAKWCT 
20 Sharjah Cement & Industrial Development Co. SCIDC 
21 Union Cement  UCC 
22 Abu Dhabi Aviation ADAVIATION 
23 Abu Dhabi Ship Building ADSB 
24 Abu Dhabi for Building & Materials BILDCO 
25 National Marine Dredging NMDC 
26 Emirates Telecommunication Co. ETISALAT 
27 Gulf Medical Projects Co. GMPC 
28 Gulf pharmaceutical Industries JULPHAR 
29 Aabar Investments AABAR 
30 Dana Gas DANA GAS 
31 Abu Dhabi National Energy Co.  TAQA 
32 Arab Heavy Industries AHI 
33 Arabtec Holding PJSC ARTC 
34 Dubai Development Company DDC 
35 Deyaar Development PJSC DEYAAR 
36 Emaar Properties EMAAR 
37 Union Properties UPP 
38 Air Arabia PJSC AIRARABIA 
39 Aramex ARMX 
40 Gulf Navigation Holdings GULFNAV 
41 National Cement Company  NCC 
42 Dubai Refreshments Company DRC 
43 Gulfa Mineral Water & Processing Industries Co. PLC GULFA 
44 Jeema Mineral Water JEEMA 
45 United Foods Company UFC 
46 United Kaipara Dairies Co. UNIKAI 
47 Emirate Integrated Telecommunications Company DU 
48 Tabreed TABREED 
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Decision rules and definitions for content analysis  
 
Content analysis of annual reports was performed based on detailed decision rules. 
The decision rules were adopted mainly from ICAEW (1999), Linsley and Shrives 
(2006), Konishi and Ali (2007) and Abraham and Cox (2007) with some further 
modifications for further clarification and details in the Appendix.   
 
1- To identify risk disclosures, a broad definition of risk and risk disclosure were 
adapted. 
Risk definition: 
- Risk is referred to as upside risk (opportunity) and downside risk (loss) and 
“Uncertainty as the amount of benefits and the term includes both potential for 
gain and exposure to loss” (ASB, 1998). 
 
- Abraham and Cox (2007) referred to risk as variation (e.g. volatility), risk as 
uncertainty (e.g. contingency) and opportunity (e.g. upside). They stated that 
key words referring to risk would be risk, variation, fluctuation, volatility, 
oscillation, amplitude, uncertainty, unexpected, contingency, surprise, shock, 
opportunity, prospect, potential, upside, advantage. 
 
Risk disclosure definition: 
- Linsley and Shrives (2006, p.3) defined risk disclosure thus: “if the reader is 
informed of any opportunity or prospect, or of any hazard, danger, harm, 
threat, or exposure, that has already impacted upon the company or may 
impact upon the company in the future or of the management of any such 
opportunity prospect, hazard, harm, threat or exposure”. 
 
- Hassan (2009, p.669) defined risk disclosure as “the financial statements 
inclusion of information about managers‟ estimates, judgments, reliance on 
market-based accounting policies such as impairment, derivative hedging, 
financial instruments and fair value as well as the disclosure of concentrated 
operations, non-financial information about corporations‟ plans, recruiting 
strategy and other operational, economic, political and financial risks”. 
- Risk disclosure refers to risks, actions, measures, management, analysis of risk 
related events (ICAEW, 1999).  
 
2- Sentences are to be coded as risk disclosure if the reader is informed of any 
opportunity, or prospect or of any hazard, danger, harm, threat or exposure, that has 
already impacted upon the company or may impact in the future or of the 
management of any such opportunity, prospect, hazard, harm, threat or exposure. 
 
3- All risk disclosures must be specifically stated; they cannot be implied. 
 
4- Risk disclosure sentences shall be classified according to the coding stages (see 
coding stages chart).  
 
5- A risk disclosure sentences shall be referred to risk categories and sub-categories 
(see coding scheme). 
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6- If the sentence has more than one possible classification, the information will be 
classified into the category that is most emphasized within the sentence. 
 
7- Tables (quantitative and qualitative) that provide risk information should be 
interpreted as one line equals one sentence and classified accordingly. 
 
8- Any disclosure that is repeated shall be recorded as a risk disclosure sentence each 
time it is discussed. 
 
9- If a disclosure is too vague in its reference to risk then it shall not be recorded as a 
risk disclosure. 
 
10- A risk disclosure sentence is classified as: 
- “Quantitative” risk disclosures are information that contain and primarily 
relate to actual numbers, ratio, percentage and information that enable the 
reader to calculate the financial impact of a risk. 
- “Qualitative” risk disclosures are information that is not numerical in nature. 
 
11- A risk disclosure sentence is classified as follows: 
- “Past” risk disclosure is information related to the past or backward-looking 
and it is historical. 
- “Future” risk disclosure is forward-looking information, 
- “Non-time” if it is not past or future or if it referred to present and general 
statement on risk disclosure related policy. 
 
12- A risk disclosure sentence is coded as: 
- “Bad news” if the risk disclosure sentence refers to a negative impact or event. 
- “Good news” if the risk disclosure sentence refers to a positive impact or 
event. 
- “Neutral news” if it is not bad or good news and if risk disclosure sentence 
refers to general statements on risk disclosure related policy. 
 
13- All sections of annual reports should be examined except independent external 
auditor reports. 
 
14- A risk related sentence with number and appeared within tables or graphs is coded 
as one sentence. 
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Appendix D 
Table D.1: Skewness and Kurtosis tests  
 Skewness Kurtosis Results Robustness checks Transformation  
TotalRiskDisclosure 1.900 4.968 Not normal  but approximately normal visually   
FinancialRiskDisclosure 1.442 3.376 Not normal  but normal in K-S test/ normal visually   
NonFinancialRiskDisclosure 2.034 4.171 Not normal  but approximately normal visually   
TotalAsset 3.113 9.037 Not normal  LogTotalAssets 
MarketCapitalisation 5.318 31.066 Not normal  LogMarketCapitalisation 
ROA 1.351 7.737 Not normal  but approximately normal visually   
Tobin‟s Q -6.543 48.168 Not normal  NSTobin‟s Q 
CurrentRatio 3.221 11.099 Not normal  LogCurrrentRatio 
DebtToAssets 0.438 -0.774 Normal   
AuditorType Dummy       
IndustryType Dummy      
Concentration -0.237 -0.686 Normal   
Government 1.364 0.741 Normal   
Institution 0.549 -0.598 Normal   
Individual 0.170 -0.761 Normal   
Foreign 1.988 4.846 Not normal  but approximately normal visually  
BoardSize 0.703 1.844 Normal   
Nonexecutive -0.984 0.145 Normal   
IndependentDirector -0.366 -0.666 Normal   
InternalAuditors Dummy     
InternalControl Dummy     
RiskManagement Dummy     
AuditCommitteeSize -0.648 -0.344 Normal   
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Table D.2: Multicollinearity analysis of Variable Inflation Factors (VIF) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 
Dependent variable      
Constant      
X1 = Company size¹ 1.532  1.758 1.758 1.758 
X2 = Performance² 1.172  1.350 1.350 1.350 
X3 = Liquidity³  2.023  2.248 2.248 2.248 
X4 = Company risk level
4
 2.158  2.591 2.591 2.591 
X5 = Industry type
5
 1.480  1.220 1.220 1.220 
X6 = Auditor type
6 
 1.115  1.720 1.720 1.720 
X7 = Ownership structure
7
   1.115 1.230 1.230 1.230 
X8 = Board composition
8
   1.027 1.209 1.209 1.209 
X9 = Independence
9
   1.188 1.379 1.379 1.379 
X10 = Internal auditing
10
   1.884 2.371 2.371 2.371 
X11 = Internal control
11 
  2.404 2.616 2.616 2.616 
X12 = Risk management
12
   1.479 1.604 1.604 1.604 
Average  1.58 1.51 1.77 1.77 1.77 
 
 
Figure D-1: Histogram for Model 3 
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Figure D-2: Normal P-P Plot for model 3 
 
 
Figure D-3: Scatterplot for Model 3 
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Figure D-4: Histogram for NSModel 3 
 
 
Figure D-5: Normal P-P Plot for NSModel 3 
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Figure D-6: Scatterplot for NSModel 3 
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Appendix E 
 
Example of the steps followed in the grounded theory approach  
 
The following section provides an example of how the grounded theory is followed in 
the research. It provides an example of open coding, axial coding and selective 
coding. The different colours refer to the different interviewees. It also provides an 
example of memo development throughout the analysis. The development of the ideas 
and thoughts provided by the interviews was analysed and reanalyzed until the final 
stage where the grids were designed summarizing the outcome of the grounded theory 
analysis and approach.  
 
Table 1: Examples of early codes in grounded theory analysis (open coding) 
 
Interview text Codes  
External Auditor 1 
The key risk they face is currently the asset impairment 
issue, risk linked to the future benefits derived from the 
cash flow. There could be other risks, for example, 
recoverability of the receivables. There are the long 
term risks, for example, the property values in the 
market. So reduced values shall be an issue or a risk for 
the current market.  
Key risk 
Asset impairment issue  
Future benefits risk  
Cash flow risk  
Other risk 
Recoverability of receivables  
long term risks 
Property values risk  
Reduced values 
Risk for the current market 
Company Manager 1 
Liquidity and collection risks are the most important 
risks now facing the company. Clients are not paying 
back loans and banks are not giving loans and suppliers 
are not paid and they are not supplying. The client is not 
paying then they have two choices: either stop the work 
or take legal action. That is the most important risk our 
company and other companies are facing currently. The 
most important problem in the market is the collection 
of money, the receivables. Other risks are manageable 
such as quality of people, strength of business, moving 
from one location to another and legal frames or 
actions. Those risks are manageable but liquidity risk or 
receivable risk is difficult to manage. 
Liquidity risks 
Collection risks 
The client not paying back 
Banks not giving loans 
Suppliers not paid 
Suppliers not supplying 
Stop the work 
Legal action 
Collection of money 
Receivables  
Other risks are manageable 
Difficult to manage 
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Example of memo development 
 
Memo 1: Date 15 February 2010 
 
What are the most important risks facing UAE companies and markets? 
 
The initial data analysis identifies many aspects that derive risks faced by UAE 
companies which in turn affect the risk disclosure practice of the companies. It seems 
the risks are derived from external and internal sources. The interviews expressed 
various causes for such risks. They showed disagreement on the most important risks 
facing UAE companies and markets. Some interviews emphasized internal risks (risks 
caused by internal factors) and considered them as the most important risks. However, 
other interviewees emphasized external risks (e.g. risks caused by factors outside the 
companies) and considered them as the most important risks.  
 
Memo 2: Date 1 March 2010 
 
The ideas on risks facing UAE companies are further developed along with further 
analysis of the interviewees‟ responses. 
  
Risk drivers or causes can be classified as internal drivers and external drivers. 
External drivers include market situation, for example, the global financial crisis and 
the Dubai financial crisis, industry (e.g. banks‟ exposure and the real estate sector 
crisis), change of regulations and introducing new rules, change of accounting 
standards (IFRSs), the demand by the investors (users‟ needs). Internal drivers include 
management manipulation, board of directors‟ manipulation, companies‟ needs for 
capital and company reputation. The following diagram shows the main drivers of 
risks in UAE markets.  
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Memo 3: Date 20 March 2010 
 
The thoughts and comments by the interviewees suggested many factors which help 
in reducing the risks and causes to risks. They explained further factors, for example, 
the role of regulators and stock market authorities. They emphasized that part of the 
responsibility is to protect investors and the market by managing the market risks or 
risks imposed by companies themselves, for example, management manipulation and 
board of director fraud and insider trading. The interviewees emphasized the need for 
proper risk management systems and corporate governance mechanisms within the 
company in order to gain loans from banks. All banks are becoming more precise and 
demanding. One interview emphasized that being audited by one of the Big 4 would 
facilitate the borrowing process and give banks some assurance about financial 
statements.  
 
Example of diagrams  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk management drivers  
Internal drivers  
Management 
Board of directors  
Capital need and liquidity 
Human capital and 
employee  
External drivers  
Regulators and laws 
Banks and capital need 
Users and investors  
Market 
Accounting standards  
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Table 4: Example of Grids  
 
Grid 1: The most important risks facing listed companies in UAE 
Concepts  Categories  Properties and dimensions 
Financial risks  
Non-financial risks 
Risk types  
Economic risks e.g. financial crisis  
Stock market risks e.g. volatility 
Listed companies risk e.g. liquidity  
Most important 
risks in UAE 
Direct vs. Indirect risks 
Local vs. International  
Financial crises 
Management manipulation  
External auditor manipulation 
What drives 
risks? 
Internal factors 
External factors 
Strict legislation  
Reporting requirements 
Corporate governance 
Risk management  
Controlling and monitoring 
Diversification  
How to minimise 
risks? 
Extent of regulation and 
control 
 
 
 
